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The topic of defences to crimes under international law has been described as the "most confused and
contentious area of international criminal law" (M. Lippman, "Conundrums of Armed Conflict:
Criminal Defenses to Violations of the Humanitarian Law of War", (1996) 15 Dickinson Journal of
International Law 1, pp. 1-2). While the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court offers, for
the first time in the history of conventional international criminal law, a codification of available
defences, this codification is only partial. Defences not enumerated within the Rome Statute may still
be considered by the International Criminal Court where they derive from a defined set of "applicable
law". It is the purpose of this thesis to assist in the process of arriving at a comprehensive
understanding of which defences may be raised and relied upon by defendants appearing before the
International Criminal Court. This thesis seeks to assist in that process through two means:
In Part One, this thesis examines the principal norms which govern the application and interpretation
of law under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in so far as they are relevant to
determining the admissibility and content of defences to crimes under the Statute. Part One examines:
(1) The "applicable law" of the Rome Statute. Defences not enumerated within the Statute must
derive from the "applicable law", as defined in Article 21 of the Statute, in order to be considered by
the International Criminal Court. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of which defences may
be considered by the Court can only follow from an understanding of precisely which sources of law
belong to the "applicable law" in Article 21 of the Statute. This thesis examines whether the
"applicable law" of the Statute includes the entire corpus of general international law, and which, if
any, treaties, considered qua treaty law, are included; (2) The principle nullum crimen sine lege. This
principle incorporates both rules of application and interpretation. It is argued that the principle
(which is incorporated, inter alia, in Article 22 of the Rome Statute) is applicable to defences, and
entails certain corollaries including a prohibition on the ex post facto repeal of pre-existing defences
and a prohibition on the narrow construction of such defences contrary to the interests of defendants;
(3) The extent of permissible judicial discretion under the Rome Statute. Where a defence, not
enumerated within the Rome Statute, derives nevertheless from the "applicable law" of the Statute and
upon its proper interpretation would operate to exculpate the defendant, there is a question as to
whether the International Criminal Court must admit that defence, or whether the admissibility of the
defence is only discretionary. Article 31(3) of the Rome Statute states merely that the International
Criminal Court "may" consider defences not enumerated within the Statute, a provision which is
ostensibly discretionary. This thesis argues that the power of the International Criminal Court to
consider and apply non-enumerated defences is not discretionary, but rather is a power to be exercised
de jure. Where certain preconditions are met, the International Criminal Court must admit the relevant
defence. This conclusion follows not merely from the principle nullum crimen sine lege, but also from
the ordinary rules of construction of treaties as located in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.
Part Two of this thesis examines these rules of application and interpretation in concreto in the
context of one particularly controversial defence, the defence of belligerent reprisals. Part Two
incorporates an in-depth examination of the status of the defence under customary and conventional
international law. Many of the arguments located in academic writings and (in obiter) in case law,
seeking to deny the admissibility of the defence in certain or all circumstances, are juridically weak
and. in some cases, inconsistent with the principle nullum crimen sine lege. This thesis concludes,
however, that at least one of these arguments (positing a prohibition on the right to engage reprisals
against persons and objects protected under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1977, on the basis of an obligation on parties to those
conventions to respect the conventions "in all circumstances") while juridically weak, nevertheless is
not violative of the principle nullum crimen sine lege and may therefore be relied upon by the
International Criminal Court, consistently with the rules of interpretation and application of the Rome
Statute, as a basis for denying the defence of reprisals.
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introduction
One of the fundamental principles asserted as a basis for limiting the prescription and
interpretation of criminal laws is the principle of legality.1 At its core lies the
descriptive assumption that the subject of the law is capable of exercising free will,2
and the normative corollary that unless the subject is given a fair opportunity to
adjust his behaviour to the law its penalties ought not to apply to him.'1 The principle
of legality, expressed in its most abstract sense, requires the non-arbitrary
prescription and interpretation of law,4 but is more typically expressed through
concretised corollaries requiring, for e.g., that criminal laws be prescribed non-
retroactively and in unambiguous form and that they be construed strictly and (in the
case of ambiguity not extensive enough to be fatal to the law's applicability) to the
benefit of the accused/ Of the various criticisms that have been levelled against
prosecutions for crimes under international law, the most serious is the claim that
those prosecutions infringe the principle of legality.6
Issues pertaining to legality arise in the context of the definitional
elements of crimes, but also arise in the context of general principles relating to
criminal responsibility, including defences. The scope and definition of defences to
crimes under international law remains uncertain, and where uncertainty over
substantive criminal law exists, the risk that the principle of legality will be infringed
1 The principle of legality is asserted as a fundamental principle of criminal law in both common law
and civil law systems (see Chapter 2, nullum crimen sine lege, below).
2 See A. Ashworth, Principles ofCriminal Law, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 27.
3 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968, p. 181.
4 A. Norrie, Crime. Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law, Butterworths,
London, 1993, p. 10.
' See Chapter 2, nullum crimen sine lege, below.
6 G.J. Simpson, "War Crimes: A Critical Introduction", in T.L.H. McCormack and G.J. Simpson, The
Law ofWar Crimes: National and International Approaches, Klumer Law International, The Hague,
1997, p.l 1. See, e.g., L.C. Green, The Contemporary Law ofArmed Conflict, 2" ed., Manchester
University Press, Manchester, 2000, p. 41, who argues that "crimes against humanity" and "crimes
against peace" were both defined as crimes within the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, even though they had not been formerly defined as crimes under international law.
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is heightened. The topic of defences to crimes under international law has been
described as the "most confused and contentious area of international criminal law".7
This thesis seeks to examine the principal norms which govern the
application and interpretation of law under the Rome Statute of the International
• • • &
Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC Statute), in so far as they are relevant to
determining the admissibility and content of defences to crimes under the Statute. It
is hoped that such an examination could be of assistance to others in the
determination of which defences are potentially applicable under the ICC Statute,
and the scope of those defences.
Prior to the 1990's, there was no authoritative, conventional9 provision
for the admissibility of any defences to crimes under international law, other than the
right of the defendant to offer a factual refutation of the prosecution case.10 Explicit
recognition of the availability, definition and scope of separate defences occurred for
the first time, in the history of conventional international criminal law, within the
ICC Statute. The ICC Statute addresses the matter of defences by enumerating and
defining a number of defences within the Statute (ne bis in idem;li exclusion of
jurisdiction over persons under eighteen;12 mental incapacity;13 intoxication;14 self-
defence and defence of others and property;17 duress;16 mistake of fact or law;17 and
10
superior orders ) yet leaving open the possibility of the Court's consideration of
other, non-enumerated, defences where those defences derive from a defined set of
'
M. Lippman, "Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of the Humanitarian
Law ofWar", (1996) 15 Dickinson Journal ofInternational Law 1. pp. 1-2. See, also, A. Eser,
'"Defences' in War Crime Trials" in Y. Dinstein and M. Tabory (eds), War Crimes in International
Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1996, p. 252.
8 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 (1998) as corrected by
UN Doc C.N.577.1998.TREATIES-8 (1998). UN Doc C.N.604.1999.TREATIES-18 (1999) and UN
Doc C.N.I075.1999.TREATIES-28 (1999).
9
The term conventional as employed in this thesis means by way of international treaty (except when
used to refer to a class of weapons).
111 See V. Morris and M.P. Scharf. An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunalfor the
Former Yugoslavia, vol. 1, Transnational Publishers Inc.. Irvington-on-Hudson, 1995, pp. 103-4; P.
Krug, "The Emerging Mental Incapacity Defense in International Criminal Law: Some Initial
Questions of Implementation", (2000) 94 American Journal ofInternational Law 317, p. 317.
11
Art. 20, ICC Statute.
12 Art. 26. ICC Statute.
13 Art. 31(l)(a), ICC Statute.
14
Art. 31(l)(b), ICC Statute.
15 Art. 31(l)(c), ICC Statute.
16
Art. 31(1 )(d), ICC Statute.
17
Art. 32, ICC Statute.
18
Art. 33, ICC Statute.
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applicable law.19 The ICC Statute therefore offers, for the first time in the history of
conventional international criminal law, a codification of defences, albeit only a
partial one. The ICC Statute has been criticised on the basis that it is not a
"dogmatically refined" international criminal code.20 Dogmatic, or rational,
coherence was necessarily compromised by the need to merge aspects of the criminal
justice systems of over 150 States into one Statute acceptable to all delegations
represented at the Rome Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries which
promulgated the ICC Statute.21 The "General Part"22 of international criminal law
elaborated within the ICC Statute nevertheless represents "an ambitious attempt at
• • • • , , o-i
codifying general principles of international criminal law".
This thesis is divided into two Parts:
Part I considers the principal norms which govern the application and
interpretation of law by the ICC, in so far as those norms are relevant to the
application and interpretation of defences to crimes under the ICC Statute. There is
no intent here to delve into the theoretical dimensions of the scope of "application"
in its formal sense as a function for relating prescriptive norms to the facts of a
particular case.24 While "interpretation" is sometimes treated as an aspect of the
broader function of "application",25 this thesis works on the assumption that a
distinction can clearly be drawn between the process of determining which norms are
operative in the context following rules of "application",26 and the process of
• • 97
determining the meaning of those norms following rules of "interpretation". This is
19 See Art. 2t, ICC Statute.
20 See K. Ambos, "General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute", (1999) 10 Criminal Law
Forum 1, p. 1.
2' hi.
2~ On the distinction between the "General Part" and "Special Part" of criminal law, see, e.g.. J.
Gardner. "On the General Part of the Criminal Law", in A. Duff (ed), Philosophy and the Criminal
Law: Principles and Critique, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.
22 W.A. Schabas, "General Principles of Criminal Law in the International Criminal Court Statute
(Part III)", (1998) 6 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 400. p. 428.
~4 M.S. McDougal. H.D. Lasswell, & J.C. Miller, The Interpretation of International Agreements and
World Public Order: Principles ofContent and Procedure, New Haven Press, New Haven, 1994, p.
xxv, n. 1.
22 See id.
26 See entry for "apply" in J.R. Nolan and J.M. Nolan-Haley, Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed.. West
Publishing Co.. St. Paul. Minn., 1990 (hereinafter Black's Law Dictionary), p. 99.
27 See entry for "interpretation" in Black's Law Dictionary, pp. 817-818.
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a distinction which is incorporated into the structure and terms of the ICC Statute,"
and is therefore adopted here.
Part II of this thesis considers these rules of application and interpretation
in the context of one specific defence, namely the defence of belligerent reprisals.
This defence has been chosen for two reasons: (1) Its current status under
international law is uncertain and the object of considerable controversy.29 Thus,
there is some benefit in a work on defences to war crimes in assessing the
admissibility of this defence under the ICC Statute; (2) there is certainly sufficient
basis for concluding that at least up until very recently, the defence of belligerent
reprisals was clearly recognised as a defence to war crimes under international law.30
Nevertheless, the institution of belligerent reprisals is often viewed with abhorrence.
As the ICTY Trial Chamber stated in its Judgment in Prosecutor v Kupreskic:
It cannot be denied that reprisals against civilians are inherently a
barbarous means of seeking compliance with international law. The most
blatant reason for the universal revulsion that usually accompanies
reprisals is that they may not only be arbitrary but are also not directed
specifically at the individual authors of the initial violation."''
:,s See, e.g., Article 21(1) of the ICC Statute which identifies the relevant sources of law to be applied
by the ICC, but does not identify any means for ascertaining the meaning of law falling within the
enumerated sources; see, also. Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute which refers to the "application and
interpretation" of law. thus distinguishing the two processes.
29 See, e.g., E. Mezzetti, "Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility", F. Lattanzi (ed.), The
International Criminal Court: Comments on the Draft Statute, Editoriale Scientifica, Naples, 1998, p.
157.
0
Eser stated, for instance, in his well-cited work on defences to war crimes, that in relation to
belligerent reprisals "we are on comparatively safe ground since international law, in principle,
recognizes retributive measures against another State or its nationals, at least in so far as the measures
are intended to force the adversary to conduct himself according to international law." (A. Eser,
'"Defences' in War Crimes Trials", Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 201, p. 217). In R v Finta
(1994), the respondent was charged with the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity
directed against the Jewish population in Hungary during the Second World War under §7(3.71) of
the Canadian Criminal Code. By §7(3.73) an accused may rely upon any justification, excuse or
defence available under international law or the laws of Canada when charged under §7(3.71). La
Forrest J, in his dissenting judgment stated that "[t]he inclusion of the international justifications,
excuses and defences will allow any recognized doctrines peculiar to the international context to be
included. An example of a peculiar form of international defence is reprisals" ((1994) 104 ILR 284, p.
331). The Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of Germany held, in its 1969 Judgment in the
Norwegian Resistance Case, that "a reprisal in time ofwar is undeniably an act recognized by
international law" ((1969) 61 ILR 663, p. 667).
M
Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan
Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, par.
528.
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Mezzetti stated that it would be '"completely inappropriate'' if belligerent reprisals
were to "surreptitiously find their way into the [ICC] Statute through unenumerated
grounds - applied and interpreted by the ICC". An examination of the defence of
belligerent reprisals enables us, therefore, to examine whether those rules of
application and interpretation under the ICC Statute which are aimed, in part, at
achieving some level of normative consistency in international criminal law,33
nevertheless permit sufficient flexibility to facilitate the development of the law in
certain respects.
PARTI
Article 21 of the ICC Statute, which is examined in Chapter 1 of this thesis,
elaborates the Statute's principal rules of application. It sets out the relevant sources
of law which may be applied by the ICC. This is of particular relevance to the
admissibility of non-enumerated defences under the ICC Statute where the condition
precedent to their admissibility is that they are "derived from applicable law as set
forth in article 21 ."34
Chapter 2 examines the principle nullum crimen sine lege which is
incorporated in Article 22 of the ICC Statute. It comprises both rules of application
and interpretation. The principle nullum crimen sine lege, when applied to defences,
protects individuals against the repeal of pre-existing defences derived from
applicable law, and the narrow construction of such defences contrary to the interests
of the accused. To the extent nullum crimen sine lege sets up rules of interpretation,
there is a potential inconsistency with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
which governs the ICC Statute. Both standards of interpretation are examined, as is
the meaning and effect of their mutual operation.
The final Chapter in this Part, Chapter 3, concerns judicial discretion.
Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute empowers the ICC to consider non-enumerated
defences in ostensibly discretionary terms ("the Court may consider" such
32 E. Mezzetti (1998), p. 157.
33 L.S. Sunga, The Emerging System ofInternational Criminal Law: Developments in Codification
and Implementation. Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1997, p. 332.
34 Art. 31(3), ICC Statute.
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defences). ' Chapter 3 examines whether the ICC's power to consider and apply non-
enumerated defences is in fact discretionary or whether it must be exercised
according to law. The extent of judicial discretion that exists in relation to the
consideration of non-enumerated defences is determined in part by the operation of
the principle nullum crimen sine lege. An accused can only be considered to possess
a right to raise non-enumerated defences deriving from the applicable law where the
power of the ICC to apply defences is non-discretionary,'16 or discretionary only in
the "weakest" sense.'17
PART II
Chapter 4 of this thesis examines the doctrine of belligerent reprisals under
customary international law. It examines the prerequisites to the legality of reprisals
as well as rules governing the manner in which they are employed.
Chapter 5 examines the express prohibitions on reprisals against specific
targets under conventional law. The treaties in force leave a number of lacunae, thus
potentially there are a number of targets that could theoretically be attacked in
reprisal.
Chapter 6 examines the customary law status of these treaty provisions.
This examination must take place against the backdrop of the rules of application and
interpretation. Certain interpretative criteria under the ICC Statute apply to the
determination and interpretation of customary law.
"
Art. 31(3), ICC Statute (emphasis added).
According to Hart's view of discretion, where judges possess discretion no party in the proceedings
has a pre-existing legal right to prevail. This observation derives from Dworkin's reading of Hart (R.
Dworkin, "The Model of Rules I", in Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
1977, p. 17). Although Hart later complained that Dworkin misrepresented his views on a number of
accounts, Hart did not object to this particular observation (see B. Leiter, "Beyond the Hart/Dworkin
Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence", (2003) 48 American Journal ofJurisprudence
17, p. 20).
3 According to Dworkin's view of discretion, discretion can be divided into "strong" and "weak"
varieties. Where judges are accorded "weak" discretion, parties with pre-existing legal rights retain
the right to prevail. While strong discretion involves the absence of standards that govern the process
of decision-making, weak discretion (in one of the two senses identified by Dworkin) means that there
are applicable standards, but they cannot be applied mechanically and require the use of judgment
(Dworkin (1977), pp. 31-32).
17
The final Chapter, Chapter 7 examines additional bases of the illegality
of reprisals. The fact that reprisals are a strongly entrenched institution of customary
international law, and that prohibitions on reprisals have occurred in a largely
piecemeal fashion leaving a number of lacunae, means that international jurists
seeking to posit the general outlawry of reprisals, or at least a wider set of
prohibitions, must often rely on highly innovative or constructive legal arguments, or
alternatively, on judicial discretion. The permissibility of these forms of arguments,
and the extent of judicial discretion, is assessed in light of the rules of application
and interpretation under the ICC Statute with a view to determining the scope of the
admissibility of reprisals as a defence under the Statute.
"Defences"
A final word on terminology: This thesis is concerned with "defences" under the
ICC Statute. The term "defence" is of common law origin, though it is a term
commonly employed in works on international criminal law,"'8 including those by
39 • ?civil law lawyers." In its common law usage, the term "defence" has both narrow
and wide meanings. In its narrow or "technical"4'1 sense the term is only used to
cover those circumstances precluding criminal responsibility despite the presence of
both actus reus and mens rea.Al Thus the argument that a crucial element of the
offence is missing is often termed a "failure of proof" argument and distinguished
from a "defence" stricto sensu.4" Nevertheless, there have been some conceptual
38 E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations ofInternational
Humanitarian Law, T.M.C. Asser Press, The tfague, 2003, p. 229.
M See, e.g., van Sliedregt (2003); G.J.G.J. Knoops. Defenses in Contemporary International Criminal
Law, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY, 2001; A. Eser, '"Defences' in War Crime Trials" in Y.
Dinstein and M. Tabory (eds), War Crimes in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston,
1996.
4(1




difficulties in distinguishing defences stricto sensu from other "defences".43
Glanville Williams, for e.g., has stated that the distinction between the definitional
and defence elements of a crime is impossible to draw satisfactorily.44 The term
"defence" is therefore commonly used in academic writings in its wide or "casual"4^
sense to refer (according to Robinson) to "any set of identifiable conditions or
circumstances which may prevent a conviction for an offense".46 This thesis does not
seek to enter into the debate on the categorisation and definition of the term
"defences", and the term will be employed here in its wide or non-technical sense.
Thus any exonerating condition arising under the ICC Statute or its applicable law is
potentially captured by the term "defence" as employed in this thesis.
43 See, e.g., generally, D.N. Husak. "'The Serial View of Criminal Law Defenses" (1992) 3 Criminal
Law Forum 369.
44 G. Williams, Textbook ofCriminal Law, 2nd ed., Stevens and Sons, London. 1983, p. 138.










Article 21 of the ICC Statute is entitled "Applicable law" and sets out a hierarchy of
three sources of law which are to be applied by the ICC in the adjudicative process.47
The specification of the sources of international criminal law satisfies, in part, the
requirements of the principle of legality (a requirement further satisfied by the
4o
incorporation of separate provisions on nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine
lege,49 and non-retroactivity,50 within the ICC Statute),51 but is of especial
importance in the determination of the admissibility of criminal defences. Certain
defences are expressly enumerated and defined within the ICC Statute, but these
enumerated defences are not exhaustive of all defences admissible before the ICC. A
number of defences are expressly set out in Article 31(1) of the ICC Statute (where
they are referred to as "grounds for excluding criminal responsibility", a term not
employed in relation to the defences expressly set out within other articles of the
Statute).52 Other defences are expressly provided for in Articles 20, 26, 32 and 33 of
the ICC Statute.53 Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute provides, however, that "[a]t trial,
the Court may consider a ground for excluding criminal responsibility other than
those referred to in paragraph 1 where such a ground is derived from applicable law
47 Art. 21, ICC Statute.
48 Art. 22, ICC Statute.
4y Art. 23, ICC Statute.
50 Art. 24, ICC Statute.
M In fact, Art. 21 of the ICC Statute constitutes the first codification of the sources of international
criminal law (M.M. deGuzman, "Article 21: Applicable Law", in O. Triffterer (ed). Commentary on
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article, Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1999, p. 438, margin 6).
52 Art. 31(1), ICC Statute.
53 Arts 20, 26, 32 & 33, ICC Statute.
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as set forth in article 21. 4 Article 21 of the ICC Statute is therefore a central
referent in the determination of the admissibility of non-enumerated defences under
the ICC Statute. An understanding of which non-enumerated defences are potentially
applicable under the ICC Statute can only follow from a comprehensive examination
of precisely which sources of law belong to the applicable law set out in Article 21 of
the ICC Statute. Article 21 provides as follows:
1. The Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the
principles and rules of international law, including the established
principles of the international law of armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from
national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate,
the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction
over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent
with this Statute and with international law and internationally
recognized norms and standards.
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its
previous decisions.
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must
be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be
without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as
defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion, or
belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth,
birth or other status."
The elaboration of three hierarchical tiers of applicable law in Article 21
of the ICC Statute raises a number of issues. The first relates to the determination of
which sources of law are captured within each tier, and is essentially a question of
both definition and demarcation. The second issue relates to the operation of the
hierarchical relationship between each tier. Hierarchical rules relating to sources of
law (e.g. the rule lex posterior derogat priori),56 often involve the application of one
norm in place of another in the case of a direct inconsistency, but Article 21 of the
ICC Statute appears to envisage the simultaneous application of numerous legal
sources which may operate without any conflict whatsoever (each source
complimenting or clarifying the other). Article 21 of the ICC Statute states that the
54 Art. 31(3). ICC Statute.
55 Art. 21, ICC Statute.
v>
A later statute takes away the effect of a prior one (Black's Law Dictionary, p. 912).
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ICC shall apply the first tier of applicable law "[i]n the first place",57 the second tier
"[i]n the second place, where appropriate",58 and the third tier 'L[t]ailing that".5
There is, however, no clear indication of the circumstances in which recourse may be
had to second or their-tier sources of applicable law; nor is it clear whether recourse
to those additional sources of law is a power to be exercised by the ICC at its
discretion, or whether it is instead, a power to be exercised de jure. The
determination of whether a defendant may raise a particular non-enumerated defence
in accordance with Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute will depend, therefore, not only
on whether that defence derives from one of the three tiers of applicable law under
Article 21 of the ICC Statute, but also whether that defence may be applied by the
ICC in light of the hierarchical rules that govern which sources of applicable law
may be applied by the ICC in the circumstances. The final issue to be examined in
this chapter concerns the effect of Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute which states that
the application and interpretation of law pursuant to Article 21 must be consistent
with internationally recognised human rights.60 Although Article 21(3) exists outside
of the three-tiered hierarchy of applicable law elaborated in Article 21(1), the body
of law referred to in Article 21(3) - i.e., internationally recognised human rights -
appears to effectively trump all other potentially applicable law under the ICC
Statute, including the terms of the ICC Statute itself.
ii. THE THREE TIERS OF APPLICABLE LAW
1. The First Tier (Art. 21(1)(a))
The first tier of applicable law comprises the ICC Statute, the Elements of Crimes
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.61 Article 21(1 )(a) of the ICC Statute states
that these sources shall be applied "[i]n the first place",62 which has been interpreted
as indicating the "primacy",63 or "superiority",64 of the Statute and its related
57 Art. 21(1 )(a), ICC Statute.
58 Art. 21(l)(b). ICC Statute.
59 Art. 21(l)(c), ICC Statute.
60 Art. 21(3), ICC Statute.
61 Art. 21(l)(a), ICC Statute.
62 Art. 21(l)(a), ICC Statute.
63 deGuzman (1999), p 439, margin 8.
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instruments over the other sources of law which the ICC may apply. Nevertheless,
other sources of law may act by way of clarification, or even operate as an exception
to the terms of the ICC Statute. A relevant defence, for e.g., which is located in the
second or third tier of applicable law, and admitted under Article 31(3) of the ICC
Statute, is effectively given primacy over that part of the ICC Statute which
enumerated and defined the relevant crime. The defence, though not expressly
provided for in the ICC Statute, acts as an exception to the terms of the Statute itself.
Of course, given that the ICC Statute and its related instruments are to be applied
"[i]n the first place'", this would suggest that other sources of law (i.e. those deriving
from the second or third tier of applicable law) can only be applied to the extent that
they are compatible with the ICC Statute (for e.g., by clarifying ambiguity in the
Statute or filling a lacuna), or else, to the extent that departure from the terms of the
Statute is expressly provided for (for e.g., in relation to defences located in the
second or third tier of applicable law, as provided for in Article 31(3)).
Article 21(l)(a) of the ICC Statute lists the ICC Statute, the Elements of
Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as each falling within the first tier
of applicable law without setting out a hierarchy that applies between them in the
case of inconsistency. Nevertheless, other provisions in the ICC Statute clearly
indicate the primacy of the ICC Statute over the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. Article 9(1) of the ICC Statute states that the Elements of
Crimes "shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6. 7 and
8",6? indicating that the ICC Statute shall be the starting point in the interpretation
and application of the provisions relating to core crimes, and that the Elements of
Crimes operate by way of clarification. In addition, a supremacy clause is implied in
Article 9(3) of the ICC Statute which states that "[t]he Elements of Crimes and
amendments thereto shall be consistent with this Statute", 6 suggesting that any
inconsistent Elements are ultra vires and inapplicable. In relation to the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, Article 51(5) of the ICC Statute expressly states that in the
1,4 A. Pellet, "Applicable Law", in A. Cassese. P. Gaeta, J.R.W.D. Jones, The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2002, vol. 2. p. 1078.
65 Art. 9(1), ICC Statute.
66 Art. 9(3), ICC Statute.
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event of a conflict between the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, "the
Statute shall prevail''.67
2. The Second Tier (Art. 21(1)(b))
The second tier of applicable law comprises, "where appropriate, applicable treaties
and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles
of the international law of armed conflict."68 There are two questions, in particular,
that arise here. The first relates to the meaning of "applicable" treaties: Article 21
does not specify which treaties (outside of the ICC Statute and its related
instruments)69 are to apply. It appears entirely circuitous in a provision on
"applicable law" to state that treaties apply where "applicable". The second question
relates to the meaning of "the principles and rules of international law", and whether
this category includes the entire corpus of general international law, or only a
segment thereof.
In relation to "applicable treaties", this category could include provisions
in human rights treaties to the extent that they are applicable as "internationally
recognized human rights" for the purpose of Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute.70 As
discussed below, however, it is unlikely that "internationally recognized human
rights" in Article 21(3) includes human rights norms applicable only as a matter of
treaty law. '1 It could be argued, then, that "applicable treaties" includes those treaties
relevant to determining the content of norms to be applied by the ICC. It has been
suggested, for instance, in support of this proposition, that:
widely ratified treaties may be viewed as evidence of the "rules and
principles of international law." In this regard, for example, the Genocide
Convention, along with its traveaux, and the Hague and Geneva
Conventions may be relevant to the determination of an issue before the
Court.72
hl Art. 51(5), ICC Statute. No provision is made in the ICC Statute for the resolution of
inconsistencies between the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. As both
were adopted and can be amended by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of States
Parties (Arts 9(l)-(2), 51(1 )-(2), ICC Statute), Schabas has suggested that they are of equal value and
that neither takes precedence over the other (Schabas (1998), p. 404).
68 Art. 21(l)(b), ICC Statute.
69 As provided for in Art. 21(l)(a), ICC Statute.
70 Art. 21(3), ICC Statute.
71 See below.
72 deGuzman (1999). p 440, margin 10.
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The problem here is that the three-tiered hierarchy of applicable law in Article 21(1)
of the ICC Statute is a hierarchy of formal sources of law. Where treaties are referred
to for their evidential value in ascertaining the content of other norms (e.g. customary
international law, or the meaning of similarly worded provisions in the ICC Statute),
those treaties are not applied as such, but are rather subsidiary means for the
determination of applicable law. The fact that "applicable treaties" appears in Article
21(1) of the ICC Statute - as opposed, for instance, to Article 21(2),7'' which refers to
case law, which is clearly applicable only for its evidential value - indicates that the
drafters envisaged the possibility of treaties (outside of the ICC Statute) being
applied by the ICC qua treaty law.
One suggestion is that the reference to "applicable treaties" leaves open
the possibility of the ICC acting according to some special jurisdiction specifically
conferred on the ICC by two or more States.74 It may be, for instance, that the
international community wishes the ICC to deal with a number of atrocities that took
place in a newly emergent State prior to that State's accession to the ICC Statute.
The problem with this view is that if the jurisdiction of the ICC were to be expanded
for some narrow purpose, this would require an amendment to the ICC Statute itself
(rather than simply an agreement between States).7? Any such amendment would
confer the necessary powers to exercise the expanded jurisdiction, leaving the
reference to "applicable treaties" in Article 21 (1 )(b) redundant.
Another possibility as to the meaning of "applicable treaties" is that it
refers to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in so far as those conventions form a
directly applicable component of the definition of war crimes within the ICC
Statute.7'' Article 8(2)(a) of the ICC Statute confers jurisdiction over "[gjrave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the
relevant Geneva Convention..."; Article 8(2)(c) confers jurisdiction, in the case of
73 Art. 21(2), ICC Statute.
7j Pellet (2002), p. 1069.
^ The ICC's jurisdiction ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione temporis are each tightly
circumscribed within the ICC Statute (see Parts 2-3, ICC Statute).
76 See Pellet (2002), pp. 1069-70.
77 Art. 8(2)(a), ICC Statute.
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an armed conflict not of an international character, over "serious violations of article
3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. namely any of the
following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
"70
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause...". It could be
asserted that the reference to the Geneva Conventions does not result in the ICC
applying those Conventions as such - the ICC Statute only incorporates a number of
its principles which apply as elements of the ICC Statute. The position could be
analogous to the applicability of a treaty incorporated into the domestic law of a
dualist State: the treaty applies qua domestic law, even where the legislation
incorporating the treaty makes express reference to the treaty itself.79 Certainly this
assertion could hold in relation to Article 8(2)(c) of the ICC Statute, which, by
referring to the persons protected, the factual preconditions to jurisdiction (namely
conflict not of an international character), as well as the prohibited acts, makes it
unnecessary to refer to Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, let
alone to apply common Article 3 as such. Conversely, Article 8(2)(a) of the ICC
Statute refers to the "grave breaches" provisions of the Geneva Conventions in such
a manner as to require detailed reference to the Geneva Conventions themselves. It is
not entirely clear in this context whether it is the ICC Statute alone that is being
applied, or whether the Geneva Conventions are also being "applied". The
determination of whether relevant persons or property are protected under the
Geneva Conventions (a precondition to the ICC's subject-matter jurisdiction under
Article 8(2)(a) of the ICC Statute),80 does at first appear to involve the "application"
of those Conventions. Article 8(2)(a) of the ICC Statute is based on the similarly
worded Article 2 of the ICTY Statute.81 In relation to the latter article, the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY in its Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction in Prosecutor v Tadic stated that:
78 Art. 8(2)(c), ICC Statute.
79 See, e.g., H. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's International Law, 8th ed.. David McKay Co.. New York.
1955, vol. 1, pp. 37-39.
80 Art. 8(2)(a). ICC Statute.
81 Art. 2, Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
since 1991, UN Doc. S/25704 (1993) (herinafter ICTY Statute).
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the offences listed under Article 2 can only be prosecuted when
perpetrated against persons or property regarded as "protected" by the
Geneva Conventions under the strict conditions set out by the
Conventions themselves. This reference in Article 2 to the notion of
"protected persons or property" must perforce cover the persons
mentioned in Articles 13, 24, 25 and 26 (protected persons) and 19 and 33
to 35 (protected objects) of Geneva Convention I; in Articles 13, 36, 37
(protected persons) and 22, 24, 25 and 27 (protected objects) of
Convention II; in Article 4 of Convention III on prisoners of war; and in
Articles 4 and 20 (protected persons) and Articles 18, 19, 21, 22, 33, 53,
57 etc. (protected property) of Convention IV on civilians. Clearly, these
provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply to persons or objects
protected only to the extent that they are caught up in an international
armed conflict.82
In light of the need to engage in extensive consideration of the terms of the Geneva
Conventions, the Appeals Chamber referred to the "interplay" between the ICTY
Statute and the Geneva Conventions.84 In its Review of the Indictment Pursuant to
Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence in the case of Prosecutor v Rajic,
the ICTY Trial Chamber's decision appears to involve the simultaneous application
of Geneva Convention IV and the ICTY Statute:
The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the property of Stupni Do became
protected property for the purposes of the grave breaches provisions of
Geneva Convention IV. The Trial Chamber notes this for the sole purpose
of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction over the offences allegedly
committed by the accused.84
Even still, it could be asserted that there is no "application" of the Geneva
Conventions as such. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his report on
the ICTY Statute, took the view that the ICTY should only apply rules of
international humanitarian law which were beyond any doubt part of customary law
(so as to avoid the problem of adherence of some but not all States to specific
conventions), and that the law applicable in armed conflict as embodied in the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 was such an example of customary law.8"' The Geneva
8
Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1/AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, par. 81.
83M, par. 83.
s4
Prosecutor v Rajic, Case No. IT-95-12-R61, Trial Chamber. Review of the Indictment Pursuant to
Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 13 September 1996, par. 42. This decision is cited by
Pellet as evidence of the direct application of the Geneva Conventions by the ICTY (Pellet (2002), p.
1069, n. 107).
88
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Regulation 808
(1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (1993), pars 34-35.
28
Conventions could therefore be referred to, both in the ICTY and ICC Statutes, as an
evidentiary source of applicable customary law. In this sense, there would be no
"application" of any treaty (other than the statute of the court).86 It is almost certain,
for instance, that if there was a party to the ICC Statute which was not a party to the
Geneva Conventions, the crimes contained within Article 8(2)(a) of the ICC Statute
would still be prosecuted in relation to atrocities carried out by nationals of that
State. There could be no argument that the Geneva Conventions did not directly
protect the affected persons or property: either Article 8(2)(a) of the ICC Statute
would be taken as incorporating customary rules reflected in the Conventions, or the
terms of Article 8(2)(a) would be taken as an independent basis of consent for the
application of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, with the ICC Statute being
the only treaty directly applied as such. It should be noted that in relation to the
jurisprudence of the ICTY, that tribunal has not endorsed the view of the UN
Secretary-General that the ICTY should only apply rules of humanitarian law which
are beyond any doubt part of customary law. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has taken
the view that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute (which confers jurisdiction ratione
materiae in respect of violations of the "laws or customs ofwar") confers jurisdiction
over "violations of agreements binding upon the parties to the conflict, considered
qua treaty law, i.e., agreements which have not turned into customary international
07 # , , .
law." There is, of course, no equivalent provision within the ICC Statute. The
jurisdiction ratione materiae of the ICC is limited to the crimes enumerated within
00
the Statute. On the other hand, the ICC Statute does allow for the application of
external sources of law through Article 31(3) (allowing for non-enumerated
defences). Thus, it could be argued, provisions located in treaty law and applicable
qua treaty law could be applied by the ICC as provisions of "applicable treaties" if
they relate to a ground excluding criminal responsibility not enumerated in the ICC
Statute. It could be, for e.g., that a ground of exculpation is recognised under treaty
law that has no customary counterpart, or alternatively, that a ground of exculpation
8(1 The ICTY Statute is not strictly speaking a treaty of course, having been promulgated as a
resolution of the Security Council.
87 Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 October 1995, par. 89.
88 Art. 5, ICC Statute.
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recognised under customary law has been narrowed or removed by treaty provisions
not yet binding as customary law.
A further explanation for the reference to "applicable treaties" is that it is
simply a place-holder for the introduction of treaty crimes into the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the ICC at a later date. The negotiating history of the ICC Statute
indicates that a significant number of States originally supported the incorporation of
various treaty-based crimes into the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC. At its
forty-fifth session in 1993, the ILC's Working Group on the Question of an
International Criminal Jurisdiction transmitted its report to the ILC which contained
a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal.89 In the 1993 draft, three
categories of crimes were envisaged: (1) crimes under general international law; (2)
crimes under a list of treaties in force (e.g. various "terrorism" conventions directed
at acts such as hijacking and hostage taking); and (3) a further category of crimes
giving effect to what were described as "suppression conventions".90 This third
category was meant to cover conventions such as the United Nations Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of December
20, 1988, which in terms envisages that the crimes punishable in accordance with the
convention are crimes under national law.91 Nevertheless, the role of these treaty
crimes and suppression conventions within the framework of the ICC diminished
throughout the ICC's negotiating process. Thus, in the ILC's 1994 Draft Statute for
an International Criminal Court, the distinction between crimes under listed treaties
and crimes under suppression conventions was abandoned. In effect, the two
92
categories merged, combining the more restrictive elements of each. " During further
negotiations, several delegations expressed opposition to the inclusion of drug
trafficking among the crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, primarily on the
ground that cases involving such crimes were better handled by national legal
X9 See Report of the Working Group on the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction, Report
of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Fifth Session, 3 May-23 July 1993, UN
GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. no. 10, UN Doc. A/48/10 (1993).
90 Id., par. 287.
9 See, e.g.. Art. 3(1), United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, 20 December 1988, UN Doc. E/Conf.82/15 (1988) ("Each Party shall adopt
such measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law...").
92 J. Crawford, "The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court", (1995) 89 American
Journal ofInternational Law 404, p. 412.
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systems and international co-operation.9'" At the same time, a number of delegations
opposed the inclusion of the crime of terrorism within the ICC Statute.94 Other
delegates, however, were adamantly in favour of the inclusion of one or more treaty
crimes within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC.9" While those States
ultimately lost out, a number of them nevertheless clung to their agenda right to the
end of the negotiating process. Thus Denmark suggested in the Ad Hoc Committee
(and repeated its suggestion during the sessions of the Preparatory Committee) that,
if agreement could not be reached on aggression or treaty crimes, the ICC Statute
could provide for a review after a number of years to determine whether other crimes
should be added to the ICC's jurisdiction.96 Several delegations welcomed this
proposal, although New Zealand and others had some doubts about the effectiveness
of treaty review clauses, citing the experience of the review clause in Article 109 of
the UN Charter.97 In addition to the amendment procedures in Article 121 and 122,
93 United Nations Press Release, 4 April 1995, UN Doc. GA/8869 (1995) (hereinafter GA/8869)
(Comments of Sweden, United Kingdom, The Netherlands, United States and Thailand); United
Nations Press Release, 4 April 1995, UN Doc. GA/8870 (1995) (hereinafter GA/8870) (Comments of
Japan). Likewise, some delegations argued that to include drug trafficking crimes under the
jurisdiction of the ICC would be contrary to the aim of complementarity between the ICC and national
systems, and would overburden the Court (GA/8869 (Comments of Thailand, Germany and Mexico)).
It was also predicted that to include drug trafficking crimes in the Statute would probably deter many
countries from ratifying or acceding to the ICC Statute (GA/8869 (Comments of Sweden)).
94 One delegation argued that to extend the Court's jurisdiction to crimes related to terrorism would
increase the burden on the Court (GA/8870 (Comments of Germany)). Another delegation reserved its
position on terrorism, but expressed concern that exercising jurisdiction over acts of terrorism would
undermine national jurisdiction (GA/8870 (Comments of United States)). Similarly, it was stated that
crimes of terrorism were already covered by an effective network of multilateral conventions, which
allocated jurisdiction among States concerned (GA/8869 (Comments of United States)), and it was
suggested that crimes of terrorism should be handled through international co-operation (GA/8869
(Comments of Thailand, The Netherlands)).
93 One delegation, for instance, argued that drug trafficking and associated crimes were of great
concern, especially when those crimes posed a threat to an entire nation or region, and should be
included within the Court's jurisdiction (GA/8869 (Comments of Trinidad and Tobago)). Similarly, it
was observed that the involvement of the Court would help the prosecution efforts of small states
(GA/8870 (Comments of Antigua and Barbuda)). Another delegation observed that the inclusion of
drug trafficking crimes could help remove any political factors that might arise, such as in a case
involving extradition (GA/8870 (Comments of Russian Federation)). Others stated that only the most
serious drug trafficking crimes should be included under the jurisdiction of the Court (GA/8869
(Comments of Canada, Australia)). Support was also expressed for including the crime of terrorism
within the ICC Statute (GA/8869 (Comments of Algeria); GA/8870 (Comments of Turkey)). In
supporting the inclusion of both terrorism and drug-trafficking crimes, one delegation described
terrorism as an exceptional crime, and noted that terrorism was internationally recognized as often
being supported by drug trafficking (GA/8870 (Comments of Turkey)).
96 C.K. Hall, "The First Two Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the establishment of an
International Criminal Court", (1997) 91 American Journal of International Law 177, p. 179.
97 Id.
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the ICC Statute provides for an automatic review of the Statute after seven years,98
and optional additional reviews thereafter." This was courted particularly by those
States who were of the hope that the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court would
be expanded over time to include additional crimes such as terrorism and drug
offences.100 The drafting of the amendment procedure was therefore influenced in
part by a number of States that wanted to retain the opportunity to add offences to the
list of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC at a later date, including certain
treaty-based offences.101 The fact that treaty crimes were ultimately not included in
the ICC Statute does not mean that they were given up on, or precluded. Many States
simply deferred the issue. It is possible that the reference to "applicable treaties'' in
Article 21(l)(b) of the ICC Statute simply acts as a place-holder, awaiting the
possible future introduction of treaty-based crimes into the subject-matter jurisdiction
of the ICC through amendment procedures.
In addition to "applicable treaties", Article 21 (1 )(b) of the ICC Statute
refers to "the principles and rules of international law, including the established
principles of the international law of armed conflict."102 The phraseology here is
certainly clumsy. There is no indication as to precisely what is intended by the
reference to "principles and rules of international law".10'1 Given that "applicable
treaties" have been referred to separately, it is clear that the "principles and rules of
international law" extends to the entire corpus of customary international law,104 but
not conventional law. What is uncertain is the extent to which the "principles and
rules of international law" includes general principles of law. Ordinarily it might be
thought that any reference to the principles and rules of international law would
include general principles of law, as they are recognised as a formal source of
international law in Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ. The source of the
98 Art. 123(1), ICC Statute.
99 Art. 123(2), ICC Statute.
1011 See R.S. Clark, "Article 123: Review of the Statute", in O. Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the
Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article, Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1999, p. 1277.
101 See Id., p. 1266.
102 Art. 21(l)(b), ICC Statute.
102 Or why, in light of the reference to the "principles and rules" of international law, Article 21(1 )(b)
of the ICC Statute should include, by way of illustration, the established "principles" of the
international law of anned conflict, with no reference to the established "rules".
11)4 deGuzman (1999), pp. 441-2, margin 14.
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confusion, however, is that the third tier of applicable law, set out in Article 21(l)(c)
of the ICC Statute, comprises:
general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States
that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that
those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with
international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.'"1
If the above reference to general principles of law corresponds to that category of
general principles recognised as a formal source of international law (as a result of
Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ), then it could be concluded that the
reference to the "principles and rules of international law" in Article 21(1 )(b) of the
ICC Statute is a reference to the entire corpus of general international law with the
exception of general principles of law; i.e., it is a reference to customary
international law. General principles of law would be included only if they had the
status of customary international law. The reason for the exclusion of general
principles of law lies in the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which is one of
the canons of interpretation recognised by international courts and tribunals.106
According to this rule, where something is expressly included in one provision, its
absence in a parallel provision implies an intent to negate it.107 Given the express
reference to general principles of law in the third tier of applicable law (Article
21(l)(c) of the ICC Statute), the omission of any reference to general principles of
law as such in the second tier of applicable law (Article 21(l)(b)) could imply its
exclusion from that tier. While there is certainly a reference to the "principles" of
international law in the second tier of applicable law (as well as specific reference to
the established '"principles" of the international law of armed conflict), the term
""principles" here is not necessarily in any sense a reference to general principles of
law as such. The term "principles" is often used in reference to "principles" of
customary international law,108 which may be distinguishable from "rules" of
105 Art. 21(l)(c), ICC Statute.
106 See Abu Dhabi Arbitration (Petroleum Development Ltd v Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR
144, p. 150; Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-
96-21-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment. 16 November 1998, par. 166.
107 See. e.g., Clinchfield Coal Co. vFMSHRC, 895 F.2d 773, 779 (1990).
108 See, e.g., A.P.V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996,
pp. 1-26.
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customary international law on the basis of the normative determinacy and generality
of the norms in question.109 Thus relevant "principles" of customary international
law include (in relation to the law of armed conflict) the principles of proportionality,
distinction, military necessity and humanity.110 It can safely be said, therefore, that
there is no reference to general principles of law as such in the second tier of
applicable law, but they are expressly referred to in the third tier. The expressio unius
rule could therefore be appropriately applied. The alternative interpretation whereby
general principles of law are not excluded from the second tier, but are rather
applicable equally under the second tier (as "principles and rules of international
law") as well as the third would appear to be precluded by the hierarchical nature of
Article 21(1) of the ICC Statute.
Nevertheless, it could be possible to assert that certain general principles
of law are applicable under the second tier of applicable law, and certain other
general principles of law are applicable under the third tier. Thus it could be possible
to divide general principles of law up into second and third tier general principles.
The third tier of applicable law under Article 21(l)(c) of the ICC Statute comprises
"'general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems
of the world"}u According to Cheng, however, there are in fact two possible
approaches to understanding general principles of law under Article 38(l)(c) of the
Statute of the ICJ. The first approach views general principles of law as deriving
from principles inherent in extant national laws (which corresponds to the approach
adopted within the third tier of applicable law in the ICC Statute),112 whereas the
alternative approach views general principles of law as deriving from legal
conscience generally, including international law.1L" The first approach may be
109 See Pellet (2002), p. 1072. Fitzmaurice has suggested that a "rule" answers the question what,
whereas a "principle" in effect answers the question why (G. Fitzmaurice, "The General Principles of
International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law", (1957-11) 92 Hague Recueil 1,
p. 7).
110
Rogers (1996), p. 3.
111
Art. 21(l)(c), ICC Statute (emphasis added).
Lauterpacht was of the view that Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ referred only to
principles of municipal law (H. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's International Law, 8th ed., David McKay
Co.. New York, 1955, vol. 1, p. 29). This is a view which was endorsed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Reference Re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental ShelfOff-Shore Newfoundland
((1984)5 DLR 4th 385, p. 411).
'13 B. Cheng. General Principles ofLaw as applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Grotius
Publications, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 2-4.
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thought of as positivist, whereas the second approach appears to be grounded in
natural law theory.114 One suggestion of a general principle of law grounded in
international legal conscience, as opposed to municipal law, is the rule that a State or
government cannot plead the provisions or deficiencies of its own internal laws or
constitution as a ground or excuse for non-compliance with its international
obligations."4 If general principles of law exist in the sense of principles deriving
from sources outside of national laws, then those principles have not been excluded
from the second tier of applicable law in the ICC Statute as a result of the rule
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Expressio unius can only exclude from one
provision that which was expressly included in another. The third tier of applicable
law refers only to general principles deriving from national laws; it makes no
reference to general principles deriving from any other source. To the extent that
general principles of law, in the sense of principles deriving from sources outside of
national laws, in fact form part of the "principles and rules of international law", then
they must be applicable under the second tier of applicable law in the ICC Statute. Of
course, the possibility that these natural-law-based general principles of law exist
may be entirely moot. The Martens clause with its invocation of "the principles of
the law of nations, as they result from usages established among civilized peoples,
from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience"116 may be an
114 G. von Glahn, Law Among Nations, 6th ed.. MacMillan Co., New York, 1986, pp. 22-24.
G. Fitzmaurice, Symbolae Verzijl, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Plague, 1958, pp. 164-5. This
principle, however, is probably merely a specific restatement of a more general principle which can be
located in municipal laws. The internal law or rules of any organ or entity do not absolve that organ
from the laws of the greater polity of which the organ is merely one among many subjects.
Corporations, for e.g., cannot raise internal instruments in defence to violations of the laws governing
corporations (see, e.g., Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)).
116
Preamble, Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, annexed to Convention
IV respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, 18 October 1907, [1910] UKTS 9 (hereinafter
Hague Regulations of 1907). This clause within the Preamble to the Hague Regulations of 1907 is a
slightly modified version of the one that appeared in the Preamble to the Regulations Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, 29 July 1899, [1901] UKTS 11 ( hereinafter Hague Regulations of 1899). The
Preamble to the 1899 Hague Regulations provides, inter alia, that:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in
the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain
under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as
they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from
the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience...
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example of such a general principle,117 although it probably operates in
118
contemporary international law as a material, rather than formal, source of law.
3. The Third Tier (Art. 21(1)(c))
As indicated above, the third tier of applicable law comprises general principles of
law in the positivist sense of general principles derived from national laws of legal
systems of the world. It has been suggested that the determination of such principles
requires a triple calculation: a comparison between national systems, the search for
common principles, and their transposition to the international sphere.11" It has also
been suggested that the reference to "national laws of legal systems of the world"
makes it unnecessary to engage in a systematic comparison of all national legal
systems, but only to poll a number of representative national systems from the
principal legal systems of the world.120 In the Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen on
Prosecution Motion for Production of Defence Witness Statements, in the case of
Prosecutor v Tadic, his Honour stated that "where a substantial number of well-
recognised legal systems adopt a particular solution to a problem it is appropriate to
regard that solution as involving some quite general principle of law".121 The
reference here to "well-recognised" legal systems probably renders the effect of
Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ into a more palatable form. The Statute of
the ICJ recognised, as a source of law, "the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations".122
See, also, the decision of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case which referred to "certain general and
well recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in
peace than in war" (Corfu Channel Case (UK vAlbania) [1949] ICJ Rep. 1, p. 22); see, also, the
decision of the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Furundzlja which referred to "the general
principle of respect for human dignity [which] is the basic underpinning and indeed the very raison
d'etre of international humanitarian law and human rights law" (Prosecutor v Auto Furundzlja, Case
No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 10 December 1998, par. 183).
117 deGuzman (1999), p. 441, margin 12, n. 35.
118 See Chapter 7 below.
119 Pellet (2002), p. 1073.
120 Id.
121 Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, Decision on Prosecution Motion for
Production of Defence Witness Statements, Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen, 27 November 1996,
P',6'122 Art. 38(l)(c), Statute of the International Court of Justice, annexed to the Charter of the United
Nations, 26 June 1945, 3 Bevans 1153 (hereinafter Statute of the ICJ) (emphasis added).
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The most controversial feature of Article 21(l)(c) of the ICC Statute is its
suggestion of the potential relevance of the national laws of particular States in the
determination of general principles of law. Article 21(l)(c) refers to the general
principles of law derived from national laws of legal systems of the world,
"including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with
this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and
standards.''123 Presumably a "general"' principle of law retains its generality
regardless of the circumstances of the case in which it is applied. It is puzzling
therefore that the determination of general principles in any one case should depend
in any sense on which States would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime.
The original predecessor of Article 21 of the ICC Statute (namely Article
33 of the ILC's draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, submitted to the
General Assembly in 1994) had set out three sources of applicable law, the last of
which comprised "to the extent applicable, any rule of national law." 124 Even the
1951 and 1953 draft statutes for a permanent international criminal court - products
of the UN's first attempts at the creation of an international criminal court - both
provided (in Article 2) that "[t]he Court shall apply international law, including
international criminal law, and where appropriate, national /aw."122 There is,
therefore, nothing new in the ICC Statute's reference to national laws. But whereas
the earlier draft statutes had envisaged the direct applicability of certain national
laws, the ICC Statute provides for their indirect applicability as component elements
of general principles of law. The reference to the direct applicability of national law
in the ILC's 1994 draft Statute was heavily criticised.126 The drafters of the 1995
123 Art. 21(1 )(c), ICC Statute.
124 Art. 33, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 2 May-22 July 1994, UN GAOR. 49th Sess.,
Supp. no. 10, UN Doc A/49/10 (1994).
I2' See Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction on its Session held from 1 to
31 August 1951, UN GAOR, 7lh Sess., Supp. no. 11, UN Doc. A/2136 (1952); Report of the 1953
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction on its Session held from 27 July to 20 August 1953,
UN GAOR, 9lh Sess., Supp. no. 12, UN Doc. A/2645 (1954).
126 See, e.g., the response of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which had
been invited by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to provide written comments on the
ILC's draft Statute. The ICTY noted that some judges of the Tribunal found Article 33 troubling
inasmuch as it provided for the application of "any rule of national law" (Comments Received
Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution 49/53 on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Report of the Secretary-General, 20 March 1995, UN Doc A/AC.244/1).
37
Siracusa Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (a private initiative by a
number of experts in international criminal law), opposed the reference to national
laws in the ILC's draft Statute in the following terms:
Article 33 of the ILC Draft statute should not be interpreted to permit the
Court to substitute the laws of any nation or general international law for
a proper "general part" of an applicable substantive criminal law.
Accordingly, such a General Part must be elaborated, and to be suitable
for international use, it should reflect principles from the major criminal
law systems of the world in language that is as neutral or universal as
possible.127
When delegates began meeting in UN circles around the same time, they offered
views of similar purport. Delegates to the Ad Hoc Committee expressed the view that
in order to satisfy the onerous requirements of precision and certainty that prevail in
criminal proceedings, the law to be applied by the ICC should be clearly determined
by the Statute, rather than by national conflict-of-law rules.128 National law, it was
argued, was far from uniform.129 The suggestion was therefore made that the
provision on national law within Article 33 of the ILC's draft Statute should either
be amended so as to make it clear that national law is a subsidiary means for the
determination of general principles of law common to the world's major legal
systems, or else that the provision should indicate what national law was relevant, the
State whose national law would apply, and the circumstances in which it would
apply.1'0 A number of States urged the abandonment of the direct applicability of
national law altogether.131 Chief amongst these were Colombia, the Netherlands, and
the United States.1'2 It was remarked that in view of the divergences in national
criminal laws and in the absence of precise rules in the provisions of article 33 as to
which national law should be applied, a direct reference to national law would lead to
inequality of treatment of the accused in criminal proceedings and inconsistent
127 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Suggested Modifications to the 1994 ILC-Draft
(hereinafter Siracusa Draft Statute), reproduced in J. Holmes Armstead Jr, "The International Criminal
Court: History, Development and Status", (1998) 38 Santa Clara Law Review 745, Annex A, p. 798.
128 r»
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN
GAOR, 50lh Sess., Supp. no. 22, UN Doc. A/50/22 (1995), par. 52.
'2'f See id., par. 53.
130 Id.
1.1 See id., par. 88.
1.2 United Nations Press Release, 28 March 1996, UN Doc. L/2767 (1996).
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jurisprudence. The final wording in Article 21(l)(c) of the ICC Statute appears to
involve a strange compromise between the position that individual national laws
should be directly applicable and the position that there is no relevant role for
individual national laws. The laws of specific States (those that would normally
exercise jurisdiction over the crime) are made indirectly relevant in the determination
of general principles of law. Of course, the law of these States would in any event
have been indirectly relevant for that purpose, but not in a manner that granted to
those States any particular relevance beyond other States (except, of course, where
they were paradigmatic examples of particular legal systems).
In the end it may be that the reference to the national laws of particular
States in the determination of general principles of law will enable the ICC to bridge
the gap between theory and practice. While general principles of law are, in theory,
arrived at after a multitudinous examination of the legal systems of the world, in
practice international courts and tribunals often apply, as general principles of law,
laws unique to a small number of States.134 Given that most legal systems share at
least some ancestry, or "common roots",135 it may be possible to derive, at some
general and abstract level, a number of features or principles, common to the major
legal systems of the world. Glaser has attempted to construct just such a system of
principles of international criminal liability on the basis of a comparative study of
criminal law.136 But at the level of detailed rules, differences in detail within major
legal systems (let alone between them) make the process of abstracting detailed
common rules for the purpose of positing "general principles of law" almost
impossible.137 A project at the Max-Planck-Institute has revealed, in particular, that
we are far from being able to arrive at a system of defences by way of an analysis of
comparative law.138 One response to this problem is to assert that it is not the task of
international courts and tribunals to discover common rules and institutions, for the
133 See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN
GAOR, 50lh Sess., Supp. no. 22, UN Doc. A/50/22 (f995), par. 88.
134 See below.
13:1
See, e.g.. J. H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of
Western Europe and Latin America, 2nd ed., Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1985, pp. 1-5.
136 See S. Glaser, "Culpabilite en Droit International Penal", (1960-11) 99 Recueil des Cours 467, cited
by E.M. Wise, "'General Rules of Criminal Law", (1997) 25 Denver Journal ofInternational Law and
Policy 313, p. 316, n. 9.
137 See Wise (1997), p. 316.
133 See A. Eser, "The Need for a General Part", (1993) 11 Nouvelles Etudes Pennies 43, p. 51.
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purpose of positing general principles of law. but only general indications of "policy
and principles" throughout the legal systems of the world.139 But general indications
of policy and principles, as opposed to concrete working rules, are entirely unhelpful
in determining issues relating to criminal responsibility. A judge would generally be
loathe to formulate concrete working rules based simply on abstract policy concerns
common to legal systems. The concretisation of highly abstract principles into
technical rules is not a mere formality, but is in fact likely to be determinative of the
outcome in the case. Very often the general "policy" of two criminal jurisdictions
will be identical, but minor differences in technical rules may lead to an acquittal in
one jurisdiction and a conviction in another.140 Were the judge to construct his own
technical rules at will, guided only by abstract policy and principles common to legal
systems, such construction would scarcely be reconcilable with the principle nullum
crimen sine lege.ul The fact that it is rarely possible to derive working rules from a
process of comparative induction of principles from across legal systems, coupled
with the natural tendency of judges (steeped in the habit of legality) to search out
pre-existing rules, has often meant that international courts or tribunals will latch on
to the concrete rules applicable in one particular national or legal system for the
purpose of positing general principles of law. Examples can be cited from the war
crimes trials conducted under Control Council Law No. 10 in the aftermath ofWorld
War II - for e.g., the cases of Masao Kudo and others and Daijiro Yamasaki, both
conducted by Australian Military Courts at Rabaul, where a number of accused were
charged with murder as a war crime yet found guilty of "manslaughter",14" a lesser-
included offence that is made out on the basis of certain partial defences recognised
in a number of common law jurisdictions.143 Examples can also be cited from the
139 See International Status ofSouth West Africa (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep. 128, Separate
Opinion of Judge McNair, p. 148.
140 Consider for instance rules relating to the admissibility of evidence improperly obtained by
investigators. While some jurisdictions follow a mandatory rule of exclusion of such evidence, other
jurisdictions follow a discretionary rule. The difference may be determinative of the outcome in any
one case. Compare the discretionary approach in Australia (see, e.g. R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321,
p. 335 per Barwick CJ) and Canada (see, e.g. R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265, p. 282) with the
mandatory approach in the United States (see, e.g. United States v Leon. 468 US 897 (1984)).
141 See below.
142 Discussed in UNWCC, "The Sources of International Criminal Law" (1949) XV LRTWC 5, p. 8.
See also Trial ofCarl Krauch (I.G. Farben Trial) where a United States Military Tribunal cited with
favour, the notion of guilt upon a charge of "conspiracy" ((1948) X LRTWC 1, p. 40).
143 See Ashworth (1999), pp. 263-317.
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decisions of the ICTY - for e.g. Prosecutor v Deliac,144 where the Trial Chamber
defined "diminished responsibility", a specific partial defence, derived from the law
of England and Wales.146 In Judgment on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior
Counsel, Milan Vujin, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that it possessed the power
to punish the crime of "contempt",146 a power inherent in the jurisdiction of superior
courts of record in common law States.147 The judgment illustrates the futility of
looking to abstract principles and policies for the purpose of ascertaining general
principles of law, and the need to pinpoint concrete rules. The crime of contempt is
not expressly provided for in the ICTY Statute. The Appeals Chamber noted that
there was no specific customary international law that hinged directly on the question
of whether the Appeals Chamber possessed the power to punish contempt.146 It was
therefore "of assistance to look to the general principles of law common to the major
legal systems of the world".149 The Court noted that the law of contempt originated
as, and remained, a creature of the common law; it appeared to be unknown to the
civil law.150 Nevertheless, many civil law systems had legislated to create offences
that criminalised acts similar to those criminalised by the law of contempt.161 Thus, if
the Appeals Chamber were looking for the general principle or policy common to
legal systems it had found it in the conclusion that a crime of contempt of sorts
existed in the major legal systems. It was often not contempt as such, but it produced
1
"a similar result". ' The problem, however, was that this general policy or principle
had to be translated into something concrete that could be applied by the Court. If the
concrete rules found in common law systems were applied, the conclusion would be
that the ICTY Appeals Chamber possessed an inherent jurisdiction to try and punish
contempt irrespective of the fact that there was no Statutory basis for doing so. If the
144 Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landio, Case No. IT-96-21-T.
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998.
145 See, e.g., Ashworth (1999), p. 288.
I4''
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on Allegations
of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, 31 January 2000, affirmed in Prosecutor v Dusko
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, Appeals Chamber, Appeal Judgment on Allegations of Contempt
Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, 27 February 2001.
14 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on Allegations
of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, 31 January 2000, par. 17.





concrete approach of the civil law were adopted, however, the conclusion would be
that in the absence of a Statutory basis for trying contempt (or its equivalent) there
was no jurisdiction to do so. The general policy or principle that held across legal
systems was incapable of bringing the Court any closer to a resolution of the case.
The course adopted by the ICTY was to follow the concrete approach of the common
law. The conclusion here is that in order to give effect to general principles of law it
is very often necessary to apply the concrete rules of a specific legal system. Perhaps
Article 21(l)(c) of the ICC Statute, in its reference to the national laws of States that
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, seeks to direct the Court's
attention to the concrete rules of those States when attempting to give effect to
general principles of law - rather than, for instance, the rules of the States of which
the judges are nationals. If the concrete rules that applied in the territory where the
crime was committed, for e.g., were (indirectly) given effect to as general principles
of law, that approach would be more consistent with nullum crimen sine lege than
giving effect to the concrete rules of a third State.153 Of course, concerns with the
consistency of jurisprudence and equality of treatment of persons before the Court
may mean that it is very often not "appropriate" to give any special consideration to
the laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction. Article 21(l)(c) of the
ICC Statute calls for the derivation of general principles of law from such States only
"as appropriate",154 and it goes without saying that issues of consistency and equality
of treatment would be paramount in this calculation. In fact Article 21(3) of the ICC
Statute (discussed further below) requires that the ICC only interpret and apply law
to the extent such interpretation and application is consistent with internationally
recognised human rights, and is without any adverse distinction on grounds such as
national origin.155 Where an accused faced the prospect of being deprived the benefit
of the application of some favourable law which had been applied as a general
principle of law in earlier cases, on the basis that he lives in or is a national of State x
which would ordinarily exercise jurisdiction over the crime and which does not
1x1 See, e.g.. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 2 May-22 July 1994, U.N. G.A.O.R., 49th Sess.,
Supp. no. 10, U.N. Doc A/49/10 (1994), p. 104 ("The dictates of the nullum crimen principle...require
that the Court be able to apply national law to the extent consistent with the Statute, applicable treaties
and general international law.")
154 Art. 21(l)(c), ICC Statute.
155 See below.
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recognise such law, this would amount to adverse distinction and be precluded by the
operation of Article 21(3).
iii. THE HIERARCHY OF APPLICABLE LAW
The relationship between the three tiers of applicable law in Article 21(1) of the ICC
Statute is clearly hierarchical in the sense that there is some level of ordering
between the three tiers ("[i]n the first place", "[i]n the second place", "[fjailing
that"). To assert, without adding more, that there is a normative hierarchy between
the three tiers in which the ICC Statute is supreme in all instances,IM' may be,
however, to invite confusion. It implies, for instance, that where the terms of the ICC
Statute appear clear on their face, there need be no reference to (or application of)
additional sources, whereas in fact reference to general international law may reveal
an ambiguity in the Statute (that does not appear on its face), or a recognised
exception to a general rule in the Statute (that has not been expressly repealed).
Treaties do not exist in a legal vacuum, as recognised for instance, in the general rule
of interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which requires
that the interpretation of terms shall take into account, inter alia, "any relevant rules
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties."157 While a treaty
may appear to state quite clearly that parties are under obligation x, when interpreted
in light of governing rules of international law the conclusion may be that parties are
in fact under obligation y. The ICC Statute cannot ultimately be applied
independently of other governing rules.
To make sense of the hierarchy of applicable law in Article 21(1) of the
ICC Statute then, it probably needs to be pointed out that almost all applications of
law by the ICC would take place under Article 21(l)(a). Where the ICC Statute is
interpreted in light of governing rules of international law - whether governing
treaties, customary law, or general principles of law - it is still the Statute that is
ultimately being applied. Thus, there need be no recourse to Article 21(l)(b) or
21(l)(c) which only relate to the direct application of additional sources of
156 Subject, of course, to Art. 21(3), ICC Statute.
1,7 Art. 31(3)(c), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331
(hereinafter Vienna Convention).
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international law, as opposed to their use in the process of interpretation.lxS It could
be argued that when interpreting the ICC Statute, the Court is necessarily applying
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.iy' Even this application of treaty law
however, would appear to take place prior to and as part of the application of law
pursuant to Article 21(l)(a) of the ICC Statute. The Vienna Convention would not
appear to be an "applicable treat[y]" within the meaning of Article 21(1 )(b). The
reason for this is that Article 21(1 )(a) states that the Court shall apply "[i]n the first
place, this Statute...".160 Whenever the terms of the Statute themselves are given
effect to, that process of the application of the Statute involves a number of steps,
including the application of relevant rules of interpretation whether deriving from
(and governing as) general international law or treaty. Where Article 21(l)(b) states
that the Court shall apply "[i]n the second place, where appropriate, applicable
treaties...",161 the premise here is that the ICC Statute has already been interpreted
and applied as law.
In what circumstances, then, may the ICC exercise its powers under
Article 21(l)(b) or 21(l)(c) of the ICC Statute? There are in fact two such situations.
The first is where the ICC Statute expressly provides for the application of rules of
international law extrinsic to the Statute. The principal example here is Article 31(3)
which provides that the ICC may consider a ground for excluding criminal
responsibility not provided for in the Statute where such a ground derives from the
applicable law in Article 21.162 Where an Article 31(3) defence is accepted as
admissible in the circumstances by the ICC, the Court applies both the Statute
(Article 31(3)) and the relevant source of law which grounds the defence. On its face,
the ICC Statute classifies the conduct in question as a crime, but sources extrinsic to
the ICC Statute indicate that it is not. It would be untenable to assert that as the ICC
Statute must be applied "[i]n the first place" the defence must fail as it is based on
normatively inferior sources of law that directly conflict with the Statute. Certainly
l;,'s In this sense there is some question as to the appropriateness of including the Elements of Crimes
within the hierarchy of applicable law (Art. 21(1 )(a)), as the Elements of Crimes are merely a material
source aimed at assisting the Court in the interpretation and application of the ICC Statute (Pellet
(2002), pp. 1077-78).
1V' On the application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, see Chapter 3 below.
lfi0Art. 21(l)(a), ICC Statute.
161 Art. 21(l)(b), ICC Statute.
162 Art. 31(3), ICC Statute.
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the defence sets up a direct inconsistency with either Article 6, 7 or 8 of the ICC
Statute (i.e. the provisions defining the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court),
but at the same time such inconsistency is provided for in Article 31(3). Thus, the
question is whether the ICC will apply Article 6, 7, or 8 to its full extent, or whether
it will apply, instead, Article 31(3). The inconsistency thus relates to an
inconsistency between Statutory norms and the hierarchy of applicable law in Article
21(1) of the ICC Statute does not indicate how this conflict is to be resolved.
Whether the defence is ultimately accepted or not, the ICC has still applied the ICC
Statute "[i]n the first place'' - either because they have applied the relevant definition
of the crime to its full extent (Article 6, 7, or 8) or because they have applied Article
31(3). In the latter case they will also apply a second or third tier source; in the case
of a customary law defence for e.g., the customary defence will be applied "[i]n the
second place". The second situation in which the ICC may directly apply sources of
law extrinsic to the ICC Statute as provided for in Article 21(l)(b) and 21(l)(c) is
where the ICC Statute is silent on a relevant matter. An example from the
jurisprudence of the ICTY is where the ICTY Appeals Chamber directly applied a
general principle of law in holding that it possessed the power under its inherent
jurisdiction to try and punish contempt despite the silence of the ICTY Statute on the
matter.163 It may be concluded, then, that in order to move from the first tier of
applicable law to the second and/or third tier when applying law, the ICC must either
be permitted to do so by the ICC Statute (as is the case, for e.g., with Article 31(3)),
or else the ICC Statute must not constrain the application of second or third tier
sources in the circumstances - which is to say that the ICC Statute should be silent
on the question of whether a particular power, for e.g., may be exercised, and such
power must not be otherwise precluded by the Statute.
The principal question that arises in examining the power of the ICC to
apply second or third tier sources of applicable law is whether that power is
discretionary, or whether it is to be exercised according to law. Article 21(1) of the
ICC Statute states that the ICC shall apply second tier sources in the second place,
163 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on Allegations
of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, 31 January 2000, par. 18; affirmed in Prosecutor v
Dusko Tadic. Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, Appeals Chamber, Appeal Judgment on Allegations of
Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, 27 February 2001.
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where appropriate-,164 third tier sources shall be applied failing that.u° The phrase
"where appropriate" has been viewed as indicating that the Court enjoys discretion in
determining whether "applicable treaties" or "the principles and rules of international
law" (i.e. second tier sources) are to be applied.166 Interestingly, there does not
appear to be a similar grant of discretion in relation to third tier sources: "Failing
that" (i.e. failing the application of the first two sources),167 the Court "shall"168
apply general principles of law. While the phrase "shall apply", which is ostensibly
mandatory in nature,161 precedes the reference to each of the three tiers of applicable
law in Article 21(1) of the ICC Statute, that mandatory term is muted in relation to
the reference to second tier sources where the full effect is "shall apply...where
appropriate". No such watering down of the term "shall" exists in relation to the third
tier of applicable law. Failing the application of the first two tiers the ICC is
ostensibly duty-bound to apply general principles of law. Of course it may be asked
precisely what is meant by "failing" the application of the first two tiers. The
assumption behind the ICC Statute appears to be that there is some concrete end that
the Court has tried to achieve, and has failed in that end in relation to both the Statute
(and its related instruments) and the second tier sources of applicable law. That end
is almost certainly a concrete and final determination of the law. The purpose behind
Article 21(l)(c) of the ICC Statute would appear to be as a final safety net in order to
avoid a non liquet}10
The overall structure of Article 21 of the ICC Statute is highly similar to
that in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ,171 (with the exception that the Statute of
the ICJ merely enumerates each of the formal sources as opposed to explicitly setting
out a hierarchy between them). The purpose behind Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute of
the ICJ (concerning general principles of law) was understood by its drafters to
involve the avoidance of a non liquet}12 The prevailing view that there can be no non
164 Art. 21(l)(b), ICC Statute.
165 Art. 2t(l)(c), ICC Statute. Third tier sources comprise general principles of law including, "as
appropriate" the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime (id.).
deGuzman (1999), p. 440, margin 9.
167 Art. 21(l)(c), ICC Statute.
168 Art. 21(1), ICC Statute.
169 See Chapter 3 below.
17,1 deGuzman (1999), p. 443, margin 17; Pellet (2002), p. 1067.
171 Pellet (2002), p. 1076.
172 deGuzman (1999), p. 443, margin 17.
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liquet in international law means, in essence, that "every international situation is
• • 173 • j?
capable of being determined as a matter of law." ' There are in fact two approaches
that are adopted in support of the rejection of non liquet. The first argues that
lacunae in international law are impossible as international law is logically
complete.174 The second admits of the possibility of gaps, but maintains that the
system possesses built-in mechanisms to close these gaps.175 To the extent that the
ICC Statute does not admit the situation of non liquet, it adheres to the second
theory. General principles of law, which may be developed by the Court (as
evidenced for instance by the power of the ICC to give consideration to the national
laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime in deriving
general principles), are the primary mechanism through which a non liquet may be
avoided. The first approach to non liquet - i.e. that there are no gaps in international
law - was clearly expressed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
Lotus case, which held that whatever is not explicitly prohibited by international law
is not left in a state of uncertainty, but is in fact perfectly permissible.176 This view
has since been overtaken by a countervailing jurisprudence evident in the decisions
of the ICJ. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, for e.g., the ICJ held that the
absence of relevant conventional or customary law governing the delimitation of the
continental shelf did not create (or leave) unfettered rights in the parties on the
question of delimitation; there were in fact general principles that could be applied in
the form of equity.177 In the Barcelona Traction Case international law was silent on
the rights of certain shareholders in a company.178 The ICJ therefore found that it was
required to apply general principles of law which were addressed to the rights of
shareholders in the circumstances:
If the Court were to decide the case in disregard of the relevant
institutions of municipal law it would, without justification, invite serious
legal difficulties. It would lose touch with reality, for there are no
177 R.Y. Jennings and A.D. Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, 9l ed., Longman, London, 1992,
vol. 1, p. 13.
174 P. Weil, ""The Court Cannot Conclude Definitively...' Non Liquet Revisited", (1997) 36
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 109. p. 110.
175 Id.
nh S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey), 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 10, p. 18.
177 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark) (Federal Republic
ofGermany v Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, pp.46-47.
17s Barcelona Traction. Light and Power Co. (Belgium v Spain), [1970] ICJ Rep. 3, par. 52.
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corresponding institutions of international law to which the Court could
refer. Thus the Court has, as indicated, not only to take cognizance of
municipal law but also to refer to it.179
Nevertheless, the ICJ has not always viewed itself as duty-bound to avoid the
situation of a non liquet. In the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
the ICJ held in its Advisory Opinion that "in view of the current state of international
law, and of the elements at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an
extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of the State would
be at stake"'.180 Weil has suggested, however, that the result in that case may be
justified on the basis that it is only in its contentious jurisdiction that the ICJ is duty-
bound to avoid a non liquet:
In contentious proceedings, non liquet is eclipsed by the principle of
consensual jurisdiction and the necessity to abide by the will of the parties
to resort to the judicial settlement of their dispute. That is why the
Tribunal is obliged in contentious proceedings to avoid finding lacunae in
the law and therefore, to deny non liquet. In advisory proceedings, non
liquet is an expression of the principles of self-interpretation and
polynormativity that are characteristic of the international legal system.
Therefore, when in response to a request for an advisory opinion, the ICJ
concludes "that it cannot conclude," such a response appropriately may
reflect the state of the law and the specific role the Court plays in such
matters.181
The jurisdiction exercised by the ICC is analogous to the contentious jurisdiction of
the ICJ. Cases concern the concrete disposition of rights. Thus, where Article 21(1)
of the ICC Statute states that "[fjailing that" (i.e. the application of the first two tiers
of applicable law) the Court "shall apply...general principles of law",182 this would
tend to suggest an obligation to avoid the situation of a non liquet. This is suggested
not simply by the use of the ostensibly mandatory term ("shall"), but the general duty
of international courts to avoid a non liquet in the disposition of rights.
The fact that the ICC is duty bound to arrive at a concrete and final
determination of the law in relation to any issue that genuinely presents itself, would
suggest that any "discretion"' that the ICC possessed in relation to the application of
179Id., par. 50
180
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep. 226. par.
105.
181 Weil (1997), p. 119.
182 Art. 21(1), ICC Statute.
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any of the sources of applicable law is highly constrained. The reference to "where
appropriate" in relation to the second tier sources of applicable law may simply
indicate that the application of treaties or customary law is contingent upon a number
of preconditions being satisfied - for e.g., the ICC Statute permitting recourse to
additional sources (as in the case of Article 31(3)); the ICC not precluding recourse
to additional sources (where the ICC is silent on a matter); the consistency of the
norm with "internationally recognized human rights" (in Article 21(3)); as well as
the satisfaction of tests of legal validity relating to the continued operation of the law
in question and the resolution of inconsistencies between it and conflicting treaties or
rules of general international law. The phrase "where appropriate" may also relate to
the need to resolve the question of law in the first place: where, for instance, it is
suggested that a convicted person should have recourse to partial defences (e.g.,
provocation, diminished responsibility), the conclusion may be that such recourse in
unnecessary as the ICC Statute already makes sufficient allowance for the possibility
of lesser forms of criminal responsibility through its provisions on sentencing (for
e.g., by reference to "the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the
convicted person").183
There is of course some discretion that is necessarily involved in the
determination of which second and third tier sources of applicable law to apply in
order to arrive at a concrete and final determination of the law. This is particularly
evident in Article 21(l)(c) of the ICC Statute which recognises that general
principles of law include "as appropriate, the national laws of States that would
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime".184 This suggests the need to fashion
general principles in certain cases, in order to avoid a noil liquet. Where particular
general principles are already recognised within international jurisprudence the scope
for discretion is diminished, but where the law in force appears to be silent on the
105
matter in question then the process of "deriv[ingj" " general principles necessarily
involves judgement - as does the process of ascertaining customary international
law, for the purpose of Article 21(l)(b) of the ICC Statute. Nevertheless, there is an
element of discretion in every exercise of judicial power (with the exception of those
183 Art. 78(1), ICC Statute.
184 Art. 21(l)(c), ICC Statute.
185 Id.
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instances involving the purely formulaic application of clear rules).186 In fact, if
anything, the discretion exercisable by the ICC in determining which law to apply
would have to be viewed as more constrained (and thus a "weaker" form of
discretion)18 than the discretion exercisable by the ICJ in that same process. The
Statute of the ICJ merely lists the various sources that may be applied, whereas the
ICC Statute lists the order in which they are to be applied. There is, therefore, by no
means an unfettered discretion inherent in the ICC to pick and choose which sources
of law will be applied at will. The ICC is required to arrive at a concrete and final
determination of the relevant law, which may require supplementing the rules found
in the ICC Statute and its related instruments with additional sources. The task of
determination is not necessarily straightforward, and some element of judgement
may be required. Nevertheless, the ICC does not possess the power to ignore or
exclude a relevant source of law that completes the legal equation. If Article 21 of
the ICC Statute is to be described as conferring "discretionary" powers on the ICC, it
is only discretionary in the sense that any powers of legal determination are
discretionary.
iv. INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED HUMAN RIGHTS
Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute provides that the "application and interpretation" of
law pursuant to Article 21 must be "consistent with internationally recognized human
rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as
defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief,
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other
186 I. Weinstein, "The Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing Discretion: Koon's Failure to Recognize
the Reshaping of Judicial Discretion under the Guidelines", (1999) 79 Boston University Law Review
493, p. 497.
187 The notion of "weak" discretion comes from Dworkin's formulation of three classes of discretion.
Dworkin identifies two forms of "weak" discretion: the first describes the situation where the
applicable standards cannot be applied mechanically but demand the use of judgement; the second
describes the situation where the decision-maker cannot be reviewed or reversed by any authority. The
third class of discretion is "strong" discretion which exists where the decision-maker is not bound by
any standards set by the authority in question (Dworkin (1977), p. 69). Dworkin's formulation differs
from the classic notion of discretion, described by Hart and Sacks, as involving "the power to choose
between two or more courses of action, each of which is thought of as permissible." (H.M. Hart &
A.M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law, Foundation
Press, Westbury, N.Y., 1994, p. 144 (W.N. Eskridge, Jr., & P.P. Frickey eds).
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status."188 Article 21(3) implies that the process of applying and interpreting
applicable law shall occur consistently with human rights norms. This rule extends to
the application and interpretation of all sources of applicable law, including those
within the ICC Statute itself. Thus, where a provision in the ICC Statute governing
the process of application or interpretation of law is currently, or over time comes to
be. inconsistent with an "internationally recognized human rights" norm, then that
statutory provision shall be inapplicable (at least to the extent of the inconsistency).
"Internationally recognized human rights" have been described by Pellet
as acting, within the context of the ICC. as a species of "super-legality", akin in some
respects to the operation of jus cogens within international law.lsy Article 21(3) of
the ICC Statute renders inapplicable (or inoperative) any provision of the ICC
concerned with the application or interpretation of law which is inconsistent with
"internationally recognized human rights". But what "internationally recognized
human rights" put into slumber, jus cogens puts to its death: the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties renders a treaty "void" if, at the time of its conclusion, it
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law,190 or if a new
peremptory norm emerges rendering an existing treaty in conflict.1,1 Nevertheless,
the "super-legality" created in Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute is, in another respect,
of wider effect than the law relating to jus cogens. Jus cogens relates to fundamental
human rights, whereas Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute relates to all "internationally
recognized human rights".192
Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute, however, fails to expressly identify
those sources of human rights norms which are to stand as an overriding limit upon
the ICC's capacity to interpret and apply law. "Internationally recognized human
rights" is not a legal term of art. Article 21(3) does make reference to a number of
grounds of non-discrimination, however these grounds do not appear to be listed as
illustrations of "internationally recognized human rights" as such, but rather, as
independent bases of review (Article 21(3) states that the application and
lss Art. 21(3), ICC Statute. Art. 7(3), ICC Statute defines "gender" as "the two sexes, male and
female, within the context of society."
189 Pellet (2002), p. 1081.
1911 Art. 53, Vienna Convention.
191 Art. 64, Vienna Convention.
192 Pellet (2002), p. 1081.
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interpretation of law by the ICC must be consistent with "internationally recognized
human rights, and be without any adverse distinction...").193 Nevertheless, many, if
not all, of the listed grounds of discrimination would certainly be prohibited by
"internationally recognized human rights", however defined, such that the reference
to adverse distinction in Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute sets up a redundancy.194
Discrimination on the basis of age, however, does not appear in the primary human
rights instruments,19"' and it is possible that this ground alone adds to the requirement
that the ICC interpret and apply law consistently with "internationally recognized
human rights".
The phrase "internationally recognized human rights" would suggest that
those sources include, at minimum, customary human rights norms, as well as human
rights principles which have the status of general principles of law, as both sources
are dependent upon either recognition or practice of the international community.196
What is less certain is the extent to which human rights norms contained only within
international treaties are to be considered a limit upon the ICC's capacity to interpret
and apply law, given that those norms are recognised only by the contracting parties.
A question arises as to whether a treaty-based human rights norm which has recently
been adopted by a large number of States but is not yet strictly customary law is an
"internationally recognized" norm for the purpose of Article 21(3) of the ICC
Statute, or whether the norm must have entered into general international law. If the
norm were binding only as a matter of treaty law, then presumably that norm could
only limit the capacity of the ICC to apply law where the treaty in question would
otherwise have governed the adjudicative process, for e.g., where the State which
would otherwise have exercised jurisdiction over the matter was a party to the treaty.
The problem with giving effect to treaty norms which are binding only qua treaty
law is that that approach would give rise to the inconsistent application of law by the
ICC. This is not in itself a basis for ruling out that approach: Article 21(l)(c) of the
ICC Statute, for instance, requires the application "as appropriate" of "the national
laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime",197 a
193 Art. 21(3), ICC Statute (emphasis added).
194 deGuzman (1999), pp. 445-6. margin 24.
195 Schabas (1998), p. 406.
196 See Art. 38(l)(b)-(c), ICJ Statute.
197 Art. 21(l)(c), ICC Statute.
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provision that may require the application of inconsistent law in different cases. But
the direct applicability of national laws as envisaged in that sub-paragraph
engendered great debate and was strongly opposed by a number of States who were
concerned that it would, amongst other things, give rise to the inconsistent
1 QO
application of criminal law. No such debate attended Article 21 (3)*s reference to
"internationally recognized human rights", which was virtually unanimously
supported by delegates to the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference.199 A provision
containing the gist of Article 21(3), namely that the application and interpretation of
law be consistent with '"internationally recognized human rights" including certain
prohibitions on adverse distinction, appeared for the first time, and in unbracketed
form, in the draft statute attached to the final Report of the Preparatory Committee in
1998,200 though support for such a provision had been voiced in principle at the Inter-
Sessional Meeting in Zutphen earlier that year.201 Although the provision in the
Preparatory Committee's draft statute gave rise to considerable debate at the 1998
Rome Diplomatic Conference, the source of the debate surrounded the inclusion of
"gender" as one of the impermissible bases of adverse distinction, an inclusion that
2Q2
was viewed by some delegates as condoning homosexuality. The phrase
"internationally recognized human rights", however, remained free of controversy,
suggesting that delegates did not view the phrase as a reference to strictly
conventional human rights norms, but rather as a reference to only those human
rights norms which had properly entered into general international law.
™ deGuzman (1999), p. 439, n. 25.
IW
Id., p. 445, margin 23.
21111
Art. 20(3). Draft Statute and Draft Final Act. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1 (1998), p. 56.
201 See Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting from 19 to 30 January 1998 held in Zutphen, The
Netherlands, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13 (1998), p. 64, n. 117.
202 See P. Saland, "International Criminal Law Principles", in R.S. Lee (ed). The Making of the Rome
Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1999, p. 216.
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2
nullum crimen sine lege
i. INTRODUCTION
The application and interpretation of defences under the ICC Statute are subject to
the principle nullum crimen sine lege, which finds expression in Article 22 of the
Statute.20 , The principle nullum crimen sine lege prohibits the retroactive application
of criminal laws. It operates alongside the principle nulla poena sine lege, found in
Article 23 of the ICC Statute, which prohibits the retroactive application of criminal
penalties.204 Together, the two principles comprise what is generally referred to as
''the principle of legality".2Cb The principle nullum crimen sine lege, as with the
principle of legality generally, is not one unified principle, but rather a collection of
related principles, each limiting or guiding the exercise of governmental power.
Thus, while nullum crimen sine lege may act as a jurisdictional limit on both
legislative and judicial powers,206 other aspects of the principle may impact upon the
203 Art. 22, ICC Statute.
21,4 Art. 23, ICC Statute: "A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with
this Statute."
Jb
See, e.g., A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp. 139-
158. In some common law States, the principle of legality is more commonly referred to as "the rule
of law" (see, e.g., Ashworth (1999), p. 70).
206 For an example of the former, see Art. I, §9(3), Constitution of the United States of America
(prohibiting Congress from passing ex post facto laws or Bills of Attainder). For an example of the
latter, see Prosecutor v Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T. Trial Chamber I, Judgment and
Opinion, 5 December 2003, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Nieto-Navio, pars
108-113 (concluding that the offence of inflicting terror on a civilian population did not fall within the
jurisdiction of the ICTY as there was insufficient evidence to indicate that it attracted individual
criminal responsibility under customary international law). It would appear, however, that neither the
bringing of an indictment that is violative of the principle nullum crimen sine lege by a prosecutor, nor
the approval of such an indictment by a judge amounts to an abuse of process (see Prosecutor v Alex
Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kami, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Trial
Chamber, Written Reasons for the Trial Chamber's Oral Decision on the Defence Motion on Abuse of
Process due to Infringement of the Principles ofNullum Crimen Sine Lege and Non-Retroactivity as to
Several Counts, 31 March 2004, par. 30).
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exercise of powers in non-jurisdictional ways, for e.g., through rules of judicial
interpretation.207 Nullum crimen sine lege is generally divided into primary and
corollary principles. Thus while the primary import of the principle is the general
notion that a criminal conviction may only be affixed where law provides for it (i.e.
"no crime without law"),208 a number of corollaries follow. These include the
principle of non-retroactivity (prohibiting the application of criminal laws that were
enacted or came into being subsequent to the conduct in question),209 and the
principles that criminal laws be strictly construed and any ambiguity be resolved in
favour of the accused.210
While the principle of legality is said to exist and be recognised in all of
the world's major criminal justice systems,2" the principle does not apply across
systems in an undifferentiated form. The Latinised formulation of the principle of
legality which we employ today (nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege)
owes its origins to Paul Johann Anselm Feuerbach who, in his 1801 work, Lehrbuch
des peinlichen Rechts, enunciated three principles which he coined as follows: nulla
poena sine lege, nulla poena sine crimine, nullum crimen sine poena legalirIt is
accepted that lege, or legali, in this formulation indicates written law.213 The
principle of legality, therefore, in its classical formulation, requires criminal conduct
to be explicitly spelled out in advance in statutory form.-14 Yet this is a formulation
suited only to those legal systems employing exhaustive criminal codes. Common
law jurisdictions, with definitions of crimes and general liability rules developing
over time through the accretion of judicial decisions, necessarily fall short of this
strict standard of legality; as do crimes under international law wherever the
211 M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, 1999. p. 123.
208 Prosecutor v Sabino Gouveia Leite, Case No. 04a/2001, District Court of Dili, Special Panel for
the trial of Serious Crimes, Judgment, 7 December 2002, par. 60.
2<)y
See, e.g.. Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-
96-21-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment. 16 November 1998, pars 402 & 408.
210 See, e.g., id., pars. 402 & 408-413.
211 Id., par. 403; see also Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Appeals
Chamber, Decision on Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May
2004, par. 25.
212 J. Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege", (1937) 47 Yale Law Journal 165, pp. 169-70.
213 S. Glaser, "Nullum Crimen Sine Lege", (1942) 24 Journal ofComparative Legislation and
International Law 29, p. 30.
214
The requirement known to civil law systems that criminal offences be enumerated and defined in
written, statutory, form, is known by the maxim nullum crimen sine lege scripta (Cassese (2003), p.
141).
55
existence and definition of the crime is a product of customary international law
rather than multilateral treaty. According to the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v
Delalic, it could be postulated that the principle of legality under international law is
different, with respect to its applications and standards, than its counterpart in
215national legal systems." ~ For the purpose of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC
Statute, the primary test is that set out in Article 22, which provides, inter alia, that:
1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless
the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be
extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be
interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or
convicted.216
Nevertheless, the principle nullum crimen sine lege, as it applies under general
international law, may still govern the application and interpretation of the provisions
of the ICC Statute (including relevant defences), even where the general international
law standard of nullum crimen sine lege appears to differ from the standard in Article
22: Firstly, general international law may provide an interpretative background from
which the effect of Article 22 of the ICC Statute may be inferred; and second, if the
principle nullum crimen sine lege, as it applies under general international law, is an
"internationally recognized human right" for the purpose of Article 21(3) of the ICC
Statute,217 then the application and interpretation of the ICC Statute will have to be in
accordance with the general international law standard of legality wherever it is
wider than the standard encapsulated in statutory form in Article 22.
ii. EMERGENCE OF NULLUM CRIMENSINE LEGE AS A
PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. At Nuremberg
21:1 Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 405.
216 Art. 22, ICC Statute.
217 Art. 21(3). ICC Statute (discussed in Chapter 1 above).
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Although the principle nullum crimen sine lege has antecedents reaching back, at
least to Roman law,218 and has long been recognised as a maxim of domestic law in
various states,219 its recognition as a principle of general international law occurred
only in the second half of the Twentieth Century.220 The principle had not yet
crystallised in international law at the time it was raised by the Nazi defendants
221
appearing before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) . There,
the Charter of the IMT, which was annexed to the London Agreement of 8 August
1945, contained a number of elements of an arguably novel or innovative nature.
Article 6 of the IMT's Charter made provision for three crimes which were deemed
• • 2^3
to fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal: Crimes Against Peace (Article 6(3)),*"
War Crimes (Article 6(b)),224 and Crimes Against Humanity (Article 6(c)).22:1 Article
8 of the Charter expressly excluded the defence of obedience to superior orders,
although it recognised that the defence could be considered by the Tribunal in
mitigation of punishment.226 As the Tribunal was convened in order to try the major
21,s Bassiouni (1999). p. 130.
2iy
See, e.g., J. Hall (1937), pp. 168-9; Glaser (1942). pp. 30-31.
2J) Nevertheless, even before its crystallization as a rule of international law, the principle nullum
crimen sine lege influenced the outcome of negotiations over international criminal prosecutions. On
25 January 1919, at the Preliminary Peace Conference at Paris, the Allied and Associated Powers
appointed a 15-member commission to consider questions relating to criminality arising out of the
First World War. The Report, which was presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference on 29 March
1919. made a number of recommendations, including that criminal responsibility should lie, not
merely for violations against the "laws and customs ofwar", but also for violations against the "laws
of humanity". The United States delegation, however, expressed concern over the prosecution of
individuals for violations against the "laws of humanity" on the basis that, unlike the "laws and
customs ofwar", the "laws of humanity" lacked an objective and certain standard ofmeasurement.
Ultimately, no provision was made for the prosecution of individuals for crimes against the "laws of
humanity" in the Treaty of Versailles. (See, generally, M.C. Bassiouni, "World War I: 'The War to
End All Wars" and the Birth of a Handicapped International Criminal Justice System", (2002) 30
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 244).
221 See Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14
November 1945-1 October 1946, IMT. Nuremberg, 1947-49, vol. 1, p. 219. The principle nullum
crimen sine lege had earlier been the subject of judicial consideration by the PCIJ in its Advisory
Opinion on the Consistency ofCertain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the Free
City (1935 PCIJ (Ser. A/B) No. 65, p. 51). However in that case, the Court was not concerned with the
question of whether the principle was recognised under international law; instead its sole
consideration was whether, in light of the principle, certain legislative decrees of the Free City of
Danzig were consistent with the guarantees in the City's Constitution (id., p. 52).
222 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, August 8, 1945, 82 UNTS 79 (hereinafter Nuremberg
Charter).
222 Art. 6(a), Nuremberg Charter.
224 Art. 6(b), Nuremberg Charter.
222 Art. 6(c), Nuremberg Charter.
22<' Art. 8, Nuremberg Charter.
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war criminals of the European Axis for acts committed during the Second World
War,227 the promulgation of the Tribunal's Charter on 8 August 1945, was viewed by
some, in light of the novelty of certain of its inculpatory, and limited exculpatory,
features, as an ex post facto prescriptive act. It was urged on behalf of the defendants,
for instance, during the course of the proceedings, that no sovereign power had made
aggressive war (criminalised as a crime against peace under Article 6(a) of the
Charter) a crime at the time that the then-alleged Nazi aggressions were committed
and that no statute had defined aggressive war.22lS A similar lack of prior
criminalisation (at least in an explicit sense) and prior definition existed in relation to
crimes against humanity under Article 6(c). The removal of the defence of
obedience to superior orders also posed problems from the perspective of
retroactivity. The theoretical admissibility of obedience to superior orders as a
defence in war crimes proceedings was clearly recognised within international law
prior to the promulgation of the Nuremberg Charter. Expressions of the principle at
the start of the twentieth century tended to recognise an unqualified defence of
superior orders in the case of members of the armed forces following orders of their
commanders.2'0 While the defence soon came to be qualified by the introduction of
subjective and objective tests of the subordinate as to the lawfulness of the order, the
enduring legality of the defence was affirmed.2 '1 In fact, the negotiating record of the
Charter of the IMT indicates that superior orders were originally viewed by a number
of experts as theoretically admissible as a defence under international law.2'2 The
express exclusion of the defence in Article 8 of the IMT Charter - a position that was
replicated in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far
227 Art. 1, Nuremberg Charter.
_2S Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14
November 1945-1 October 1946, IMT. Nuremberg, 1947-49, vol. 1, p. 219. It was also urged that no
penalty had been fixed for the commission of aggressive war and that no court had been created to try
and punish offenders (id.), although these issues are more closely related to the principle nulla poena
sine lege.
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Attempts to try individuals after the First World War for crimes against the "laws of humanity"
failed for the very same reason (see footnotes above). No treaty was promulgated in the inter-war
period to fill the lacuna as a matter of positive law.~3"
See, e.g., L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Longmans, London, 1906, vol. 2. p. 264.
231
See, e.g.. R v Smith, (1900) 17 SC 561, pp. 567-8 (per Solomon J); The Dover Castle, (1921) 16
AJIL 704; The Llandovery Castle, (1921) 16 AJIL 708.
232 See H.S. Levie, "The Rise and Fall of an Internationally Codified Denial of the Defense of
Superior Orders", (1991) 31 Revue Internationale de DroitMilitaire et de Droit de la Guerre 183, p.
183ff.
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East (IMTFE) and Article II(4)(b) of Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL10) -
therefore appears to be an innovation in international law.
The IMT responded to the defendants' pleas of nullum crimen sine lege
in three ways: The IMT's principal position was that it was bound to apply the terms
of the Charter, irrespective of its conformity with the principle nullum crimen sine
lege. The IMT stated in its judgment that "[t]he law of the Charter is decisive, and
binding upon the Tribunal."233 The basis of this decision appears to rest upon an
analogy with the doctrine of the sovereignty of parliament.234 The IMT took the
view that the making of the Charter was a sovereign legislative act by those countries
to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered.2'0 But as if to hedge its bet,
the IMT then declared a secondary position: that the Charter is in conformity with
international law anyway. The IMT stated that the Charter "is not an arbitrary
exercise of power on the part of the victorious Nations," but rather, "the expression
of international law existing at the time of its creation; and to that extent is itself a
contribution to international law".236 The view was taken that the Charter did not
" '
Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14
November 1945-1 October 1946, IMT, Nuremberg, 1947-49, vol. 1, p. 218; see. also id., pp. 174, 219
& 253; see also the submissions of Mr Justice Jackson (id., vol. 2, p. 143) and Sir Hartley Shawcross
(id., vol. 3, p. 93). The cases heard under Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty
ofWar Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Humanity, 20 December 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control
Council for Germany 50 (hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10 or CCL10) adopted the same view
with respect to the binding nature of Control Council Law No. 10 (Bassiouni (1999), p. 156; see, also,
United States v Flick, 174 F.2d 983 (D.C.), cert, denied, 338 U.S. 879 (1949)).
~34
See, e.g., A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., Macmillan, London, 1959, ch. 1.
Trial of the Major War Criminals before the InternationalMilitary Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14
November 1945-1 October 1946, IMT, Nuremberg, 1947-49, vol. 1, p. 218.
" Id. The same reasoning was applied in the CCL10 cases, where Control Council Law No. 10 was
deemed to be a reflection of pre-existing international law (see especially, United States vAlstoetter et
al. ("Justice Case") (1948) 3 TWC 1, p. 968; United States v Ohlendorfet al. ("Einsatzgruppen
Case") (1948) 4 TWC 1. p. 498; Trial ofHans Albin Ranter (1949) XIV LRTWC 89, p. 120; United
States v List et al. ("Hostages Case") (1948) VIII LRTWC 35. p. 53; United States v. Alfried Krupp
von Bohlen und Halbach ("Krupp Case") (1948) 9 TWC 1327, p. 133 1; United States v Carl Krauch
et al ("Farben Case") (1948) X LRTWC 1. pp. 58-59; United States v Flick et al ("Flick Case")
(1948) 6 TWC 1187). See, also, Bassiouni (1999), pp. 170-172, who notes that since the IMT, IMTFE
and CCL10 cases, a number of States have attempted prosecutions of individuals for crimes against
humanity arising out of atrocities of the Second World War: in each of these national prosecutions, the
plea of nullum crimen sine lege was rejected in favour of the assumption that crimes against humanity,
as criminalised under the Nuremberg Charter, were pre-existent in international law. Bassiouni states
that:
In fact, all national prosecutions undertaken after 1946 took the same position, and
none reopened the question, as if the accumulation of time and precedents relying on
the IMT's judgments had cured all possible legal defects. This leads to the legally
incongruous conclusion that reiteration of the same argument confirms its validity.
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involve any substantive retroactivity, only procedural. This is in line with the
submission of Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom,
who had argued before the Tribunal that: "Nor, though this procedure and this
Indictment of individuals may be novel, is there anything new in the principles which
by this prosecution we seek to enforce."237 Yet the reasoning of the Tribunal does not
entirely bear faith with the assertion that there was no substantive retroactivity. The
IMT stated, quite uncontroversially, that, i-[w]ith respect to War Crimes...the crimes
defined by Article 6, Section (b), of the Charter were already recognized as War
Crimes under international law."238 Interestingly, however, the IMT appears to have
neatly side-stepped this very same issue with respect to crimes against humanity by
failing to similarly affirm that the crimes defined by Article 6, Section (c), of the
Charter (i.e. crimes against humanity) were equally recognised as crimes under
international law. The IMT did cite a number of international instruments that could
be viewed as cumulatively indicating the criminality of waging aggressive war under
239
customary law, though whether the accumulation of State practice offered up by
the IMT was in fact sufficient to cross the threshold into customary law has been
seriously doubted.240 Similar doubts could be put in relation to the conclusion of the
IMT that the exclusion of the defence of obedience to superior orders in Article 8 of
the IMT's Charter was "in conformity with the law of all nations."241 Perhaps in
recognition of the weakness of its assertions as to the conformity of the terms of the
(id., p. 172).
" ' Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14
November 1945-1 October 1946, IMT. Nuremberg, 1947-49, vol. 3, p. 92; see, also, id., p. 94.
238 Id., vol. 1. p. 253.
239 See, in particular, id., vol. 1, pp. 221-2.
240
See, e.g., A. Cassese, "Crimes Against Humanity", in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, J.R.W.D. Jones, The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol. 1, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2002, Ch. 11.2.
241 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the InternationalMilitary Tribunal, Nuremberg. 14
November 1945-1 October 1946, IMT. Nuremberg, 1947-49, vol. 1, p. 224. According to the IMT:
That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation of the international law of war
has never been recognized as a defense to such acts of brutality, though, as the Charter
here provides, the order may be urged in mitigation of the punishment. The true test,
which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations, is not the
existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible.
(id.). That this overstates the customary law position in its aversion to the defence of obedience to
superior orders is indicated by the previously cited authorities: R v Smith (1900) 17 SC 561, pp. 567-8,
per Solomon J; The Dover Castle, (1921) 16 A.J.I.L. 704; The Llandovery Castle, (1921) 16 A.J.I.L.
708.
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Charter with international law as it existed prior to the Second World War, the IMT
pronounced a third position: that the principle nullum crimen sine lege is not, in any
242
event, a principle of international law, but only a principle of '"justice". " The
Tribunal declared that:
In the first place, it is to be observed that the maxim nullum crimen sine
lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of
justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of
treaties and assurances have attacked neighboring states without warning
is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must know that
he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would
be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished."43
"42 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the InternationalMilitary Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14
November 1945-1 October 1946, IMT, Nuremberg, 1947-49, vol. 1, p. 219.
24"' The conclusion that it would be "unjust" not to punish the Nazi defendants was only expressly
reached by the IMT in the context of crimes against peace, in particular the waging of aggressive war.
This conclusion appears to have been reached on two separate grounds. The first relates to the extent
of the wrongdoing of the defendants and the second relates to the fact that the declaration of law in the
Nuremberg Charter cannot be said to have genuinely taken the defendants by surprise. In relation to
the latter point, the Tribunal stated, with particular reference to the Kellog-Briand Pact (General
Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 27 August 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57), which was binding on
Germany, that:
Occupying the positions they did in the Government of Germany, the defendants, or at
least some of them must have known of the treaties signed by Germany, outlawing
recourse to war for the settlement of international disputes; they must have known that
they were acting in defiance of all international law when in complete deliberation they
carried out their designs of invasion and aggression.
{Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14
November 1945-1 October 1946, IMT, Nuremberg, 1947-49, vol. 1. p. 219). This follows the remarks
of the Chief Prosecutor for the United States, Mr Justice Jackson, who addressed the issue of notice in
the following way:
I cannot, of course, deny that these men are surprised that this is the law; they really
are surprised that there is any such thing as law. These defendants did not rely on any
law at all. Their program ignored and defied all law...International law, natural law,
German law, any law at all was to these men simply a propaganda device to be
invoked when it helped and to be ignored when it would condemn what they wanted to
do. That men may be protected in relying upon the law at the time they act is the
reason we find laws of retrospective operations unjust. But these men cannot bring
themselves within the reason of the rule which in some systems of jurisprudence
prohibits ex post facto laws. They cannot show that they ever relied upon international
law in any state or paid it the slightest regard.
{id., vol. 2, p. 144.) The issue of justice appears to be presented here through analogy with the
principles of equity: where individuals place reliance upon the state of the law at a particular point in
time, the State is estopped from raising an ex post facto alteration to the law. The Nazi defendants
were not able to make out their claim at equity, first, because they could not be said to have ever relied
upon the state of the law at any point in time immediately prior to or during their reign of terror and
aggression, and secondly, because they can hardly be said to have come to the Court with "clean
hands" {see, e.g., P. Parkinson, "Estoppel", in P. Parkinson (ed.), The Principles ofEquity. LBC
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The position of the IMT, therefore, was that international law did not place any limit
upon the prescriptive or adjudicative jurisdiction of states with respect to the creation
or application of laws having retroactive effect.-44 This was a position that was
supported by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which confirmed its
"complete accord" with the view of the IMT that nullum crimen sine lege is not a
limitation of sovereignty;-42 and was reiterated in the judgments of a number of the
cases tried under Control Council Law No. 10.246 Although the Hostages Case held
(in obiter dicta) that Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations of 1907 operated as a
bar to retroactive action in criminal matters,247 and that in any event, a victorious
940
nation had no lawful authority to enact ex post facto criminal laws," this was an
uncommon position in the post-World War II proceedings.249
Information Services, Sydney, 1996, pp. 201-280; M. Spence, "Equitable Defences", in P. Parkinson,
id., pp. 966-970).
244 See Attorney-General of the Government of Israel vAdolfEichmann (1961) 36 ILR 5 (District
Court of Jerusalem, affirmed by the Supreme Court of Israel, (1962) 36 ILR 277), par. 27, which
states that by asserting that nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, the IMT
indicated that, "the penal jurisdiction of a state with respect to crimes committed by 'foreign
offenders,' insofar as it does not conflict on other grounds with the principles of international law, is
not limited by the prohibition of retroactive effect."
_4> B.B. Ferencz, Defining InternationalAggression: The Search for World Peace; A Documentary
History and Analysis, Oceana Publications, New York, 1975, vol. 1, p. 546.
246
See, in particular, United States vAltstoetter et al. (''Justice Case") (1947) VI LRTWC 1, p.
41.
24 Article 23(h), Hague Regulations of 1907, states, inter alia, that it is especially forbidden: "To
declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals
of the hostile party."
248 United States v List et al. (".Hostages Case") (1948) VIII LRTWC 35, p. 54.
249 See UNWCC, "Defence Pleas", (1949) XV LRTWC 155, p. 170. Nevertheless, the IMT did not
necessarily envisage that the principle nullum crimen sine lege should be completely extrinsic to the
legal process. Its pronouncement on the status of the principle was limited to a denial of its having any
limiting effect on jurisdiction ("sovereignty"). Judge Pal (India) of the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East stated, in his dissenting opinion, that "[t]he rule denying retroactivity to a law is not
that a law cannot be made retroactive by its promulgator, but that it should not ordinarily be made so
and that if such retroactive operation can be avoided courts should always do that." (Judgment of the
InternationalMilitary Tribunal for the Far East, 1 November 1948, Judgment ofMr Pal, Member
from India, reprinted in B.V.A. Roling and C.F. Filler (eds), The Tokyo Judgment: The International
Military Tribunal For the Far East (I.M.F.T.E.), 29 April 1946-12 November 1948, University Press
Amsterdam BV, Amsterdam, 1977, vol. 2, p. 538). The Member from India therefore envisaged that
nullum crimen sine lege would operate at at least two levels: First, it would apply to the legislator as a
matter of ethics, requiring the legislative authority to enquire into and satisfy itself as to the justice of
prescribing acts as criminal ex post facto; secondly, it would apply to the adjudicator as a matter of
interpretation, who, upon the assumption that the legislative authority would not enact laws that




The judgment of the IMT was affirmed by unanimous resolution of the United
Nations General Assembly on 11 December 1946;2r,° but soon afterwards a steady
flow of international instruments were created which indicated the impermissibility
of criminal convictions on the basis of conduct which was not prescribed as criminal
at the time of its commission. Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948) states that:
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal
offence was committed.2M
Geneva Convention III of 12 August 1949 applies the same principle to prisoners of
war as a matter of humanitarian law;"2 while Geneva Convention IV prohibits the
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enactment of retroactive penal provisions by an Occupying Power." The principle
nullum crimen sine lege was also inserted in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1966),224 and Protocols I and II Additional to the Geneva
250 G.A. Res. 95(1), UN Doc. A/64/Add.l (1946).
22' Art. 11(2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), UN Doc. A/810 (1948).
2,2 Art. 99, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75
UNTS 135 (hereinafter Geneva Convention III):
No prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden
by the law of the Detaining Power or by International Law, in force at the time
the said act was committed.
2x2 Art. 65, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar, 12
August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (hereinafter Geneva Convention IV).
2:14 Art. 15, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 171
(hereinafter ICCPR):
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty
be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal
offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the Offence,
provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender
shall benefit thereby.
2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person
for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal
according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of
nations.
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Conventions of 1949 (1977),25:1 as well as in regional human rights treaties: the
European Convention on Human Rights (1950),256 the American Convention on
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Human Rights (1969), ~ and the African Charter on Human and Peoples" Rights
(1981).2;,'s The proliferation of international treaties and instruments embodying the
Art. 2(c). Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Relative to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (hereinafter
Protocol I):
No one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account of any act
or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under the national or
international law to which he was subject at the time when it was committed; nor
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time
when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of the
offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the
offender shall benefit thereby.
Art. 6(c), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609
(hereinafter Protocol II):
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under the law, at the time
when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which
was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the
commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a
lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.
256 Art. 7, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November
1950, 213 UNTS 222 (hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights):
1 No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or
international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal
offence was committed.
2 This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any
act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal
according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.
~ Art. 9. American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 (herinafter
American Convention on Human Rights):
No one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a
criminal offense, under the applicable law, at the time it was committed. A
heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time
the criminal offense was committed. If subsequent to the commission of the
offense the law provides for the imposition of a lighter punishment, the guilty
person shall benefit therefrom.
~"s
Art. 7(2), African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 27 June 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5 (hereinafter African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights):
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principle nullum crimen sine lege provided an international counterpart to the already
extant principle of legality found in municipal law. The result is that nullum crimen
sine lege is now uncontroversially accepted as a principle of customary international
law.269 Thus, in his report to the Security Council on the creation of the ICTY, the
United Nations Secretary-General stressed that the principle nullum crimen sine lege
would require the Tribunal to limit itself to the application of rules of humanitarian
law which were "beyond any doubt part of customary law".260 Although the Statute
of the ICTY does not expressly incorporate the principle of legality (and the same
observation may be made in relation to the Statutes of the ICTR, the Special Court
for Sierra Leone and the Iraqi Special Tribunal),'61 nevertheless the binding quality
of the principle nullum crimen sine lege has been affirmed in the jurisprudence of the
No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a
legally punishable offence at the time it was committed. No penalty may be
inflicted for an offence for which no provision was made at the time it was
committed. Punishment is personal and can be imposed only on the offender.
259
See, e.g., Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic andEsadLandzo, Case No. IT-
96-21-T. Trial Chamber. Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 402; Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay,
Case No. SCSL-03-05-PT, Trial Chamber, Decision and Order on Defence Preliminary Motion for
Defects in the Form of the Indictment, 13 October 2003, par. 5; Prosecutor v Georges Anderson
Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Trial Chamber I, Judgment and Sentence, 6 December
1999, par. 86; Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 29
July 2004, par. 141; Prosecutor v Joao Franca da Silva Alias Jhoni Franca, Case No. 04a/2001,
District Court of Dili, Special Panel for the trial of Serious Crimes, Judgment, 5 December 2002. par.
59; Prosecutor v Sabino Gouveia Leite, Case No. 04a/2001, District Court of Dili. Special Panel for
the trial of Serious Crimes, Judgment, 7 December 2002. par. 60; Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman,
Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Appeals Chamber, Decision on Preliminary Motion based on Lack
of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May 2004, par. 25; Prosecutor v Enver Hadzihasanovic,
Mehmed Alagic andAmir Kubura, Case No. 1T-01-47-T, Trial Chamber, Decision on Joint Challenge
to Jurisdiction, 12 November 2002, par. 56.
260
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (1993), par. 34.
261 See ICTY Statute; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such
violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states, between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994, UN Doc. SC/5974 (1995) (herinafter ICTR Statute); Statute of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, available at www.sc-sl.org: Statute of the Special Iraqi Tribunal, available at www.cpa-
iraq.org. The Statute of the Special Iraqi Tribunal does, however, provide in Art. 24(e) that "[t]he
penalty for any crimes under Articles 11 to 13 which do not have a counterpart under Iraqi law shall
be determined by the Trial Chambers taking into account such factors as the gravity of the crime, the
individual circumstances of the convicted person and relevant international precedents." The principle
nullum crimen sine lege is expressly provided for in Section 12 of UNTAET Regulation 2000/15,
establishing the Special Panel for Serious Crimes within the Dili District Court, East Timor. See, also,
Art. 33(2) of the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of the Democratic Kampuchea (as
amended up to 27 October 2004) which provides that the Extraordinary Chambers of the trial court
shall exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with Arts 14 and 15 of the ICCPR.
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ICTY (and other tribunals)262, both explicitly,263 as well as implicitly, for e.g.,
through the tribunal's development of a principle of continuity of judicial decisions
based loosely on the doctrine stare decisis.2bA
3. A General Principle of Law?
While the status of nullum crimen sine lege as a principle of customary international
law is now undisputed, there is some question as to whether that principle also has
the status of a general principle of law (in the sense of Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute
of the ICJ).265 The principle nullum crime sine lege is a source of substantive rights,
and on that basis may exceed the minimal function assigned to general principles of
law as a formal source of international law;266 but at the same time nullum crimen
sine lege contains rules of legal interpretation, and is therefore precisely the sort of
262 See below.
263
See, e.g.. Prosecutor v Radislcn' Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 August
2001, par. 580; Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdra\'ko Mucic, Haiim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No.
IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998. par. 402ff.
2,14
In Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleskovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 24 March
2000, the ICTY Appeals Chamber considered that the ratio decidendi of its decisions were binding on
Trial Chambers (par. 113) and that the Appeals Chamber should follow its own previous decisions,
but should be free to depart from them for cogent reasons in the interests of justice (par. 107). The
rationale for this principle was expressly grounded, at least in part, in "the interests of certainty and
predictability" (pars. 107, 113). The Appeals Chamber also considered that while decisions of the
Trial Chambers have no binding force on each other, the Trial Chamber may nevertheless find them to
be "persuasive" (par. 114); see also Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdra\'ko Mucic, Hazim Delic and
Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 167;
Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A,
Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 20 February 2001 par. 8; Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy
Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT. Trial Chamber. Written Reasons for
the Trial Chamber's Oral Decision on the Defence Motion on Abuse of Process due to Infringement of
the Principles of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and Non-Retroactivity as to Several Counts, 31 March
2004, par. 40; Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima. Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu,
Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Trial Chamber, Decision and Order on Defence Preliminary Motion on
Defects in the Form of the Indictment, 1 April 2004, pars 24-25; Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay,
Case No. SCSL-03-05-PT, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Immediate
Protective Measures for Witnesses and Victims and for Non-Public Disclosure, 23 May 2003, pars 11-
12; Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-03-08-PT, Trial Chamber, Decision on the
Defence Motion on the Denial of Right to Appeal. 7 November 2003, par. 3; Prosecutor v Morris
Kallon, Case No. SCSL-03-07-PT. Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion on the Denial of
Right to Appeal, 7 November 2003, par. 3; See also Prosecutor v Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic
and Dragoljub Ojdanic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Dragoljub
Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction - Joint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003, Separate
Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, pars 15-28; Prosecutor v Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic and
Dragoljub Ojdanic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's
Motion Challenging Jurisdiction - Joint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003, Separate Opinion of Judge
David Hunt, pars 36-43.
265 Art. 38(l)(c), Statute of the ICJ.
2M>
See, e.g., H. Waldock, "General Course on Public International Law" (1962-11) 106 Hague Recueil
1, P- 54ff.
66
principle found among general principles of law."67 Perhaps nullum crimen sine lege
operates in some respect as a principle of equity infra legem, i.e. as a form of equity
which constitutes a method of interpretation of the law in force."68 It has been
suggested, however, that nullum crime sine lege is not "a general principle of law
universally accepted by all States."269 Certainly the principle of legality operates in a
different manner from state to state, and is thus susceptible to generality only at a
certain level of abstraction. But the test of a general principle of law has never been
put as requiring universal domestic consensus as to the specific rules of application
of any relevant principle.270 Bin Cheng has stated that general principles of law do
not consist in "specific rules formulated for practical purposes, but in general
propositions underlying the various rules of law which express the essential qualities
of juridical truth itself, in short of Law."271 The strongest argument levelled against
the status of nullum crimen sine lege as a general principle of law appears to be the
claim that while the basic prohibition on ex post facto laws may be found in civil law
states,272 it does not generally exist as a rule of law as such in common law systems.
There it tends to operate as nothing more than an interpretative presumption."72
While it has potentially far-reaching implications at the level of judicial
interpretation in such systems, it is ultimately incapable of preventing a conviction
on the basis of ex post facto legislation where the legislative intent to create ex post
facto law is manifest in the terms of the Statute. Such an argument may be thought to
be fatal to the claim that the prohibition on ex post facto criminal laws has entered
customary law, but the claim presumably proceeds on the assertion that common law
states tend to be parties to the international instruments prohibiting ex post facto
laws, and that their contribution towards state practice in recognising the
inadmissibility of such laws is to be located in their signing and supporting the
relevant international instruments rather than in their domestic practice.274 In fact, the
2hl See, e.g.. Frontier Dispute Case (Burkino Faso vMali) [19851 ICJ Rep. 6. par. 28.
",,'s See id.
2M Lamb (2002), p. 740.
2711 C.A. Ford, "Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38( l)(c) and 'General
Principles of Law"', (1994) 5 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 35, p. 73.
271
Cheng (1987), p. 24.
21' See Cassese (2003), p. 141.
277 Lamb (2002). p. 740.
2,4 On treaty practice as state practice for the purpose of customary international law, see discussion
on prohibition on reprisals under international law below.
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claim that common law and civil law states can be strongly differentiated in terms of
the prescriptive jurisdiction of their respective legislatures to pass ex post facto
criminal laws is misconceived and out of date. The overwhelming majority of states
which employ common law as a formal source of law have expressly entrenched the
prohibition on ex post facto criminal laws in their constitutions.
Art. I, §9(3) of the United States Constitution states that, "[n]o Bill of
Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed" by Congress." ~ Art. I, §10(1)
prohibits the States from passing the same.276 A Similar provision exists in the
Constitutions of American Samoa;277 the Federated States of Micronesia;276 and the
Marshall Islands.279 The Constitution of Ireland states that the Oireachtas (the
national parliament) "shall not declare acts to be infringements of the law which
were not so at the date of their commission".280 The Indian Constitution provides that
"[n]o person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force
at the time of the commission of the Act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a
penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at
the time of the commission of the offence."281 Similar provisions to the latter may be
7^7 283found in the Constitutions of: Antigua and Barbuda; the Bahamas;"
Bangladesh;284 Barbados;286 Belize;286 the Cook Islands;287 Cyprus;288 Dominica;289
Fiji;290 Ghana;291 Grenada;292 Guyana;296 Jamaica;294 Kenya;296 Kiribati;296
~78 Art. I, §9(3), Constitution of the United States of America, reprinted in G.H. Flanz (ed.),
Constitutions of the Countries of the World, Oceana Publications Inc., Dobbs Ferry. NY. 1971-2004,
binder XX.
276 Art. I(10)(l), Constitution of the United States of America, id.
277 Art. 1(13), Constitution of American Samoa, available at www.asbar.org.
27,8 Art. 4(11), Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004),
binder XII.
279 Art. 11(8), Constitution of the Marshall Islands, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder
XII.
280 Art. 15(5)(1°), Bunreacht na hEirann (Constitution of Ireland), reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004),
binder IX.
281 Art. 20(1), Constitution of India, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder VIII.
~8~ Art. 15(4), Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder I.
282 Art. 20(4), Constitution of the Bahamas, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004). binder I.
284 Art. 35(1), Constitution of Bangladesh, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder II.
288 Art. 18(4), Constitution of Barbados, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder II.
286 Art. 6(4), Constitution of Belize, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder II.
287 Art. 65(g)-(h), Constitution of the Cook Islands, available at www.paclii.org.
288 Art. 12(1), Constitution of Cyprus, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder V.
289 Art. 8(4), Constitution of Dominica, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder VI.
2911 Art. 28(l)(j), Constitution of the Fiji Islands, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder VI.
291 Art. 19(5)-(6), Constitution of Ghana, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder VII.
292 Art. 8(4), Constitution of Grenada, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder VII.
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Lesotho;297 Malawi;298 Malaysia;299 Malta;300 Mauritius;" Mozambique,
Namibia;303 Nigeria;304 Pakistan;305 Saint Kitts and Nevis;306 Saint Lucia;3°7 Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines;308 Sierra Leone;309 Singapore, the Solomon
Islands;311 South Africa;312 Sri Lanka;71'1 Tanzania;314 Tuvalu;" Uganda;' and
21)3 Art. 144(4), Constitution of Guyana , reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder VIII.
294 Art. 20(7), Constitution of Jamaica, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder IX.
29:1 Art. 77(1), Constitution of Kenya, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder X.
2% Art. 10(4). Constitution of Kiribati, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder X.
29 Art. 12(4), Constitution of Lesotho, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder X.
298 Art. 42(2)(f)(vi), Constitution of Malawi, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XI.
299 Art. 7(1), Constitution of Malaysia, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XI.
300 Art. 39(8), Constitution of Malta, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XI.
301 Art. 10(4), Constitution of Mauritius, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XII.
302 Art. 99, Constitution of Mozambique, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XII.
303 Art. 12(3), Constitution of Namibia, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XII.
304 Art. 36(8), Constitution of Nigeria, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XIV.
305 Art. 12(1), Constitution of Pakistan, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XIV.
306 Art. 10(4), Constitution of Saint Kitts and Nevis, available at
http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/Kitts/stkitts-nevis.html.
3117 Art. 8(4), Constitution of Saint Lucia, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XV.
308 Constitution of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder
XV.
309 Art. 23(7)-(8), Constitution of Sierra Leone, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XVI.
310 Art. 11(1), Constitution of Singapore, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XVI.
311 Art. 10(4), Constitution of the Solomon Islands, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XVI.
312 Art. 35(3)(1) & (n), Constitution of South Africa, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XVI. The
South African Constitution states that the offence must have been an offence either under national or
international law at the time of its commission (Art. 35(3)(1)).
313 Art. 13(6), Constitution of Sri Lanka, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XVII. Section 6 adds
that:
Nothing in this Article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for
any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal
according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of
nations.
314 Art. 13(6)(c), Constitution of Tanzania, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XVIII.
317 Art. 22, Constitution of Tuvalu, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XVIII:
(6) No-one shall be convicted of an offence on account of an act that was not at
the time of the doing of the act, an offence or a legal element of an offence.
(7) No penalty shall be imposed for an offence that is more severe in amount or
in kind than the maximum that might have been imposed for the offence at the
time when it was committed.
The reference to "a legal element of an offence" in (6) above is puzzling as the implication arising
from the text is that an act which involved only the partial completion of an offence at the time of its
commission may be deemed a completed offence retroactively.
316 Art. 28(7)-(8), Constitution of Uganda, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XVIII.
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Vanuatu.317 Some States go further, requiring as a matter of constitutional
imperative, that offences not merely be pre-existing in law at the time of their
commission, but that they be defined as well. This is the case in the Constitutions of
Nauru;318 Western Samoa;317 Papua New Guinea;120 and Zambia;321 the latter two
expressly requiring that that definition be located in written law. Reference should
also be made to the Constitution of Tonga which expressly prohibits the enactment of
retrospective laws, though in terms somewhat different to the preceding examples/2-
Of course, in a small number of common law States there remains
prescriptive jurisdiction to pass ex post facto criminal laws. These States (for e.g.,
Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia) are particularly prominent
common law States. Is the presence of this lingering prescriptive jurisdiction to pass
ex post facto criminal laws fatal to the assertion that nullum crimen sine lege is a
general principle of law? The answer is surely no. Even in these States, the "general
21 Art. 5(2)(f)-(g), Constitution of Vanuatu, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XX. The
Constitution states that the offence must have existed, at the time of its commission, in either written
or customary law (Art. 5(2)(f)).
Ms Art. 10(1)&(4), Constitution of Nauru, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XII.
M<J Art 10(1 )-(2), Constitution ofWestern Samoa, available at www.paclii.org.
220 Art. 37(2)&(7), Constitution of Papua New Guinea, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004). binder XIV.
221 Art. 18(4)&(8), Constitution of Zambia, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XX.
~'22 Art. 20, Constitution of Tonga, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder XVIII.:
It shall not be lawful to enact any retrospective laws in so far as they may curtail
or take away or affect rights or privileges existing at the time of the passing of
such laws.
The reference to "privileges" indicates the unconstitutionality of certain forms of procedural
retroactivity. The position in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is also of interest. The
Hong Kong Bill ofRights Ordinance 1991 incorporated into the law of Hong Kong, provisions of the
ICCPR. §8 of the Ordinance sets out the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, Art. 12 ofwhich provides for the
prohibition on ex post facto criminal laws in terms substantively identical to Art. 15 of the ICCPR.
Any legislation passed by Hong Kong's Legislative Council which purports to prescribe ex post facto
criminal laws, or which overrides the protections afforded in the Bill of Rights, would appear to be
ultra vires the powers of the Council. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of the People's Republic ofChina, which acts in all instances as a constraint upon the legislative
powers of Hong Kong's legislature (see Art. 11), provides in Article 39 that:
1. The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and
international labour conventions as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force
and shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
2. The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be
restricted unless as prescribed by law. Such restrictions shall not contravene the
provisions of the preceding paragraph of this Article.
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proposition" (to apply Bin Cheng's test) that underlies the law is one that
disapproves of, and seeks to prevent, the application of ex post facto criminal laws.
In Canada, for instance, §11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
provides that any person charged with an offence has the right "not to be found guilty
on account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the act or omission, it
constituted an offence under Canadian or international law or was criminal according
• r* • 323
to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations."'"' The
Canadian Charter incorporates a supremacy provision rendering inconsistent laws a
nullity to the extent of the inconsistency/-4 While §33 of the Charter enables the
Canadian Parliament or the legislature of a Province to expressly declare an Act to be
operative notwithstanding inconsistency with certain Charter provisions (including
995 •
the prohibition on ex post facto laws), ' in practice legislative recourse to §33 is
39ft
extremely rare (with the exception of Quebec).'"
In the United Kingdom neither the Scottish Parliament,327 nor the
39R •
Northern Ireland Assembly, " have legislative competence to prescribe ex post facto
criminal laws. The European Convention on Human Rights (which incorporates the
principle nullum crimen sine lege) was incorporated in part into the domestic law of
323
§11(g), Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (enacted as Part 1 of the Constitution Act 1982





(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision
thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or
sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made under
this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the
provision of this Charter referred to in the declaration.
(3) A declaration made under subsection 1 shall cease to have effect five years
after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the
declaration.
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made
under subsection 1.
(5) Subsection 3 applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection 4.
,2h
F.L. Morton, "Can Judicial Supremacy be Stopped?", [October 2003] Policy Options 25; F. R.
Liss, "A Mandate to Balance: Judicial Protection of Individual Rights Under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms", (1992) 41 Emory Law Journal 1281, p. 1286.
327
§29(2)(d), Scotland Act 1998 (UK) provides that an Act of the Scottish Parliament is not law so far
as it is incompatible with any "Convention rights". "Convention rights" include the prohibition on ex
post facto criminal laws under Art. 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (See §126(1),
ScotlandAct 1998 (UK); §1(1), Human Rights Act 1998 (UK)).
328
§6(2)(c). Northern Ireland Act 1998 (UK).
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the whole of the United Kingdom through the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), but the
scope within that Act for judicial review of legislation enacted by the Westminster
Parliament on the grounds of incompatibility with the European Convention is
limited. Nevertheless, courts are required to interpret and apply Westminster
399
legislation as compatible with Convention rights wherever possible, " and if such an
interpretation is impossible, then the court may make a declaration indicating such
TOO
incompatibility. " A declaration of incompatibility does not affect the validity or
• • • • 3^1
continuing operation of the legislation in any respect, ~ but in its White Paper on the
Human Rights Bill the government expressed the view that a declaration on
incompatibility would "almost certainly" prompt an alteration to the offending
legislation.3"12 The Act includes an extraordinary procedure for amending legislation
after a declaration of incompatibility."1"11 In addition, for legislation passed after the
coming into force of the Human Rights Act, the Minister in charge of the bill is
required to attest to the compatibility (in his view) of the bill with Convention rights,
or alternatively acknowledge that such an attestation cannot be made, but that the
government nevertheless wishes to proceed with the bill.334 Of course none of these
safeguards protect an individual already charged on the basis of an ex post facto law.
For such an individual the remedy may lie only in the European Court of Human
Rights.
In New Zealand. §26(1) of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides that,
"[n]o one shall be liable to conviction of any offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute an offence by such person under the law of New
Zealand at the time it occurred."33-'1 While §6 of the Act requires courts to interpret
other Acts as consistent with the protections set out in the Bill of Rights Act where
possible,336 §4 precludes the possibility of Courts invalidating or not applying other
Acts in the case of a direct inconsistency.337 New Zealand's Bill of Rights, therefore,
329
§3(1), Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). "Convention rights" are defined to include the right to
protection against ex post facto criminal laws in Art. 7 (see § 1. Human Rights Act 1998 (UK)).
330
§4, Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).
331
§4(6), Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).
332
Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, Cmd 3782, 1997. par. 2.9.
333
§ 10. Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).
334
§ 19, Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).
335 §26( 1), Bill ofRights Act 1990 (NZ).
336 §6. Bill ofRights Act 1990 (NZ).
337 §4, Bill ofRights Act 1990 (NZ).
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has no higher status than ordinary legislation.3 8 A small number of common law and
hybrid-common law states offer no explicit protection against ex post facto criminal
laws at all. These states include Australia,339 Cameroon,"'40 Trinidad and Tobago,"'41
342 343
Israel," and Niue." Nevertheless, the interpretative presumption against criminal
laws operating retroactively within these (as within all) common law states still
indicates a juridical principle that expost facto criminal laws are unjust and improper
and should be avoided. This principle could be said, therefore, to operate generally
across legal systems.
4. An Internationally Recognized Human Right?
The principle nullum crimen sine lege operates, not simply as a principle of general
international law, but as an "internationally recognized human right."344 It is one of
the few provisions set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
that cannot be derogated from even in time of public emergency; '4' and is expressly
listed in other human rights treaties as non-derogable in time of war or other public
emergency.346 While the UN's Human Rights Committee has suggested that non-
derogability of human rights does not necessarily signify that the right in question
lies at the core of human rights,"'47 Schabas has stated that international human rights
338 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: New Zealand 3/10/1995, UN Doc.
A/50/40 (1995), par. 176. See, however, J. McLean, "Legislative Invalidation, Human Rights
Protection and s 4 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act", (2001) 4 New Zealand Law Review 421,
who argues that New Zealand's Bill of Rights nevertheless wields a powerful normative force.
339 See Constitution of Australia, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder I.
1411 See Constitution of Cameroon, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder III.
341 See Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, reprinted in Flanz (1971-2004), binder reprinted in Flanz
(1971-2004), binder XVIII, which enshrines, in Part I, a number of rights and freedoms, but makes no
reference to the prohibition on ex post facto criminal laws.
"4~ See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 1992 (Israel), which incorporates a number of
fundamental rights into Israeli law at a constitutional level, but makes no explicit reference to the
prohibition on ex post facto criminal laws.
"43 See Constitution of Niue, available at www.paclii.org.
'44 See chapter 1 above.
345 Art. 4(2), ICCPR.
346 Art. 15(2), European Convention on Human Rights; Art. 27(2), American Convention on Human
Rights. Although the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights does not contain a general non-
derogation clause, the permissibility of derogation in the case of public need is expressly provided for
in certain Articles; no such provision is made however in respect of Article 7(2), incorporating the
principle nullum crimen sine lege.547 'General Comment No. 24(52)', UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 (1994), §12, cited in W.A.
Schabas, "Perverse Effects of the Nulla Poena Principle: National Practice and the Ad Hoc Tribunals",
(2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 521, p. 522 (hereinafter Schabas, (2000a)).
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law considers "the prohibition of retroactive crimes and punishments to be one of its
most fundamental principles."348 The relevant test, for the purpose of Article 21(3) of
the ICC Statute, is simply whether the human right is "internationally recognized". It
was suggested above that this test would be satisfied by the status of the relevant
human rights norm as general international law. The international law principle
nullum crimen sine lege is a principle of customary international law, and appears to
be a general principle of law. Further, it is incorporated into various multilateral
human rights and humanitarian law treaties as indicated above, and into the
fundamental rights provisions of a significant number of national constitutions.
Recourse may therefore be had to Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute if, and to the
extent, that the principle nullum crimen sine lege in Article 22 understates the
principle as it applies in general international law. The application and interpretation
of law by the ICC must be in accordance with the wider standard.
5. Congruence between the ICC Statute & Customary Law
The customary international law standard of nullum crimen sine lege does not strictly
require pre-existing criminal laws in written form; both written and unwritten sources
of criminal law may suffice. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, for e.g., adds the proviso that the prohibition on ex post facto criminal law
shall not "prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission
which, at the time it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles
of law recognized by the community of nations."341' The ILC's 1994 Draft Statute for
an International Criminal Court had originally proposed that the court would have
subject-matter jurisdiction over certain enumerated treaty-based crimes as well as
crimes under general international law." The ICC Statute, however, confers
jurisdiction over crimes only where enumerated and defined in advance in written
W.A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2001, p. 57.
349 Art. 15(2), ICCPR.
See, e.g., J. Crawford, "The ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal", (1994) 88
American Journal of International Law 140, pp. 143-7. See, also, CR v UK (1995) 21 EHRR 363, par.
33, where the European Court of Human Rights indicates that the term "law" within Article 7 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (incorporating the principle nullum crimen sine lege),
comprises written as well as unwritten law.
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form.351 The ICC Statute appears, therefore, to evince a respect for the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege which is in some respects more extensive than that required
by customary international law. The ICTY, for instance, which purports in its case
law to abide by the customary international law standard of nullum crimen sine
lege,3'2 had no trouble in recognising an "inherent jurisdiction' to try and punish
individuals for the crime of contempt, despite no mention of such a crime in the
ICTY Statute." " The ICC Statute, on the other hand, specifically enumerates (within
Article 70) the offences against the administration of justice over which the ICC has
jurisdiction.'154
While the classical civil law requirement that offences be enumerated
and defined in written law355 appears to have been adopted by the ICC Statute
despite the fact that it does not form a part of nullum crimen sine lege under
customary international law, in other respects there is a close congruence between
the principle nullum crimen sine lege as it exists under customary law and the
principle as it exists within Article 22 of the ICC Statute. Article 22(1) of the ICC
351 See Arts 5-8, ICC Statute.
332 See below.
3x1 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on Allegations
of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, 31 January 2000, pars 13 & 24, affirmed in
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, Appeals Chamber, Appeal Judgment on
Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, 27 February 2001. The International
Court of Justice recognised the existence of "inherent powers" in its judgment in the Northern
Cameroons Case [1963] ICJ Rep. 15, p. 29. These powers were further elaborated by the ICJ in the
Nuclear Tests Cases as follows: "the Court possesses an inherent jurisdiction enabling it to take such
action as may be required, on the one hand to ensure that the exercise of its jurisdiction over the
merits, if and when established, shall not be frustrated, and on the other, to provide for the orderly
settlement of all matters in dispute, to ensure the observance of the 'inherent limitations on the
exercise of the judicial function' of the Court and to 'maintain its judicial character'" (Australia v
France [1974] ICJ Rep. 253, par. 23; New Zealand v France [1974] ICJ Rep. 457, par. 23.) The
recognition of an inherent jurisdiction is not in any sense remarkable, but then, at no stage did the ICJ
suggest that these inherent powers extended to the power of criminalisation.
334 Art. 70, ICC Statute. See, also, Art. 5(2) of the ICC Statute which excludes the crime of aggression
from the ICC's jurisdiction until such time as the crime is explicitly defined in an amendment to the
ICC Statute. Compare this insistence on written law with the existence of the residual jurisdiction
under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute over violations of the "laws or customs of war", a source of
jurisdiction which extends to all serious violations of humanitarian law (including customary
violations), with the exception of those violations already enumerated within the ICTY Statute, i.e.,
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-
1/AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2
October 1995, pars 87, 91; Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic,
Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, 22 February 2001, par. 401: but see Prosecutor
v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1/AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, Separate Opinion of Judge Li, par. 13).
333 This requirement is known in civil law systems as nullum crimen sine lege scripta (see, e.g.,
Cassese (2003), p. 141).
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Statute, which states the general principle that "[a] person shall not be criminally
responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it
takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court",356 is drafted in terms that
are almost identical to the principle nullum crimen sine lege as drafted in successive
human rights treaties.'07 Article 22(2) of the ICC Statute, which contains a number of
corollaries of the principle nullum crimen sine lege ("The definition of a crime shall
be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the
definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted
or convicted"), appears to replicate the requirements of nullum crimen sine lege
under customary international law, at least as they apply to the definitions of crimes
where located in statutory form. The ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Delalic,
for instance, has confirmed as a corollary of the principle of legality under customary
law, the rule that "penal statutes must be strictly construed".358 The requirement of
strict construction, and its logical necessity - the prohibition on the extension of
crimes by analogy - have been confirmed in numerous decisions of international
criminal tribunals,3'79 as well as the European Court of Human Rights.160 The
requirement that ambiguity in the definition of a crime be resolved in favour of the
3M> The effect of Article 22(1) of the ICC Statute is discussed below.
07 On this point see below.
Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 408.
0
See, e.g., Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 August
2001. par. 580; Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No.
IT-96-21, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, Esad
Landzo. 1 May 1997, pars 17-21; Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana andAllien
Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Trial Chamber, Decision on Motion to Compel the Production of
Exculpatory Witness Statements, Witness Summaries and Materials Pursuant to Rule 68, 8 July 2004,
pars 19-20; Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-
15-T. Trial Chamber, Sesay - Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rules 66 and
68 of the Rules, 9 July 2004, pars 17-18; Prosecutor v Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial
Chamber I, Judgment and Opinion, 5 December 2003, par. 93; Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljevic, Case
No. 1T-98-32-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 29 November 2002, par. 195; Prosecutor v Leonardus
Kasa, Case No. ll/CG/2000, Dili District Court, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, Judgment, 9 May
2001, at part 'E'; Prosecutor v Domingos Amati and Fransisco Matos, Case No. 12/2003, Dili District
Court, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, Decision on the Defence Motion to Dismiss Count 1 of the
Indictment for Failure to Establish a Prima Facie Case, 11 July 2003, pars 31-32; Prosecutor v Alex
Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kanutra and Santigie Borbor Kami, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Trial
Chamber, Brima - Decision on Applicant's Motion Against Denial by the Acting Principal Defender
to Enter a Legal Service Contract for the Assignment of Counsel, 6 May 2004, pars 89-91.
360 See, e.g., CR v UK (1995) 21 EHRR 363, par. 33.
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accused (a rule of construction known as contra proferentem)361 has also been upheld
in decisions of the international criminal tribunals.36" In one respect, however, it
appears that the elaboration of the principle nullum crimen sine lege in Article 22 of
the ICC Statute fails to mention a significant corollary of the principle nullum crimen
sine lege recognised under customary international law, i.e., the requirement of
specificity. This requirement, known to civil law systems by the maxim nullum
363 •
crimen sine lege stricta; ' requires that an offence not merely be defined in law, but
that it be defined clearly. The ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Delalic, for
instance, identified as a corollary of the principle nullum crimen sine lege, the
"requirement of specificity and the prohibition of ambiguity in criminal
legislation";364 the European Court of Human Rights identified as a component of the
principle nullum crimen sine lege, the rule that "an offence must be clearly defined in
law".365 This requirement has been upheld in a number of decisions of international
criminal tribunals.366 The requirement of specificity could be argued to follow in any
event from the rule of strict construction and from the rule contra proferentem:
Where a crime is defined ambiguously the accused can only be convicted if his
conduct clearly and unambiguously violated the relevant provision. But the
requirement of specificity is not coextensive with the rules of strict construction and
361 Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 413.
362 See. e.g. Prosecutor Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo. Case No. IT-
96-21-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, pars 402 & 413; Prosecutor v Clement
Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment and Sentence. 21
May 1999, par. 103; Prosecutor vMilan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic and Dragoljub Ojdanic, Case
No. IT-99-37-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging
Jurisdiction -Joint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003, pars 27-28; Prosecutor v Stanislav Galic, Case
No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgment and Opinion, 5 December 2003, par. 93.
363 Cassese (2003), pp. 141-2.
364 Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic. Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 402; see also, id., par. 409.
365 CR v UK (1995) 21 EHRR 363, par. 33.
366 See, e.g., Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 29
November 2002, pars 193, 201-202; Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-
AR72(E), Appeals Chamber, Decision on Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child
Recruitment), 31 May 2004, par. 40. See, also, Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A,
Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 29 July 2004. par. 141; Prosecutor v Enver Hadzihasanovic, Mehmed
Alagic andAmir Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003, par. 44;
Prosecutor v Milan Milutinovic,, Nikola Sainovic and Dragoljub Ojdanic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72,
Appeals Chamber, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction -Joint Criminal
Enterprise, 21 May 2003, par. 9; Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad
Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 20 February 2001, par. 178.
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contra proferentem, and it deserves separate mention. The effect of specificity as a
pre-requisite for criminalisation is that the court is stripped of subject-matter
jurisdiction in respect of an ambiguously defined crime even where the conduct in
question unambiguously contravenes the provision. Thus specificity is in some
respects a more stringent rule than strict construction and contra proferentem. The
requirement of specificity is similar in effect to the void-for-vagueness doctrine
under U.S. constitutional law whereby vaguely drafted penal provisions may be
declared unconstitutional/"67 As an element of the principle nullum crimen sine lege
under customary international law, the requirement of specificity governs the
application and interpretation of the ICC Statute by virtue of Article 21(3) of the
Statute which states that the application and interpretation of law by the ICC must be
consistent with internationally recognised human rights.368
There are, however, a number of potential means through which the ICC
could treat an absence of specificity in relation to a crime within the ICC Statute.
Treating the crime as falling outside of the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the ICC
by virtue of the requirement of specificity (which impliedly forms a part of the ICC
Statute as a result of Article 21(3)) is only one such means. Each of the corollaries of
the principle nullum crimen sine lege is inherently intertwined,369 thus any particular
violation of the principle could theoretically, depending on the circumstances, be
treated as a violation of more than one corollary. In relation to an absence of
specificity, therefore, the ICC could (instead of applying a non-specified corollary by
recourse to Article 21(3)) apply the rule contra proferentem under Article 22(2) of
the ICC Statute so as to interpret any ambiguity in the favour of the accused.
Alternatively, the ICC could treat the absence of specificity as entailing a violation of
the prohibition on non-retroactivity (which is incorporated in Article 22(1) of the
ICC Statute). The latter approach has been adopted in the practice of the ICTY. In
the case of Prosecutor v Vasiljevic, Trial Chamber II acquitted the accused of the
charge of "violence to life and person" on the grounds that the crime was
367
See, e.g., Ashworth (1999), p. 76. The requirement of specificity does not, however, create any
voidability as such; rather the court is deprived jurisdiction ratione materiae in respect of any
provision which is not drafted with sufficient clarity."68 See above.
369
See, generally, however, J.C. Jeffries, Jr., "Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal
Statutes", (1985) 71 Virginia Law Review 189
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insufficiently defined within customary international law. The Trial Chamber held
that although the crime ostensibly fell within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
ICTY (as a "serious" violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of
1949),370 it could not convict an accused person of the crime unless "the criminal
conduct in question was sufficiently defined and was sufficiently accessible at the
relevant time for it to warrant a criminal conviction and sentencing under the
criminal heading chosen by the Prosecution"/'1 The requirement of sufficient clarity
in the definition of a criminal offence was stated by the Chamber to be a component
of the principle milium crimen sine lege?1' and thus a precondition to the Tribunal's
jurisdiction.'173 Ultimately, the Trial Chamber was unable to find any conclusive
evidence of State practice which would point towards the definition of the crime of
"violence to life and person",374 and acquitted the accused on that charge.375 The
requirement of sufficient clarity in the definition of an offence appears to have been
treated by Trial Chamber II as an aspect of the requirement of non-retroactivity.
According to the Trial Chamber, the absence of any clear indication in the practice of
States as to the definition of "violence to life and person" meant that the Trial
Chamber was not able to satisfy itself that such an offence existed under customary
international law.376 The Trial Chamber indicated that even where a crime is listed as
a punishable offence in statutory form, that does not dispense with the requirement to
ensure that the offence is defined with sufficient clarity.377 It could be objected that
the position would be entirely different in relation to a crime falling within the ICC
Statute. The ICC Statute, after all, pre-dates any potential conduct which may be
378 • •
prosecuted under it, thus (it could be argued) precluding any issue of non-
retroactivity. But in fact it was the very absence of a definition of the offence (rather
than the absence of its enumeration in any authoritative form) which was the source
of the defect in Vasiljevic. Trial Chamber II indicated two ways in which a court may
370 Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 29 November
2002. par. 193.
371 Id.
372 Id., par. 201.
373 Id., par. 202.
374 Id., par. 194.
3 ' Id., par. 204.
376Id., par. 203.
377Id., par. 202.
37,s Art. 11. ICC Statute.
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violate the principle nullum crimen sine lege through the retroactive creation of
criminal offences: One was by criminalising an act which had not until the present
time been regarded as criminal (this, we may think of as retroactivity in the classical
sense), and the other was by "giving a definition to a crime which had none so
^79
far": Thus, wherever criminal conduct is enumerated and identified as criminal in
the ICC Statute, that conduct could nevertheless fall outside of the ICC's subject-
matter jurisdiction on the basis of the principle of non-retroactivity under Article
22(1) of the ICC Statute if the definition of that conduct is not sufficiently precise to
identify the conduct in question and distinguish the criminal from the permissible.380
iii. APPLICABILITY OF NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE TO
DEFENCES
While the principle nullen crimen sine lege unquestionably applies to the definition
of crimes located in the "special part" of the criminal law, there is some question as
to the extent to which the principle applies to other rules responsible for affixing
criminal liability. Article 22(2) of the ICC Statute provides only that "[tfhe definition
of a crime" shall be strictly construed, not extended by analogy, and interpreted in
favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted in the case of
ambiguity.381 It is therefore unclear to what extent, if any, these rules of
interpretation apply to rules located in the "general part" of the criminal law,
including a number of defences. Certainly, some core of the principle nullum crimen
sine lege applies, under the ICC Statute, to liability rules generally, including
"general part" defences. Article 22(1) states that "[a] person shall not be criminally
responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it
,7y Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgment. 29 November
2002, par. 196 (emphasis added).
380 See id., par. 193. Of course this does not prevent a court from interpreting and clarifying the
elements of a particular crime (id., par. 196, citing Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleskovski, Case No. IT-95-
14/1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 24 March 2000, pars 126-7 & Prosecutor v Zejtiil Delalic,
Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment,
20 February 2001, par. 173). Nor does it preclude the progressive development of the law by the court
(Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 29 November
2002, par. 196).
381 Art. 22(2), ICC Statute (emphasis added).
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takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court."382 The term "'conduct"
'JOT
would imply the criminal act (or omission)' ' in its totality, including the absence of
any defence. Fletcher has stated that "[t]he definition [of any crime] must be read,
together with the exceptions represented by claims of justification and excuse, in
order to arrive at the conduct that is actually subject to punishment."384 That portion
of the nullum crimen sine lege principle contained within Article 22(1) could
therefore be said to apply to all defences, whether contained in the "special part" or
the "general part" and whether justification or excuse. But what portion of the nullum
crimen sine lege principle is contained within Article 22(1)?
Article 22(1) of the ICC Statute is a sparse statement of the legality
principle. It could be asserted that it embodies only the basic prohibition on the
retroactive application of criminal laws (i.e. the branch of the principle delimiting
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction),385 with the other corollaries of nullum
crimen sine lege (i.e. the rules of interpretation) being relegated to Article 22(2).
There are, however, two problems with this view: The first concerns the difficulty of
distending non-retroactivity from the other corollaries of nullum crimen sine lege at
the fringes. There is a point at which the interpretation of pre-existing law becomes
so extensive or constructive that it becomes indistinguishable from retroactivity; The
second - and more substantial - problem relates to the wording employed in the
various international human rights and humanitarian law treaties and instruments
incorporating the nullum crimen sine lege principle. In each example, the principle is
incorporated in its entirety through the use of sparse language, similar to Article
22(1) of the ICC Statute. The European Convention on Human Rights, for instance,
•'" Article 22(1), ICC Statute (emphasis added).
3X3 B. Broomhall, "Article 22: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege", in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the
Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article, Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1999, p. 455, margin 29.
3X4 G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1978. p. 575.
3Xx The enunciation of the principle of non-retroactivity in Article 22(1) may appear superfluous in
light of the limitation of the jurisdiction ratione temporis of the ICC in Article 11 which states that the
ICC has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of the ICC
Statute. But where a State makes a declaration under Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute, accepting the
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC in relation to crimes committed on the territory of the State, or on
board a vessel or aircraft registered in that State, or by nationals of the State, after the entry into force
of the ICC Statute but before its entry into force for that State, then Article 22(1) prevents the
possibility of criminal responsibility in relation to acts or omissions which were not criminal under
customary international law (see Schabas (2001), p. 58). However, as elaborated below. Article 22(1)
does not simply incorporate the principle of non-retroactivity, but the principle nullum crimen sine
lege generally, including each of its corollaries (of which the principle of non-retroactivity is but one).
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which employs the very same language used in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,'186 and highly similar language to that used in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,'lS Protocols I and II Additional to the Geneva
Conventions,388 the American Convention on Human Rights389 and the African
Charter on Human and People's Rights,390 states simply, in Article 7(1), that, "[n]o
one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission
which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the
time when it was committed."391 Yet from these sparse words, which ostensibly
incorporate only the basic principle of non-retroactivity, the European Court of
Human Rights has confirmed, flow the entire principle nullum crimen sine lege
including each of its corollaries. As the Court stated in its Kokkinakis v Greece
judgment of 25 May 1993:
Article 7(1) of the Convention is not confined to prohibiting the
retrospective application of the criminal law to an accused's
disadvantage. It also embodies, more generally, the principle that only the
law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty (nullem crimen, nulla
poena sine lege) and the principle that the criminal law must not be
extensively construed to an accused's detriment, for instance, by analogy;
it follows from this that an offence must be clearly defined in law.392
The implication is that the language of Article 22(1) of the ICC Statute - being
identical, or at least highly similar, in all material respects to that employed in the
various human rights treaties - incorporates the principle nullum crimen sine lege in
its entirety including its various corollaries.1'1 General liability rules, including
386 Art. 15(1), ICCPR.
387 Art. 11(2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), UN Doc. A/810 (1948).
388 Art. 2(c), Protocol I; Art. 6(c), Protocol II.
389 Art. 9. American Convention on Human Rights.
390 Art. 7(2), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
391 Art. 7(1), European Convention on Human Rights.
392 Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397, par. 52; see also CR v UK (1995) 21 EHRR 363, par.
33.
393 Indeed, in the ILC's original Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, draft Article 39.
entitled Principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege), only addressed in express terms, the general
principle of non-retroactivity, athough the title of the draft Article clearly indicates that by those terms
it was the entire principle nullum crimen sine lege that was intended to be incorporated. Draft Article
39 stated:
An accused shall not be held guilty:
(a) in the case of a prosecution with respect to a crime referred to in article 20 (a) to
(d), unless the act or omission in question constituted a crime under international
law;
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defences found in the "general part" of the ICC Statute (even those non-enumerated
grounds excluding criminal responsibility in Article 31(3)) would be subject, at least
theoretically, to the principle nullum crimen sine lege and its corollaries. But if this is
so, how does one account for Article 22(2) which specifically sets out the rule of
strict construction, the prohibition on analogy and the requirement that ambiguity be
resolved in favour of the defendant, and yet applies these rules only to '"[tjhe
definition of a crime"?394
It may be that Article 22(2) is not intended to limit the operation of
nullum crimen sine lege under the ICC Statute in any sense, but only to clarify
certain of its features in a non-exhaustive manner. The drafters of the ICC Statute
may have decided, for instance, in light of the practice of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which have tended to take an
expansive view of the circumstances giving rise to criminal responsibility,39^ that the
ICC Statute should set out explicitly, the fact that nullum crimen sine lege requires
strict construction, a non-analogical approach to interpretation and ambiguity to be
resolved in favour of the accused. That these requirements are said to exist in relation
to the "definition of a crime" does not. on this view, limit these requirements to that
context, but rather clarifies the existence of these requirements in addition to the
other requirements which flow from the incorporation of the principle nullum crimen
sine lege in Article 22(1) of the ICC Statute. Section 12 of UNTAET Regulation
2000/15 limits the jurisdiction of the Special Panel for Serious Crimes according to
the principle nullum crimen sine lege in terms that are substantively identical to
Article 22 of the ICC Statute. Regulation 2000/15 provides:
12.1 A person shall not be criminally responsible under the present
regulation unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it
takes place, a crime under international law or the laws of East
Timor.
(b) in the case of a prosecution with respect to a crime referred to in article 20 (e),
unless the treaty in question was applicable to the conduct of the accused:
at the time the act or omission occurred.
(Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court. Report of the International Law Commission on its
Forty-Sixth Session, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth
session, 2 May-22 July 1994, U.N. G.A.O.R., 49th Session, Supplement No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10
(1994))
394 Art. 22(2). ICC Statute.
395 See below.
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12.2 The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be
extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be
interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or
convicted. 396
The Special Panel for Serious Crimes within the Dili District Court has taken the
view that §12.1 of Regulation 2000/15 (incorporating, in general terms, the principle
nullum crimen sine lege) "is underlined" by §12.2.397 This would suggest that §12.2
of Regulation 2000/15 (and by necessary implication, Art. 22(2) of the ICC Statute)
merely emphasises certain features or corollaries of nullum crimen sine lege in a non-
exhaustive manner. Contrarily, however, the view could be taken that Article 22(2)
operates to limit the effect of Article 22(1). The specific reference to the three
interpretative rules in the context of "[tjhe definition of a crime" may imply that they
do not apply outside of that context. But any attempt to apply the principle nullum
crimen sine lege under Article 22 of the ICC Statute more narrowly than its
customary international law counterpart is thwarted by Article 21(3) which requires
that the application and interpretation of law by the ICC be consistent with
398
internationally recognised human rights." If customary international law recognises
that the principle nullum crimen sine lege, including its corollaries, applies fully to
defences found in the "general part" of the criminal law, then the ambiguity over the
effect of Article 22(2) - i.e. whether it limits the operation of nullum crimen sine lege
under Article 22, or whether it simply clarifies certain features in a non-exhaustive
manner - should be resolved in favour of latter.
What then, does customary international law say as to the applicability of
nullum crimen sine lege to defences? Some defences, of course, are simply "failure
of proof' arguments,399 and there is no question that the principle of legality applies
to them (in a negative sense). Military necessity, where expressly provided for, is a
defence that falls within the "special part" of international criminal law statutes.
Thus, it is a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and a war
196
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, Regulation No. 2000/15, On the
Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, UN Doc.
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2000).
39' Prosecutor v Domingos Amciti and Fransisco Matos, Case No. 12/2003, Dili District Court, Special
Panel for Serious Crimes, Decision on the Defence Motion to Dismiss Count 1 of the Indictment for
Failure to Establish a Prima Facie Case, 11 July 2003.
398 Art. 21(3), ICC Statute.
399 Ashworth (1999), p. 209.
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crime under Article 8(2)(a)(iv) of the ICC Statute to commit "[ejxtensive destruction
and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly".400 The principle that the definition of a crime not be
extended by analogy, for e.g., implies here that the absence of military necessity not
be extended - rather than the defence itself, which is, after all, only incorporated into
the definition negatively. Other defences, however, fall within the "general part" of
the ICC Statute. These include defences expressly provided for and defined within
the Statute,401 as well as non-enumerated defences derived from the "'applicable law"
of the Statute, including customary international law.402 The wording of the various
international human rights and humanitarian law treaties and instruments which
incorporate the principle nullum crimen sine lege is couched in such terms as to
indicate the applicability of the principle even to these "general part" defences. Each
applies the requirement of non-retroactivity to "any act or omission" which did not
constitute a criminal offence at the time of its commission. The principle is not
limited, by terms, to the definitional element of the offence.40'1 Given that acts or
omissions do not constitute criminal offences in isolation, but only when coupled
with the requisite mens rea, it would appear that the international law standard of
nullum crimen sine lege applies generally to any aspect of act or omission which
bears on criminality, including any attenuating mental state,404 regardless of whether
that aspect has been incorporated into the "general" or "'special" part of the criminal
law, and regardless (in the case of defences) of whether it constitutes justification or
4(l"
Art. 8(2)(a)(iv), ICC Statute (emphasis added).
401
See, e.g., Art. 31(1), ICC Statute.
402 Art. 31(3), ICC Statute.
403 Article 11(2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217A (III), UN Doc. A/811
(1948); Art. 15(1), ICCPR; Art. 2(c), Protocol I; Art 6(c), Protocol II; Art. 7(1). European Convention
on Human Rights; Art. 9, American Convention on Human Rights; Art. 7(2), African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights. Art. 99, Geneva Convention III, refers simply to any "act" (omitting the
word "omission"). Art 65 ofGeneva Convention IV is stated in somewhat different terms:
The penal provisions enacted by the Occupying Power shall not come into force
before they have been published and brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in
their own language. The effect of these penal provisions shall not be retroactive.
(Emphasis added). By limiting the "effect" of penal provisions to non-retroactive effects only, the
Article is couched in terms that apply generally and not only to the definitional element of any
offence.
4114
Where act or omission x did not formerly constitute a criminal offence when committed with state-
of-mind y, retroactively deeming or interpreting mental state y as no longer excluding criminal
responsibility means than an individual has been held guilty of a criminal offence an account of an act
or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence at the time of its commission.
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excuse. According to the ICTY Trial Chamber in its Decision on Joint Challenge to
Jurisdiction in the case of Prosecutor v Hadzihasanovic (the emphasis appearing in
the original):
This Trial Chamber understands the principle nullum crimen sine lege, a
constitutive element of the principle of legality, in relation to the factual
criminality of a particular conduct. In interpreting the principle of nullum
crimen sine lege, it is critical to determine whether the underlying
conduct at the time of its commission was punishable. The emphasis on
conduct, rather than on the specific description of the offence in
substantive criminal law, is of primary relevance. This interpretation of
the principle is supported by the subsequent declaratory formulation of
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege in Article 22 of the ICC Statute:
"A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute
unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes
place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court."
This interpretation is further supported by the relevant practice between
States in the field of extradition. In order to determine whether the
requirement of double criminality is fulfilled, the test to be applied is not
so much whether a certain conduct is qualified in the respective national
jurisdiction in the same way, but whether the conduct in itself is
criminalised under those jurisdictions. The Trial Chamber is fully aware
of the different contexts in which these two principles are applied.
However, the Trial Chamber observes the similarity of the underlying
problem and legal guarantee. In order to meet the principle of nullum
crimen sine lege, it must only be foreseeable and accessible to a possible
perpetrator that his concrete conduct was punishable at the time of
commission. Whether his conduct was punishable as an act or an
omission, or whether the conduct may lead to criminal responsibility,
disciplinary responsibility or other sanctions is not of material
405
importance.
Thus any suggestion that the principle of legality does not apply to "general part''
elements of criminal responsibility (as opposed to the definition of the crime itself)
is, at least in the context of international criminal law, misconceived.406 International
4(b Prosecutor v Enver Hadzihasanovic, MehmedAlagic andAmir Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T,
Trial Chamber, Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, 12 November 2002, par. 62 (emphasis in
original).
41)6
Certainly, such suggestions exist. Fletcher, for e.g., notes that citizens "need to know what is
prohibited in the special part of the code in order to avoid the risk of liability," whereas citizens "need
not ponder the mysteries of action, causation, and the subtle differences between purposeful, knowing,
and reckless conduct." He states:
The primary purpose of legislation in the general part of a criminal code is
distinguished from the purpose of the special part in that it may not be to guide
citizens, but rather to generate consistency in judging. The audience may be primarily
judges rather than citizens. Definitions of excusing conditions, such as duress,
insanity, and mistakes of law, are needed not so much to advise citizens about how to
avoid liability for harmful conduct, but rather to channel the decisions of the judges
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criminal law has never devised a rigorous dogmatic, or theoretical, structure for the
elaboration of crimes.407 The ICC Statute itself has been criticised on the basis that it
is not a "dogmatically refined" criminal code.408 The weakness in any assertion that
only the "special part" of the ICC Statute, and not the "general part", should be
governed by the principle of legality is that the ICC Statute is comprised of a
somewhat haphazard collection of rules, definitions and principles, dispersed
throughout the Statute.404 The haphazard dispersal throughout the Statute of
conditions resulting in exoneration would make a mockery of the notion that those
conditions are subject to the principle of legality only when found in the "special
part" but not when found in the "general part" of the ICC Statute. Were such
fundamental consequences to attach to the precise method of elaboration of crimes
(and their division into doctrinal elements) the drafters of the ICC Statute would have
taken far greater care to ensure a "dogmatically refined" Statute. That they did not -
probably out of the necessity of forging a Statute made up of elements of diverse
legal systems - should put aside any suggestion that legality applies only to certain
elements of criminal responsibility under international criminal law and not to others.
Indeed, one only need look at the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals
to see that the principle nullum crimen sine lege is held to apply, not only to the
definitional element of offences, but to the wider corpus of criminal law. In
Prosecutor v Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic and Dragoljub Ojdanic, the ICTY
Appeals Chamber stated that the jurisdiction ratione personae of the ICTY was
limited by the principle nullum crimen sine lege in the same manner as the
jurisdiction ratione materiae;410 in Prosecutor v Leonardus Kasa, the Special Panel
into predictable patterns. These are the rules that Meir Dan-Cohen describes as
decision rules for judges rather than conduct rules addressed to citizens. However, it
would be difficult to say this is the exclusive function served by the norms of the
general part. For example, norms about the justifiable use of deadly force, also in the
general part, serve to advise citizens about when and under what circumstances they
can shoot to kill.
(Fletcher (1998). pp. 752-3).
40' See above.
4"s
K. Ambos, "General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute", (1999) 10 Criminal Law
Forum 1, p. 1.
409 See above.
410
Prosecutor vMilan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic andDragoljub Ojdanic, Case No. IT-99-37-
AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction -Joint
Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003, par. 10.
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for Serious Crimes held as inadmissible an analogical approach to interpretation
which would have taken an expansive view of the Court's jurisdiction ratione loci;411
in both Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao and
Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allien Kondewa, the Trial
Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone endorsed strict construction as the
proper method of interpretation of the Court's Rules of Procedure and Evidence.412
For a final observation - specifically in relation to defences - it should be noted that
the complete removal of the defence of "obedience to superior orders" in relation to
the trials arising out of the second world war is often viewed as having been a serious
violation of the principle of legality.41'' That this ex post facto application of law
(assuming that that was what it was) was not in relation to the definitional element of
an offence, but rather to a defence (and an excuse, rather than a justification, at
that),414 is not viewed in any sense as having diminished the violation.
iv. LIMITS TO NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE IN PRACTICE
1. Introduction
Treated as an aspect of "justice" the principle of legality makes no ex ante
prescription as to the interpretation of law: The correct interpretation (narrowly or
broadly, exculpatory or inculpatory) falls to be determined by balancing the
competing interests of justice; on the one hand, individual justice to the accused
through the provision of fair notice, and on the other hand, social justice through the
punishment of wrongs. As a legal principle, however, the principle of legality does
not enter into the philosophical or practical dimensions of justice. Individual justice
411 Case No. 1I/CG/2000, Dili District Court, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, Judgment, 9 May
2001, paid 'E'.
412 Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T,
Trial Chamber, Sesay - Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rules 66 and 68 of
the Rules, 9 July 2004, par. 18; Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana andAllien
Kondewa. Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Trial Chamber, Decision on Motion to Compel the Production of
Exculpatory Witness Statements, Witness Summaries and Materials Pursuant to Rule 68, 8 July 2004,
par. 20.
413 See, e.g., Bassiouni (1999), p. 159. See, also, id., p. 163.
414 Obedience to superior orders as a defence under international law is not a justifying condition, but
at best only an excusing one on the basis that there is no "right", under international law, to obey
orders of commanders and other superiors that are violative of international law. For the distinction
between justifications and excuses, see, e.g. van Sliedregt (2003), pp. 229-231.
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(as a value) and positivism (as a method) are given automatic priority over other
competing interests.41"1 The principle of legality, in its pure form, insists on complete
certainty.416 That at least, is the theory. The practice of courts, however, at both the
domestic and international level, does not always bear faith with the rules of strict
construction and the resolution of ambiguity in favour of the accused.417 This
deviation from theory may be, at least at some level, necessary. It has been observed
that it is impossible, and probably undesirable, to construct a legal system consisting
entirely of fixed, precise, mechanical rules.418 Ashworth notes that, "[ujnless the
criminal law occasionally resorts to open-ended terms such as 'reasonable' and
'dishonest', it would have to rely on immensely detailed and lengthy definitions
which might be extremely complicated and which might still fail to cover the
ground."419 The European Court of Human Rights has stated that "[hjowever clearly
drafted a legal provision may be, in any system of law, including criminal law, there
is an inevitable element of judicial interpretation. There will always be a need for
elucidation of doubtful points and for adaptation to changing circumstances."420
There are a number of examples in the jurisprudence of international criminal
tribunals involving the adoption of expansive interpretations of offences enumerated
within the relevant statute.421 Consider for instance the ICTY's interpretation of the
411 See Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Appeals Chamber,
Decision on Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment). 31 May 2004,
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson, pars 12 (referring to nullum crimen sine lege as an
"absolute" principle) & 15; Prosecutor v Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber I,
Judgment and Opinion, 5 December 2003, par. 98 (referring to the "unqualified imperative of respect
for the nullum crimen sine lege principle"). See, also, Cassese (2003), p. 141 (noting that "most
democratic civil law countries tend to uphold the doctrine of strict legality as an overarching
principle.")
416 Ashworth (1999), p. 78.
41' See, e.g.. Knuller vDPP [1973] AC 435 which, according to Ashworth, appears to create a new
offence of outraging public decency while ostensibly upholding the principle of non-retroactivity
(Ashworth (1999), p. 72, n. 34). See, also, CR v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 363, where the
European Court of Human Rights concluded that the House of Lords had not violated the principle
nullum crimen sine lege in upholding the conviction of a husband of marital rape, despite the
existence of a long-standing presumption of consent in marital sexual relations which had not been
repealed by legislation and appeared to be upheld in a number of earlier cases.
Jeffries (1985), p. 213.
419 Ashworth (1999). p. 78.
420 CR v UK (1995) 21 EHRR 363, par. 34.
421
See, e.g.. Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Appeals Chamber,
Decision on Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May 2004,
which concluded that the recruitment of child soldiers was a crime under customary international law
by November 1996, the beginning of the time frame referred to in the indictments. The Decision was
heavily criticised by Justice Robertson in his Dissenting Opinion on the basis that prior to the
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meaning of "[violations of the laws or customs of war" which is enumerated within
Article 3 of the ICTY Statute as a class of offence falling within the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Tribunal.422 Article 3 of the ICTY Statute does not offer a
definition of "[vjiolations of the laws or customs ofwar", but instead provides that:
Such violations shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated
to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic
monuments and works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.4"1
Each of the violations listed above derives from the Hague Regulations of 1907
which is concerned with limitations on the means and methods of warfare and is
often referred to as "Hague law" (as opposed to "Geneva law", a reference to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and related customary law, which is principally
concerned with the protection of those taking no active part in hostilities).424 While
the distinction between "Hague law" and "Geneva law" is a blurred one, there is
nevertheless a clear conceptual difference between the employment of unlawful
weapons or the unnecessary destruction of civilian property on the one hand
(prohibited under "Hague law") and acts such as murder and torture of civilians on
the other (prohibited, for e.g., under common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of
1949).4" Applying the canon of statutory interpretation ejusdem generis,426 whereby
promulgation of the ICC Statute there was insufficient basis for the conclusion that the recruitment of
child soldiers gave rise to individual criminal responsility under customary law (see id., Dissenting
Opinion of Justice Robertson). See, also, Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A. Appeals
Chamber. Judgment, 19 April 2004, which may be viewed as having confirmed a widening of the
legal definition of genocide in accepting that the killing of men only (and the sparing of women and
children) may still satisfy an "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such."
422 Art. 3, ICTY Statute.
422 Id.
424 See, e.g., Jones & Powles (2003), p. 251, par. 4.2.431.
42:1 Article 3, common to the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (herinafter Geneva
Convention I), Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (hereinafter Geneva
Convention II), Geneva Convention III and Geneva Convention IV (hereinafter Common Article 3).
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general words are not to be construed in their widest sense but are to be construed as
applying only to things of the same general kind or class as those specifically
mentioned,427 violations of the laws or customs of war under Article 3 of the ICTY
Statute would appear to be limited to violations of "Hague law".4~'s Nevertheless, the
ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) adopted what could probably be described as
the widest possible interpretation of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute:
[IJt can be held that Article 3 is a general clause covering all violations of
humanitarian law not falling under Article 2 or covered by Articles 4 or 5
[of the ICTY Statute], more specifically: (i) violations of the Hague law
on international conflicts; (ii) infringements of provisions of the Geneva
Conventions other than those classified as "grave breaches" by those
Conventions; (iii) violations of common Article 3 [of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949] and other customary rules on internal conflicts; (iv)
violations of agreements binding upon the parties to the conflict,
considered qua treaty law, i.e., agreements which have not turned into
customary international law.429
That these conclusions did not follow inexorably from the wording of Article 3 of the
ICTY Statute is evident in the Separate Opinion of Judge Li who viewed the
majority's conclusion that Article 3 covered all serious violations of international
humanitarian law not otherwise covered by the ICTY Statute as an "unwarranted
assumption of legislative power which has never been given to this Tribunal by any
authority."430 It can be observed, therefore, that in practice the theoretical quest for
certainty is mediated by practical concern with the need to allow for the gradual
development or clarification of rules. Thus each of the corollaries of nullum crimen
See J.E. Ackennan & E. O'Sullivan, Practice and Procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, Kluwer Law International. The Hague, 2000, p. 26.
4J' The canon of statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis, could be said to entail analogical reasoning
and therefore be inconsistent with the principle nullum crime sine lege. Ejusdem generis may,
however, be consistent with nullum crimen sine where the relevant provision specifically calls for the
application of analogy (discussed below).4" Black's Law Dictionary, p. 517.
42N See Ackerman & O'Sullivan (2000), p. 26.
4-9 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1/AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, par. 89; see, also. Prosecutor v
Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment of the Trial
Chamber, 22 February 2001, par. 401; Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zclravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and
Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 278.
42,1 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1/AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, Separate Opinion of Judge Li, par.
13.
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sine lege have been interpreted in the jurisprudence of international criminal
tribunals as limited in nature.
2. Strict Construction
In accordance with the principle nullum crimen sine lege, the ICTY Trial Chamber in
its Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, Esad
Landzo (in the context of Prosecutor v Delalic) confirmed that it was obliged to
interpret statutory provisions according to the rule of strict construction.4"1
According to the Trial Chamber:
the meaning and intention of a statutory provision should be discerned
from the plain and unambiguous expression used therein rather than from
any notions which may be entertained as just and expedient.
Hence where the language of a provision is clear and plain, admitting
only of one meaning there is no need for construction. The clear,
unambiguous meaning so understood should be applied. When the
meaning of a provision is plain, it is scarcely the province of the reader to
scan its wisdom or policy. The duty is to expound the law as it stands
according to the real sense of the words.43"
There is, in the Trial Chamber's Decision, a clear repudiation of the "purposive" or
• • -» • • 4.TT
"teleological" approach to the interpretation of international penal provisions, " at
least where the meaning of the provision is clear. According to the Trial Chamber:
The corollary to the literal rule of construction is that nothing should be
added to or taken away from a statute, unless there are adequate grounds
to justify the inference that the legislator intended something which it
omitted to express. In Thompson v Goold [1910] AC 409 at p. 420, Lord
Mersey, speaking of English Law, stated that "[i]t is a strong thing to read
into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of
clear necessity, it is a wrong thing to do."
The Trial Chamber accepts and adopts this view...4,4
431 See Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-
21, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, Esad
Landzo, 1 May 1997, pars 17-21.
432 Id., pars 17-18.
433 On the distinction between "textual" and "teleological" approaches to statutory interpretation, see,
e.g., S.L. Bunn-Livingstone, Juriscultural Pluralism vis-a-vis Treaty Law: State Practice and
Attitudes, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2002, pp. 85-88. On the meaning of "purposive"
approach, see Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 231, p. 236 per Lord Simon: see also
A. Bredimas, Methods ofInterpretation and Community Law, North-Holland Publishing Company,
Amsterdam, 1978, pp. 157-161.
4 ,4 Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21,
Trial Chamber, Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, Esad Landzo, 1
May 1997, pars 20-21.
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Insofar as the above passage implies that it may be acceptable, in the presence of a
"clear necessity", to read into a statutory provision something which does not appear
in its literal terms, it is evident from the Chamber's reasoning that "clear necessity"
does not include the interests of justice or any other policy concern. As the Trial
Chamber indicated above, the meaning of words should not be deduced "from any
notions which may be entertained as just and expedient".4'1'7 Instead, the rule is that it
is impermissible to read into statutory provisions, "words which are not there, and
which cannot by necessary implication be read into [the provision] to give it sense
and meaning."436 The only extraneous words or inferences that may be added to the
statutory text, therefore, are those that are mandated by "necessary implication". This
would suggest some limited power to avoid logical non-sequiturs or absurdities in
the construction of statutory terms, but not a judicial fiat to construe terms as
commensurate with the underlying purpose of the provision or with social policy.
An analysis of the constellation of methodological approaches to
statutory interpretation within the common law tradition is instructive as it suggests
that the approach to statutory interpretation employed by the ICTY Trial Chamber in
the decision cited above is commensurate with what common law lawyers
traditionally referred to as the "golden rule" of statutory interpretation. To this end, it
entails a rejection of the two alternative rules that stood at opposite extremes of the
spectrum of interpretative methods traditionally referred to by common law judges:
The "literal rule" of interpretation and the "mischief rule".437 Although the Trial
Chamber in the passage cited immediately above referred to the "literal rule" of
Id., par. 17.
43(> Id., par. 21 (emphasis added).
4,7
Judges in the common law tradition have tended to distinguish these three rules or methods of
statutory interpretation (i.e., the "golden", "literal" and "mischief' rules) as the alternative rules or
methods employed by courts (see, e.g., R.J. Aldisert, "The Brennan Legacy: The Art of Judging",
(1999) 32 Loyola ofLos Angeles Law Review 673, p. 679). Nevertheless, Bennion states, in relation to
the contemporary process of statutory interpretation as applied in common law systems:
Our courts have moved on from the old simplistic view. No longer is a problem of
statutory interpretation settled by applying some talisman called "the literal rule", or
"the golden rule", or the "mischief rule". Nowadays we have purposive construction,
coupled with respect for the text and a recognition by judges that interpreting a modern
Act is a matter sophisticated and complex. Rules of thumb are out. The only golden
rule, as Shaw said, is that there are no golden rules.
(F. Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, Butterworths, London, 1984, p. xxvii).
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construction,438 apparently in reference to the method of construction being
expounded by the Chamber itself, the Trial Chamber's approach is in fact not
reconcilable with the "literal rule" of construction as that term is known in common
law systems. Although it is possible to presume, for reasons of facial similarity, that
"strict construction" entails an obligation to employ the "literal rule" of statutory
construction, the presumption would be incorrect. The term "strict construction" has
no definite or precise meaning, and it has been observed that "strict construction" is
not the opposite of "liberal construction".439 The "literal rule" was enunciated in
Vacher & Sons Ltd v London Society of Compositors (1913) where Lord Atkinson
stated that unambiguous statutory terms must be given effect to, even where the
result produces an absurdity:
If the language of a statute be plain, admitting of only one meaning, the
Legislature must be taken to have meant and intended what it has plainly
expressed, and whatever it has in clear terms enacted must be enforced
though it should lead to absurd or mischievous results. If the language of
this sub-section be not controlled by some of the other provisions of the
statute, it must, since its language is plain and unambiguous, be enforced,
and your Lordship's House sitting judicially is not concerned with the
question whether the policy it embodies is wise or unwise, or whether it
leads to consequences just or unjust, beneficial or mischievous.440
It is clear that the principle of strict construction as it has been interpreted in the
decisions of the international criminal tribunals does not extend to granting primacy
to the text in circumstances where that would lead to an absurdity.441 At the same
448 Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21,
Trial Chamber, Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, Esad Landzo, 1
May 1997, par. 20.
439 Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1422.
440 Vacher & Sons Ltd v London Society ofCompositors [1913] AC 107, pp. 121-2. See also Dixon v
Harrison (1669) Vaugh 36, 124 ER 958; Wallis v Smith (1804) 1 Smith KB 346; Warburton v
Loveland (1832) 2 Dow&Cl 480, 5 ER 499; Lowther v Bentink (1874) LR 19 Eq 166. p. 169 per
Jessel MR: Caledonian Railway Co v North British Railway Co (1881) 6 App Cas 114 , p. 121 per
Lord Selborne LC.
441 See Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-
21, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused. Esad
Landzo, 1 May 1997, pars 20-21; Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad
Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T. Trial Chamber. Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 410; Prosecutor v
Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana andAllien Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Trial Chamber,
Decision on Motion to Compel the Production of Exculpatory Witness Statements, Witness
Summaries and Materials Pursuant to Rule 68, 8 July 2004, par. 19; see also Prosecutor v Issa Hassan
Sesay. Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber, Sesay-
Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rules 66 and 68 of the Rules, 9 July 2004,
par. 16.
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time, it appears that the decisions of the international criminal tribunals do not
explicitly support the "mischief rule'" whereby a liberal construction of statutory-
terms is adopted in order to ensure that the purpose or object of the statutory
provision is given effect. The "mischief' rule (now more commonly referred to as
the "purposive'" or "functional" approach to statutory construction)442 was articulated
in Heydon's Case (1584) as follows:
That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they
penal or beneficial, restricting or enlarging of the common law) four
things are to be discerned and considered: (f) what was the common law
before the passing of the Act; (2) what was the mischief and defect for
which the common law did not provide; (3) what remedy the Parliament
hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth; (4)
the true reason of the remedy. And then the office of all the judges is
always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and
advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for
continuance of the mischief, and pro private commotio, and to add force
and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers
of the Act, pro bono publico,443
This approach to statutory interpretation is clearly at odds with the approach to
statutory interpretation as explicitly articulated in decisions of the international
criminal tribunals. In its Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the
Accused, Esad Landzo, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated (as cited above) that "[wjhen
the meaning of a provision is plain, it is scarcely the province of the reader to scan its
wisdom or policy".444 The Trial Chamber thus refrained from adopting an
interpretation that would ensure that the result was "just" or "expedient"".444 The Trial
Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone has equally insisted that the meaning
of statutory terms should be discerned from the plain and unambiguous expression
employed rather than from notions of justice or expedience.446 As a corrective to
442 See Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 231, p. 236 per Lord Simon.
443 (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a. See, also, Parker v Sanders (1617) Cro Jac 418, 79 ER 357; Stallwood v
Tredger (1815)2 Phillim 287, 161 ER 1147; Lyde v Barnard (1836) 1 M&W 101, 150 ER 363; River
Wear Comrs v Adamson (1877) 2 App Cas 743, p. 764; ReMayfair Property Co, Bartlett vMayfair
Property Co [1898] 2 Ch 28, p. 35.
444 Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdra\>ko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21.
Trial Chamber. Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused. Esad Landzo. 1
May 1997, par. 18.
442 Id., par. 17.
44h Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana andAllien Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T,
Trial Chamber. Decision on Motion to Compel the Production of Exculpatory Witness Statements,
Witness Summaries and Materials Pursuant to Rule 68, 8 July 2004, par. 19; see also Prosecutor v
Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber,
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perceived ills arising both from the "literal" and "mischief* rules, common law
judges enunciated the "golden rule" of statutory interpretation which offers fealty
neither to the literalistic terms of the statutory provision (where those terms compel a
meaning which is absurd or inherently self-contradictory), nor to the "object" and
"purpose" of the provision (where that object and purpose is separable from, or not
manifest in, the actual words employed). As Lord Wensleydale stated in his
exposition on the "golden" rule in Grey v Pearson (1857):
in construing... statutes, and indeed all written instruments, the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless
that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency
with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and
ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that
absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.447
The approach to statutory interpretation, as explicitly expounded in decisions of the
international criminal tribunals, appears to be commensurate with this "golden rule"
approach. This approach is, in effect, a means of mediating both the primacy of the
text and the intention of the legislature (including the object or purpose of the
legislative enactment). The mediating principle is the assumption that the legislature
intended what the text clearly states. The principle is in effect a denial of the
assumption that unjust, inconvenient and ostensibly narrow constructions of
legislative terms do not accord with the true intent of the drafters.44* In fact, where,
as in the case of the ICC Statute, the terms are the product of involved negotiations
between numerous interested State parties it cannot simply be assumed that the final
wording was chosen with the common intention that it should be given its most
expansive or humanitarian interpretation. In Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, the
Trial Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone adopted the dictum of Lord
Herschel in The Bank ofEngland v Vagliano Brothers [1891] AC 107 at 144 where
Sesay - Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rules 66 and 68 of the Rules, 9 July
2004, par. 16.
447
(1857) 6 HLC 61, p. 106 (emphasis added). See also Simpson v Unwin (1832) 3 B&Ad 134, 110
ER 50; Becke v Smith (1836) 2 M&W 191, 150 ER 724; Brettell v Dawes (1852) 7 Exch 307, 155 ER
963; Cave v Horsell [1912] 3 KB 533; Bodega Co vMartin [1915] 2 Ch 385; Re Jenkins, Jenkins v
Davies (1931) 100 LJ Ch 265; M v Law Society (Alberta) [1941] 1 DLR 213; Stock v Frank Jones
(Tipton) Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 948; McCormick v Horsepower Ltd [1981] 2 All ER 746; R v West
Yorkshire Coroner, Ex p Smith [1982] 3 All ER 1098.
448 See Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR
297, p. 305.
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His Lordship stated that "'I think the proper cause is in the first instance, to examine
the language of the Statute and to ask what its natural meaning is."444 The Trial
Chamber proceeded to state that this dictum:
has stood the test of time because it limits the prevalent temptation to
import into a clearly enacted Statute or Regulation, extraneous meanings
and interpretations which, in the long run, not only enable the authority to
assume legislative functions which is ultra vires, but also produces a
result that is directly contradictory or even contrary to the necessary
intendment of the legislative or regulatory instrument.4^"
In its Judgment in Prosecutor v Delalic, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated that *"[t]he
legislature will not allow [its] intention to be gathered from doubtful inerences from
the words used. It will also not leave its intention to be inferred from unexpressed
words. The intention should be manifest."4"11 Then, in what appears to be a direct
rebuke to the "mischief' rule, the Trial Chamber stated that:
The accepted view is that if the legislature has not used words sufficiently
comprehensive to include within its prohibition all the cases which should
naturally fall within the mischief intended to be prevented, the interpreter
is not competent to extend them. The interpreter of a provision can only
determine whether the case is within the intention of a criminal statute by
construction of the express language of the provision.422
The assumption that the intention of the legislative drafters cannot be put
at anything higher than that which is unambiguously present in the text itself does of
course begin to collapse once the clear and unambiguous meaning of the text
produces a result which is absurd or self-contradictory. Thus the "golden rule"
permits a tightly constrained deviance from the clear meaning of the text in such
circumstances, but both the circumstances justifying deviance and the extent of the
44'
Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brirna, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kami, Case No.
SCSL-04-16-PT. Trial Chamber, Brima - Decision on Applicant's Motion Against Denial by the
Acting Principal Defender to Enter a Legal Service Contract for the Assignment of Counsel. 6 May
2004. par. 90.
441
Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kami, Case No.
SCSL-04-16-PT, Trial Chamber, Brima - Decision on Applicant's Motion Against Denial by the
Acting Principal Defender to Enter a Legal Service Contract for the Assignment of Counsel, 6 May
2004, par. 91; see, also, Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo,
Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 409 ("The legislature will
not allow [its] intention to be gathered from doubtful inferences from the words used. It will also not
leave its intention to be inferred from unexpressed words. The intention should be manifest.")
4M Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 409.
452M, par. 410.
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deviance itself are limited. Logical non-sequiturs may be avoided, but this should not
be taken by the judicial decision-maker as an opportunity to simply re-write the
statutory terms to accord with principles of justice or social policy.
The role of the "golden rule'" as a means of mediating what are otherwise
apparently inconsistent considerations is highlighted in the following decision of the
Trial Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, where the Trial Chamber
observes:
by way of first principles, that no rule, however formulated, should be
applied in a way that contradicts its purpose. A kindred notion here is that
a statute or rule must not be interpreted so as to produce an absurdity. In
effect, it is rudimentary law that a statute or rule must be interpreted in
light of its purpose. Another basic canon of statutory interpretation is that
a statute is to be interpreted in accordance with legislative intent.4"
The Trial Chamber then proceeds immediately to endorse what it refers to as the
"literal" approach to interpretation in which (citing the ICTY Trial Chamber), "the
meaning and intention of a statutory provision shall be discerned from the plain and
unambiguous expression used therein rather than from any notions which may be
entertained as just or expedient."4"'4 Legislative intent and the purpose of the
enactment are treated as considerations consistent with a strict rendering of the
, . 455text.
4" Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allien Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T,
Trial Chamber, Decision on Motion to Compel the Production of Exculpatory Witness Statements,
Witness Summaries and Materials Pursuant to Rule 68, 8 July 2004, par. 19; see, also, Prosecutor v
Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber,
Sesay - Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rules 66 and 68 of the Rules, 9 July
2004, par. 16.
4'4 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allien Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T,
Trial Chamber, Decision on Motion to Compel the Production of Exculpatory Witness Statements,
Witness Summaries and Materials Pursuant to Rule 68, 8 July 2004, pars 19-20 (citing Prosecutor v
Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21, Trial Chamber,
Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused. Esad Landzo, 1 May 1997, par.
17); see also Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-
04-15-T, Trial Chamber, Sesay - Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rules 66
and 68 of the Rules, 9 July 2004, pars 17-18.
4" See, however, the Judgment of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Celebici case:
The rule of strict construction requires that the language of a particular provision shall
be construed such that no cases shall be held to fall within it which do not fall within
the reasonable meaning of its terms and within the spirit and scope of the enactment.
(Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landio, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 410). It appears on the face of it that the above
passage is a "watered down" version of strict construction; one that ultimately permits a more liberal
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As indicated above, "strict construction", as the term has come to be
interpreted in the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals, does not
prohibit all "constructive" interpretations of statutory terms; construction is
permissible in order to avoid logical non-sequiturs, absurdities or self-contradiction.
Presumably the legislative intent or object and purpose of the enactment may be
examined in conducting these limited acts of construction. Consider, for instance,
the "constructive" interpretation adopted by the ICTY Trial Chamber in its Rule 61
decision in Prosecutor v Rajic. That decision concerned, inter alia, the status of the
residents of Stupni Do, a village in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian
Croats. The Trial Chamber found that although the residents of Stupni Do were not
directly or physically "in the hands of' Croatia (a requirement for their
characterisation as protected persons under Geneva Convention IV of 1949),476
nevertheless they could be treated as being "constructively" in the hands of
Croatia.4,7 The Trial Chamber was satisfied that the Bosnian Croats controlled the
territory surrounding the village, ' and that the attack against the village was carried
out by the Croatian Defence Council, the forces of which were under the control of
Croatia to such an extent that they could be regarded as "agents" of the Croatian
State.4:>9 While the residents of Stupni Do were not directly or physically in the hands
of Croatia, they nevertheless fell within the protective provisions of Geneva
Convention IV which protects those who "at a given moment, and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a
rendering of statutory terms. Of course, the above passage needs to be treated with some considerable
caution. The Trial Chamber offered no authority for its proposition (either from among the decisions
of national courts or from the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals). Further, the very
notion of "strict construction", while not the subject of precise definition (on this point, see above)
nevertheless suggests at least some element of "strictness". That element is incorporated into the
decisions of the international criminal tribunals (in their consideration of the requirement of strict
construction) cited in the preceding paragraphs of the text above. In the final analysis, it is hard to
escape the conclusion that the above passage does not establish a standard of statutory interpretation,
but rather begs the very question of what that standard is. Strict construction, we are told, requires us
to adopt a meaning which does not exceed the "reasonable meaning" of the provision's terms. The
meaning that is "reasonable" must surely depend on the relevant rules and methods of interpretation.
While mention is made of the "spirit and scope" of the enactment, this is not offered as the sum total
of the correct measure of interpretation, but rather a measure which exists in addition to that of the
"reasonable meaning".
4"' Art. 4, Geneva Convention IV.
4' Prosecutor v Rajic, Case No. IT-95-I2-R61, Trial Chamber, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to
Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 13 September 1996, par. 37.
458 Id., par. 37.
459 Id., par. 35.
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Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.'"460 While
the Trial Chamber's interpretation appears constructive, it would not appear to fall
foul of the requirements of strict construction. The relevant provision is "clear and
plain"461 in its inclusive approach to the meaning of being "in the hands of' a Party
(i.e. by virtue of the phrase "in any manner whatsoever").
The requirement of strict construction of penal provisions is a
requirement that exists in relation to the interpretation of terms located in the form of
treaties or international instruments. It is relevant to ask whether the requirement
exists in any form in relation to norms located in customary international law. On the
face of it, it does not. The elements of customary law are state practice and opinio
juris,462 rather than textual provisions which can be construed "strictly" or otherwise.
On the other hand, it may be that where a customary norm is heavily associated with
a particular treaty provision (as is the case, for e.g., in relation to the UN Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide),463 then the
interpretation of the relevant norm should be by way of strict construction of the
relevant text.464
Finally, it is to be recalled that the requirement of strict construction
exists in relation to statutory terms that are clear and unambiguous. As the ICTY
Trial Chamber stated in its Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by
the Accused, Esad Landzo (cited above), "where the language of a provision is clear
460 Art 4, Geneva Convention IV (emphasis added).
4M Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21,
Trial Chamber, Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, Esad Landzo, 1
May 1997, par. 17.
462 Art. 38(l)(b). ICJ Statute.
463 See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime ofGenocide
(Advisory Opinion), [1951] ICJ Rep. 16, p. 23; Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons
(Advisory Opinion), [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, par. 31; Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (1993), par. 45.
464 It will very often be the case, however, that in the determination of customary norms, the relevant
norm will not be located or reflected in one authoritative treaty. As the Appeals Chamber of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone stated in Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-
AR72(E), Appeals Chamber, Decision on Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child
Recruitment), 31 May 2004, par. 38:
A norm need not be expressly stated in an international convention for it to crystallize
as a crime under customary international law. What, indeed, would be the meaning of a
customary rule if it only became applicable upon its incorporation into an international
instrument such as the Rome Treaty?
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and plain, admitting only of one meaning there is no need for construction".466 What
is the relevant interpretative course, however, where the statutory terms are
ambiguous? In such circumstances, the rule of strict construction offers no guidance.
Instead one must look to the other corollaries of the principle nullum crimen sine
lege: the obligation to interpret ambiguity in favour of the accused, the prohibition on
analogy and the requirement of specificity.
3. Interpretation in Favour of the Accused
In the case of ambiguity in penal provisions the relevant interpretative principle is
that the interpretation which most favours the accused is the one that should be
adopted.466 Just as with the principle of strict construction as expounded in the
jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals, it would appear that the
principle of interpreting ambiguity in favour of the accused (also known as the
principle contra proferentem,467 in dubio pro reo,468 or favor rei)w> is not to be
applied to the point that the end result is absurd or entails self-contradiction or some
other logical non-sequitur. In Prosecutor v Krstic, the ICTY Trial Chamber upheld
the principle that "where there is a plausible difference of interpretation or
application, the position which most favours the accused should be adopted".470 For
the purpose of application of the principle, it is only in relation to competing
"plausible" interpretations, that any ambiguity may be said to arise.
4<° Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21,
Trial Chamber, Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, Esad Landzo, 1
May 1997, par. 18.
466
Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Chamber. Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 402; Prosecutor v Milan Milutinovic, Nikola
Sainovic and Dragoljub Ojdanic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Appeals Chamber. Decision on
Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction -Joint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003, pars
27-28; Prosecutor v Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber I. Judgment and Opinion, 5
December 2003, par. 93; Prosecutor v Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-
1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment and Sentence, 21 May 1999, par. 103.
4'" See Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zclrcrvko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-
21-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 413.
4,'s See Prosecutor v Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic and Dragoljub Ojdanic, Case No. IT-99-37-
AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction - Joint
Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003, pars 27-28.
469 See Cassese (2003). pp. 156-7.
47,1
Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 August 2001, par.
502 (emphasis added).
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In the case of Krstic, the principle of interpretation in favour of the
accused was employed in the context of determining the elements of "extermination"
as a crime against humanity under Article 5(b) of the ICTY Statute. The Trial
Chamber noted that the term "extermination" strongly suggested the commission of a
"massive" crime, but could also be taken to refer to the eradication of an entire
471
population made up of only a relatively small number of people. In applying the
principle of resolving ambiguity in favour of the accused, the Trial Chamber
concluded that the definition of extermination should be read as meaning '"the
destruction of a numerically significant part of the population concerned".47" The
principle of resolving ambiguity in favour of the accused was also employed by
ICTR Trial Chamber I in Prosecutor v Akayesu in relation to the meaning of
"killing" in the context of the definition of Genocide in Article 2(2)(a) of the ICTR
Statute. The Trial Chamber noted that the term ""killing" could encompass both
intentional and unintentional homicides, whereas the French version of the Statute
employed the term ''meurtre" (the same term employed, incidentally, in the Penal
Code of Rwanda in relation to intentional homicide).473 The Trial Chamber stated
that:
Given the presumption of innocence of the accused, and pursuant to the
general principles of criminal law, the Chamber holds that the version
more favourable to the accused should be upheld and finds that Article
2(2)(a) of the Statute must be interpreted in accordance with the definition
of murder given in the Penal Code of Rwanda, according to which
"meurtre" (killing) is homicide committed with the intent to cause
death.4'4
The principle of resolving ambiguities in favour of the accused was also
visited by the ICTY Trial Chamber in its Judgment in Prosecutor v Delalic. The
Judgment in that case, however, adds an element of confusion as to the proper
application of the principle. The Trial Chamber stated that:
4/1 Id., par. 50f.
47:
Id., par. 502 (emphasis added). While the Trial Chamber's definition of extermination was
addressed on appeal, the application by the Trial Chamber of the principle of resolving ambiguity in
favour of the accused was not touched upon (see Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A.
Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 19 April 2004).47
Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, 2 September
1998. par. 500.
474 Id., par. 501. This aspect of the Trial Chamber's Judgment was not raised on appeal (see
Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment. 1 June 2001).
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The effect of strict construction of the provisions of a criminal statute is
that where an equivocal word or ambiguous sentence leaves a reasonable
doubt of its meaning which the canons of construction fail to solve, the
benefit of the doubt should be given to the subject and against the
legislature which has failed to explain itself. This is why ambiguous
criminal statutes are to be construed contra proferentem.4 ^
The element of confusion is produced by the suggestion that it is only reasonable
doubt as to the meaning of a statutory provision "which the canons of construction
fail to resolvewhich must be interpreted in favour of the accused. The Trial
Chamber does not enlighten the reader as to which canons of construction it had in
mind. Given that the discussion relates to the interpretation of penal provisions, and
given that such interpretation must be consistent with the principle milium crimen
sine lege, it is axiomatic that the Trial Chamber's reference to the canons of
construction is a reference only to those canons of construction consistent with the
principle nullum crimen sine lege. Those canons include strict construction, the
prohibition on analogy and (at the risk of circularity in this context) the requirement
to interpret ambiguity in favour of the accused. It is probably fair to conclude, then,
that the phrase "which the canons of construction fail to resolve" implies simply that
it is not any literalistic ambiguity on the face of the Statute that must be interpreted in
favour of the accused, but rather those ambiguities that remain after the judicial
decision-maker has attempted a strict construction of the statute, giving the words
their ordinary and natural meaning and avoiding any conclusions which are absurd or
illogical. If, after such an endeavour, there are two or more possible interpretations -
each consistent with the natural and ordinary meaning of the words and each fairly
open to the court (being neither absurd or illogical), then the court should apply that
interpretation which poses the least imposition towards the accused.476
The difficulty here, however, is that both the rule of strict construction
and the prohibition on analogy have narrow applications. The requirement of strict
construction applies only where the terms of any provision are plain and
4o Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 413. See also Prosecutor v Milan Milutinovic,
Nikola Sainovic and Dragoljub Ojdanic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on
Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction - Joint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003, pars
27-28.
476 For similar conclusions in the domestic law context, see Kirkness v John Hudson & Co Ltd [1955]
AC 696, p. 712 per Viscount Simonds; DPP v Ottewell [1970] AC 642, p. 649 per Lord Reid.
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unambiguous; the requirement has limited, if any, application in the context of norms
located solely in customary law.477 The narrow application of the prohibition on
analogy is discussed below. It may therefore be that in the context of ambiguous
provisions, provided that the prohibition on analogy is observed, those provisions
may be construed in accordance with interpretative criteria that apply generally in
international law, which is to say, in accordance with those rules of interpretation
arising under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, including reference to
the object and purpose of the provision in question.478 Thus in the context of
ambiguous penal provisions, it could be said that the "object and purpose"
approach479 is not inconsistent with milium crimen sine lege so long as the approach
does not involve reliance on analogy (as discussed below). Nevertheless, if the ICTY
Trial Chamber is correct in Delalic and the requirement of interpreting ambiguity in
favour of the accused is a residual rule only, applying where the canons of
construction have left a "reasonable doubt" as to the meaning of the provision, then
the rule contra proferentem must still have some considerable application as canons
of construction (such as looking to the "object and purpose" of the enactment) must
regularly involve "reasonable doubt" as to whether the proper interpretation is x as
opposed to y. Unless the object and purpose, for e.g., is unambiguously clear and
involves, beyond any "reasonable doubt", interpretation x, then the question whether
x ory is the correct interpretation must be resolved contra proferentem, i.e. in favour
of the accused.
The principle of interpreting ambiguity in favour of the accused appears
to apply, under customary international law, not only to the interpretation of penal
provisions in statutory form, but also to the determination of norms relating to the
ascription of individual criminal responsibility located in customary international
law. This would appear, after all, to be what was intended in the Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Regulation 808
(1993), concerning the creation of the ICTY, which states:
477 See above.
478 See Arts 31-33, Vienna Convention.
479 This is a reference to the determination of the meaning of treaty terms in light, inter alia, of the
"object and purpose" of the treaty as provided for under the general rule of interpretation set out in
Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.
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In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the principle
milium crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal should
apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt
part of customary law.480
The international criminal tribunals have also considered or applied the principle of
interpretation in favour of the accused in the context of determining the customary
international law status of certain norms. For instance, Justice Robertson, in his
Dissenting Opinion in the Decision on Preliminary Motion based on Lack of
Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) in Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, stated, in the
context of the question of whether the recruitment of child soldiers gave rise to
individual criminal responsibility under customary international law, that "in cases of
real doubt as to the existence or definition of a criminal offence, the benefit of that
doubt must be given to the defendant".481 In its Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's
Motion Challenging Jurisdiction - Joint Criminal Enterprise, the ICTY Trial
Chamber decided that "[ijnsofar as concerns the question whether joint criminal
enterprise is recognised in customary international law, the Appeals Chamber has no
•> 489
doubt that the application of the principle in dubio pro reo could help to resolve."
While the Trial Chamber found that the conditions necessitating application of the
principle in dubio pro reo were not enlivened, it nevertheless considered that the
principle was potentially applicable in the determination of a customary norm
impinging on criminal responsibility. Of course, there is more scope for doubt in the
determination of rules of customary international law than there is in the
interpretation of statutory provisions, and the level of acceptable doubt must
therefore be greater in the context of the determination of customary norms. Those
norms, however, must still be determined consistently with the prohibition on
analogy, and applied consistently with the requirement of specificity.
4S"
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Regulation 808
(1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (1993), par. 34 (emphasis added).
481 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Appeals Chamber, Decision on
Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May 2004, Dissenting
Opinion of Justice Robertson, par. 6.4S~ Prosecutor vMilan Milutinovit, Nikola Sainovic and Dragoljub Ojdanic, Case No. IT-99-37-
AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction-Joint
Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003, par. 28. See, however, Jones and Powles who note that while it is
understandable that joint criminal enterprise should have been incorporated into the ICTY's practice
as a matter of jurisprudence, basing convictions on a form of liability which is not set out in the ICTY
Statute may nevertheless be criticised on legality grounds (Jones & Powles (2003), pp. 418-9, par.
6.2.44).
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4. Prohibition on Analogy
The prohibition on analogy is a prohibition that applies equally in the context of
statutory interpretation and the determination of norms of customary international
law.4S3 It is a corollary of the principle of non-retroactivity in that the prohibition of
act x does not entail a prohibition of acts analogous to x; in the absence of a
prohibition encompassing the act in question, the act cannot be criminalised simply
because of its similarity or proximity to unlawful conduct. In Prosecutor v Vasiljevic,
ICTY Trial Chamber II stated, in relation to the criminality of "violence to life and
person'* as prohibited under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
that:
The residual character of a criminal prohibition such as Article 3 of the
[ICTY] Statute does not by itself provide for the criminalisation by
analogy to any act which is even vaguely or potentially criminal, and the
statement by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic [that "customary
international law imposes criminal liability for all serious violations of
common Article 3"] does not repair the absence of any definition of the
crime at the time of the acts charged in the particular case.484
Thus, it was insufficient, for the purpose of establishing criminal liability under
customary international law, to show that the putative offence in question involved
analogous conduct to that which was clearly criminal under customary international
law; it was essential to show that precise conduct was recognised as a matter of
customary international law, as amounting to "violence to life and person" and that
criminal liability attached to such conduct.
While analogy is prohibited as an interpretative criterion in the
construction of statutory norms, and as a basis for determining the content of
customary norms, it is not, however, the case, that international criminal law must
4N* See Cassese (2003). p. 154; Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber II,
Judgment, 29 November 2002, par. 195; Prosecutor vLeonardus Kasa, Case No. ll/CG/2000, Dili
District Court, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, Judgment, 9 May 2001, part "E'. See, however,
Bassiouni (1999), p. 144 (stating that the "minimum standard of legality" applicable under
international criminal law "permits the resort to the rule ejasdem generis with respect to analogous
conduct"); Prosecutor vJoao Franca da Silva Alias Jhoni Franca, Case No. 04a/2001, District Court
of Dili, Special Panel for the trial of Serious Crimes, Judgment, 5 December 2002, par. 75 (stating that
"[u]se of analogy in applying customary definitions is necessary because traditionally, international
criminal law has lacked the specificity of national criminal law in defining crimes.")
484 Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 29 November
2002, par. 195.
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remain a static body of law, never changing or developing. As the ICTY Appeals
Chamber stated in Prosecutor vAleksovski, the principle nullum crimen sine lege:
does not prevent a court, either at the national or international level, from
determining an issue through a process of interpretation and clarification
as to the elements of a particular crime; nor does it prevent a court from
relying on previous decisions which reflect an interpretation as to the
meaning to be ascribed to particular ingredients of a crime.4'"
The upper limits on the permissible development of international criminal law
(through the interpretation of applicable treaties or international instruments, and
through the determination of relevant customary norms) are addressed in the next
section on the principle of specificity. It suffices for present purposes to observe that
the sort of development of legal principle envisaged in Aleksovski would, in all
likelihood, rarely contravene the ban on analogy, strictly speaking. Analogical
reasoning is of the form represented by the following syllogism:
1. Act x is prohibited;
2. Act y is similar to act x;
3. Therefore acty is prohibited.
Where, through the judicial development of international criminal law, act y comes
to be deemed as giving rise to individual criminal responsibility in circumstances
where it did not formerly attract judicial opprobrium, the basis for this development
would rarely lie, at the level of juridical reasoning, in the mere fact that act y is
similar to act x. Instead, the juridical basis of the development would almost certainly
be articulated by reference to some juridical principle, for e.g., a "general principle of
law" articulated for the first time in the jurisprudence of international tribunals, or a
newly emerged rule of customary international law. Cassese notes that "international
law only prohibits the so-called analogia legis (that is, the extension of a rule so as to
cover a matter that is formally unregulated by law). It does not bar the regulation of a
matter not covered by a specific provision or rule, by resorting to general principles
of international criminal law, or to general principles of criminal justice, or to
4" Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleskovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber. Judgment, 24 March
2000, par. 127.
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principles common to the major legal systems of the world."486 Thus there is nothing
inherently wrong in the inclusion in statutory form of prohibitions couched in general
terms, or in criminalisation on the basis of ostensibly open-ended norms located in
general international law, for e.g., the prohibition on persecution as a crime against
humanity,487 or the prohibition on means and methods of warfare of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.488 Nevertheless, in determining whether
concrete facts fall within the norm in question, the judicial decision-maker is limited
by the requirements of specificity.489
There does appear, however, to be one exception to the prohibition in
international criminal law on analogical reasoning (in the syllogistic sense indicated
above). That exception is where a norm set out in treaty form (or through some other
international instrument) explicitly invites or requests analogy.490 Examples may be
found in the ICC Statute: Article 8(2)(b)(xviii) prohibits "[ejmploying asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices" ;49] Article
7(l)(k) lists as a crime against humanity "[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar
character [i.e. to the other prohibitions in Article 7(1)] intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or mental or physical health;"492 Article 7(1 )(g)
prohibits "[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity".493
According to Cassese, where the text itself calls for analogical reasoning, the
relevant norm should be interpreted according to the ejusdem generis canon of
statutory construction.494 That was the conclusion of the District Court of Tel Aviv in
the case of Elsa Ternek which interpreted the meaning of "other inhumane acts"
486 Cassese (2003). p. 155.
487 See, e.g., Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic,
Dragon Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment. 14 January 2000,
pars 567-636; Prosecutor v Dario Kordic andMario Cerkei, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T. Trial Chamber,
Judgment, 26 February 2001, pars 203-210.
488 See, e.g. Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), [1996] ICJ Rep.
226, pars 78-9; Shimoda v. The Japanese State (1964) 8 Japanese Annual of International Law 212,
pp. 241-2.
489 See Prosecutor v Dario Kordic andMario Cerke:, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Chamber.
Judgment, 26 February 2001, par. 194.
4911 Cassese (2003), p. 155.
4,1 Art. 8(2)(b)(xviii), ICC Statute (emphasis added).
49~ Art. 7(l)(k), ICC Statute (emphasis added).
Art. 7(1 )(g), ICC Statute (emphasis added).
494 Cassese (2003), p. 155.
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within the definition of crimes against humanity in Article 1 of the Nazis and Nazi
Collaborators (Punishment) Law 5710-1950 to be a reference to acts "which
resemble in their type and severity" the expressly enumerated acts, namely murder,
extermination, enslavement, starvation and deportation.49^ The international criminal
tribunals have suggested, however, a less rigorous approach to the interpretation of
"other inhumane acts" within the definition of crimes against humanity within their
respective statutes. In Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana the ICTR Trial
Chamber suggested only that the other inhumane acts must be "of similar gravity and
seriousness" to the other enumerated crimes in Article 3(i) of the ICTR Statute
(omitting the requirement in Elsa Ternek of similar typology).496 In Prosecutor v
Kupreskic the ICTY Trial Chamber stated that in interpreting the phrase "other
inhumane acts" within the meaning of Article 5(i) of the ICTY Statute, "resort to the
ejusdem generis rule of interpretation does not prove to be of great assistance."497
The Trial Chamber stated that rather than covering acts similar to those specifically
provided for in the rest of Article 5 of the ICTY Statute:
Less broad parameters for the interpretation of "'other inhumane acts" can
instead be identified in international standards on human rights such as
those laid down in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948
and the two United Nations Covenants on Human Rights of 1966.
Drawing upon the various provisions of these texts, it is possible to
identify a set of basic rights appertaining to human beings, the
infringement of which may amount, depending on the accompanying
circumstances, to a crime against humanity. Thus, for example, serious
forms of cruel or degrading treatment of persons belonging to a particular
ethnic, religious, political or racial group, or serious widespread or
systematic manifestations of cruel or humiliating or degrading treatment
with a discriminatory or persecutory intent no doubt amount to crimes
against humanity: inhuman or degrading treatment is prohibited by the
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 7), the
European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 (Article 3), the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights of 9 June 1994 (Article 5) and
the 1984 Convention against Torture (Article 1). Similarly, the expression
at issue undoubtedly embraces the forcible transfer of groups of civilians
(which is to some extent covered by Article 49 of the IV Convention of
1949 and Article 17(1) of the Additional Protocol II of 1977), enforced
prostitution (indisputably a serious attack on human dignity pursuant to
most international instruments on human rights), as well as the enforced
49'"1 Elsa Ternek. District Court of Tel Aviv, Judgment of 14 December 1951, as cited in Cassese
(2003), p. 146, n. 19.
496 Prosecutor v Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Chamber,
Judgment and Sentence, 21 May 1999, par. 154.
4'' Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan
Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, par.
564.
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disappearance of persons (prohibited by General Assembly Resolution
47/133 of 18 December 1992 and the Inter-American Convention of 9
June 1994). Plainly, all these, and other similar acts, must be carried out
in a systematic manner and on a large scale. In other words, they must be
as serious as the other classes of crimes provided for in the other
provisions of Article 5. Once the legal parameters for determining the
content of the category of "inhumane acts" are identified, resort to the
ejusdem generis rule for the purpose of comparing and assessing the
gravity of the prohibited act may be warranted.4'""
Treating ejusdem generis as a means of relating acts by virtue of their "gravity", or
the moral turpitude displayed in their perpetration, rather than as a means of relating
acts by virtue of similar inherent characteristics or typology seriously weakens the
predictive value of ejusdem generis as a criterion of interpretation. While the
prohibition on analogy does not, strictly speaking, prohibit methods of interpretation
such as that indicated in the passage of the ICTY Trial Chamber above, nevertheless
such interpretative methods may, depending on the concrete application, still be
violative of the principle nullum crimen sine lege by virtue of the strictures inherent
in the requirement of specificity.499
5. Requirement of Specificity
As indicated above, nullum crimen sine lege has not been interpreted in the
jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals as preventing a court from
developing elements of international criminal law through interpretation and
clarification.500 Some elements of international criminal law, whether elaborated in
treaty form or located in customary international law, are open-ended, rather than
elaborate and specific in their definition. The imprecise nature of some norms of
criminal law is sometimes advocated as necessary in order to ensure that the norms
adequately cover the ground of the regulated subject-matter.M" For example, in
Prosecutor v Radoslav Brdjanin, the Amicus Curiae Prosecutor sought leave, inter
alia, to amend the allegation of "intimidating" a witness to "intimidating or
Id., par. 566.
499 It is therefore of note that the ICC Statute, in Article 7(l)(k), resurrects the requirement of similar
typology in the context of "other inhumane acts" within the definition of crimes against humanity,
stating that such acts must be of "a similar character" to the other enumerated crimes in Art. 7( 1) of
the ICC Statute.
MHI Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleskovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 24 March
2000, par. 127.
M"
See, e.g., Ashworth (1999), p. 78.
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otherwise interfering with" a witness (emphasis added). The Respondent objected to
the amendment, inter alia, on the grounds that the term "otherwise interfering with
the Witness" is exceedingly vague and amounts to a violation of the principle nullum
crimen sine lege. The Trial Chamber held, however, "that it would be undesirable for
this category to be exhaustively enumerated and consequently create opportunities
for evasion of the letter of the prohibition".50- While the requirements of strict
construction, the interpretation of ambiguity in favour of the accused and the ban on
analogy are interpretative criteria mandated by the principle nullum crimen sine lege,
the principle of specificity is an overarching test that limits the adjudicative
jurisdiction of the court or tribunal in such a manner that it can only apply the
relevant law, once determined or interpreted, if it satisfies the requirement of
specificity. As Judge Nieto-Navia stated in his Separate and Partially Dissenting
Opinion in Prosecutor v Galic:
Once it is satisfied that a certain act or set of acts is indeed criminal under
customary international law, a Trial Chamber must finally confirm that
this offence was defined with sufficient clarity under international
customary law for its general nature, its criminal character and its
approximate gravity to have been sufficiently foreseeable and
accessible.5'
The above statement is made, of course, in relation to the determination of whether a
putative norm of customary international law satisfies the requirement of specificity.
Presumably there is an expectation that treaty-based norms will be defined with
greater clarity than norms located in customary international law. Nevertheless, the
requirement of specificity offers only limited concession to the fact that customary
norms are not authoritatively elaborated in written form. The offence must be defined
with sufficient clarity under customary international law for its "general nature, its
criminal character and its approximate gravity". Norms of criminal law, particularly
those of the level of gravity dealt with by international criminal tribunals, must
presumably be elaborated with clarity. Thus, in his Dissenting Opinion in the
Prosecutor v Radoslav Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-R77, Trial Chamber II, Decision on Motion
by Amicus Curiae Prosecutor to Amend Allegations of Contempt of the Tribunal, 6 February 2004.
The Trial Chamber concluded that in any event there had been no violation of nullum crimen sine lege
(id.)
3(13 Prosecutor v Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber I. Judgment and Opinion. 5
December 2003, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Nieto-Navia, par. 110.
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Decision on Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment)
in the case of Prosecutor v Norman, Justice Robertson stated, in relation to the
determination of customary based norms, that:
the elements of the offence must be tolerably clear and must include the
mental element of a guilty intention. Its existence, as an international law
crime, must be capable of reasonable ascertainment, which means (as an
alternative formulation) that prosecution for the conduct must have been
foreseeable as a realistic possibility."104
In terms of how such a test could realistically be satisfied in the context of customary
based norms, some insight is offered by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in its Decision
on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction - Joint Criminal
Enterprise, in Prosecutor v Milutinovic, which finds the twin tests of foreseeability
and accessability of the customary norms satisfied on the basis that there was "a long
and consistent stream of judicial decisions, international instruments and domestic
legislation which would have permitted any individual to regulate his conduct
accordingly and would have given him reasonable notice that, if infringed, that
standard could entail his criminal responsibility."^ The conjunctive test of
foreseeability and accessibility tends to be the most common way in which the
requirement of specificity is expressed. Both the ICTY Trial Chamber, in its
Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction in Prosecutor v Hadzihasanovic, and the
Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in its Decision on
Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) in Prosecutor
v Norman, have expressed the requirement of specificity as requiring, in relation to
any particular norm, that it must have been '"foreseeable and accessible to a possible
504 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-f4-AR72(E), Appeals Chamber, Decision on
Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May 2004, Dissenting
Opinion of Justice Robertson, par. 20 (emphasis added). See also Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No.
IT-94-1, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion on the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 10
August 1995. par. 128, which predicated criminality upon "the clear and unequivocal recognition of
the rules of warfare in international law and state practice indicating an intention to criminalize the
prohibition"; see, also. Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Appeals
Chamber, Decision on Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May
2004, par. 37.
Mb Prosecutor v Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic and Dragoljub Ojdanic, Case No. IT-99-37-
AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction -Joint
Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003, par. 41.
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perpetrator that his concrete conduct was punishable."506 How this translates, in
terms of applying the conjunctive test, is explained in the Judgment of ICTY Trial
Chamber II in Prosecutor v Vasiljevic:
the Trial Chamber must further satisfy itself that the criminal conduct in
question was sufficiently defined and was sufficiently accessible at the
relevant time for it to warrant a criminal conviction and sentencing under
the criminal heading chosen by the Prosecution, in this case "violence to
life and person". From the perspective of the nullum crimen sine lege
principle, it would be wholly unacceptable for a Trial Chamber to convict
an accused person on the basis of a prohibition which, taking into account
the specificity of customary international law and allowing for the gradual
clarification of the rules of criminal law, is either insufficiently precise to
determine conduct and distinguish the criminal from the permissible, or
was not sufficiently accessible at the relevant time. A criminal conviction
should never be based upon a norm which an accused could not
reasonably have been aware of at the time of the acts, and this norm must
make it sufficiently clear what act or omission could engage his criminal
responsibility/"7
Thus, what the tests of foreseeability and accessibility mean in practice is that an
individual must be in a position to distinguish the criminal from the non-criminal. It
must have been clear, not simply that his concrete conduct was considered
questionable or suspect by the international community but that it would render him
criminally responsible.
According to the European Court of Human Rights, the requirement of
specificity is satisfied where "the individual can know from the wording of the
relevant provision and ifneed be, with the assistance of the courts ' interpretation of
it, what acts and omissions will make him criminally liable."508 Thus the result must
have been foreseeable in the sense that it clearly falls within the wording of a
provision in a formalistic sense, or alternatively, that the jurisprudence of the courts
clearly indicates what the result will be. The conclusion appears to be that it is the
predictable trajectory of juridical reasoning, and not the predictable trajectory of
public opinion, that determines whether a particular development in the law was
sufficiently predictable for the purpose of satisfying the principle nullum crimen sine
506 Prosecutor v Enver Hadzihasanovic, MehmedAlagic andAmir Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T,
Trial Chamber, Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, 12 November 2002, par. 62; Prosecutor v
Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Appeals Chamber, Decision on Preliminary
Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May 2004, par. 25.
Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber II. Judgment, 29 November
2002, par 193.
508 CR v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 363, par. 33 (emphasis added).
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lege. Predictability or foreseeability is not to be answered by whether the expectation
of the international community was that a particular act should be outlawed, but
rather whether the law in its totality (i.e. taking into account all applicable norms,
both conventional and customary) has reached a point where that act must clearly be
viewed as prohibited. According to Ascensio et al.:
for the nullum crimen principle to be observed scrupulously, it is not
absolutely necessary that the international norm providing for and/or
organising the repression of the crime should define the figura criminis
and the applicable penalty down to the last detail. It suffices to observe,
for this purpose, that the author of the act in question was subject, at the
tempus delicti, to clear, accessible legal norms - internal and/or
international - establishing such a definition ante factum
During the Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child
Recruitment) in Prosecutor vNorman, the prosecution submitted that "[t]he principle
of nullum crimen sine lege should not be rigidly applied to an act universally
regarded as abhorrent. The question is whether it was foreseeable and accessible to a
possible perpetrator that the conduct was punishable."510 The prosecution further
submitted that '"[t]he possible perpetrator did not need to know the specific
description of the offence. The dictates of the public conscience are important in
determining what constitutes a criminal act. and this will evolve over time.11
Naturally, the Appeals Chamber did not rely on, or endorse, these submissions.
Instead the Chamber endorsed the view of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tctdic
predicating criminality upon "the clear and unequivocal recognition of the rules of
warfare in international law and state practice indicating an intention to criminalize
the prohibition."512 Justice Robertson, in his Dissenting Opinion, stated that:
[t]he enlistment of children of fourteen years and below to kill and risk
being killed in conflicts not of their making was abhorrent to all
reasonable persons in 1996 and is abhorrent to them today. But
M 9 "Presentation de la Heme partie" in H. Ascensio, E. Decaux & A. Pellet, Droit international penal,
2000, at p. 246 (translated in Pellet (2000), p. 1058, n. 39).
M" Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Appeals Chamber, Decision on
Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May 2004. par. 2 (as
paraphrased by the Appeals Chamber).
M1 Id., par. 4 (as paraphrased by the Appeals Chamber).
M2 Id., par. 37.
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abhorrence alone does not make the conduct a crime in international
law.513
He stated further that the fact the defendant's conduct would shock or even appall
decent people is not enough to make it unlawful in the absence of a prohibition.'014
There is, however, some residual relevance of the immorality of particular conduct to
the question of whether the requirement of specificity is satisfied. The ICTY Appeals
Chamber in its Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction -
Joint Criminal Enterprise, stated that:
due to the lack of any written norms or standards, war crimes courts have
often relied upon the atrocious nature of the crimes charged to conclude
that the perpetrator of such an act must have known that he was
committing a crime. In the Tadic Judgment, for instance, the Appeals
Chamber noted "the moral gravity" of secondary participants in a joint
criminal enterprise to commit serious violations of humanitarian law to
justify the criminalisation of their actions. Although the immorality or
appalling character of an act is not a sufficient factor to warrant its
criminalisation under customary international law, it may in fact play a
role in that respect, insofar as it may refute any claim by the Defence that
it did not know of the criminal nature of the acts.'1'
Thus while immorality (even of the gravest form) cannot, of itself, satisfy the
requirements of foreseeability and accessibility, as the relevant test relates to the
predictability of the lex lata and not the lex ferenda, nevertheless, where the
particular conduct can be shown clearly to be prohibited as a matter of treaty or
customary law it would be more difficult for the accused to assert that that result was
not foreseeable or accessible.
v. INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN NULLUM CRIMEN AND THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE TAW OF TREATIES?
The operation of Article 22 of the ICC Statute (and Article 21(3) to the extent that it
incorporates aspects of nullum crimen sine lege not already incorporated by Article
''3 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Appeals Chamber, Decision on
Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May 2004, Dissenting
Opinion of Justice Robertson, par. 9.
Id., par. 13.
''' Prosecutor vMilan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic and Dragoljub Ojdanic, Case No. 1T-99-37-
AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction - Joint
Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003, par. 42.
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22)516 sets up a potential inconsistency with the operation of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. The Vienna Convention governs the ICC Statute (both
expressly on the grounds that the latter is an international agreement concluded
between States/17 and impliedly on the grounds that it is the constituent instrument
of an international organisation)518 and incorporates its own rules of treaty
interpretation.519 These rules of treaty interpretation are potentially inconsistent with
the rules of interpretation contained within the principle nullum crimen sine lege as
incorporated in Article 22 (and possibly 21(3)) of the ICC Statute. Article 22, for
e.g., requires, in relation to the definition of crimes, that they be strictly construed
and not extended by analogy, and that any ambiguity be interpreted contra
proferentem.520 The general rule of interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, on the other hand, states that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
521
treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose."" The existence of two
differing regimes of treaty interpretation, each ostensibly applicable to the
interpretation of the same treaty terms, creates the risk of an inconsistent result. For
instance, the strict construction of inculpatory terms, as required by the principle
nullum crimen sine lege, could be viewed in particular instances as inconsistent with
the obligation of "good faith" interpretation of those terms as required under the
Vienna Convention (e.g., on the basis that a good faith interpretation requires that
legal obligations not be evaded through a narrow application of clauses).522
Alternatively, the strict construction of terms could produce a result which is
inconsistent with the "object and purpose" of the ICC Statute, which, it could be
516 See above.
517 Arts 1, 2, 4, Vienna Convention.
518 Art. 5, Vienna Convention. See A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 113.
My Arts 31-33, Vienna Convention.
520 Art. 22(2), ICC Statute.
821 Art. 31(1), Vienna Convention. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention has been accepted by the ICJ
as reflecting customary international law (Territorial Dispute Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad)
[1994] ICJ Rep. 6, par. 41; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain), [1995] ICJ Rep. 6, p. 18)
:02 See Report of the International Law Commission on the second part of its seventeenth session
(Monaco, 3-28 January 1966) and on its eighteenth session, 4 May to 19 July 1966, [1966-11]
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1, p. 211. Good faith is mandated under the Vienna
Convention in relation to both the interpretation (Art. 31(1)) and performance (Art. 26) of the treaty.
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argued, is to restrict the scope for atrocity and impunity, rather than extend the scope
for exculpation.
While the Vienna Convention rules of interpretation potentially differ
from nullum crimen sine lege under the ICC Statute, nevertheless the two sources
should, in all instances, be capable of simultaneous application. The Vienna
Convention's approach to the interpretation of treaties is primarily textual. The
International Law Commission explained, in relation to its draft of the Convention,
that the general rule of interpretation "is based on the view that the text must be
presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; and that, in
consequence, the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of
the text".523 The ICJ has confirmed that interpretation in line with the Vienna
Convention "must be based above all upon the text of the treaty."524 Thus where the
text clearly provides that the terms of the treaty be interpreted according to the
principle nullum crimen sine lege, then interpretation in line with that principle is in
fact consistent with the Vienna Convention in so far as the Vienna Convention gives
primacy to the text. There is some question, however, as to the limits to which the
Vienna Convention will give effect to the clear meaning of the text when it conflicts
with the other considerations cited in the general rule of interpretation (good faith,
context and object and purpose). In his Separate Opinion in the South West Africa
Case, Judge de Castro stated that "a clause which is reasonably clear cannot be
interpreted literally if by so doing one reaches a result which is contrary to the
purpose of the treaty."52'2 The Vienna Convention, however, leaves it unclear as to
how the various elements listed in the general rule of interpretation in Article 31 are
to be related to each other and the text, and given effect to in the case of
inconsistency between them.226 The view has been expressed that the "object and
'
Report of the International Law Commission on the second part of its seventeenth session
(Monaco, 3-28 January 1966) and on its eighteenth session, 4 May to 19 July 1966, [1966-11]
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1, p. 220.
Territorial Dispute Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad) [1994] ICJ Rep. 6, par. 41. See, also,
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, [ 1950] ICJ
Rep. 4, p. 8 ("the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a
treaty is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in
which they occur.")
425
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence ofSouth Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep. 16,
Separate Opinion of Judge de Castro, p. 183.
526
McDougal et al. (1994), p. lxiii; see, also, Colder v United Kingdom (1975) 1 EHRR 524, par. 14.
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purpose" of the treaty is to be referred to in determining the ordinary meaning of the
597 .
terms, and not as an independent basis for interpretation.' It would appear on this
view that object and purpose could not be given effect to, when to do so would
directly contradict the wording of the treaty itself.528 However, even if the Vienna
Convention does permit recourse to good faith, context and object and purpose when
the text is clear, those extra-textual elements are entirely consistent, in the case of the
interpretation of the ICC Statute, with the principle nullum crimen sine lege. It is
clear, for instance, that the "object and purpose" of the ICC Statute is not the
unqualified prosecution of individuals responsible for serious violations of
humanitarian law, but rather the prosecution of such individuals only to the extent
that it is compatible with the principle nullum crimen sine lege and other
internationally recognised human rights.5'1 In addition, the Vienna Convention states
that, together with "context", account shall be taken, inter alia, of "any relevant rules
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties."530 These rules
must surely include the principle nullum crimen sine lege which limits, as a matter of
general international law, the prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction of States with
respect to the prosecution of crimes.531 Where the ordinary meaning of the terms of
the treaty, the context of those terms, and the object and purpose of the treaty are
each consistent with the principle nullum crimen sine lege, then the only "good faith"
interpretation of those terms is one which is equally consistent with that principle.
D.J Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1998, p.
814.
See Interpretation ofPeace Treaties Case (Second Phase) (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep.
221, pp. 226-230.
529 Arts 22,21(3), ICC Statute.
Art. 31(3)(c), Vienna Convention.
131 The Vienna Convention itself deals directly with the issue of non-retroactivity of treaties in Article
28:
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact
which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of
the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.
This Article, however, does not replicate the nullum crimen sine lege principle: it is a provision of
much narrower scope. It only replicates those provisions in the ICC Statute precluding the ICC from
exercising jurisdiction in respect of conduct committed prior to the entry into force of the Statute.
Where the ICC asserts jurisdiction over an individual in respect of conduct committed after the entry
into force of the ICC Statute, but in circumstances where the relevant applicable law is unclear or has
not yet been determined, then that may amount to a violation of Article 22 of the ICC Statute, but it
does not raise an issue relevant to Article 28 of the Vienna Convention.
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There would therefore appear to be no inconsistency as such between the application
of the general rule of interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention and
the principle nullum crimen sine lege under the ICC Statute.
What would be the consequence, however, if an inconsistency
between the Vienna Convention and nullum crimen sine lege were nevertheless held
to exist? There is no express provision in the Vienna Convention indicating that
where a subsequent treaty sets out its own rules of interpretation which are
inconsistent with the Vienna Convention rules that the rules in the subsequent treaty
are to be accorded primacy. Article 5 of the Vienna Convention does, however, state
that '"[t]he present Convention applies to any treaty which is the constituent
instrument of an international organization and to any treaty adopted within an
international organization without prejudice to any relevant rules of the
organization,"532 The ICC Statute is the constituent instrument of an international
organisation (the ICC). If the rules of interpretation contained within the principle
nullum crimen sine lege under the ICC Statute could be considered "relevant rules of
the organization", then the rules of interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention
would be without prejudice to the principle nullum crimen sine lege as provided for
in the ICC Statute. Alternatively, Article 30 of the Vienna Convention concerns the
resolution of inconsistencies produced by the application of successive treaties
relating to the same subject-matter/" It provides for the application of the rule lex
posterior derogat priori in relation to parties to both treaties; the earlier treaty thus
applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later
treaty.5 '4 For this test to apply in the potential inconsistency between nullum crimen
sine lege under the ICC Statute and the rules of interpretation in the Vienna
Convention, it would need to be shown that the two treaties are "treaties relating to
the same subject-matter".535 The Vienna Convention relates to the law of treaties
whereas the ICC Statute relates to penal consequences for violations of international
humanitarian law, however the test of whether they relate to the same subject-matter
Art. 5, Vienna Convention (emphasis added).
Art. 30, Vienna Convention.
Art. 30(3)-(4)(a), Vienna Convention. In the relations between a State party to both treaties, and a
State party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual
rights and obligations (Art. 30(4)(b), Vienna Convention).
^ Art. 30(1), Vienna Convention.
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for the purpose of Article 30 of the Vienna Convention is probably best answered by
the application of the following test: "If an attempted simultaneous application of
two rules leads to incompatible results it can safely be assumed that the test of
sameness is satisfied."5 ,6 The application of Article 30 of the Vienna Convention
leads to the conclusion that the principle nullum crimen sine lege under the ICC
Statute must be accorded primacy over the Vienna Convention rules of interpretation
to the extent of any inconsistency.6,7 Nevertheless, it may be that the proper
determination of this issue is not to be made by the application of the lex posterior
rule under Article 30 of the Vienna Convention, but rather the application of the rule
lex specialis derogat lex generali. In the 1969 Vienna Conference, which lead to the
Vienna Convention, the view was put that the words "relating to the same subject-
matter" in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention should be construed strictly and not
applied to successive treaties where the inconsistency related to general versus
special regimes.538 It may be then that the inconsistency is to be answered by stating
that the rules of interpretation in the ICC Statute, relating specifically to the
interpretation of penal provisions, are lex specialis and set up special rules of
interpretation to which the lex generalis in the Vienna Convention must yield.639 In
either case, nullum crimen sine lege under the ICC Statute takes precedence over the
Vienna Convention methods of interpretation.
,,A E.W. Vierdag, "The Time of the 'Conclusion' of a Multilateral Treaty: Article 30 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and Related Provisions", (1988) 59 British Yearbook of
International Law 75, p. 100.
x'7
Although some difficulty could arise in the case of a State that accedes to the Vienna Convention
after it ratifies or accedes to the ICC Statute. In such a case it would be unclear which is the "earlier",
and which is the "later", treaty. See id., p. 102.
x38 See id., p. 100. See, also, I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd rev. ed.
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984.
, - '
See, e.g., Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v Japan), Arbitral Tribunal
constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Award on





Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute confers a power on the ICC to consider defences not
expressly enumerated within the ICC Statute. That power, however, is ostensibly
expressed in discretionary form. Article 31(3) states that:
At trial, the Court may consider a ground for excluding criminal
responsibility other than those referred to in paragraph 1 where such a
ground is derived from the applicable law as set forth in article 21. The
procedures relating to the consideration of such a ground shall be
provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence/40
Rule 80 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence requires that the defence give
sufficient notice to both the Trial Chamber and the Prosecutor if it intends to raise a
ground for excluding criminal responsibility under Article 31(3), so as to enable the
Prosecutor to prepare adequately for trial/41 The Rule also provides that the Trial
Chamber shall hear both the Prosecutor and the defence before deciding whether the
defence can raise a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under Article
31(3),542 and that if the defence is permitted to raise such a ground, the Trial
Chamber may grant the Prosecutor an adjournment to address that ground.''43 The
Rules of Procedure and Evidence are silent as to what considerations the Trial
Chamber should take into account in determining whether the defence will be
permitted to raise a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under Article 31(3).
The presumption that Article 31(3) confers a discretionary power upon
the ICC derives from the use of the word "may". The term "may", where used to
M0 Art. 31(3) (emphasis added).
Ml Rule 80(1), International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc
PCNICC/2000/l/Add.l (2000) (hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence).
542 Rule 80(2), id.
543 Rule 80(3), id..
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indicate a grant of judicial power, usually indicates that the power granted is
discretionary in nature, particularly where the term "may" is specifically used in
opposition to the term ''shall".544 On this basis, it appears that the ICC is compelled
to consider the applicability of all relevant defences which are expressly enumerated
in the ICC Statute, whereas no such compulsion exists in relation to non-enumerated
defences. Article 31(2) of the ICC Statute states that "[t]he Court shall determine the
applicability of the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this
Statute to the case before it."545 This is immediately followed by Article 31(3) which
provides that "the Court may consider a ground for excluding criminal responsibility
other than those referred to in paragraph l..."546 Nevertheless, the actual terms
employed in a statutory provision (e.g. "may" or "shall") are not necessarily
conclusive as to whether a grant of power is discretionary or not; a long-standing rule
of statutory interpretation is that there may be something in the surrounding
circumstances to show that permissive terms such as "may" were in fact intended, or
>44
See, e.g., Montgomery v Wanda Modes Ltd [2002] 1 BCLC 289, par. 5: R v City of Westminster
Housing Benefit Review Board, ex parte Mehanne [2001] 2 All ER 690, par. 23 (per Lord Hope of
Craighead); R v Northumbrian Water Ltd, ex parte Newcastle and North Tyneside Health Authority
[1999] JPL 704; Masson v Netherlands (A/327) (1996) 22 EHRR 491; R v Wandsworth District
Board of Works (1858) 6 WR 576. A number of Interpretation Acts enshrine this distinction between
"may", as discretionary, and "shall", as mandatory. See, e.g., the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW),
which provides, in §9, that:
(1) In any Act or instrument, the word "may" if used to confer a power, indicates that
the power may be exercised or not at discretion.
(2) In any Act or instrument, the word "shall", if used to impose a duty, indicates that
the duty must be performed.
Notwithstanding provisions such as the above, courts, at least in common law jurisdictions, will often
find that the intention of the legislature was to confer a mandatory grant of power by the use of the
word "may", or a discretionary grant by the use of the word "shall", and interpret the Act accordingly
(A.I. MacAdam & T.M. Smith. Statutes: Rules and Examples, 2nd ed., Butterworths, Sydney, 1989, p.
255).
Art. 31(2), ICC Statute. Emphasis added.
,46 Art. 31(3), ICC Statute (emphasis added). There is perhaps an issue of defective drafting here. It
could be argued that the non-enumerated grounds for excluding criminal responsibility, provided for
in Article 31(3), are also (i.e., in addition to the enumerated grounds), "grounds for excluding criminal
responsibility provided for in this Statute". The Court "shall" therefore determine their applicability to
the case at hand (Art. 31(2)). If Article 31(2) was intended to refer only to those grounds expressly
enumerated in the Statute, then Article 31(2) should have explicitly recognised this fact. By referring,
generically, to grounds for excluding criminal responsibility "provided for" in the ICC Statute, that,
on its ordinary meaning, could include those non-enumerated grounds "provided for" in the terms of
Article 31(3). It could therefore be argued that the power to determine non-enumerated defences is
non-discretionary.
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must be construed, to operate by way of command.547 There are a number of cases
arising in common law jurisdictions concerning the distinction between the effect of
"may" and "shall" when used to confer executive or judicial powers. The principal
question involved is whether "may [do act x]" denotes a discretionary grant of power
(sometimes referred to as a "directory" provision), or whether it denotes, instead, a
mandatory grant of power. If "may" denotes a mandatory grant of power then "may
[do act x]" is equivalent in effect to the words "must [do act x]". When a literal
approach is applied to this question of statutory interpretation, the result is
indeterminate as to whether "may" is a discretionary or mandatory term. In the case
of Re Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd and Minister ofRevenue for Ontario, Thorson
J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that in some contexts the word "may" is
neither necessarily permissive nor necessarily imperative, but rather merely
empowering, i.e., its function is to empower some person or authority to do
something which, otherwise, that person or authority would be without any power to
do.548 There is, therefore, nothing inherent in the literal meaning of "may" which is
dispositive to the question of whether the term confers a power which must be
exercised when the relevant conditions are met or whether the power is to be
exercised only as a matter of discretion.749 The term "may" removes the impediment
to the exercise of powers, but the conditions under which those powers are to be
exercised can only be determined from an interpretation of the statute as a whole.770
When the question is approached from the ordinary meaning of words, however,
there is at least a presumption that "may" denotes a grant of discretion, but that
presumption is rebuttable depending upon the circumstances of the case. The
question of whether provisions in a statute are mandatory or discretionary can only
be determined by considering the factors that relate to the particular enactment rather
than by any general rule.771 Common law rules of statutory interpretation have
1,47 Halsbury's Laws of England, 4Ih ed. Reissue, Vol. 44(1), Butterworths, London, 1995, par. 1337
(hereinafter Halsbury's Laws ofEngland).
Ms Re Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd and Minister of Revenue for Ontario (1981) 121 D.L.R. (3d)
403, p. 408.
549 See, e.g., the entry for "may" in the Macquarie Dictionary, which is defined inter alia as expressing
only "ability or power" (A. Delbridge, J.R.L. Bernard, D. Blair, P. Peters & S. Butler (eds), The
Macquarie Dictionary, 2nd ed.. The Macquarie Library, Sydney, 1991, p. 1101).
550 Clarkson Co. Ltd. v White (1979) 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 25, pp. 29-30, per Hart J.A.
551 See, e.g., Howard v Bodington (1877) 2 PD 203, p. 211, per Lord Penzance; R v. Boylan [1979] 3
W.W.R. 435, p. 442, per Culliton CJ.
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tended to lend significance to the context and the general scope and object of the
enactment in this determination,' which are considerations similar to those
applicable under the general rule of interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties."3 Where, for instance, the object of a statute is the provision of
justice or the public good, courts have interpreted grants of power directed to that
end to be mandatory. Thus, in Rex et Regina v Barlow it was held that "where a
statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake of justice or the public good, the word
may is the same as the word shall: thus, the [statute] 23 H. 6 says the sheriff may
take bail; this is construed shall, for he is compellable to do so."'54 In Julius v Lord
Bishop ofOxford, Lord Cairns L.C. stated that "[w]here a power is deposited with a
public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons who are
specifically pointed out and with regard to whom a definition is supplied by the
legislature of the conditions upon which they are entitled to call for its exercise, that
power ought to be exercised and the court will require it to be exercised."' "
One specific class of statutes enacted for the sake of justice or the public
good that has been the subject of judicial consideration is statutes conferring powers
upon courts or judicial officers to dispense with the rights of parties before them.
Where a statute provides that a court "may" perform a judicial act for the benefit of a
party to the proceedings, that grant of power is held (according to common law
principles of statutory interpretation) to be mandatory.326 There is a long line of
consistent authority to this effect, as the following cases indicate:
In Alderman Backwell's case (1687) a question arose as to whether the
power of the Lord Chancellor to grant a commission of bankrupt was discretionary or
de jure. Lord Keeper North held that "the commission is de jure, and the statute,
which saith that the Chancellor may grant, &c., is as if it had been 'shall grant,' or
'ought to grant,' but he cannot grant ex officio, but on request of persons
552
See, e.g., Re Nicholson, Ex p Nyberg (1882) 8 VLR (L) 292.
Art. 31(1), Vienna Convention.
"4 2 Salk. 609; 91 ER 516 (year of judgment not published) (emphasis in original); see, also, Jones v
Harrison (1851) 2 LM&P 257; Ex p Gilbert (1873) 14 NBR (1 Pug) 231; Julius v. Lord Bishop of
Oxford (1880) 5 App Cas 214; Border RDC v Roberts [1950] 1 KB 716.
(1880) 5 App Cas 214, p. 225; see, also, Re Baker, Nichols v Baker (1890) 44 Ch D 262; R v
Turner [1897] 1 QB 445; R vMitchell, Ex p Livesey [1913] 1 KB 561.
MacDougall v Paterson (1851) 11 CB 755; 138 ER 672; Bell v Crane (1873) LR 8 QB 481;
Forbes v Lee Conservancy Board (1879) 4 Ex D 116; Fenson v City ofNew Westminster (1897) 5
BCR 624; Sheffield Corporation v Luxford, Same v Morrell [1929] 2 KB 180; John Sainsbury & Co
(a firm) v Roberts [1975] 2 All ER 801; Bristol City Council v Rawlins (1977) 34 P&CR 12.
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interested.""57 This decision was affirmed in a number of cases, including
MacDougall v. Patterson (1851), which confirmed that "when a statute confers an
authority to do a judicial act in a certain case, it is imperative on those so authorized,
to exercise the authority when the case arises, and its exercise is duly applied for by a
party interested, and having the right to make the application." " In the latter case it
was held in relation to a statute providing that in certain cases a court or judge at
chambers "may" allow a plaintiff to recover his costs, that "the word 'may' is not
used to give a discretion, but to confer a power upon the court and judges; and that
the exercise of such power depends, not upon the discretion of the court or judge, but
upon the proof of the particular case out ofwhich such power arises."559
In Fenson v City ofNew Westminster (1897), the appellant had appealed
against an order of a Justice imposing a fine, and, in accordance with §880(c) of the
Criminal Code 1892, had deposited with the Justice, money sufficient to cover the
fine, the costs of the order, and the costs of the appeal. The appeal was dismissed and
the respondent applied for payment to be made to it in accordance with §880(e) of
the Criminal Code 1892, which provided that "whenever, after any such deposit has
been made as aforesaid [i.e., in accordance with §880(c)], the conviction or order is
affirmed, the Court may order the sum thereby adjudged to be paid, together with the
costs of the conviction or order, and the costs of the appeal, to be paid out of the
money deposited, and the residue, if any, to be repaid to the appellant."560 The
appellant submitted that the power to order the payment of the fine to the respondent,
as well as the costs of the original order and appeal, was only discretionary, as
evinced by the use of the word "may". The Court held, however, that the power was
mandatory. Bole L.J.S.C. stated that:
the rule, I think, is that when a statute confers an authority to do a judicial
act in a certain case, it is imperative on those so authorized to exercise the
authority when the case arrives, and its exercise is duly applied for by a
party interested and having the right to make the application: MacDougall
v Paterson, 11 C.B. 755; Julius v Bishop of Oxford, 5 A.C. 214. In the
present case I entertain no doubt as to the sense in which the word "may"
is used. I must therefore grant the application and direct the fine, costs
and costs of appeal to be paid forthwith to the respondent, out of the
"7
(1687) 2 Chan. Cas 190, p. 191 (emphasis added).





deposit in Court, and that the balance, if any. be paid to the party entitled
thereto/'"1
In Sheffield Corporation v Luxford; Same vMorrell (1929), the Sheffield
Corporation had sought orders for possession of two premises against defendants
who were tenants of the Corporation but refused to vacate the premises after notice
to quit was given. The orders were sought under §138 of the County Courts Act
1888, which stated that where a tenant neglects to deliver up possession after the
expiry of a notice to quit, then following compliance with certain conditions, "the
judge may order that possession of the premises mentioned in the plaint be given by
the defendant to the plaintiff, either forthwith or on or before such day as the judge
shall think fit to name.*'562 The county court judge acted on the view that §138 of the
County Court Act granted him an absolute discretion (by virtue of the word "may").
He refused to issue an order against the defendant Morrell, and, against Luxford, he
made an order for possession but postponed its operation for 12 months. On appeal in
both cases by the Sheffield Corporation, the Court held that the county court judge
had in fact been under a duty to grant the order, notwithstanding the permissive
language of the statute. Talbot J stated that:
"May" is a permissive or enabling expression: but there are cases in
which, for various reasons, as soon as the person who is within the statute
is entrusted with the power it becomes his duty to exercise it. One of
those cases is where he is applied to to use the power which the Act gives
him in order to enforce the legal right of the applicant. I think this is such
a case.
On the information before us, the legal right of the plaintiffs, the
landlords, was complete as soon as the notice to quit had expired, and the
tenant's right to remain in occupation of this house had absolutely
ceased...That being so, 1 think that, as soon as the application is made to
the judge for an order for possession, the latter being clothed by the Act
of Parliament with the power to make such an order, it becomes his duty
to make it.563
In Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. White (1979), the term "may" in the Bankruptcy
Act was held to be mandatory. The Bankruptcy Act stated that where the court finds,
in relation to the sale of property in a reviewable transaction, that the consideration
given or received by the bankrupt was greater or less than the fair market value of the
Fenson v City ofNew Westminster (1897) 5 BCR 624, p- 625.
56~ Emphasis added.
563
[1929] 2 KB 180, pp. 183-4.
126
property, the court "may" give judgment to the trustee against the other party to the
transaction for the difference. Hart J.A. stated that:
although the remedy is in the permissive form, the court has a duty to
grant some judgment against any or all of the persons named in the
section so that an asset improperly removed from the company may be
restored for the benefit of creditors. The section of the Act involved does
not leave the judge with an unfettered discretion to grant or withhold the
remedy on the grounds of fairness to the people concerned but indicates
that the trustee has a right to judgment upon satisfying the requirements
established by the legislation/''4
If the above rules of interpretation are applied to determining the effect
of the meaning of "may" in the context of Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute, the
conclusion must be that although the power to dispose of the rights of the accused is
set in permissive form, there is an attenuating duty to consider and admit any defence
which is not expressly located (or excluded) in the ICC Statute, as long as (a) the
defence is applicable under international law; and (b) Rule 80 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence are complied with. If a defence exists under customary
international law (or under any other source of law located in Article 21 of the ICC
Statute, provided that that source is recognised as creating legal rights or duties under
international law), then as long as that defence has not been extinguished (including
as a result of the ICC Statute), a defendant has a right under international law to an
acquittal on that ground. Assuming that the defence can be made out, the defendant's
right to an acquittal is complete and the ICC is under a duty to admit the defence/6:i
The ICC lacks the competence or power to rule such a defence inadmissible on
public policy grounds/66
The question, then, is whether the above rules of interpretation can be
applied to Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute. Let us examine, in the first instance,
whatthe conclusion would be following the rules of interpretation set out in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As indicated above, the common law rule
of statutory interpretation, whereby the power of courts to perform a judicial act for
the benefit of a party to the proceedings is held to be mandatory, follows from the
564 Clarkson Co. Ltd. v White (1979) 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 25, per Hart J.A., p. 34.
565 See, e.g., [1929] 2 KB 180, pp. 183-4.
566 See, e.g., Clarkson Co. Ltd. v White (1979) 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 25, per Hart J.A., p. 34.
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context and the general scope and object of the enactment.567 These considerations
C/L O
are looked to for the purpose of giving effect to the intention of the legislature.'
Thus, where it is clear that the legislature intended the power granted to be
discretionary only, that intention must be given effect/69 "Intention* often occupies a
very different position in the interpretation of treaties under international law. The
question of intention is very often a fiction; especially where, as in the case of
multilateral treaty negotiation, it is almost impossible to pinpoint a common intention
which each of the parties held simultaneously in relation to any one provision.
Perhaps this is why the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not refer
expressly to 'intention*' as a marker in the interpretation of treaties,570 choosing
instead to give effect to intention indirectly by lending significance to objective,
exterior indicia of intent.571 Thus the general rule of interpretation in the Vienna
Convention looks to the ordinary meaning of words in their context and in light of
the treaty's object and purpose/77 The ordinary meaning of the word "may" certainly
appears to be discretionary in nature, but as indicated above, there is no ineluctable
necessity in "may" being a discretionary term (only an empowering one), and its
ordinary meaning can also be susceptible to ambiguity, depending upon the
circumstance. It is possible that the word "may" implies some level of discretion or
contingency without rendering discretionary the admissibility of defences which are
567 See, e.g.. Re Nicholson, Exp Nyberg (1882) 8 VLR (L) 292.
*r,s Delhi & London Bank v. Orchard (1877) LR 4 Ind App 127 (Privy Council).
569 See, e.g.. Bell v Crane (1873) LR 8 QB 481.
",70 While the intention of the parties has in the past, been asserted by some scholars as a principal test
in the interpretation of treaties (G. Fitzmaurice, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain other Treaty Points", (1951) 28 British Yearbook of
International Law 1), it appears to have been relegated to a subsidiary means of treaty interpretation
under the Vienna Convention where it may be indirectly relevant to the primary considerations
(ordinary meaning, context, object and purpose), or possibly applicable if these primary
considerations produce results which are ambiguous or obscure or lead to results which are manifestly
absurd or unreasonable (See Art. 32, Vienna Convention). Direct provision is however made for the
intention of the parties in Article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention which provides that a special
meaning shall be given to a term in the treaty "if it is established that the parties so intended."
' 1 This has been the approach of the ICJ, for e.g., which has taken clarity in the wording of a treaty as
a clear conveyance of the intention of the parties. See Territorial Dispute Case (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v Chad) [1994] ICJ Rep. 6, par. 51. See also, M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia:
The Structure of International Legal Argument, Finnish Lawyer's Publishing Company, Helsinki,
1989 (pp. 291-294, 298-299) cited in M. Dixon & R. McCorquodale (eds). Cases and Materials on
International Law, 4th ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 86, who draws a distinction
between the goal of treaty interpretation and the means for attaining it.
*72 Art. 31(1), Vienna Convention. See, also, Aust (2000), p. 188.
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raised in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and which can be
shown to exist under international law.
It is possible for instance, that the word "may" relates to the contingency
of a defence being raised in accordance with Rule 80 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, rather than to some sweeping form of discretion inherent in the Court to
admit defences or not on public policy grounds. The point may well be that while the
ICC is under a duty, ex officio, to consider and determine the applicability of all
potentially relevant defences which are expressly provided for in the ICC Statute,573
no such duty exists in relation to non-enumerated defences. Non-enumerated
defences need only be considered by the ICC where specifically raised in advance in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence/74 The possibility that "may"
signifies a duty which becomes pregnant only upon a particular contingency is
recognised in a number of the cases referred to above. For instance, in Alderman
Backwell's case Lord Keeper North held that "the statute, which saith that the
Chancellor may grant, &c., is as if it had been 'shall grant,' or 'ought to grant,' but
he cannot grant ex officio, but on request ofpersons interested."1^ In MacDougall v
Patterson the court held that the authority to perform a particular judicial act in a
certain case becomes mandatory when "the case arises, and its exercise is duly
applied for by a party interested, and having the right to make the application ,"576
Alternatively, it is possible that the term "may" relates to the limited
form of discretion that necessarily accompanies the determination of which law is to
be applied as "applicable law" in accordance with Article 21 of the ICC Statute.
What needs to be avoided in relation to the power of the ICC to consider a non-
enumerated ground for excluding criminal responsibility "where such a ground is
derived from the applicable law as set forth in article 21",577 is the situation where
573 Art. 31(2), ICC Statute.
374 Art. 31(3), ICC Statute; Rule 80, ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
575 (1687) 2 Chan. Cas 190, p. 191 (italics added).
576
(1851) 11 C.B. 755, p. 773; 138 E.R. 672, p. 679 (italics added). One implication of the
admissibility of non-enumerated defences being dependent upon being raised in advance in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence is that if counsel overlooked a potentially
applicable non-enumerated defence at or before trial, the defendant may have lost the chance of
acquittal on that ground. As the ICC is not under a duty to consider non-enumerated defences ex
officio, but only where raised in advance in accordance with procedure, the failure of counsel to raise
such a defence in time may not be able to be visited on appeal (except, perhaps, in relation to an
argument of incompetent counsel). Certainly there is no issue of error at the Trial Division level.
577 Art. 31(3), ICC Statute.
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the ICC is compelled to apply any defence which happens to be located within any of
the sources set out in Article 21. One such source includes, for instance, "the national
laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime''.578 It would
certainly be going too far to assert that the ICC was required to accept an obscure
defence which happened to be recognised in the criminal code of one of the States
that was able to assert a head of jurisdiction in respect of the crime. Not every source
listed in Article 21 is automatically applicable by the ICC in every instance. Article
21 is, instead, a reservoir of potential sources of law that may be applied by the ICC
depending upon the circumstances. This is implicit in the three-tiered hierarchy of
Article 21, where the second-tier sources shall only be applied "[i]n the second place,
where appropriate",579 and the third-tier sources only applied "[tjailing that"5S0 (the
latter sources include general principles of law, including, "as appropriate",581 law
derived from the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction
over the crime). There is by no means an unfettered discretion inherent in the ICC to
pick and choose which sources of law will be applied at will. The ICC is required to
arrive at a comprehensive determination of the relevant law, which may require
supplementing the rules found in the ICC Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence with additional sources,582 but the task of
determination is not necessarily straightforward, and some element of judgement
may be required. Nevertheless, the ICC does not possess the power to ignore or
exclude a relevant source of law that completes the legal picture. If Article 21 is to be
described as conferring "discretionary" powers on the ICC, it is only discretionary in
the sense that any powers of legal determination are discretionary. It is clear that
Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute could not state that the ICC "shall" consider and
admit a defence where derived from the applicable law set forth in Article 21. The
applicable law in Article 21 is not automatically applicable in its entirety. The word
"may" in Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute could therefore relate to that highly limited
form of discretion implicit in the consideration of which applicable law in Article 21
is applicable in any one instant.
578 Art. 21(l)(c), ICC Statute.
579 Art. 21(1 )(b), ICC Statute.




It is by no means clear, therefore, that the ordinary meaning of "may'" in
Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute indicates a grant of discretion to admit or exclude
non-enumerated defences at will or on public policy grounds. The ordinary meaning
of "may" in this context may well be consistent with a mandatory grant of power to
consider and admit non-enumerated defences subject only to a number of
contingencies (compliance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and the
relevant source of applicable law under Article 21 of the ICC Statute completing the
legal picture - for e.g., being a recognised rule of international law not excluded by
the ICC Statute). It is necessary to consider the ordinary meaning of the term "may"
in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the ICC Statute.' It is
significant that these considerations are similar to the considerations which lead the
common law courts to conclude that "may" indicated a mandatory grant of judicial
powers in the cases cited earlier/1"4 The context of the term "may" in Article 31(3) of
the ICC Statute is in the grant of judicial powers for the purpose of determining the
criminal responsibility of a defendant. It would appear inconceivable that such
powers could be dispensed at will, or exercised on the basis of public policy concerns
as opposed to the law in force. Criminal responsibility, when considered from the
perspective of the judiciary, is a question of law, not policy. As for the object and
purpose of the ICC Statute, that could be stated to be the prosecution of serious
violations of humanitarian law, but that would understate (or misstate) the true object
and purpose, which is the achievement of that goal in so far as it is compatible with
nullum crimen sine lege and with internationally recognised human rights, the latter
two expressly being given primacy over the achievement of a conviction/8" The
object and purpose of the ICC Statute is the dispensation of justice according to law.
It therefore follows from a Vienna Convention approach to the interpretation of
"may" in Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute, that the ICC is under a duty to consider
and admit any non-enumerated defence which (a) is applicable under international
law and has not been excluded by the ICC Statute; and (b) has been raised by the
defence in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. This is not to
See Art. 31(1), Vienna Convention.
See, e.g., Re Nicholson, Ex p Nyberg (1882) 8 VLR (L) 292: Re Fcilconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd
andMinister ofRevenue for Ontario (1981) 121 D.L.R. (3d) 403, p. 408.
Art. 22, ICC Statute; Art. 21(3), ICC Statute.
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suggest that there is no element of discretion in the admission of non-enumerated
defences. A defence that exists in one of the sources of law set out in Article 21 of
the ICC Statute, but which is not applicable under international law as such (for e.g.
a defence existing in the domestic law of the State where the alleged crime occurred),
could be applied by the ICC upon its discretion. Certainly the ICC possesses the
power to consider and admit the defence in question/86 But it is only where the non-
enumerated defence exists under international law and remains in force (thus
entitling the defendant to an acquittal under international law) that the ICC falls
under a duty to consider and admit the defence.
It is, of course, not always the case that discretionary powers are
mandatory ones. Judicial discretion clearly exists in relation to sentencing.' Of
course, sentencing powers are discretionary in nature because there is no single
"correct" determination of sentence, only an acceptable range.688 The admissibility of
a particular defence, on the other hand, can be determined only one way or another,
and for this reason it is appropriate to assert that admissibility should follow the law
rather than discretion. Even so, the powers of sentencing are highly circumscribed
and are directed according to concrete considerations. Direction may be found in a
number of sources, including, in relation to the ICC, the ICC Statute (which sets out
5&Q ....
the possible range of punishments,' and relevant considerations including gravity of
the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person),590 as well as the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence which sets out a non-exhaustive list of criteria to
consider in the determination of sentence or the imposition of fines, including a non-
exhaustive list of mitigating circumstances.891 In contrast, neither the ICC Statute nor
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence suggest a single criteria to be taken into
account in determining whether a non-enumerated defence, which derives from the
applicable law in Article 21 and is raised in accordance with the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, should be admitted. This is further indication of the context in which
the grant of power under Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute has been made, and makes
586 Art. 31(3), ICC Statute.
887 See, e.g.. Prosecutor v Auto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 21
July 2000, par. 250.
888 See, e.g.. Art. 77, ICC Statute.
589 Art. 77, ICC Statute.
590 Art. 78(1), ICC Statute.
891 Rules 145-6, ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
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it highly unlikely that that grant can be considered discretionary, except, perhaps, as
already indicated, in relation to defences that derive from the sources set out in
Article 21 but are not applicable under international law as such. It would be a
perverse result to interpret a grant of power to determine criminal responsibility as
discretionary; but the result would be even more perverse if that discretion was
uncircumscribed, and operated, in effect, as a blank cheque. Such powers would sit
uneasily with the remainder of the ICC Statute which is principle-based and gives
primacy to the principle nullum crimen sine lege.'9' Discretionary powers to
determine criminal responsibility (including the power to refrain from applying
grounds of exculpation extant in international law) would be repugnant to the values
underpinning the ICC Statute; they would be arbitrary in nature and inconsistent with
the judicial function. The interpretation of "may" in Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute
as discretionary would, in short, be "manifestly unreasonable and absurd", which is a
result that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties seeks to eschew/
Additional to the considerations above, the interpretation of "may" in
Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute as discretionary is precluded in relation to those
defences already existing in international law as a result of the principle nullum
crimen sine lege under Article 22 of the ICC Statute. Where a defence is pre-existing
in international law, and has not been superseded (e.g. by falling into desuetude) or
expressly excluded under the ICC Statute, then the failure to admit that defence
would violate Article 22(1) of the ICC Statute which states that a person shall not be
criminally responsible under the Statute "unless the conduct in question constitutes,
S94
at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court."' The
principle nullum crimen sine lege could operate, firstly, as a principle of
interpretation, so as to interpret "may" in Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute as equal, in
effect, to "shall" wherever the defence raised is recognised in international law. In
this sense, nullum crimen sine lege could bolster or affirm the Vienna Convention
interpretation of "may" in the case of doubt as to its proper interpretation.
Alternatively, if the ICC formed the view that "may" in Article 31(3) of the ICC
Statute was, according to ordinary rules of treaty interpretation, a discretionary term,
y'2 See, e.g., Art. 22, ICC Statute.
Art. 32, Vienna Convention.
594 Art. 22(1), ICC Statute.
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then nullum crimen sine lege would operate as a rule of application so as to preclude
the operation of the word "may" in relation to any case where the defendant raised a
non-enumerated defence pre-existing in international law, and treat it instead, as if it
read ""shall". It is to be recalled that the principle nullum crimen sine lege not only
incorporates rules of interpretation, but rules of application as well. Article 22(1) of
the ICC Statute states that a person "shall not be criminally responsible under this
Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court."595 If the ICC is unable to interpret the ICC
Statute in such a way as to ensure that a person avoids criminal responsibility for an
act that was not a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court at the time it took place,
then in order to comply with Article 22(1) the ICC would have to decline to apply
the relevant provisions of the ICC Statute which required criminalisation of the
conduct in question. The same result is produced by Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute
which states that the "application" (and interpretation) of law by the ICC '"must be
consistent with internationally recognized human rights".596 If a particular defence
recognised and currently extant in international law was not excluded within the ICC
Statute, either expressly or by necessarily implication, then where that defence is
made out the conduct in question cannot be viewed as criminal under customary law;
nor can the ICC Statute be viewed as having ousted the right to rely upon the defence
as a matter of treaty law: The defence has not been excluded under the terms of the
ICC Statute and the ICC Statute in fact makes provision for the admissibility of non-
enumerated defences. The latter point precludes any argument that parties to the ICC
Statute have, by consent, ousted the possibility of any exculpatory conditions being
raised other than those expressly provided for in the ICC Statute.










Reprisals are coercive measures of self-help, which would otherwise be contrary to
international law, but are justified on the basis that they are taken by one State in
order to stop another State from violating international law."197 Reprisals - in the
sense of forcible measures"198 - are divided according to whether they are applied in
times of peace and governed by the jus ad bellum ("peace-time reprisals") or whether
they are applied in times of armed conflict and governed by the jus in bello
v)
See, e.g., S. Oeter, "Methods and Means ofCombat" in D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, §476.
>
Traditionally, the term "reprisals" was of wide import, referring alternatively to non-forcible
measures (such as economic sanctions) as well as forcible measures, both in times of war and peace.
Modern nomenclature has seen a narrowing of the proper use of the term reprisals, such that now most
sources treat the term as referring solely to forcible measures, whether applied in times of peace or
war (although some authors continue to use the term reprisals in relation to non-forcible measures -
see, e.g., L.-A. Sicilianos, "The Relationship Between Reprisals and Denunciation or Suspension of a
Treaty" (1993) 4 European Journal ofInternational Law 341). Particularly since the Air Service
Agreement award, non-forcible measures have been referred to as "countermeasures" rather than
"reprisals" (seeAir Service Agreement between the United States ofAmerica and France, (1978) 15
R1AA 417, pp. 445-6). This is affirmed by the terminology of the ILC in its Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its Fift-third Session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August, 2001, UN
GAOR, 56'h Sess., Supp. No. 10, p. 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), Art. 22 (hereinafter Articles on
State Responsibility); see, also Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fift-
third Session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August, 2001, UN GAOR. 56lh Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN
Doc. A/56/10 (2001), p. 181. The term "countermeasures", however, is still often employed to refer
collectively to all forms of coercive self-help whether forcible or non-forcible (see, e.g., R. Provost,
"Reciprocity in Human Rights and Humanitarian Law", (1994) 65 British Yearbook of International
Law 383, p. 413; M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch & W.A. Solf, New Rules for Victims ofArmed Conflicts,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. The Hague, 1982. p. 636; J. Crawford, J. Peel & S. Olleson, "The ILC's
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Completion of the Second
Reading", (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 963 available at
www.eiiI.org/iournal/Voll2/No5/art2.pdf, n. 74).
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("belligerent reprisals").36 ^ Peace-tirne reprisals are generally recognised as illegal on
the basis that they are contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and remain
unjustified by Article 51.600 Nevertheless, it has been noted that there is a
discrepancy between formal principle and actual practice in relation to peace-time
reprisals,601 and their legality still remains a topic of debate.602 The ICJ in Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons refrained from examining the legality of
"armed [i.e. peace-time] reprisals", noting only that they were "considered to be
unlawful".603 In relation to defences to war crimes, only belligerent reprisals are
relevant. Belligerent reprisals justify, within certain strict constraints, the application
of measures which would otherwise be contrary to the jus in bello, on the basis that
they are taken in response to a prior violation of the jus in hello by one's
adversary,604 in order to coerce the adversary into compliance with the law.6Cb As the
jus in bello has never effected the outlawry of the use of force (but only limited it in
certain respects), there is no room to argue that the movement towards the illegality
See F. Kalshoven. Belligerent Reprisals, Sijthoff, Leiden, 1971, p. 1.
600 I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1963, p.
281.
601 D. Bowett, "Reprisals Involving Recourse to Anned Force", (1972) 66 American Journal of
International Law 1, p. 22.
''"2 See Kalshoven (1971), pp. 6-7. noting that it would be saying too much to assert that the coming
into force of the UN Charter has removed any uncertainty concerning the legality of peace-time
reprisals. See, also, B. Levenfeld, "Israel's Counler-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and
Reprisal Under Modern International Law", (1982) 21 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1;
G.B. Roberts, "Self-Help in Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self-Defense and Peacetime
Reprisals", (1987) 19 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 243; W.V. O'Brien,
"Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counterterror Operations" (1990) 30 Virginia Journal of
International Law 421.
m
Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, par.
46.
604
See. however, below, where the possibility of employing belligerent reprisals in relation to a
violation of international law outside of the jus in bello is discussed.
Reprisals were defined by the United States Military Tribunal in United States v. Ohlendorf as
follows:
Reprisals in war are the commission of acts which, although illegal in themselves,
may, under the specific circumstances of the given case, become justified because
the guilty adversary has himself behaved illegally, and the action is taken in the last
resort, in order to prevent the adversary from behaving illegally in the future.
((1950) 4 TWC 1, p. 493). Similar definitions may be found throughout the available literature. See,
e.g., A.R. Albrecht, "War Reprisals in the War Crimes Trials and in the Geneva Conventions of
1949", (1953) 47 American Journal ofInternational Law 590, p. 590; M.C.C. Bristol III, "The Laws
ofWar and Belligerent Reprisals Against Enemy Civilian Populations", (1979) 21 Air Force Law
Review 397, p. 397; C. Greenwood, "The Twilight of the Law of Belligerent Reprisals", (1989) 20
Netherlands Yearbook ofInternational Law 35, p. 37; Oeter (1995), §476.
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of peace-time reprisals produced a mirror effect on the legality of belligerent
reprisals. The term "reprisals" when used in this work shall refer solely to belligerent
reprisals, unless the context indicates otherwise.
It is necessary to distinguish reprisals from three related notions with
which they are often confused; namely retorsions, reciprocity and tu quoque.606
1. Retorsions
Reprisals are distinct from the related notion of "retorsions" which are legal, but
unfriendly, responses to an adversary's legal or illegal actions.607 Retorsions may
therefore consist in an escalation of attacks against lawful military objectives in
response to unfriendly (possibly illegal) conduct on the part of one's adversary.
Retorsions and reprisals, therefore, are both forms of coercion, employed to alter the
conduct of an adversary.606 Reprisals, however, are restricted by law, both in terms of
the pre-conditions which must be satisfied before a right to recourse arises, and in
terms of the pre-conditions which must be satisfied in the method of their
employment. Pictet in his commentary on the Geneva Conventions sought to answer
the question of whether the prohibitions on reprisals in the Conventions may be
interpreted as applying equally to retorsions.609 He formed the view that it "appears
more prudent to conclude" that they do not.6'0 There is of course no logical or
606
Reprisals are often confused with a fourth institution, namely self-defence. As the ICRC's
Commentary to Protocol I explains, the main difference between them is that in the case of self-
defence, force is used directly to counter an imminent danger, whereas reprisals are designed to force
an adversary to change its conduct (Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann, Commentary on
the Additional Protocols of8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, Geneva, 1987, par. 3431). Although the two may coincide at points, the precise
relationship between the two is really only relevant in the context of peace-time reprisals, where
reprisals may, in circumstances of overlap, be justified under the doctrine of self-defence (see Y.
Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001,
pp. 172-3). In the context of belligerent reprisals, however, national self-defence is no justification for
violating the jus in bello. Only self-defence, in the sense of the defence of persons or property may do
so (see Art. 31(l)(c), ICC Statute).
607 See Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 3429; Greenwood (1989a), pp. 37-38. The tenn "retorsion" has
sometimes been confused (or at least used interchangeably) with "reprisal". See, e.g., In re Lepeschkin
(1923-4) 2 AD 323, p. 325.
6,18
Schachter has suggested that retorsions are often more effective than reprisals (0. Schachter.
"International Law in Theory and Practice", (1982-V) 178 Recueil des Cours 13, p. 169).
609
See, e.g., J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the First Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, ICRC,
Geneva, 1952, p. 347.
610 Id.
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interpretative basis for holding provisions on reprisals as applicable to retorsions,
which are, after all, prima facie lawful.
2. Reciprocity
Reciprocity and reprisals constitute distinct legal mechanisms for dealing with
breaches of international law obligations.6" Although the term reciprocity has a
• • •• • f\ 1 •
number of alternative meanings in international law, " reciprocity stricto sensu
refers to that rule of the law of treaties which permits one State to suspend or
terminate its treaty obligations upon the material breach of another State.613
Reprisals, on the other hand, do not involve the suspension or termination of treaty
obligations. Reprisals are subject to strict limitations (such as proportionality and
proper purpose, discussed below), whereas such limitations would not apply if the
treaty obligation had come to a final or temporary end.614 The same point is made in
relation to non-forcible countermeasures where the Commentary to the ILC's
Articles on State Responsibility states that:
the underlying obligation is not suspended, still less terminated: the
wrongfulness of the conduct in question is precluded for the time being
by reason of its character as a countermeasure, but only provided that and
for so long as the necessary conditions for taking countermeasures are
satisfied.611
Thus in relation to the oft-cited case of the 1925 Gas Protocol, a number of States
have attached reservations which structure the reserving States' obligations under the
Protocol on a strictly reciprocal basis. Where one party engages in gas warfare
against another - assuming a relevant reservation lawfully governs the relations
between the two - then the injured party may employ gas warfare against the other
without limitation, except in relation to binding rules or principles deriving from
611 Provost (1994), p. 415.
61"
See, generally. Provost (1994); see also Bristol (1979), p. 407. This is discussed further below.
613 Provost (1994), p. 383, n. 1.
614 F. Kalshoven, "Belligerent Reprisals Revisited", (1990) 21 Netherlands Yearbook of International
Law 43, p. 71.
""
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, 23 April-1
June and 2 July-10 August, 2001, UN GAOR, 56lh Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), p.
181
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sources outside the 1925 Gas Protocol.616 In the context of reprisals, however, any
employment of gas warfare (assuming such a reprisal were permissible) would be
subject to a number of strict requirements, as set out below. In the past, some authors
have viewed the legality of reprisals as an application of the doctrine of
reciprocity,617 but this can no longer be viewed as correct.618 Reprisals may be
described as an example of "reciprocity", but only in the widest, non-technical, sense
of the word.619
3. Tu Quoque
The doctrine of reciprocity, discussed above, is an aspect of the law of treaties, and,
potentially, an aspect of the law of obligations generally under international law (i.e.
including those obligations arising under customary international law).620 Any
argument that reciprocity governs the conduct of belligerents during a state of armed
conflict would be premised on the assumption that obligations arising under the law
of armed conflict are bi-lateral in nature (owed only from State to State) and that no
other entity or individual derives any right to protection from those obligations in
their own right. The defence of tu quoque is the plea at criminal law that follows
from the doctrine of reciprocity. It seeks to set up as a defence, the fact that the
enemy has engaged in similar violations of the law of armed conflict.621 Tu quoque
purportedly operates to deny the continuing operation of the law in question,622
although there is some uncertainty as to whether the purported juridical effect of a
successful plea of tu quoque is in the nature of a defence (precluding illegality or
criminality),62'1 or whether it operates as a procedural bar to prosecution (effectively
616 See Oeter (1995), §435; Kalshoven (1990), pp. 73-4; F.J. Hampson, "Belligerent Reprisals and the
1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949", (1988) 37 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 818, p. 829.
617
See. e.g., Le Fur, Des Represailles en Temps de Guerre, 1919, p. 25, discussed in R. Bierzanek.
"Reprisals as a Means of Enforcing the Laws of Warfare: The Old and the New Law", in A. Cassese,
The New Humanitarian Law ofArmed Conflict, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 1979, p. 235, n. 16.
618 See Provost (1994), p. 383 (discussed below).
619 See Id.
620 See, generally, Provost (1994).
621 See id., pp. 446-453.
622 See R.W. Tucker, The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea, US Government Printer, Washington
D.C., 1955 (US Naval War College International Law Studies, Vol. 50), p. 67.
623 See, e.g., R. Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law, Praeger, New York, 1962, pp.
120-121.
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acting as an estoppel, preventing the victim State from invoking another's violation
of international law on the basis of the victim State's own violations).624 Whichever
is the correct characterisation, the defence of tu quoque is inadmissible under
customary international law. The defence of tu quoque was consistently rejected in
the war crimes trials following the Second World War.6" In its Judgment in
Prosecutor v Kupreskic the ICTY Trial Chamber confirmed that "the tu quoque
defence has no place in contemporary international humanitarian law.''626 In its
earlier Decision on Defence Motion to Summon Witness in the same case, the Trial
Chamber had stated that:
The tu quoque principle does not apply to international humanitarian law.
This body of law does not lay down synallagmatic obligations, i.e.,
obligations based on reciprocity, but obligations erga omnes (or, in the
case of treaty obligations, obligations erga omnes contractantes) which
are designed to safeguard fundamental human values and therefore must
be complied with regardless of the conduct of the other party or parties/'"7
4. Justification
Reprisals operate as a form of justification,626 precluding wrongfulness both at the
level of State and individual responsibility. This point was made by the United States
Military Tribunal in the Einsatzgruppen case, when it stated that:
Reprisals in war are the commission of acts which, although illegal in
themselves, may under the specific circumstances of the given case,
become justified because the guilty adversary has himself behaved
illegally, and the action is taken in the last resort, in order to prevent the
adversary from behaving illegally in the future.629
''"4 See, e.g.. Hampson (1988), p. 820; Bristol (1979), p. 407.
62' Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic. Drago Josipovic, Dragan
Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000. par.
516.
626 Id., par. 511.
62 Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan
Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Decision on Defence Motion to
Summon Witness, 3 February 1999, cited with approval in Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan
Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-
16-T, Trial Chamber, Decision on Evidence of the Good Character of the Accused and the Defence of
Tu Quoque, 17 February 1999.
62s Kalshoven (1971), p. 253; Cassese (2003), pp. 219-220; see, however, M.C. Bassiouni (1992), p.
448 ("It cannot... be claimed that reprisals are justified in and of themselves, but they may constitute
an excusable condition which exonerates the performing party from responsibility.")
629 United States v Ohlendorf, (1950) 4 TWC 1, p. 493.
141
One of the consequences of the explicit recognition of reprisals as a form of
justification rather than as a form of excuse is the illegality of counter-reprisals. It is
an inherent condition of justifications that no measure of counter-self-help may be
employed against them.6'" Thus the Tribunal in the Einsatzgruppen case found that
under international law, "there can be no reprisal against reprisal. The assassin who
is being repulsed by his intended victim may not slay him and then, in turn, plead
self-defense."631
5. Requirement of Explicit Prohibition or Desuetude
The legality of reprisals may be ousted through the explicit prohibition on reprisals in
treaty form,632 or alternatively through the right to reprisals falling into desuetude.6"
Given, however, that reprisals have long been accepted as an exception to the law in
force (i.e. an exception to treaty prohibitions as well as an exception to norms of
customary international law), there may be some doubt as to whether the right to
reprisals could be prohibited through treaty provisions that did not directly and
explicitly purport to override the operation of the doctrine of reprisals. There would
certainly be a question, if it was purported that the right to certain reprisals had been
impliedly ousted by treaty terms, as to whether those terms were sufficiently clear to
indicate that the right to reprisals had in deed been ousted.
6. Reprisals in Non-International ArmedConflicts
It is often asserted that the right to engage in reprisals is limited to States in their
relations inter se.bM It could be argued that the corollary of this is that treaty-based
and customary norms applicable in non-international armed conflict are not open to
exception by way of reprisals. Traditionally, however, non-international conflicts fell
outside of the ambit of international law,636 and retaliatory actions were common in
630 Ashworth (1999), p. 138.
631 United States v Ohlendorf, (1950) 4 TWC 1 pp. 493-494.
632 See Green (2000), p. 123.
633 In relation to desuetude, see below.
634
See, e.g., Sandoz et at. (1987), p. 1372, n. 18; see, also, Albrecht (1953), p. 599; Trial ofHans
Ranter, (1949) XIV LRTWC 89, pp. 132-3.
635 Green (2000), p. 317.
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such conflicts and remain so.6'6 Thus, whether or not reprisals are lawful in the
context of non-international conflicts, measures substantively identical to reprisals
have long been lawful in that context. The question, then, is whether reprisals (or
analogous measures) have now been prohibited by international law in the context of
non-international armed conflict.
Most treaty provisions dealing specifically with non-international
conflicts make no reference to the issue of reprisals. Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949,637 and Protocol II of 1977,638 are both silent on the
issue of reprisals. There are, however, two exceptions: Article 19(1) of the Hague
Cultural Property Convention of 19546'9 states that in the event of non-international
armed conflict each party to the conflict shall apply, as a minimum, those provisions
of the Convention which relate to "respect for cultural property".640 Article 4 of the
Convention is entitled "respect for cultural property" and includes, within its fourth
paragraph, the requirement that parties shall refrain from reprisals directed against
cultural property.641 Additionally, there is the amended Mines Protocol of 1996
which applies to non-international,642 as well as international,64' conflicts, and
prohibits the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices by way of reprisals against
civilians and civilian objects.644 The original Mines Protocol of 1980 with its more
restricted reprisal prohibition (prohibiting only the use of mines, booby-traps and
other devices by way of reprisals against civilians, but not civilian objects)645 now
also applies in the case of non-international conflicts, at least for those Parties that
636 See Kalshoven (1990), p. 77.
637 Common Article 3, Geneva Conventions I-IV.
638 Protocol II.
639 Art. 19, Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 14 May
1964, 249 UNTS 240 (hereinafter Cultural Property Convention).
640 Art. 19(1), Cultural Property Convention.
641 Art. 4(4), Cultural Property Convention.
642 Art. 1(2), Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices, 3 May 1996, UN Doc CCW/CONF.I/14 (1996) (hereinafter Amended Mines
Protocol).
643 Art. 1, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 10 October
1980, UN Doc A/CONF.95/15 (1980) (hereinafter Conventional Weapons Convention); Art. 1(2),
Amended Mines Protocol.
644 Art. 3(7), Amended Mines Protocol.
647 Art. 3(2), Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other
Devices, annexed to Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 10
October 1980, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/15 (1980) (hereinafter Mines Protocol).
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have adopted the 2001 Amendment to Article 1 to the 1980 UN Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons.646
ii. GENERAL LIMITATIONS ON RECOURSE TO REPRISALS
UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW
1. Introduction
There are a number of pre-conditions which reprisals must satisfy in order to be
legal. Customary international law has established at least four such preconditions.
These are: (1) The reprisal must be a response to a prior violation of international
law; (2) it must be undertaken for the specific purpose of coercing the enemy into
compliance with the law; (3) it must only be undertaken as a last resort; and (4) it
must be a proportionate response.647 Greenwood states that each of these
requirements exists in relation to all types of reprisals,648 and each may in fact be
found as a requirement in relation to peace-time reprisals,649 and non-forcible
countermeasures,650 as well as belligerent reprisals.661 Some sources also suggest a
number of other requirements, including that the reprisal measure must be consistent
with the principles of humanity, although not all sources agree that additional
requirements exists.662 The potentiality of additional limitations applying in relation
to recourse to reprisals is addressed later, below.
646 See Amendment to Article 1 of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, 21 December 2001, UN Doc. CCW/CONF.II/2 (2001).
"4'
See, e.g., C. Greenwood. "Reprisals and Reciprocity in the New Law of Armed Conflict", in M.A.
Meyer (ed.) Armed Conflict and the New Law: Aspects of the 1977 Geneva Protocols and the 1981




',4'' See Responsabilite de L 'Allemagne a Raison des Dommages Causes dans les Colonies Portugaises
du Sud L 'Afrique (Portugal v Germany) (1928) 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 409 (hereinafter the Naulilaa
Incident), extracted in L.C. Green, International Law Through the Cases, 2nd ed., Stevens & Sons Ltd.,
London, 1959; Bowett (1972), pp. 2-3.
6M) See, generally, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session,
23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August, 2001, UN GAOR, 56lh Sess., Supp. No. 10, p. 43ff, UN Doc.
A/56/10 (2001).
6M Each of these requirements emerges in the submission by Jackson to the IMT concerning the
limitations on reprisals as a defence to war crimes (see Trial of the Major War Criminals before the
InternationalMilitary Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, IMT, Nuremberg,
1947-49, vol. 1, pp. 217-8).
652 Greenwood (1989b), p. 229.
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2. PriorViolation
The sine qua non of any right to reprisals consists in a violation of international law
by the party against which the reprisal is taken.6" There are two issues which arise
here: The first concerns the question of whether any violation of international law
justifies a reprisal, or whether it is only violations of the law of armed conflict - i.e.
the jus in bello.^4 In The Netherlands v Rauter the Special Court of Cassation
accepted that Germany's initial aggression against the Netherlands entitled the
Netherlands to employ reprisals against Germany.666 But it appears that the reasoning
in that case has since been overtaken by the entrenchment, within international law,
of the principle that the jus in bello applies equally to each belligerent, regardless of
the justness or legality of its cause. This principle was affirmed by the United States
Military Tribunal in United States v List,(,66 and is widely accepted as a cardinal
principle of the law of armed conflict.667 The United States Department of the Air
Force Commander's Handbook on the Law ofArmed Conflict makes the point that
arising out of this principle is the subsidiary principle that '"[t]he side that is acting in
self-defence against illegal aggression does not, because of that fact, gain any right to
violate the laws of armed conflict."658 Violations of the jus ad bellum do not trigger a
right to belligerent reprisals.669
653 In the Naulilaa Incident, the Special Arbitral Tribunal stated that: "The first condition, in fact the
sine qua non, of a resort to reprisals is the existence of a previous act contrary to international law"
(extracted in Green (1959)). Because there was no prior illegal act on the part of Portugal, Gennany's
purported reprisal was unlawful.
See Albrecht (1953), pp. 593-5; Kalshoven (1971), p. 157; Greenwood (1989a), pp. 40-42.
Cm Netherlands v Rauter (1949) 14 LRTWC 89, pp. 134-5.
656 (1948) 15 AD 632, p. 637.
6:" See, e.g.. Green (2000), p. 347. See however Art. 54(5), Protocol I which departs from this
principle in permitting a party defending itself against aggression to derogate from the terms of Article
54(2) - protecting objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population - in certain
circumstances.
'"s
US Dept. of the Air Force, Commander's Handbook on the Law ofArmed Conflict, Pamphlet AFP
110-34, Dept. of the Air Force, Washington D.C., 1980, par. l-4(b) (1-3).
fo9 An interesting question may arise, however, as a result of the fact that a belligerent's legal duties
vis-a-vis other belligerents is not exhausted by the jus in bello alone. It may therefore be possible to
envisage a scenario in which a belligerent asserts a right to engage reprisals against an adversary in
answer to violations which are neither jus ad bellum violations nor jus in bello violations. Certain
duties, such as those pertaining to human rights, may remain in force throughout the duration of the
conflict (Green (2000), p. 75). On the one hand it could be argued that any right of belligerent
reprisals in response to violations of international law which are neither jus in bello nor jus ad bellum
violations would be dependent upon customary law recognising such a right. But on the other hand, it
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The second issue, which arises in relation to the requirement of a prior
violation of international law, concerns the standard of responsibility that a
belligerent must possess in relation to that violation before it may be made the target
of reprisals. In the context of non-forcible countermeasures, it appears that a State
may only be made the target of reprisals if it is responsible for an internationally
wrongful act in accordance with the principles of the law of State responsibility.660
The question is, whether the same requirement exists in relation to belligerent
reprisals. Greenwood states that "the prior violation to which the reprisals are a
response must be imputable to the State against which the reprisals are directed, or
perhaps to an ally of that State."661 Other authors also suggest the test of
imputability.662 In The Netherlands v Ranter, the Court found that the only acts
which triggered the right to reprisals were those carried out by the State or its organs;
acts carried out by members of the civilian population did not trigger any right to
reprisals.663 A similar conclusion was reached by the Italian Military Tribunal in the
Adreatine Cave case.664 Each of these sources appears to adopt the position that
before a State may be made the target of reprisals, it must be responsible for a
violation of international law in accordance with the principles of the law of State
responsibility. On the other hand, both the British and US military manuals in force
during World War II recognised that illegal acts of individuals (as distinct from
States) could trigger the right to reprisals;666 the current US Field Manual has since
deleted the reference to individuals,666 although it is retained by the British
could be pointed out that reprisals have traditionally been recognised as a lawful response to any
violation of international law - it is only as a result of the UN Charter that forcible reprisals outside of
the context of armed conflict have come to be viewed as illegal (see above). Thus it could be agued
that where States are currently engaged in armed conflict it would be permissible to engage in reprisal
measures for violations of rules of international law other than jus in bello violations (but not in
relation to jus ad bellum violations).
6r>"
Art. 49(1), Articles on State Responsibility; Case Concerning Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep. 7, par. 83.
661 Greenwood (1989a), p. 43.
662
See, e.g., M. Greenspan, The Modern Law ofLand Warfare, University of California Press,
Berkeley, 1959, pp. 410-11; Hampson (1988), pp. 822-3.
663 The Netherlands v Ranter (1949) 14 LRTWC 89, p. 132.
664 In re Kappler (1948) 15 AD 471, pp. 473-5.
Mo US War Dept., Field Manual No. 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Govt. Printing Office,
Washington D.C., 1940, par. 358(d); British War Office, Manual ofMilitary Law, HMSO. London,
1929, par. 453.
666 See US Dept. of the Army, Field Manual No. 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, Dept. of the Army,
Washington D.C., 1956 (incorporating changes required on 15 July 1976) (hereinafter US Field
Manual No. 27-10), par. 497.
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manual.667 A number of authors also reject the requirement of imputability.668
Albrecht states that such a requirement "seems to run counter to the general theory of
reprisals.''669 Provost states that "[a] rigid requirement of imputability appears to be
inconsistent with the context in which belligerent reprisals take place and
unsupported by State practice."670 Reprisals, by their very nature, are responses to
unlawful acts, and on this basis they must be preceded by a violation of international
law imputable to some responsible agent. But in the context of the law applicable in
armed conflict, violations of that body of law may be committed by individuals as
much as States.6'1 Greenwood in recognising that the right to reprisals may be
triggered when a violation is imputable to an ally of the target State departs from the
notion that the target State must be responsible for a violation of international law in
the sense of the law of State responsibility. According to Greenwood:
Allies of a State which is responsible for a violation of the laws of armed
conflict may also be subjected to reprisals where they are themselves
implicated in the violation and probably even where they have no direct
involvement if the violation takes the form of a policy of conducting
hostilities in a particular way/'72
The obvious conflict in the authorities, and the presence of State practice to the
contrary,67, must place in considerable doubt the assertion that before a State may be
made the target of a reprisal measure it must bear State responsibility for the
violation justifying the measure. On the other hand, given that reprisals must serve a
rational and genuinely deterrent function (discussed below), there must be a
sufficient connection between the perpetrator of the original violation and the target
of the reprisal measure. Given that the test of imputability within the law of State
responsibility (now more commonly referred to as the test of "attribution")674 has
667 UK War Office, Manual ofMilitary Law: Part III The Law ofWar on Land, HMSO, London, 1958
(hereinafter UK Manual of Military Law), par. 643.
668
See, e.g., E. Stowell, "Military Reprisals and the Sanctions on the Laws ofWar", (1942) 36
American Journal ofInternational Law 643, pp. 649-50:
669 Albrecht (1953), p. 595.
67(1 Provost (1994), p. 418.
671
See, generally, van Sliedregt (2003).
672 Greenwood (1989a), p. 43.
673 See Provost (1994), p. 418.
''4
See D. Bodansky and J.R. Cook, "The ILC's State Responsibility Articles: Introduction and
Overview", (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 773, p. 778.
147
considerably widened in recent years,67'"" it could well be argued that where the
actions of non-State actors or State allies cannot be attributed to the target State,
there is an insufficient connection to justify a reprisal measure.
3. Proper Purpose
In popular usage, the term "reprisal" is often used interchangeably with "retaliation"
or "revenge".676 Reprisals, stricto sensu, however, are not punitive measures and may
only be undertaken in order to serve the purely deterrent function of coercing a
delinquent adversary into compliance with the law.677 The continued reference in
• 678
some of the literature to the punitive or retributive nature of reprisals, is probably
best explained on the basis of a conflation of legal and popular usage. Sir David
Hughes Morgan, who was a member of the British delegation to the Geneva
Diplomatic Conference of 1974-77, which produced the Protocols Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, has stated that the conference may not have
appreciated the clear distinction between reprisals and retaliation.6'9 Although
reprisals were often viewed in the past as lawfully serving a partly punitive function,
that function has now come to be accepted as improper, to the point of invalidating
the legality of the reprisal measure.680 The requirement that reprisals only be
undertaken in order to achieve a specific purpose limits the range of permissible
reprisal activity in two main ways: Firstly, it requires that the initial decision to
undertake reprisals be made for a proper purpose; and second, it limits the execution
See Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment 15 July 1999,
esp. par. 137; ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Arts 4-11. Contrast Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, par.
115. There is a suggestion that State practice has moved towards an even wider test of attribution
since the events of September 11, 2001 (see S.R. Ratner, "Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After
September 11", (2002) 96 American Journal ofInternational Law 905).
676 See Almond (1980). p. 198.
"
UK Manual of Military Law, pp. 184-5; US Field Manual No. 27-10, p. 177. See, also, Walzer,
stating that reprisals may be described as "deterrence without retribution" (M. Walzer, Just and Unjust
Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977, p. 209.)
67s
See, e.g.. Bowett (1972), p. 3; Kwakwa (1990), p. 51.
679 Netherlands Red Cross Society, The New Humanitarian Law in War and Conflict: Report of an
international symposium held on 25 and 26 September 1978 under the auspices of the Netherlands
Red Cross Society, at the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands Red Cross Society, The Hague,
1978, p. 11. See, however. Kalshoven, who argues that in terms of reprisals against innocents such as
members of an occupied population, there is no real difference between "punitive" and "deterrent"
measures (Kalshoven (1971), p. 43).
<M) See Bassiouni, (1992), p. 447.
148
of the reprisal measures by ensuring that throughout their course, the nature and
purpose of the reprisals remain compatible with coercing a delinquent adversary into
compliance with the law. The Institut de droit international has stated that it is a
condition of the continuing legality of reprisals that the State must not deflect
reprisals away from their original objective.681 If the only legitimate objective is
deterrent rather than punitive, a reprisal measure which comes to be turned to a
punitive objective loses its legality.682
4. Subsidiarity
Reprisals may only be undertaken as a last resort.683 This requirement is sometimes
referred to as a requirement of "subsidiarity'" as reprisals are rendered subsidiary to
all other available remedial options, which must first be exhausted.684 The principle
of subsidiarity appears to require, inter alia, that a protest be made to the delinquent
belligerent. In the Naulilaa Incident the Arbitral Tribunal stated that "'[rjeprisals are
only legitimate when they have been preceded by an unsuccessful demand for
redress."688 Some sources go further and suggest that subsidiarity requires an express
warning of the prospect of reprisals so as to give a delinquent adversary a reasonable
opportunity to bring its actions in line with the law.686 Other sources appear to treat
protests and warnings as alternative options.687 It should be noted that in the Case
hxl
(1934) 9 AIDI 692, Article 6(5), translated in Kalshoven (1971), p. 8.
'"s2 Dinstein states however, that "a tinge of retribution can probably be traced in every instance of
response to force" (Dinstein (2001), p. 199). See, also, Greenwood:
...where a State engaged in an armed conflict has a valid reason for resorting to
reprisals, it will almost always be impossible at the time to determine how far it is
also influenced by other considerations. The presence of an ulterior motive will not,
therefore, rob reprisals of their legality, so long as they are also taken in order to put
an end to a course of illegal conduct or to deter the repetition of illegal acts.
(Greenwood (1989a), p. 46). An alternative test may be to require that the primary or overriding
motive be related to the proper purpose of reprisals.
''s'
United States v List, (1950) 11 TWC 757, pp. 1249-1250 (requiring that "every available method"
be employed before resort to the execution of hostages may be had as a reprisal measure in occupied
territory); Oeter (1995), §478; Provost (1994), p. 414; Bristol (1979), pp. 412-3.
6X4
See, e.g., Kalshoven (1971), pp. 340-341.
685 Green (2000), p. 630.
6X6
See, e.g., Oeter (1995), §478; Provost states that such a requirement "probably" exists (Provost
(1994), p. 414).
687
See, e.g., Albrecht (1953), p. 597.
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Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America),
which was concerned with principles relating to self-defence under international law,
the ICJ treated the failure of the US to protest Iran's military presence and activity on
the Reshadat oil platforms as an indication that there was no "necessity" in the US"s
attack on those platforms.688 Protests or warnings may therefore be relevant not only
in fulfilling the requirements of subsidiarity, but also in satisfying any fact finder that
there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the conclusion that the test of necessity is
satisfied. Nevertheless, if granting additional time to a belligerent, through means of
prior protest or warning, would seriously endanger the security of civilians or troops,
then the requirement may be waived,686 and this is equally the case if a protest or
warning would be futile in the circumstances.660 The law relating to reprisals is not
the only branch of public international law to offer remedies on a purely subsidiary
basis. A rule of subsidiarity exists, for e.g., in the context of diplomatic protection
claims where one State claims against another State on behalf of an injured national.
In that context, the standing of the claimant State to seek relief in an international
court or tribunal is dependent on the national of that State having exhausted all
available local remedies in the respondent State.691 There are, however, limits to this
rule of subsidiarity. Judge Lauterpacht in his Separate Opinion in the Norwegian
Loans Case stated (in the context of diplomatic protection) that:
the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies is not a purely technical
or rigid rule. It is a rule which international tribunals have applied with a
considerable degree of elasticity. In particular, they have refused to act
upon it in cases in which there are, in fact, no effective remedies available
owing to the law of the State concerned or the considerations prevailing
in it...692
6Sfi Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States ofAmerica) (Merits)
12003] ICJ Rep. 1, par. 76.
"sy Kalshoven (1971). p. 340; McDougal & Feliciano (1961), p. 688. The United States did not purport
to exhaust alternative remedies prior to bombing raids against North Vietnam in reprisal for surprise
attacks against its airbases near Pleiku in South Vietnam in 1965 due to the danger that such delay
would present to its troops (Bristol (1979), p. 413).
690 Kalshoven (1971), p. 340.
,>91 See Dixon & McCorquodale (2003), pp. 429-432. The various human rights tribunals established
by international and regional human rights instruments have also upheld a requirement to exhaust
local remedies (id., p. 432).
6,2
Norwegian Loans Case (France v Norway) [1957] ICJ Rep. 9, Separate Opinion of Judge
Lauterpacht, p. 39. See, also, Finnish Shipowners Arbitration (Finland v Great Britain) (1934) 3
RIAA 1479; El. Oro Mining and Railway Co. Arbitration (Great Britain v Mexico) (1931) 5 RIAA
191, p. 198; Robert E. Brown Arbitration (United States v Great Britain) (1923) 6 RIAA 120, p. 129.
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It is only reasonably available and effective alternatives which must be exhausted
before reprisals are resorted to.693
A number of sources list, as an additional limitation on the right to
reprisals, the requirement that reprisals may only be ordered by those at the highest
levels of the military echelon.694 Art. 86 of the Oxford Manual, for instance, states,
inter alia, that reprisals "can only be resorted to with the authorization of the
Commander in Chief."694 Interestingly, the Arbitral Tribunal in the Naulilaa Incident
did not list senior authorisation as a requirement. The distinction may lie in the fact
that the Oxford Manual was concerned specifically with belligerent reprisals whereas
the Naulilaa Incident concerned peace-time reprisals. Perhaps there is greater scope
for abuse in the context of armed conflict where a State (or other belligerent) imbues
far reaching lethal power to those at relatively low levels in the chain of command.
Alternatively, the Arbitral Tribunal's omission may indicate that the requirement of
senior authorisation was a practical limitation, rather than a generally accepted legal
one. Greenwood states that while it is highly desirable that the decision to order
reprisals be taken only by a senior officer or political body, such a requirement
"would seem to be more a matter of internal military discipline than of international
law."696 As Kalshoven stated in relation to a somewhat different aspect of the law of
reprisals:
it is not believed that international law has yet considered the details of
the procedure which a military commander ought to follow in order to
arrive at a balanced decision in respect to a contemplated execution of
693
McDougal & Feliciano (1961), p. 688; Provost (1994), p. 414 says that only "rapid and effective
measures [which] are available" must be exhausted. See, also, Levenfeld (1982) who argues, in the
context of peace-time reprisals, that the consistent failure of the Security Council to deal meaningfully
with fedayeen attacks against Israel due to the political make-up of that body (at least during the cold
war) released Israel from the requirement to seek pacific redress through the Security Council before
resorting to reprisals (pp. 38-39).
694 See, e.g., US Field Manual No. 27-10, p. 177; Oeter (1995), §477; Bothe et al. (1982), p. 312.
There is dispute among the sources, however, as to exactly which ranks are entitled to order reprisals
(see Albrecht (1953), pp. 599-600).
9" Art. 86, The Laws ofWar on Land, adopted by the Institute of International Law at Oxford, 9
September 1880 (hereinafter Oxford Manual), available at www.icrc.org.
696 Greenwood (1989b). p. 233. See UK Manual of Military Law, par. 645. See also Oeter (1995),
§477, who states that "No individual soldier is authorized to order reprisals of his own accord." The
reference here appears to be to domestic rather than international law as the Handbook goes on to
explain that the taking of reprisals "is the sole responsibility of the highest political authority, in the
case ofGermany: the Federal Government." (id.)
151
hostages or reprisal prisoners. What remains, of course, is the rule...that
'the lives of persons may not be arbitrarily taken.'697
Nevertheless, the requirement was insisted upon by the Dutch Special Court of
Cassation in In re Kooymans where the fact that a reprisal measure was authorised
fT QO
only by a non-commissioned officer was one of the bases of its illegality. It may
be that the absence of senior authorisation suggests that insufficient attention was
paid to attempting alternative remedies (thus violating the requirement of
subsidiarity). The lack of senior authorisation may therefore be a factual
consideration to be taken into account in determining compliance with subsidiarity
rather than a separate legal requirement as such. It is a requirement, however, at least
as a purely formal condition of treaty law, under the United Kingdom's reservation
to Protocol I, which reserves the right to take reprisals otherwise prohibited by
Articles 51-55 of Protocol I, but only under certain restrictive conditions, including
the requirement that "formal warning to the adverse party requiring cessation of the
violations has been disregarded and then only after a decision taken at the highest
level of government."699
5. Proportionality
Proportionality is clearly established as an essential precondition of the legality of
any reprisal.700 This was first confirmed by the Special Arbitral Tribunal in the
697 Kalshoven (1971), pp. 228-9. Kalshoven was addressing the determination of the United States
Military Tribunal in United States v List that the execution of hostages in reprisal could only occur
after a fair trial before a judicial body (see (1948) 11 TWC 757, p. 1250). Kalshoven stated that this
purported rule was an invention of the Tribunal and suggested that it has no foundation in
international law (Kalshoven (1971), pp. 228-9). See also Albrecht (1953), p. 598.
698
(1946) AD 398; see, also, In re Kappler (1948) 15 AD 471, p. 473, where the Military Tribunal of
Rome stated that belligerent reprisals "may be ordered not only by those authorities of the State which
represent it in international law, but also by the Supreme Commander or by the Commander of a big
unit."
699 Reservation of the United Kingdom upon ratification of Protocol I, reprinted in A. Roberts & R.
Guelff, Documents on the Laws ofWar, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 511.
011 This was not, however, always the case. In the Naulilaa Incident, the Special Arbitral Tribunal
noted that on the question of whether proportionality is a prerequisite to the legality of reprisals,
"authors, unanimous until a few years ago, begin to be divided in their opinions. The majority regard a
certain proportion between the offence and the reprisals as a necessary condition for the legitimacy of
the latter. Other authors, among the most modern, no longer require this condition." (extracted in
Green (1959), p. 629). See, also, the 1951 decision in the Trial ofGeneral Von Falkenhausen where
the Military Tribunal in Brussels did not include proportionality as one of the preconditions for a
legal reprisal (discussed in Kalshoven (1971), pp. 255-260.)
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Naulilaa Incident, where the disproportionality between Portugal's alleged initial
wrong and Germany's consequent reprisal was a "decisive" alternative basis for the
Tribunal's rejection of Germany's claim as to the legality of its actions. 01 According
to the Tribunal:
In its Reply, Germany admitted the need for proportion between the
reprisals and the offence. Even if it is admitted that international law only
requires relative approximation of the reprisals to the offence, reprisals
out of all proportion to the act that inspired them ought certainly to be
considered excessive and illegal.702
Although the decision concerned peacetime reprisals, the requirement of
proportionality is equally applicable to belligerent reprisals. In its Advisory Opinion
on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ refrained from
addressing the legality of belligerent reprisals, but observed that "in any case any
right of recourse to such reprisals would, like self-defence, be governed inter alia by
the principle of proportionality."703
While there is no dispute over the existence of a proportionality rule, it is
still largely unclear as to how proportionality is to be assessed in any particular
instance of reprisals. The spectrum of possibilities breaks down in a number of ways:
Firstly, there are those who argue that reprisals are to be measured against that which
is necessary to bring an end to the enemy's continuing or future illegal conduct
(which we may broadly refer to as a "future-oriented" test of proportionality);704 and
second, there are those who argue that reprisals are to be measured against the
enemy's past illegal conduct (which we may broadly refer to as a "past-oriented"
test). Within these two groupings, there are further possibilities; for instance, one
7111 The Tribunal rejected Germany's case on the ground that there was no prior illegal action on the
part of Portugal to justify' a resort to reprisals: but it held that had Portugal's conduct constituted prior
illegal action, then Germany's case would still have failed on two separate grounds, "each of which is
decisive", namely that Germany had made no demand for redress, and that Germany's actions were
disproportionate. See Naulilaa Incident, extracted in Green (1959), pp. 629-630.
702 Extracted in Green (1959), p. 630.
703
Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, p.
246.
704
See, e.g.. McDougal & Feliciano (1961), p. 682, who state that:
the kind and amount of permissible reprisal violence is that which is
reasonably designed so as to affect the enemy's expectations about the
cost and gains of reiteration or continuation of his initial unlawful act as
to induce the termination of and future abstention from such act.
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past-oriented test may measure reprisals against the physical harm illegally
perpetrated by the enemy, while another may measure it against the seriousness of
the international norm violated. In addition, it is possible to postulate a hybrid test of
proportionality that takes into account all, or a number of, possible aspects of the
enemy's conduct both past and potential.
The problem with adopting a past-oriented test, where reprisals are
measured against the level of wrong already perpetrated, is that that past wrong bears
no logical relationship to the future-oriented or preventative purpose of reprisals.70''
The only lawful purpose for which a reprisal may be undertaken is to prevent further
unlawful conduct, and not to punish or retaliate for that which has already passed. 06
Provost has observed that "if reprisals were wholly backward-looking, resting solely
on the initial violation by the enemy belligerent, they would in fact constitute
punitive actions".707 Nevertheless, employing the initial violation as the yard-stick
against which reprisals are to be measured has the advantage of reducing
proportionality to a practical, concrete test (or at least something in that direction).
The test of proportionality is always more easily stated than applied in practice,708
and cannot be reduced to a simple mathematical equation,709 but the initial violation
at least provides a focal point against which the magnitude of reprisals may be
measured. If reprisals were to be measured against some hypothetical evaluation of
the adversary's future conduct, the test of proportionality would be almost
impossible to apply in practice. It has been argued that the only feasible means of
limiting reprisals, therefore, is to limit them by reference to the initial violation.710
m Levenfeld (1982), p. 39.
7I"' See US Field Manual No. 27-10, p. 177; UK Manual ofMilitary Law, pp. 184-5.
707 Provost (1994), p. 417.
708
Rogers (1996), p. 17.
7"'J Provost (1994), p. 417.
Hampson (1988), p. 824. Nevertheless, future-oriented measures of proportionality are applied in
other contexts in customary international law, including in relation to self-defence (as an exception to
the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter). See, e.g., Legality of the
Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, where the ICJ refused to
construe Article 51 of the UN Charter or customary international law as precluding "'the use of nuclear
weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival would be at
stake." (pars 96-97). Where a State resorts to nuclear weapons in self-defence, its defensive actions
may be proportional to the threat posed by an aggressor State, but they are likely to exceed beyond
computation the magnitude of any attack already carried out. See, also, the case of the Caroline,
where US Secretary of State Daniel Webster stated that an act of self-defence must not be
"unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by
that necessity and kept clearly within it." Expressed in this way, proportionality in the context of self-
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Further, limiting proportionality by reference to a hypothetical evaluation of the
enemy's future conduct creates the very real danger that belligerents may seriously
escalate hostilities and engage in a spiral of reprisals and counter-reprisals.711 As
suggested below, if reprisals are to be at all effective, it is only likely that they will
be so if they are employed sparingly and in a restrained manner. The preponderance
of modern authors therefore tends to assert the existence of a past-oriented test of
proportionality which limits reprisals by the extent of the actual breach committed
712
by the delinquent enemy.
Ambiguity remains, however, as to what measure (or measures) of past
conduct stand as the yardstick against which reprisals are to be measured. In
particular, the authorities are unclear as to whether a reprisal should be measured
against the physical harm illegally perpetrated by the enemy, or whether it should be
measured instead by reference to the gravity of the norm violated.71'1 If the answer is
defence may be said to measure the magnitude of any permissible response against the achievement of
a future outcome; it requires that force be limited to that which is necessary to achieving the proper
purpose of self-defence (US Secretary of State Daniel Webster's letter of 24 April 1841 to the British
Minister at Washington Mr. Fox (hereinafter the Caroline case), reprinted in R.Y. Jennings, "The
Caroline and McLeod Cases" (1938) 32 American Journal of InternationalLaw 82. p. 89). See,
however, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v US) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, p. 176, where the ICJ suggested that acts of self-defence must be
proportional to the initial armed attack. Future-oriented measures of proportionality have also been
applied in the context of the jus in bello, where proportionality stands as an overriding limitation on
the legality of any particular attack. The principle of proportionality is codified in Protocol I which
prohibits attacks which may be expected to cause "excessive", "incidental loss" (Arts 5 l(5)(b) &
57(2)(b)). "Excessive" in this context is measured "in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated" from the attack (id.) The principle of proportionality in the context of the jus in
bello therefore requires commanders and others to weigh up the expected impact of any attack upon
civilians and civilian objects against the anticipated military advantage of the attack (see Art. 57(2)(b),
Protocol I). The principle of proportionality in the context of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello is
examined further in J. G. Gardam, "Proportionality and Force in International Law", (1993) 87
American Journal of International Law 391; C.A. Allen, "Implementing Limitations on the Use of
Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and Necessity", (1992) 86 American Society of International
Law Proceedings 39; W.J. Fenrick, "The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional
Warfare", (1982) 98 Military Law Review 91.
11 Levenfeld (1982). p. 40.
712 See, e.g., Provost (1994), p. 417; Hampson (1988), pp. 823-824; Greenwood (1989a), p. 44.
713 Art. 86, Oxford Manual provides that belligerent reprisals must never exceed the "measure of the
infraction of the laws ofwar"; the British manual ofmilitary law in use in the Second World War
provided that reprisals must not exceed "the degree of violation committed by the enemy" (British
War Office, Manual ofMilitary Law, HMSO, London, 1929, par. 459); the American manual in force
during the Second World War also measured reprisals against "the degree of violations committed by
the enemy" (US War Dept., Field Manual No. 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Govt. Printing
Office, Washington D.C., 1940, par. 358(c)); in the Hostages Case, the Tribunal said that belligerent
reprisals were not to exceed "the severity of the unlawful act" ((1948) 11 TWC 757, p. 1252). The test
was expressed more clearly, however, in the 1934 resolution of the Institut de Droit International
concerning peacetime reprisals, which provides, in Article 6(2) that reprisals must be proportionate to
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the latter, then a significant reprisal may be warranted even where the enemy has
caused little concrete harm. The war crimes trials arising out of the Second World
War are of limited assistance in determining the limits of proportionality. Those
reprisals which came to the attention of the military tribunals were invariably so
utterly excessive on any count that in rejecting their legality the military tribunals
have clarified little:714 In the Hostages Case, for instance, the Military Tribunal
condemned as "clearly excessive", a reprisal order calling for the execution of
between 50 and 100 "communists" in exchange for the death of every German
soldier. In the Trial of Kappler, the Military Tribunal condemned as
disproportionate, a reprisal adopting the lesser ratio of ten executions for every one
German soldier killed in a bomb attack carried out by the Italian resistance.7I6A
number of studies have examined deliberations of the U.N. Security Council in
relation to acts of peacetime reprisals, particularly in the context of the Arab-Israeli
conflict.71 It has been observed that the Security Council appears in practice to be
satisfied with (or turn a blind eye to) peace-time reprisal measures which do not
•n I Q
exceed the physical harm wrought by the initial unlawful act. In the context of
belligerent reprisals, however, most authors state that the test of proportionality is
the gravity of the illegal act and the injury suffered ("Proportionner la contrainte employee a la
gravite de l'acte denonce comme illicite et a F importance du doirnnage subi.") ((1934) AIDl 692,
translated in Kalshoven (1971), p. 8).
14 There were, however, exceptions. See, e.g., In re Best (1950) 17 ILR 434, p. 436, where the
Eastern Provincial Court of Copenhagen held that:
the essential part of those of the German measures which were exclusively against
property were not quantitatively excessive in relation to the preceding acts of the
Danish Resistance Movement. With regards to the killings and those of the demolitions
which involved and were known to involve loss oflife and personal injury, the Court
observes that the number of persons killed and injured does not exceed, according to
the evidence before the Court, the number of persons killed or injured by the preceding
Danish actions, with - possibly - isolated exceptions.
Although the Court was prepared to accept as a matter of factual inquiry that the German
measures were largely proportionate, they were ultimately held not to be lawful reprisals on
the basis that they lacked a proper purpose (due to the failure to notify the opponent that the
measures were reprisals). On appeal, the Danish Supreme Court suggested that these same
measures in fact lacked proportionality, but the finding was obiter (id., pp. 437-8).
Trial ofList et al. (1948) VIII LRTWC 35, p. 65. According to Albrecht, the wording of the
judgment "seems to be open to the view that certain circumstances might justify reprisals exceeding
the damage inflicted by the original offense." (Albrecht (1953), p. 605).
In re Kappler (1948) 15 AD 471.
1
See, e.g., R.A. Falk, "The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation", (1969) 63
American Journal ofInternational Law 415; Y. Blum, "The Beirut Raid and the International Double
Standard", (1970) 64 American Journal ofInternational Law 73; Bowett (1972); Levenfeld (1982).
18 See in particular, the Annex in Bowett (1972), pp. 33-36.
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satisfied in the absence of obvious disproportionality, rather than the presence of
strict proportionality.719 Nevertheless, the ILC, in its Articles on State Responsibility,
has adopted a much narrower test of proportionality in the context of non-forcible
countermeasures. Article 51 of the Articles (headed "Proportionality") provides that:
Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking
into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights
720
in question.
The requirement of proportionality is framed in positive terms: i.e., rather than adopt
the negative formulation that the measure must "not be disproportionate", there is a
positive requirement of commensurability. The ILCs Commentary to the Article
explains the choice of phraseology as follows:
The positive formulation of the proportionality requirement is adopted in
article 51. A negative formulation might allow too much latitude, in a
context where there is concern as to the possible abuse of
721
countermeasures. *"
The positive formulation may therefore be more a matter of "progressive
development" than pure "codification" of customary law.722 The first reading text of
the ILC's draft Articles on State Responsibility contained the negative formulation
that countermeasures "shall not be out of proportion" to the wrongful act, but this
appears to have been altered in order to bring the formulation in line with the ICJ's
treatment of countermeasures in the Gcibcikovo-Nagymaros case.'2" That case was
concerned with the actions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in relation to a treaty
between them providing for the joint construction and operation of hydro-electric and
related works. Hungary abandoned the joint project in violation of the terms of the
treaty and Czechoslovakia responded by damming the Danube River, altering its
19 Kalshoven (1971), pp. 341-2. See, also, the Naulilaa Incident, extracted in Green (1959), p. 630
("reprisals out of all proportion to the act that inspired them ought certainly to be considered excessive
and illegal").
720
Art. 51, Articles on State Responsibility.
21
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, 23 April-1
June and 2 July-10 August, 2001, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), p.
344.
22
See Art. 13(1), Charter of the United Nations, which provides that the General Assembly shall
initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose, inter alia, of "encouraging the
progressive development of international law and its codification.".
723 See J. Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility, 15 March 2000, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507
(2000), par. 346.
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water and navigational course in a manner prejudicial to Hungary. The ICJ
considered whether Czechoslovakia's actions could have been characterised as a
legitimate countermeasure. The Court stated that in its view, '"an important
consideration is that the effects of a countermeasure must be commensurate with the
injury suffered, taking account of the rights in question."724 In relation to the facts of
the case, the ICJ found that "the diversion of the Danube carried out by
Czechoslovakia was not a lawful countermeasure because it was not
proportionate."72:i Thus the ICJ framed the test of proportionality in a positive
manner.
The fact that the ILC adopted this narrow test of commensurability
within its Articles would appear flawed - at least from the perspective of codification
- on two grounds. First, the ICJ in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case dealt with
proportionality in such a cursory manner as to leave its full purport and effect
unclear. Secondly, it appears to depart from previous authority. In discussing the
conditions which must be met by any lawful countermeasure, the ICJ relied upon the
judgments in two cases: The ICJ's Judgment on the Merits in the case concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua and the Arbitral
Award in the case concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946.726 In
the Nicaragua case, the ICJ expressed the requirement of proportionality in the
context of any countermeasure, but it did not elaborate upon the calculus involved in
• • 797
determining proportionality, or disproportionality. ~ The Air Services Agreement
728
case, " however, did. In that case the dispute centred around an alleged breach by
France of the terms of its bilateral air services agreement with the United States. The
alleged breach consisted in France's refusal to permit a "change of gauge"' -
specifically, a transhipment of passengers and cargo between a Boeing 747 and a
Boeing 727 at London - in relation to Pan American's West Coast of the United
States-Paris, via London, route. The U.S. response was to issue two orders under Part
~4 Case Concerning Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep. 7, par. 85.
725
Id., par. 87.
726 Id., par. 83.
~7
See, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v
US) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, par. 249.
7_i' Air Service Agreement between the United States ofAmerica and France (United States v France)
(1978) 15 RIAA417.
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213 of the Civil Aeronautics Board's Economic Regulations : The first, ordering
Air France, and a second airline, UTA, to file flight schedules within specified time
limits, and the second, ordering the cancellation of Air France's Paris-Los Angeles,
via Montreal, route. The second order never actually came into effect as the day
before it was scheduled to do so the United States and France agreed to submit the
dispute to arbitration. The Compromis of arbitration between the two States stated
that the Tribunal shall determine, inter alia, whether the United States had the right
to undertake such action as it undertook under Part 213 of the Economic
Regulations,730 i.e. whether they had the right to make the orders they did. The fact
that the second order was not actually implemented was therefore not particularly
material. Although France asserted that the United States, through its retaliatory
actions, would have induced far greater losses by France than were originally
suffered by the United States,732 the Tribunal found that the measures ordered by the
United States were not "clearly disproportionate'" to those taken originally by France,
and were thus legal.7,3 According to the Tribunal, the test of proportionality required
"a very approximate appreciation".7 '4 The Tribunal was of the view that:
it will not suffice, in the present case, to compare the losses suffered by
Pan Am on account of the suspension of the projected services with the
losses which the French companies would have suffered as a result of the
countermeasures; it will also be necessary to take into account the
importance of the positions of principle which were taken when the
French authorities prohibited changes of gauge in third countries. If the
importance of the issue is viewed within the framework of the general air
transport policy adopted by the United States Government and
implemented by the conclusion of a large number of international
agreements with countries other than France, the measures taken by the
United States do not appear to be clearly disproportionate when compared
to those taken by France.71'
It appears therefore, that the Tribunal formed the view that the importance of the
principle initially breached by France justified the greater losses that may have been
suffered by France. The Tribunal implied that there was a paucity of evidence before
729 Hereinafter Economic Regulations.
730Id., par. 9.
731 See id., par. 41.
Id., par. 17. The United States, however, argued that Air France's Paris-Los Angeles route was
roughly equivalent, in fact, to Pan American's West Coast-Paris service (par. 18).




it in relation to concrete losses,736 - but this only strengthens the conclusion that the
Tribunal was prepared to accept asymmetrical losses given the importance of the
principle breached. Proportionality - or lack thereof - is universally acknowledged
as a sine qua non of the right to reprisals, and the onus on establishing its existence,
at least in relation to cases involving delictual, as opposed to criminal, responsibility,
must lie with the respondent State; after all a prima facie case of international
responsibility presumably stands against such State. For the Tribunal to accept the
legality of the US countermeasure, even in the absence of concrete evidence as to the
actual respective projected losses, the Tribunal must have been prepared to accept
that even if France's contention was correct and its losses would have far exceeded
those of the United States, the countermeasure was still not disproportionate. This is
not to suggest, however, that the Air Services Agreement stands for the proposition
that countermeasures may exact losses out of any proportion whatsoever with those
initially suffered. As the Tribunal proceeded to state: '"They should be used with a
spirit of great moderation and be accompanied by a genuine effort at resolving the
dispute."737 It has been suggested that:
the real insight of the Air Services Agreement award was that there had to
be a permissible level of escalation in response to illegal acts, or else the
malefactor would simply not regard the threats made by the injured state
as credible. The key, as the tribunal indicated, was that the response not
be disproportionate, and that any escalation proceed in relatively carefully
measured increments.738
Although the ICJ in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case cited the Air
Services Agreement award as supporting its conclusions on countermeasures, it
would appear that the ICJ in fact departed significantly from the law embodied in the
latter case. It is probably fair to conclude, therefore, that the restrictive approach to
proportionality taken by the ILC's Articles (in line with the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
case) is innovative rather than reflective of currently existing law. In fact a number of
States took the position that the ILC's preconditions on countermeasures has no basis
736 See id.
737 Id., par. 91.
38 D.J. Bederman, "Counterintuiting Countermeasures", (2002) 96 American Journal of International
Law 817. p. 820.
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in law.7,4 The ILC's Commentary to the Articles also implies that some level of
innovation has been adopted for practical purposes:
Considering the need to ensure the adoption ofCountermeasures does not
lead to inequitable results, proportionality must be assessed taking
account not only the purely "quantitative" element of the injury suffered,
but also "qualitative" factors such as the importance of the interest
protected by the rule infringed and the seriousness of the breach. 40
Whilst the narrow, positive approach to proportionality has some basis in
Professor Ago's early work on State responsibility, to the extent that it informed the
current approach it has probably been taken out of context. Professor Ago (as he then
was) considered that escalation may be necessary in the context of self-defence, but
viewed reprisals in an entirely different light:
The requirement of proportionality of the action taken in self-
defence,... concerns the relationship between that action and its purpose,
namely...that of halting and repelling the attack...It would be mistaken,
however, to think that there must be proportionality between the conduct
constituting the armed attack and the opposing conduct. The action
needed to halt and repulse the attack may well have to assume dimensions
disproportionate to those of the attack suffered...
Above all, one must guard against any tendency in this connection to
consider, even unwittingly, that self-defence is actually a form of
sanction, such as reprisals. There must of course be some proportion
between the wrongful infringement by one State of the right of another
State and the infringement by the latter of a right of the former through
reprisals. In the case of conduct adopted for punitive purposes, of
specifically retributive action taken against the perpetrator of a particular
wrong, it is self-evident that the punitive action and the wrong should be
commensurate with each other. But in the case of action taken for the
specific purpose of halting and repelling an armed attack, this does not
mean that the action should be more or less commensurate with the
attack. Its lawfulness cannot be measured except by its capacity for
achieving the desired result. In fact, the requirements of "necessity' and
'proportionality' of the action taken in self-defence can simply be
described as two sides of the same coin. '41
739 See, e.g., the comments and observations of Denmark (on behalf of Finland, Iceland, Norway,
Sweden and Denmark) in Comments and Observations received from Governments, 19 March 2001,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/515 (2001), p. 80; comments and observations of the United States in id., pp. 81-
83.
411
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, 23 April-1
June and 2 July-10 August, 2001, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), p.
344 (emphasis added).
41 Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980-11] Yearbook of the International
Law Commission 1, Part I, p. 69.
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The reason for the distinction in approach - i.e. the functional approach to self-
defence where the response must not be disproportionate to its purpose, and the non¬
functional approach to reprisals where the response must be commensurate to the
initial wrong - lies in Ago's theoretical characterisation of reprisals. He viewed
reprisals (in contradistinction to self-defence) as a form of "specifically retributive
action", "taken for punitive purposes". In reality, Ago's approach to reprisals may be
described as functional, but only because he saw the function of a reprisal measure as
the delivery of retribution itself. By limiting the measure of the reprisal to the
measure of the initial wrong, Ago permitted reprisals to perform their retributive
function. But it is a limited (or proportional) form of retribution.
It should be clear that what Ago was describing was not reprisals, stricto
sensu, but an outmoded conception of reprisals that is no longer part of the corpus of
international law. Reprisals are adopted strictly for the purpose of coercing an
adversary into compliance with the law. To insist that reprisals, or countermeasures,
be limited in the manner Ago specifies, is to impose a restrictive element that bears
no logical connection to the functional purpose they serve. By requiring the presence
of proportionality in both "quantitative" and "qualitative" terms - i.e. in terms of the
injury suffered as well as the importance of the interest protected by the rule
infringed and the seriousness of the breach742 - the ILC's rules on countermeasures
not only exceed or contradict pre-existing judicial authority,74 , but they can claim no
intellectual continuity with the work of Ago who was operating from an entirely
different set of assumptions (assumptions which were in fact expressly overturned,
inter alia, by Article 49(1) of the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility which
provides that countermeasures shall only be taken "in order to induce that State to
comply with its obligations").744 In addition the positive requirement of
proportionality is inconsistent with the long line of authority which has consistently
747 , ,~
Report ot the International Law Commission on the Work ot its Fifty-third Session, 23 April-1
June and 2 July-10 August, 2001, UN GAOR, 56lh Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001). p.
344.
747 As discussed above, the Air Service Agreement case did not require proportionality in both
quantitative and qualitative senses, but rather took an overall impression whereby the two values
could be considered cumulatively rather than separately. In addition, the test of proportionality was
framed in negative rather than positive terms.
744 Art. 49(1), Articles on State Responsibility.
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indicated that the test of proportionality is satisfied in the absence of clear
disproportionality.745






The first legal restrictions on the recourse to reprisals arose under customary law and
applied as general limitations applicable across the range of reprisals. These
restrictions appear to have arisen simultaneously with the emergence of the doctrine
of reprisals itself. Thus, while Article 27 of the Lieber Code of 1863 recognises the
permissibility of reprisals (*'[t]he law of war can no more wholly dispense with
retaliation than could the law of nations, of which it is a branch");746 Article 28
restricts their use as follows:
Retaliation will, therefore, never be resorted to as a measure of mere
revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, and moreover,
cautiously, and unavoidably - that is to say, retaliation shall only be
resorted to after careful inquiry into the real occurrence, and character of
the misdeeds that may demand retribution.
Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes the belligerents farther and
farther from the mitigating rules of regular war, and by rapid steps leads
them nearer to the internecine wars of savages.747
Similarly, the Oxford Manual of 1884 recognises both the permissibility of
reprisals,748 and restrictions upon their use.746 According to the Oxford Manual,
recourse to reprisals may only be had if four conditions are met: (1) the injury
746 Art. 27, General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in
the Field, 24 April 1863 (hereinafter the Lieber Code), reprinted in D. Schindler & J. Toman. The
Laws ofArmed Conflicts, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1988, p. 3.
747 Art. 28, Lieber Code.
74fi Art. 84, Oxford Manual.
749 Arts 85-86, Oxford Manual.
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complained of has not been redressed; (2) the reprisals are proportionate to the
infraction of the law of war; (3) the reprisals are carried out with the authorisation of
the commander-in-chief; and (4) the reprisals conform to the laws of humanity and
morality.750 These restrictions were, of course, the foundation for the more developed
restrictions which apply generally in relation to reprisals as a matter of customary
law at the current time (as discussed above).
In addition to these restrictions, a number of conventional rules have
been introduced which expressly prohibit the recourse to reprisals in particular
contexts. The first such express prohibition appeared in the 1929 Geneva Prisoners of
War Convention and was followed by further express prohibitions in the 1949
Geneva Conventions, the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, and Additional
Protocol I of 1977, as well as the Mines Protocol of 1980 and the Amended Mines
Protocol of 1996. The Hague Conventions and Regulations of 1899 and 1907 are,
however, silent on the matter of reprisals. It appears that in 1899 and 1907 the time
was not yet ripe for a comprehensive prohibition on reprisals in relation to any one
class of target, and no attempt was made to codify the general limitations which
applied in relation to the recourse to reprisals out of a concern that such codification
would constitute a legitimisation of their use.751 It has, however, been suggested that
Article 50 of the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 implicitly prohibits reprisals
. .... . . 7S? •
against civilians in occupied territory. Article 50 provides that:
No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the
population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be
regarded as jointly and severally responsible.7"
According to Kwakwa, this provision appears to be "a clear, albeit feeble, attempt to
grapple with the problem of belligerent reprisals."754 However customary law had
already come to recognise reprisals as an exception to the rule prohibiting collective
punishment (the Oxford Manual states quite clearly that "[rjeprisals are an exception
to the general rule of equity, that an innocent person ought not to suffer for the
750 See id. (discussed in Kwakwa (1990), pp. 53-4).
751 Kalshoven (1971), pp. 66-67. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 appears to have been silent on the
matter of reprisals for the same reason (See Kalshoven (1971), pp. 47-51).
See Kwakwa (1990), p. 54, n. 23.
Article 50. Hague Regulations of 1907.
754 Kwakwa (1990), p. 54, n. 23.
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guilty")7"'5 In addition, it seems to have been fairly well understood during the course
of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences that Article 50 was enacted without
prejudice to the question of reprisals.™' That is certainly the position that was
endorsed by the Military Manuals in force during World War II.777 The most
accepted position appears to be that no provision within the 1899 or 1907 Hague
-jc o
Conventions and Regulations relates to the matter of reprisals. "
ii. 1929 GENEVA PRISONERS OF WAR CONVENTION
On 27 July 1929, a Diplomatic Conference in Geneva resulted in the signing of two
Conventions: The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(the "1929 Prisoners of War Convention")774 and the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick Armies in the Field (the
^ Article 84, Oxford Manual; see also H. Grotius, DeJure Belli ac Pads Libri Tres, 1646 (trans, by
F. W. Kelsey, in J. Scott (ed.). The Classics of International Law, vol. II, book III. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 1925), bk. Ill, ch. XI, pt. VIII, §§ 733-4: "It is
the bedding mercy, if not of justice, that, except for reasons that are weighty and will affect the safety
ofmany, no action should be attempted whereby innocent persons may be threatened with
destruction" (emphasis added).
:v> See Albrecht (1953), p. 591, n. 6; see, also, Report of Captain Crozier to the Commission of the
United States of America to the International Conference at the Hague, Regarding the Work of the
Second Sub-Committee of the Second Committee of the Conference, 31 July 1899 (available at
www.vale.edu/lawweb/avalon/Iawofwar/hague99/hag99-Q9.htm), where Captain Crozier notes that
"because of their delicacy", certain subjects, including "retaliation and reprisals" were omitted from
the terms of the Hague Regulations of 1899.
1>1 US War Dept., Field Manual No. 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare, US Govt. Printing Office,
Washington D.C., 1940, par. 344; British War Office, Manual ofMilitary Law, HMSO, London,
1929, p. 85, n. 2.
7nS See Kalshoven (1971), pp. 55-56; Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 3432. It has also been suggested that
Article 27 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 implicitly prohibits reprisals against cultural property
(Kalshoven (1971), 66-67; A. Mitchell, "Does One Illegality Merit Another? The Law of Belligerent
Reprisals in International Law", (2001) 170 Military Law Review 155, p. 161), but in fact nothing in
Article 27 even tangentially grapples with the issue of reprisals. Art. 27. Hague Regulations of 1907
states as follows:
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as
far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and
wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for
military purposes.
It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings
or places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the
enemy beforehand.
7,9 Convention Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar, 27 July 1929, 118 LNTS 343.
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"1929 Wounded and Sick Convention").760 Article 2(3) of the 1929 Prisoners of War
Convention provides that: "Measures of reprisals against them [i.e. prisoners of war]
are forbidden."761 As is mentioned above, this was the first prohibition on reprisals in
a multilateral treaty.762 The 1929 Wounded and Sick Convention, however, makes no
reference to reprisals. It is possible that the explanation for this lies in the fact that
the 1929 Geneva Conventions were an attempt to ameliorate the horrors experienced
in the first world war, which included, in particular, reprisals against prisoners of
war.763 On the other hand it has been suggested that the 1929 Wounded and Sick
Convention implicitly incorporates a prohibition on reprisals against those protected
by the Convention: Des Gouttes has stated that the two Geneva Conventions should
be read together as the 1929 Wounded and Sick Convention is limited in its
application to armies on the battlefield, with wounded and sick combatants evacuated
to the rear already falling under the protection of the 1929 Prisoners of War
Convention. '64 Pictet has argued that the absence of a reprisal prohibition in the 1929
Wounded and Sick Convention is merely an oversight as prisoners of war and
wounded and sick are ultimately in analogous positions.765 An alternative argument,
put by some authors on the eve of World War Two, was that reprisals against the sick
and wounded would be prohibited as contrary to the principles of humanity.766 The
effect of the principles of humanity on the admissibility of reprisals is discussed
later. In relation to the argument that the 1929 Wounded and Sick Convention
implicitly included a prohibition on reprisals, that was not an interpretation that was
transmitted into the various military manuals.767 The prohibition on reprisals against
760 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field,
27 July 1929, 118 LNTS 303. The 1929 Wounded and Sick Convention was a revision of the
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies on the Field, 6
July 1906, [1907] UKTS 15 (hereinafter 1906 Wounded and Sick Convention); the 1929 Prisoners of
War Convention was a new Convention in terms of the subject-matter dealt with.
761 Article 2(3), 1929 Prisoners ofWar Convention.
''2 Kalshoven (1971), pp. 106-7.
763 See G. Roberts, "The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Additional
Protocol I", (1985) 26 Virginia Journal ofInternational Law 109, p. 141: J. Pictet (ed.). Commentary
on the Second Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949. ICRC, Geneva, 1960, available at
www.icrc.org. p. 253; Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 3434.
''4
P. des Gouttes, "La Convention de Geneve du 27 juillet 1929", (1930) Commentaire, pp. 22-24,
cited in Kalshoven (1990), p. 46, n. 8.
765 Pictet (1952), p. 344.
766 Kalshoven (1971), p. 108.
767
See. e.g., US War Dept., Field Manual No. 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare, US Govt. Printing
Office, Washington D.C., 1940, par. 358.
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prisoners of war was viewed, in 1929, as an innovation in international law. ' The
prospect of a blanket prohibition of reprisals against any one target was, at the time,
controversial: The International Law Association, for instance, took the position that
a limited right of reprisal against prisoners of war should be retained.769 Although the
analogy between prisoners of war and the wounded and sick on the battlefield is a
fair one to make at a de facto level, it may be going too far to suggest that an
innovative and controversial protection that was granted to one automatically applies,
de jure, to the other; especially if one considers that the distinction between prisoners
of war and the wounded and sick on the field is a legal distinction which continues to
apply to this day.770 In addition, the 1929 Prisoners of War Convention makes
specific provision for a system of "pr°tectmg Powers" to assist in the protection of
prisoners of war.'71 Such a system was viewed as helping eliminate the causes, or
need, for reprisals,777 and it has been observed that during the Second World War the
obligations of States towards prisoners of war were generally observed due in large
measure to the vigilance of both protecting Powers and the ICRC.771 The 1929
Wounded and Sick Convention, on the other hand, makes no provision for protecting
Powers. It may be that the absence of any prohibition on reprisals in the context of
that Convention is simply consistent with the fact that the Convention adopts a more
laisez-faire approach to the suppression of breaches, leaving it primarily to the
i • 774
parties to ensure compliance.
iii. 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
Each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 expressly prohibits reprisals against
the persons and objects protected by that Convention. The exception here is Geneva
768 Kwakwa (1990), p. 55.
7<w Kalshoven (1971), p. 107; Kwakwa (199), p. 55; Kalshoven (1990) p. 46.
7711 See Geneva Conventions I & III.
1 Arts 86-88, 1929 Prisoners ofWar Convention.
772 See Pictet (1952), p. 343.
m Id., p. 343.
774 Kalshoven (1971), p. 82. See, also. J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention
of 12 August 1949, ICRC, Geneva, 1958, p. 228, which states, in the context of Geneva Convention
IV, that '"[i]t was possible for the Convention to prohibit reprisals only because it substituted for them
other means of ensuring respect of the law, based on the principles of supervision by the Protecting
Powers and the obligation to punish individuals in cases of grave breaches."
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Convention III which prohibits reprisals against prisoners of war,777 but does not
expressly prohibit reprisals against effects and articles of personal use belonging to
prisoners of war, even though these are protected objects under the Convention. 6
Thus reprisals are prohibited against:
1. Soldiers and other protected personnel in the field who are wounded
or sick;777 and medical and religious personnel,778 and medical
buildings or equipment,779 protected by Geneva Convention I;780
0 Art. 13(3), Geneva Convention III.
776 Art. 18, Geneva Convention III.
77' Geneva Convention I provides protection to the wounded or sick belonging to the following
categories:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party
to the conflict and operating in or outside of their territory, even if their
territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps,
including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following
conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of a carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
Government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being
members thereof, such as civil members of military aircraft crews, war
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of
services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that
they have received authorization from the armed forces which they
accompany.
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices of the
merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the
conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other
provisions in international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who, on the approach of the
enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
(/yrt. 13, Geneva Convention I)
778 See Chapter IV (Arts 24-32), Geneva Convention I.
779 See Chapters III (Arts 19-23), V (Arts 33-34) & VI (Arts 35-37), Geneva Convention I.
780 Art. 46, Geneva Convention I: "Reprisals against the wounded, sick, personnel, buildings or
equipment protected by the Convention are prohibited."
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2. Naval and other protected personnel at sea who are wounded, sick or
shipwrecked;781 and medical and religious personnel,782 and medical
vessels and equipment,78, protected by Geneva Convention II;784
3. Prisoners of war;788 and
4. Civilians in occupied territory, or otherwise in the hands of a party to
the conflict of which they are not a national (e.g., enemy aliens), and
their property.786
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 effected a significant change in the law
of reprisals. They expanded the class of persons and objects protected against
reprisals, to include more than simply prisoners of war. And in the context of
prisoners of war, Geneva Convention III of 1949 provides protection (including
against reprisals) to a wider class of persons than the Prisoners ofWar Convention of
1929. Article 4 of Geneva Convention III defines '"prisoners of war", and confers
equivalent protections, upon a wider class of persons than the 1929 Convention.78
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 also put to rest the weak, but nevertheless present,
claims concerning implicit prohibitions in favour of civilians in occupied territory
(under Article 50 of the Hague Regulations of 1907) and the wounded and sick
(arising generally under the 1929 Wounded and Sick Convention by virtue of an
analogy with prisoners of war). The Geneva Conventions of 1949 prohibited
reprisals in favour of both classes of persons (and, in the context of civilians, their
property as well). The only persons not protected under the terms of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (and thus theoretically subject to reprisal) are enemy
combatants (i.e. those not outside the conflict as sick, wounded, shipwrecked or
781 Art. 13, Geneva Convention II provides protection to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea
who belong to the same categories as those set out in Article 13, Geneva Convention I (see above).
782 See Chapter IV (Arts 36-37), Geneva Convention II.
83 See Chapters III (Arts 22-35) & V (Arts 38-40), Geneva Convention II.
7X4 Art. 47, Geneva Convention II: "Reprisals against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, the
personnel, the vessels or the equipment protected by the Convention are prohibited."
88 Art. 13(3), Geneva Convention III: "Measures of reprisal against prisoners ofwar are prohibited."
786 Art. 33(3), Geneva Convention IV: "Reprisals against protected persons and their property are
prohibited." Protected persons under Geneva Convention IV are designated in Article 4(1), as "those
who, at a given moment, and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not
nationals."
787 See Art. 4, Geneva Convention III; Arts 1 & 81, 1929 Prisoners ofWar Convention.
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prisoners of war, or otherwise protected as medical, religious or other personnel) and
civilians who have not fallen into enemy hands (i.e., enemy civilians located in
enemy territory, neutral territory or the High Seas). Thus Greenwood notes that in the
context of the first GulfWar:
Reprisal attacks on urban centres of population, such as were undertaken
in the 'war of the cities'...were thus outside the scope of any treaty
prohibition on reprisals, although it was arguable that they were
prohibited by customary international law. NS
iv. 1954 HAGUE CULTURAL PROPERTY CONVENTION
The necessity of protecting cultural property was highlighted by the devastation
wrought upon the cultural heritage of Europe during the Second World War."v' The
Geneva Conventions of 1949, however, made only limited inroads towards their
protection. The Geneva Conventions accord protection to objects or property in two
distinct contexts:790 (1) Where the property is of a type accorded protection under the
Conventions regardless of the status of the territory where it's located; only a narrow
range of property is protected here, primarily on the basis of its dedication to the
medical assistance of war victims, for example, hospitals and hospital ships;791 and
ss Greenwood, 1989(a), p. 51.
789 H. Abtahi, "The Protection ofCultural Property in Times of Anned Conflict: The Practice of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Fonner Yugoslavia", (2001) 14 Harvard Human Rights
Journal 1, p. 7. During the Second World War the Germans employed a type of reprisal known as
Badeker Raids which involved air attacks against cultural, historical, artistic and religious importance
(Albrecht (1953), p. 601, n. 50). See, however, Detter:
The attack on the monastery of Monte Cassino, by an erroneous lack of
judgment or on the basis of false information, by the Americans,
assuming this was a German stronghold, caused... the loss of some of the
most important medieval manuscript collections in the world. The attack
on Dresden by the United Kingdom, in retaliation for the bombing of
Coventry, caused the total destruction of one of the most important cities
in Europe, together with the Meissen porcelain works. But otherwise the
cultural heritage of Europe was spared; neither Rome nor Paris was
bombed.
(I. Detter. The Law of War, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 177,
n. 76.) See, also, Kalshoven, who argues that "reprisals against cultural property in practice
have never represented a particularly serious issue." (Kalshoven (1990), p. 53).
790 See Prosecutor v Dario Kordic andMario Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Chamber,
Judgment, 26 February 2001. par. 341.
791 See, e.g., Chapters III (Arts 19-23), V (Arts 33-34) & VI (Arts 35-37), Geneva Convention I;
Chapters III (Arts 22-35) & V (Arts 38-40), Geneva Convention II; Arts 18, 21 & 22, Geneva
Convention IV. Of course, such objects lose their immunity when used lor hostile purposes (see, e.g.,
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(2) where property is accorded protection on the basis of its location in occupied
territory, or on the basis that it belongs to enemy aliens; the class of protected
property here is much wider extending, in the case of property in occupied territory,
to "real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private
persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative
7Q9
organizations''. Cultural property is thus only protected under the Geneva
Conventions to the extent that it is located in occupied territory. It may also receive
some protection in the case of enemy aliens under Article 27 of Geneva Convention
IV which provides, inter alia, that:
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their
persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and
practices, and their manners and customs.7V '
The destruction of religious or cultural institutions by a particular State belonging
(whether in a legal sense or not) to enemy aliens living within that State may
constitute a violation of the "respect" owed by that State as specified above.
The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
extends these protections by obliging States to respect and protect cultural property
regardless of whether it is located in one's own territory or the territory of another
High Contracting Party,744 or in occupied territory.795 Significantly, the Convention
requires Parties to "refrain from any act directed by way of reprisals against cultural
property."79'1 Although limited protections exist in relation to a wide class of cultural
Art. 2f. Geneva Convention I; Art. 34, Geneva Convention II; Art. 19, Geneva Convention IV). This
appears to have been the case, for instance, when Unites States Marines seized a hospital near the
Iraqi city of Nasiriya during Operation Iraqi Freedom in March, 2003, on the basis that it was being
used as a staging area for attacks against US positions. It appears that the hospital was housing a large
quantity of AK47 assault rifles and ammunition and that it was used as a firing position by Iraqi forces
("Nasiriya Hospital Shows Signs ofMilitary Use", ABC News Online, 26 March 2003, available at
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s816684.htm).
792 Art. 53, Geneva Convention IV. See, also, Art. 33, Geneva Convention IV, which provides in
relation to protected persons, both in occupied territory and the territory of a party to the conflict, that
"[pjillage is prohibited" (Art. 33(2)) and that "[rjeprisals against protected persons and their property
are prohibited" (Art. 33(3)).
793 Art. 27, Geneva Convention IV.
14 See Art. 4, Cultural Property Convention
79>
See Art. 5, Cultural Property Convention.
796 Art. 4(4), Cultural Property Convention. "Cultural property" is defined by Article 1 of the
Convention as the following objects, irrespective of origin or ownership:
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property under the Hague Conventions and Regulations of 1907, those protections do
not extend to immunity from reprisals.797
v. 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I
The prohibitions on reprisals in Protocol I are far more extensive than those
contained in the earlier treaties, and considerably reduce the ambit of permissible
reprisals, at least as a matter of conventional law. Protocol I contains seven separate
provisions concerning reprisals, each prohibiting reprisals against a different class of
persons or objects. The first of these, Article 20, is contained within Part II of the
Protocol, concerned with the wounded, sick and shipwrecked. It proved to be an
entirely non-controversial provision among the delegates to the Geneva Diplomatic
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural
heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or
history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of
buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of
art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or
archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important
collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property
defined above;
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit
the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as
museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges
intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural
property defined in subparagraph (a);
(c) centres containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in
sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as 'centres containing
monuments'.
777 The Hague Regulations of 1907 provide protection to "buildings dedicated to religion, art, science,
or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are
collected" in the case of sieges and bombardments (Art. 27(1)); and "[t]he property ofmunicipalities,
that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences" (Art. 56( 1)) and
"historic monuments, works of art and science" (Art. 56(2)) in the case of occupied territory. The
Hague Convention IX of 1907 provides protection to "sacred edifices, buildings used for artistic,
scientific, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick or
wounded are collected" in the case of bombardment by naval forces (Art. 5(1), Convention IX
Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time ofWar, 18 October 1907, [1910] UKTS 13
(hereinafter Hague Convention IX of 1907)). While the cultural objects protected by the 1907 Hague
Conventions and Regulations are more extensive than those protected under the Cultural Property
Convention, the level of protection offered is more limited. In occupied territory, seizure, destruction
or wilful damage to protected objects is forbidden (Art. 56. Hague Regulations of 1907), but in
relation to sieges and bombardments from land and sea, forces are required only to take all necessary
steps to spare such objects "as far as possible" (Art. 27(1), Hague Regulations of 1907; Art. 5(1),
Hague Convention IX of 1907). The claim that property protected under the Hague Regulations of
1907 was implicitly immunised from reprisals by operation of Article 50 of the Hague Regulations
was discussed above.
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Conference.798 The remaining six are each contained within Part IV of Protocol I,
concerned with the civilian population. The primary innovation in relation to these
prohibitions consists in the extension of protection over civilians and their property
to all civilians on land regardless of the territorial status of that land.
1. Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Article 20 of Protocol I provides that: "Reprisals against the persons and objects
protected by this Part [i.e. Part II] are prohibited."799 Part II of Protocol I, headed
"Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked", extends the basic protections provided for in
Geneva Conventions I and II. Given that both those Conventions prohibit reprisals
against protected persons and objects,so° it followed that those additional persons and
objects protected in Part II of Protocol I should also be immune from reprisal attacks.
Whereas the Conventions adopted an enumerated approach to protected persons and
objects, Part II of Protocol I adopted a more general (and expansive) definition of
protected persons and objects.801 Thus, for instance, Geneva Conventions I and II
provide protection to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked only when they fall within
one of a number of specified categories (e.g. members of the armed forces of a Party
to the conflict),802 whereas Protocol I provides quite simply that "wounded" and
"sick" means:
persons, whether military or civilian, who, because of trauma, disease or
other physical or mental disorder or disability, are in need of medical
assistance or care and who refrain from any act of hostility. These terms
also cover maternity cases, new-born babies and other persons who may
be in need of immediate medical assistance or care, such as the infirm or
expectant mothers, and who refrain from any act of hostility.80'1
2. Civilian Population
798 Kalshoven (1990), p. 52.
799 Art. 20, Protocol I.
800 Art. 46, Geneva Convention I: "Reprisals against the wounded, sick, personnel, buildings or
equipment protected by the Convention are prohibited."; Art. 47, Geneva Convention II: "Reprisals
against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, the personnel, the vessels or the equipment
protected by the Convention are prohibited."
01 Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 809.
802 Art. 13(1), Geneva Conventions I & II. See, generally. Art. 13, Geneva Conventions I & II.
803 Art. 8(a), Protocol I.
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Article 51(6) of Protocol I provides that: "Attacks against the civilian population or
civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited."804 In prohibiting reprisal attacks, the
reference here is to direct attacks; reprisal attacks which harm civilians indirectly
through collateral damage are not prohibited, at least under the terms of Article
51(6). Certain provisions within Protocol I provide immunity to certain persons and
objects from direct attack, ~ and other provisions provide generalised protections to
those same persons and objects from the indirect effects of attacks.806 Article 51(6)
falls into the former category, providing immunity to civilians, collectively and
individually, from reprisal attacks made directly against them. This is implied in
particular, by the reference to the prohibition of reprisal attacks "against" civilians in
the wording of Article 51(6). This same point may be made with respect to all six
reprisal prohibitions in Part IV of Protocol I, each of which prohibits reprisals
"against" certain persons or objects,807 or prohibits certain objects from being made
the "object" of a reprisal attack.808
8(14 Art. 51(6). Protocol I. During the course of the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1974-1977, the
prohibition on reprisals against the civilian population and civilians as it appears in Article 51(6) of
Protocol I was adopted by consensus in Committee III of the Conference, which was assigned the task
of dealing with methods and means of warfare and with the protection of the civilian population
(Bothe et al. (1982), pp. 312-3). Most concerns of States in relation to prohibitions on reprisals were
reserved for the reprisal prohibitions other than those relating to civilian persons - i.e. those
appearing in Articles 52-56 (see Bothe et al. (1982), pp. 313-4). Nevertheless, some concerns have
been raised in relation to the prohibition in Article 51(6). See, e.g.. Kwakwa (1990), p. 60:
it is doubtful that a prohibition on reprisals against civilians will have the intended
effect. Theoretically, it seems difficult to argue that state A is precluded from
responding in kind to state B's massive and continuing attacks against state A's
civilian population. In actual armed conflict there is bound to come a time when
state A can no longer tolerate state B's illegal acts on its civilian population without
taking retaliatory or extraordinary measures to effect a change in the policy of state
B.
In relation to Article 51 of Protocol I, see the first sentence of paragraph 2, which provides that
"[t]he civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack". The
term "as such" implies that the paragraph provides no protections against indirect harm to civilians
resulting from attacks directed against legitimate targets (Bothe et al. (1982), p. 300). Various States
made declarations to this effect upon ratification of Protocol I. Australia declared upon ratification
that "the first sentence of paragraph 2 Article 52 is not intended to, nor does it, deal with the question
of incidental or collateral damage resulting from an attack directed against a military objective"
(reprinted in Roberts & Guelff (2000). p. 500.) A number of other States made substantially identical
statements (see statements by Canada (reprinted in id., pp. 502-3); Italy (id., p. 507); Netherlands (id.,
p. 508); New Zealand (id., p. 508); and the United Kingdom (id., p. 511))
s"" In relation to Article 51 of Protocol I, see pars 1, 4, 5, 7 & 8. See, also, Arts 55-60, Protocol I.
807 Arts 51(6) & 55(2), Protocol I.
Arts 52(1), 53(c), 54(4) & 56(4), Protocol I.
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Although the Hague Regulations of 1907 and Geneva Conventions of
1949 do not provide protection to civilians other than those in occupied territory or
otherwise in the hands of a party to the conflict of which they are not a national,
Protocol I is significant in that it does not distinguish between civilians by virtue of
the status of the territory in which they are located or the nationality of the
civilian.809 Thus, under Protocol I, reprisals may not be carried out against enemy
civilians located in their own (i.e. enemy) territory. In fact, Protocol I even extends
protection to a State's own citizens.810 Protocol I does not, however, provide full
protection to civilians (or civilian objects) at sea, in the air, or in outer space. Article
49(3) of Protocol I provides that:
The provisions of this Section [including all six reprisal prohibitions in
Part IV] apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the
civilian populations, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They
further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives
on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air.811
The issue of reprisals against civilians or civilian objects in space is
perhaps, at this time, somewhat academic, but it may be that they are precluded by
operation of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Moon Treaty of 1979 which
812
limit the permissible uses of space to peaceful purposes. ~ These treaties are
generally regarded as having achieved the status of customary law.813 In terms of the
law of naval and aerial warfare, the relevant international instruments are silent on
the matter of reprisals.814 There appears to be a tendency among jurists to treat the
8l)y R.W. Gehring, "Loss ofCivilian Protections under the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol 1",
(1980) 90Military Law Review 49, p. 65.
810 There is some debate, however, as to whether a State must accord its own citizens the protections
set out in Article 75 of Protocol I, concerning fundamental guarantees (Gehring (1980). p. 65, n. 29).
Article 75 does not refer to "civilians" as the object of protection, but rather, "persons who are in the
power of a Party to the conflict" (Art 75(1), Protocol I).
811 Art. 49(3), Protocol I.
812 Arts I-IV, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967, 610 UNTS 205; Art.
3, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 18
December 1979, UN Doc. A/RES/34/68 (1979), Annex.
81-1 N. Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and the United Nations. Kluwer Law International, The
Hague, 1999, p. 190; see, also. B. Cheng, "United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: 'Instant'
International Customary Law?", (1965) 5 Indian Journal of International Law 23.
814 On the law of aerial warfare, see, in particular. Declaration (XIV) Prohibiting the Discharge of
Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, 18 October 1907, [1910] UKTS 15; Arts 25, 26, 27, 29 &
53, Hague Regulations of 1907; Draft Rules on Aerial Warfare, 19 February 1923, (1923) 17 AJIL
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expanded protections accorded to civilians and civilian objects on land under
Protocol I as equally applicable to the air and sea. This is evident, for instance, in the
1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.
The Manual adopts a definition of "military objectives" identical to that in Protocol
1,81:1 and limits attacks strictly to such objectives.8"' Although the Manual provides
no definition of "civilians" or "combatants" as such, it does set out a list of certain
protected persons,817 and stipulates that Parties to the conflict shall at all times
distinguish between civilians and other protected persons on the one hand, and
combatants on the other.818 In addition, the Manual sets out certain basic rules
governing means and methods of warfare, including the prohibition on the use of
indiscriminate means and methods of warfare,819 and the requirement of
proportionality,820 and other precautions which must be taken in attack, identical or
highly similar to a number of those in Protocol I.S21 These rules are applicable to any
attack upon enemy warships822 and enemy82'1 and neutral824 merchant vessels, as well
Supplement 245; San Remo Manual of International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 12
June 1994, reprinted in Roberts & Guelff (2000) (hereinafter San Remo Manual), p. 573. On the law
of naval warfare, see in particular Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, 16 April 1856, reprinted in
Roberts & Guelff (2000), p.48; Convention (III) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the
Principles of the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864, 29 July 1899, [1901] UKTS 10; Convention
(VI) Relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities, 18 October 1907,
[ 1910] UKTS 10; Convention (VII) Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-Ships, 18
October 1907, [1910] UKTS 11; Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine
Contact Mines, 18 October 1907, [1910] UKTS 12; Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by
Naval Forces in Time ofWar, 18 October 1907, [1910] UKTS 13; Convention (X) for the Adaptation
to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2371;
Convention (XI) Relative to certain Restrictions with regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in
Naval War, 18 October 1907, [1910] UKTS 14; Convention (XII) Relative to the Creation of an
International Prize Court, 18 October 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 381; Convention (XIII) Concerning the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, 18 October 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 395;
Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare, 26 February 1909, 208 Consol. T.S. 338; Treaty
for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments, (Part IV, Art. 22, relating to submarine
warfare), 22 April 1930, 112 L.N.T.S. 65; Proces-verbal relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare
set forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of 22 April 1930, 6 November 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 353;
Geneva Convention II; San Remo Manual.
815 San Remo Manual, par. 40; Art. 52(2), Protocol I.
816 San Remo Manual, par. 41.
81 San Remo Manual, pars 161-8.
818 San Remo Manual, par. 39.
819 San Remo Manual, par. 42(b).
820 San Remo Manual, pars 4 & 46(d).
821 San Remo Manual, par. 46; Art. 57(2) Protocol I. See also San Remo Manual, pars 72-77, which
set out certain precautions aimed at minimising harm to civil aircraft, unique to the San Remo
Manual.
822 San Remo Manual, par. 66.
822 San Remo Manual, par. 61.
824 San Remo Manual, par. 68.
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as to military aircraft82:i and enemy8"6 and neutral8"' civil aircraft. Thus the San
Remo Manual is applicable to aerial warfare, at least in so far as attacks from the sea
are concerned. These developments may indicate that wider aspects of the modern
jus in bello, as it applies on land, are equally applicable in air and at sea. It may be
that on this basis the reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I, so far as they are
incorporated into customary law, are applicable to those additional areas of
operation. Some caution would be required, however, as the San Remo Manual is not
a treaty as such, but rather a restatement of the law by legal and naval experts acting
in their personal capacity,828 and contains a number of provisions which may be
considered progressive developments in the law.829
3. Civilian Objects
Article 52(1) of Protocol I provides that: "Civilian objects shall not be the object of
attack or reprisals."830 Civilian objects are defined, negatively, as "all objects which
are not military objectives".8'1' Military objectives are, in turn, defined as:
823 San Remo Manual, par. 66.
826 San Remo Manual, par. 64.
82' San Remo Manual, par. 71.
828 See Introductory Note, San Remo Manual.
s2y Id. See, also, Roberts & Guelff (2000), p. 573. On the other hand, it might be argued that the San
Remo Manual merely involves a clarification or elaboration on Article 57(4) of Protocol I which
provides for protections of civilians and civilian objects at sea or in the air as follows:
In the conduct of military operations at sea or in the air, each Party to the conflict
shall, in conformity with its rights and duties under the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, take all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of
civilian lives and damage to civilian objects.
830 Art. 52(1), Protocol I. The prohibition of reprisals against civilian objects was the most
controversial reprisal prohibition in Protocol I. Committee III adopted Article 52(1) by a vote of 58 to
3 with 9 abstentions (CDDH/III/SR.24, par. 16, reprinted in Federal Political Department
(Switzerland), Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development
ofInternational Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974-1977, Federal
Political Department, Bern, 1978 (hereinafter Official Records), vol. XIV, p. 217). The benefit of a
prohibition on reprisals against civilian objects is that it strengthens protections against civilians
generally; were civilian objects to be targeted in reprisals, the collateral damage to civilians
themselves would be extensive. On the other hand, the prohibition has been criticised as unrealistic. It
has been suggested that granting states a limited right to conduct reprisals against civilian objects -
instead of prohibiting reprisals in their entirety — may be a case of choosing the lesser of two evils: If
States insist on carrying out reprisals, it is better that they carry them out against civilian objects than
civilian populations. If both forms of reprisals are prohibited. States may in practice end up carrying
out reprisals against civilians as much as, or more than, civilian objects (see Kwakwa (1990), p. 63;
Kalshoven (1990), pp. 47-8; Mitchell (2001), pp. 165-6).
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those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage.'""''"
Thus, civilian objects are not defined in terms of objects falling within the ownership
or possession of civilians, but rather in terms of their lack of military significance.
This may indicate a shift from the position in the Geneva Conventions, where
Geneva Convention IV provides that "reprisals against protected persons and their
property are prohibited".8'13 It might be pointed out that protected property in the
latter context appears to be defined in terms of ownership rather than military
advantage. Under Protocol I, an object belonging to the armed forces could
theoretically constitute a "civilian object" if its destruction offered no definite
military advantage.8,4 At the same time, a house or other object belonging to
civilians could theoretically constitute a "military objective", and thus not qualify for
835
protection. It should be noted that the protections accorded by Protocol I are
Art. 52(1), Protocol I.
N'"
Art. 52(2), Protocol I.
Art. 33(3), Geneva Convention IV.
MJ This may be unlikely given that "military advantage" is to be judged in tenns of the advantage
anticipated from the attack as a whole, and not in terms of the advantage accruing from isolated or
particular aspects of the attack (Bothe et al. (1982), pp. 324-5; see, also, interpretative statements
upon ratification of Protocol I by Belgium (reprinted in Roberts & Guelff (2000). p. 501), Canada (id.,
p. 503), Italy (id., p. 507), the Netherlands (id., p. 508) and New Zealand (id., p. 508). In addition,
military advantage may refer to a number of possible advantages, including security to troops (Bothe
et al. (1982), p. 324; interpretative statement of New Zealand (reprinted in Roverts & Guelff (2000),
p. 508), or benefits derived from the mere harassment of enemy forces even where objects destroyed
are of no particular significance to either side (see Bothe et al. (1982), pp. 307-8, particularly in
relation to harassing and interdiction fires).
s" In the case of doubt, however, as to whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian
purposes, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action. Article 52(3) of Protocol I
creates the presumption that it is a civilian object and immune from direct attack or reprisals (Art.
52(3), Protocol I). Bothe et al. (1982) state that this presumption may be overturned whenever a
commander or other responsible decision-maker concludes that the object is in fact being used to
make an effective contribution to military action on the basis of information reasonably available to
him at the time (p. 326). This is consistent with a number of interpretative statements made by States
upon signature or ratification of Protocol I. Italy, for e.g., stated that "[i]n relation to Articles 51 to 58
inclusive, the Italian Government understands that military commanders and others responsible for
planning, deciding upon or executing attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their
assessment of the information from all sources which is available to them at the relevant time"
(reprinted in Roberts & Guelff (2000), p. 507). Similar statements were made by Australia (id., p.
500), Belgium (id., p. 501), the Netherlands (id., p. 508), New Zealand (id., p. 508), Spain (id., p. 509)
and the UK (id., p. 510). See, however, Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 2034, where it is implied that the test
requires "certainty" on the part of commanders.
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additional to those accorded by the Geneva Conventions. " Thus, if Geneva
Convention IV confers protection over property on the basis of ownership, then these
protections may be additional to those in Protocol I - at least in relation to property
belonging to that narrow class of civilians protected by the Convention. On the other
hand, these protections are limited in a number of ways: Property in occupied
territory (including property belonging to civilians) may be destroyed where such
destruction is rendered "absolutely necessary by military operations."8'17 Civilians in
the hands of a party to the conflict of which they are not a national may lose their
protections under Geneva Convention IV, including the protection of their property,
838
where they engage in, or are definitely suspected of engaging in, hostile activity.
Whilst the protections accorded to civilian objects are in general wider under
Protocol I than under Geneva Convention IV, in particular as a result of Protocol I's
application to all civilians on land regardless of the territorial status of that land,
there may theoretically be certain circumstances where civilian objects not qualifying
for protection under Protocol I nevertheless qualify for protection under Geneva
Convention IV. On the other hand, the principle of distinction as it applied to
property was left in a state of disorder and uncertainty prior to its clarification in
Protocol I,839 and it may be that on that basis, Article 52 of Protocol I is to be treated
as the most precise statement of the principle.
4. Cultural Objects and Places ofWorship
According to Article 53 of Protocol I it is prohibited to make "historic monuments,
works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of
peoples...the object of reprisals."840 Article 53 appears to provide protection to
substantially the same objects protected under the Hague Cultural Property
Convention of 1954 which protects "property of great importance to the cultural
heritage of every people".84' According to the ICRC, there was no question during
the Diplomatic Conference of 1974-77 of creating a new category of cultural
''' See Art. 1(3), Protocol I.
837 Art. 53, Geneva Convention IV.
838 Art. 5(1), Geneva Convention IV.
839 See Rogers (1996), chapter 2.
840
Art. 53, Protocol I.
841 Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 2064; Bothe et al. (1982), p. 333.
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objects.84- Differences in terminology (for instance, the inclusion of "spiritual"'
heritage in Article 53 of Protocol I) may be explained as being more a matter of
clarification than deviation from the Cultural Property Convention.84, The reprisal
prohibition in Article 53 of Protocol I, therefore, appears to replicate the reprisal
prohibition in the Cultural Property Convention.
There is a degree of overlap between Article 53 and Article 52 of
Protocol I. To the extent that the objects listed in Article 53 are "civilian objects"
they are already immune from reprisals under Article 52. An ancient cathedral, as an
object normally dedicated to civilian purposes, is presumed to be a "civilian object"'
as a result of the presumption mandated by Article 52(3).844 Where, however, it is
clear that that cathedral is being used to make an effective contribution to military
action, and action against it would offer a definite military advantage, then its
immunity under Article 52 is lost.848 It may, however, still retain its protection under
Article 53. Article 53 differs from Article 52 in that it makes no express provision for
loss of immunity. At the same time, the protections accorded to objects under Article
53 are accorded "[wjithout prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954,
and of other relevant international instruments".846 To the extent that the Cultural
Property Convention and other relevant instruments, such as the Hague Conventions
and Regulations of 1907, make provision for loss of immunity or protection for
cultural property, those provisions may continue to apply. Under the Cultural
Property Convention, certain protections, including immunity of cultural property
from acts of hostility directed against such property, may be waived in cases of
imperative or unavoidable military necessity.847 Under the Hague Conventions and
842 Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 2064, n. 23.
843 See id., par. 2064.
844 Art. 52(3). Protocol I.
845 See Arts 52(l)-(2), Protocol I.
846 Art. 53, Protocol I.
847 The Cultural Property Convention creates a two-pronged system of protection for cultural property.
Chapter I of the Convention sets out ordinary protections for "cultural property" as defined in Article
1 of the Convention (Arts 1-7); in addition, a set of special protections are set out in Chapter II for
refuges intended to shelter moveable cultural property, centres containing monuments, and immovable
cultural property of very great importance, provided they fulfil certain qualifications (Arts 8-11). In
terms of cultural property generally, parties are under an obligation, inter alia, to refrain from (1) any
use of the property and its immediate surroundings, or of the appliances in use for its protection, for
purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and (2)
any act of hostility directed against such property (Art. 4(1), Cultural Property Convention). These
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Regulations of 1907, the protections accorded to cultural property during sieges and
bombardments, including from naval forces, may be waived where such property is
being used, at the time, for military purposes.848 It is unclear whether Parties to
Protocol I must also be Parties to (or otherwise bound by) the earlier Conventions in
order to avail themselves of the waiver provisions in those Conventions, or whether
those waiver provisions are impliedly incorporated into the terms of Article 53 for all
Parties. The ICRC suggests the former interpretation: "...in case of a contradiction
between [Article 53 of Protocol I] and a rule of the 1954 Convention the latter is
applicable, though of course only in so far as the Parties concerned are bound by that
Convention. If one of the Parties is not bound by the Convention, Article 53
applies."844 On the other hand, the delegates to the Diplomatic Conference indicated,
during their discussions concerning Article 53, that there was no need to revise the
existing rules on the subject of cultural property.880 This may suggest that Article 53
was intended as a restatement of existing rules, and that existing exceptions to the
immunity of cultural objects were impliedly incorporated into Article 53. This was
the understanding of a number of delegates to the Conference. Upon ratification of
Protocol I, the United Kingdom and Ireland both declared that if objects protected by
Article 53 were unlawfully used for military purposes, they would thereby lose
protection from attacks directed against them.88' These declarations were made
despite the fact the United Kingdom and Ireland had each signed, but not ratified, the
Cultural Property Convention. It would be insufficient to explain these declarations
on the basis that both States were merely availing themselves of the waiver
provisions in the Hague Conventions and Regulations of 1907 which they were
entitled to rely upon on the basis that they had entered customary law. Article 53 of
obligations may be waived "in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver"
(Art. 4(2)). In terms of specially protected property, parties are under an obligation, inter alia, to
refrain from (1) any act of hostility directed against such property; and (2) any use of such property or
its surroundings for military purposes (Art. 9).These obligations may be waived in "exceptional cases
of unavoidable military necessity" (Art. 11(2)). Rogers submits that there is no difference between
"imperative" and "unavoidable" military necessity (Rogers (1996), p. 93; see, also, id., p. 99).
848 Art. 27(1), Hague Regulations of 1907; Article 5(1), Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment
by Naval Forces in Time of War, 18 October 1907, [1910] UKTS 13.
849 Sandoz et a/.(1987), par. 2046. See, also, Bothe et al. (1982), p. 330, n. 2. On this basis, Rogers
stated, prior to the UK's ratification of Protocol I, that: "The United Kingdom would be well advised
either to ratify the Cultural Convention before ratifying Protocol I or to make an appropriate
reservation on ratifying Protocol I" (Rogers (1996), p. 103).
880 Sandoz et al. (1982), par. 2046.
851 Roberts & Guelff (2000), pp. 506, 511.
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Protocol I applies to cultural objects in a number of circumstances not covered under
the 1907 Conventions and Regulations - for instance, in relation to enemy territory
not under occupation - yet the declarations purportedly applied to all objects
protected by Article 53. It may be possible to explain the declarations as reservations
that depart from the letter and spirit of Article 53. On the other hand, a number of
delegates indicated, during the course of the Conference, that their understanding of
the purport and effect of Article 53 was that should the objects protected under the
Article be used in support of the military effort, these objects would lose their
8S2
protection.
Where a Party to Protocol I relies upon provisions relating to loss of
protection of cultural objects or places of worship under the Cultural Property
Convention, or other relevant Conventions, not only must the conditions for loss of
protection be met under those Conventions, the object must also fall within the
OCT
definition of a "military objective" under Article 52 of Protocol I. " Otherwise, the
object will remain protected as a "civilian object" under Article 52 - and such
protection is not made subject to the provisions of other conventions. Of course, any
cultural object which loses its immunity under the Cultural Property Convention or
the Hague Conventions and Regulations of 1907 is almost certain to fall within the
definition of a "military objective" under Article 52 in any event.
Any cultural object or place of worship ordinarily entitled to protection
under Article 53 which loses its immunity may be made the object of direct attack -
provided of course that such attack satisfies other applicable requirements, including
those related to precautions in attack.854 It follows therefore that any such attack
against it, using lawful means and methods of warfare, cannot amount to a "reprisal"
as the attack would not be prima facie unlawful. But what of the situation where a
cultural object or place of worship which has lost its immunity under Article 53 is
attacked using unlawful weapons as a reprisal? Such reprisal would appear to be
prohibited under the terms of Article 53 which precludes such objects from being
made the object of reprisals; it appears that the loss of immunity does not render the
'y,:2 See CDDH/SR.42, par. 16 (reprinted in Official Records, vol. VI, p. 205); CDDH/SR.42, annex
(reprinted in Official Records, vol. VI, pp. 219-42); Bothe et al. (1982), p. 333.
MSee Sandoz et al. (1982), par. 2079.
S:i4
See, e.g.. Art. 57, Protocol I.
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object liable to reprisals. This is because the exceptions to Article 53 - namely, the
provisions of the Cultural Property Convention and other relevant international
instruments - may provide for loss of immunity from direct attack, but do not
provide for the loss of protection against reprisals, meaning that the prescription of
Article 53(c), prohibiting reprisals against cultural objects and places of worship, is
not open to waiver. Article 4(2) of the Cultural Property Convention allows a waiver
- in the case of imperative military necessity - of the obligations set out in Article
4(1); the prohibition on reprisals, however, is contained in Article 4(4), and therefore
falls outside of those obligations open to waiver. The Hague Conventions and
Regulations of 1907, on the other hand, do not set out any prohibition on reprisals.
This may leave open the theoretical question of whether a State bound by the Hague
Conventions and Regulations of 1907, but not the Cultural Property Convention, may
carry out a reprisal against cultural property which has lost its immunity under the
1907 Conventions and Regulations. On the one hand it might be said that a reprisal
attack against an object which has lost its immunity under the 1907 Conventions and
Regulations would not be impermissible under those Conventions and Regulations;
thus if Article 53(c) of Protocol I is without prejudice to the 1907 provisions then
Protocol I cannot prohibit reprisals in such a context. On the other hand, it might be
said that the 1907 provisions leave the issue of reprisals untouched - thus, a
prohibition on reprisals in Article 53(c) of Protocol I can hardly be said to
"prejudice" the 1907 provisions given that there is no direct conflict as such. As the
silence of the 1907 provisions in relation to reprisals appears to have been based in
part on concern that by expressly dealing with the matter the 1907 Conventions and
Regulations would be seen to legitimise their use and arrest the development of
customary law against such use,8'''' the latter interpretation appears to be the better
one: The prohibition on reprisals in Article 53(c) of Protocol I does not "prejudice"
the provisions of the 1907 Conventions and Regulations, notwithstanding that
reprisals against cultural objects which have lost their immunity under the 1907
provisions would be perfectly lawful under the terms of those provisions.
5. Objects Indispensable to the Civilian Population
8ro See above.
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Article 54(4) of Protocol I provides that objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population "shall not be made the object of reprisals."856 Such objects are not
exhaustively defined by Protocol I (nor by any other international instrument)
although an illustrative list is provided in Article 54(2) whereby such objects include
"foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation
works".857 The protection of objects indispensable to the civilian population is
significant in that it confers protection on items that are of use and importance to the
civilian population, but may not qualify for protection as "civilian objects" as defined
oco
by Protocol I. ~ Civilian objects are defined negatively, in terms of their lack of
military significance, whereas objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population are illustrated positively, in terms of their significance to civilians. In
relation to the general protection afforded objects indispensable to survival under
Article 54(2), it is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless such
objects "for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the
civilian population or to the adverse Party".859 Exceptions apply, within certain
limits, where the objects are used by an adverse party solely for the sustenance of
their armed forces,860 or in direct support of military action,861 as well as in the case
of defence of unoccupied territory by defending forces.86" Thus, direct attacks upon
such objects do not violate the general protection afforded such objects per se\ rather,
the infraction is dependent upon the presence of a "specific purpose" to deny the
sustenance value of such objects to civilians, or to enemy forces in the case where
civilians also rely upon those objects. If an object indispensable to survival falls
within the definition of a "military objective" under Article 52, it may be attacked, at
least consistently with Article 54(2), provided there is no relevant specific
purpose.863 The prohibition on reprisals, however, does not depend upon the
establishment of any specific purpose. Nevertheless, where an object indispensable
8S" Art. 54(4), Protocol I.
857 Art. 54(2), Protocol I.
858 Art. 52(1), Protocol I.
859 Art. 54(2), Protocol I.
860 Art. 54(3)(a), Protocol I.
861 Art. 54(3)(b), Protocol I.
862 Art. 54(5), Protocol I.
863 Bothe et al. (1982), p. 339.
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to survival may be attacked consistently with Article 52 and Article 54(2), any attack
against it, using lawful means and methods of warfare, for the purpose of coercing an
enemy into compliance with the law could only be described as a "retorsion" and not
a "reprisal". On the other hand, reprisals consisting in the use of unlawful weapons
or methods of warfare against objects indispensable to survival are prohibited under
Article 54(4) of Protocol I, even where there is no "specific purpose" as elaborated in
Article 54(2).
6. Natural Environment
Article 55(2) of Protocol I provides that: "Attacks against the natural environment by
way of reprisals are prohibited."864 It should be noted that attacks against the "natural
environment" are not prohibited as such by Protocol I. Therefore Article 55(2) only
prohibits reprisals consisting in otherwise unlawful attacks against the natural
environment. Protection is accorded to the natural environment in Article 55(1) of
Protocol I as follows:
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a
prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended
or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.^
Nothing in the wording of Article 55(1) requires the realisation of any particular
harm to the natural environment as such; rather, what is prohibited is the use of
methods or means of warfare specifically "intended" to cause widespread, long-term
and severe damage to the environment, or alternatively, the use of methods or means
which "may be expected" to cause such damage.866 The latter standard appears to
require an objective expectation that such damage would flow from the use of the
methods or means in question.867 The level of damage which must be intended or
expected is quite extreme, being described in Article 55(1) in conjunctive terms as
consisting in widespread, long-term and severe damage. During the course of the
864 Art. 55(2), Protocol i.
865 Art. 55(1), Protocol i.
866 Bothe etal. (1982), p. 345.
867 Bothe etal. (1982), p. 345.
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Geneva Diplomatic Conference which promulgated Protocol I, the Report °f
Committee III did not address the meaning of "widespread" or "severe",868 but it did
address itself to the meaning of "long-term", noting that while it was impossible to
say with certainty what period of time may be involved, it was considered by some to
be measured in decades, and that references to twenty or thirty years were made by
some delegates as being a minimum.869
The reprisal prohibition in Article 55(2) prohibits reprisal attacks
"against" the natural environment. This implies that while reprisal attacks '"intended"
to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment are
prohibited, reprisal attacks which are only "expected" to cause such damage are not,
at least under the terms of Article 55(2). The term "against" implies a prohibition on
direct attacks rather than those which may be expected to produce certain collateral
effects. At the same time, by prohibiting "[ajttacks against the natural environment
by way of reprisals", Article 55(2) appears to prohibit reprisals consisting in any
unlawful attack against the natural environment and not just those provided for under
Article 55(1). Protection of the natural environment is also provided for under Article
35(3) of Protocol I which provides that: "It is prohibited to employ means and
methods of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment."870 The prohibition is
almost identical to that in Article 55(1), with the exception that Article 55(1) adds the
qualification "and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population." It is
not clear whether this amounts to an additional substantive requirement as such, or
whether it merely clarifies the purpose of Article 55(1). Article 55(1) relates to the
protection of the civilian population whereas Article 35(3) relates to the prohibition
of unnecessary injury.871 One clear substantive difference between Article 55(1) and
Article 35(3) is that Article 55(1) is limited in its scope of operation to hostilities
which may affect the civilian population, individual civilians, civilian objects or
868 Bothe et al. (1982), p. 346.
869 CDDH/215/Rev.l, par. 27 (reprinted in Official Records, vol. XV, p.259).
87,) Art. 35(3), Protocol I.
v 1
CDDH/III/GT/35, p. 3, par. 11, reprinted in H.S. Levie (ed.), Protection ofWar Victims: Protocol I
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Oceana Publications Inc., Dobbs Ferry, NY, 1980, vol. 3, p. 268.
Art. 55(1), Protocol I refers merely to the "population" rather than the "civilian population". The
omission appears to be deliberate, serving to emphasis the fact that as the relevant damage to the
natural environment is long-term it is likely to affect the whole population without distinction (see
Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 2134).
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other objectives on land;87- whereas Article 35(3) is of wider scope, relating to all
means or methods of warfare including those in the air or at sea.871 Thus
environmental damage on the high seas, for example, may fall within the prohibition
in Article 35(3), but not Article 55(1). Any attack upon the natural environment
contrary to Article 35(3) of Protocol I by way of reprisal would appear to be
prohibited by Article 55(2), regardless of whether the attack is prohibited under the
terms of Article 55(1). Protection of the natural environment is also provided for in
the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons
(Protocol III) of 1980, Article 2(4) of which makes it "prohibited to make forests or
other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by incendiary weapons except where
such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other
military objectives, or are themselves military objectives." This prohibits certain
attacks against the natural environment as such. It is therefore possible that Article
55(2) of Protocol I renders violations of Article 2(4) of the Protocol on Incendiary
Weapons by way of reprisals, impermissible. In addition, protection of the natural
environment is directly provided for in the United Nations Convention on the
Prohibition of Military and any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques of 1976 (also known as the ENMOD Convention). Article 1(1) of the
ENMOD Convention provides that each State Party to the Convention:
undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of
environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting
or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any
other State Party.874
Whereas Article 55(1) of Protocol I provides certain protection to the natural
environment against attacks by any methods or means, the ENMOD Convention
prohibits only certain methods or means, specifically those involving the deliberate
manipulation of the natural processes of the Earth, its contents, or surrounds.8 ° On
the other hand, the ENMOD Convention prohibits the use of such methods or means
against any other State Party - which is to say, against its armed forces, civilian
s'2 Art. 49(3), Protocol I; Rogers (1996), p. 113.
N"
Rogers (1996), p. 113; Sandoz et al. (1982), par. 1449.
s 4
Art. 1(1), Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, 10 December 1976, 1108 UNTS 151.
87> See Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 1451.
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population, towns, industries, agriculture, transportation and communication
networks, natural resources and wealth or other objectives,876 whereas Article 55(1)
of Protocol I only prohibits certain attacks intended or expected to damage the
natural environment. In this sense, it could be argued that the ENMOD Convention is
not concerned with attacks '"against" the natural environment as such, as the
environment is merely manipulated as a method or means of attack rather than as a
target as such. There may be some doubt, therefore, as to whether the prohibition on
reprisals in Article 55(2) of Protocol I prohibits violations of the ENMOD
Convention by way of reprisals.
7. Works and InstallationsContaining Dangerous Forces
Article 56(4) of Protocol I provides that it is prohibited "to make any of the works,
installations or military objectives mentioned in [Article 56(1)] the object of
reprisals."877 Article 56(1) protects certain works and installations containing
dangerous forces as well as certain other military objectives from attack. These
objects appear to be limited8'8 to (1) dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating
stations where an attack upon them "may cause the release of dangerous forces and
consequent severe losses among the civilian population"; and (2) other military
objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations where an attack
upon them "may cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or
installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian population".879
Article 56(2) provides for loss of immunity from attack, of objects
protected under Article 56(1), under certain highly restrictive circumstances. Thus, in
relation to dams and dykes, loss of protection against attack occurs where a dam or
877 Art. 56(4), Protocol I.
878
Art. 56(1), Protocol I states that works or installations containing dangerous forces are "namely
dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations..." (emphasis added). This implies an
exhaustive, rather than an illustrative, list. In particular, it may be contrasted with Art. 54(2), Protocol
I which prohibits attacks upon objects indispensable to the civilian population which are said to be
objects "such as" foodstuffs etc.
8 ''
Art. 56(1), Protocol I. By referring to attacks which "may" cause the release of dangerous forces
and consequent severe losses among the civilian population, Article 56(1) imposes a high standard of
care - it is not merely attacks which are "likely" or may be "expected" to produce this result which are
prohibited (Bothe et al. (1982), p. 353).
189
dyke is (1) "used for other than its normal function",880 i.e. for a purpose other than
containing an actual or potential body of water;881 (2) used "in regular, significant
gg9 ^
and direct support of military operations"; ~ and (3) where an attack "is the only
feasible way to terminate such support" 883 In relation to nuclear electrical generating
stations, loss of protection against an attack occurs where a station (1) "provides
electric power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations";884
and (2) where an attack "is the only feasible way to terminate such support".88"' It has
been observed that in practice, electricity is conducted to both civilian and military
destinations,886 and that it is difficult to check the source of supply in an integrated
grid.887 It has also been observed that it is relatively easy to stop electricity reaching
its destination by attacking electricity lines, as opposed to nuclear electrical
generating stations.888 In relation to other military objectives, protected under Article
56(1) by virtue of their location at or in the vicinity of dams, dykes or nuclear electric
generating stations, loss of protection against attack occurs where such objects are
(1) "used in regular, significant and direct support of military operations";889 and (2)
where such attack "is the only feasible way to terminate such support". 90
Where an object ordinarily protected under Article 56(1) loses its
immunity as provided for above, it is still protected against reprisals. This is because
the provision concerning loss of immunity merely states that the protections provided
by Article 56(1) shall cease in the circumstances mentioned, whereas the protections
against reprisals are located in Article 56(4) and thus not open to waiver.891 If an
object has lost its immunity under Article 56(1) then any attack against it using
lawful methods and means of warfare is not prohibited and cannot amount to a
8811 Art. 56(2)(a), Protocol I.
881 Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 2161; CDDH/215/Rev.l, par. 88, reprinted in Official Records, vol. XV,
L259"Art. 56(2)(a), Protocol I. Bothe et al. (1982) view this as creating a higher standard than is used in
Article 52, i.e.. "effective contribution to military action" (p. 355; see. also. Sandoz et al. (1987). par.
2162).
883 Art. 56(2)(a), Protocol I.
884 Art. 56(2)(b), Protocol I.
888 Art. 56(2)(b), Protocol I.
886 Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 2165.
887 Bothe et al. (1982), p. 355.
888 Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 2166.
889 Art. 56(2)(c), Protocol I.
890 Art. 56(2)(c), Protocol I.
891 Art. 56(2), Protocol I.
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reprisal, but any reprisal attack against it using unlawful methods or means is
prohibited under the terms of Article 56(4).
What is uncertain is whether Article 56(4) renders the objects listed in
Article 56(1) immune from reprisals in all circumstances, or only in the
circumstances set out in Article 56(1) - namely, where an attack upon it "may cause
the release of dangerous forces [from the works or installations] and consequent
severe losses among the civilian population.'''89' Article 56(4) states that the objects
"mentioned in paragraph 1" are protected against reprisals, but paragraph 1 protects
certain objects in certain circumstances. If the objects listed are immune from
reprisals in all circumstances, then any illegal attack against them by way of reprisals
(for e.g. through the use of an unlawful weapon) becomes impermissible, even if the
particular attack is not otherwise contrary to Article 56(1). The common sense
answer is probably that Article 56(4) only prohibits reprisals against objects listed in
Article 56(1) under the circumstances provided in that paragraph, namely where an
attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses
among the civilian population. Article 56 appears to have been geared towards
protection against serious loss of human life.89'' Article 56 is located within Part IV
of Protocol I concerned with the Civilian Population. Article 56(4) therefore appears
to be intended as a means of directly protecting the civilian population. It may also
be pointed out that Article 56 protects "works and installations containing dangerous
forces", whereas a nuclear electrical generating station which has not yet come on
line, for e.g.. does not yet contain "dangerous forces". Thus it is probably fair to
conclude that Article 56(4) prohibits reprisals against the objects mentioned in
Article 56(1) only in the circumstances there mentioned.
8. Conclusion
If the reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I have not entered customary international law,
then a significant catalogue of persons and objects could lawfully be made the target
of reprisals by those States to which the reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I are non-
opposable. Thus, for instance, reprisal attacks could lawfully be carried out against
892 Art. 56(1), Protocol i.
893 See Rogers (1996), p. 117.
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civilians in enemy territory. Given that the civilian objects protected under Geneva
Convention IV are those belonging to protected civilians,894 the property of civilians
in enemy territory (including their houses) could be attacked in reprisal together with
individual civilians or the civilian population if the reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I
are not binding as a matter of general international law. The same could be said of
cultural objects and places of worship and objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population (where not protected as civilian objects under Geneva Convention
IV) and the natural environment and works and installations containing dangerous
forces.
Even if we assume, however, that the reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I
have entered general international law, there may still be a number of legitimate
reprisal measures lawfully open to belligerents. While the catalogue of reprisal
prohibitions in Protocol I and the Geneva Conventions covers most persons and
objects other than effective combatants and their arms and equipment,89" it would be
going too far to conclude, as the ICRC's Commentary to Protocol I does, that "the
Conventions and Protocol incontestably prohibit reprisals against any person who is
not a combatant in the sense of Article 43 (Armed Forces), and any object which is
not a military objective."89'' In fact, there appear to be reprisal measures other than
those against combatants and military objectives which do not fall within any
conventional prohibition. These lacunae arise, in part, as a result of the failure of
Protocol I to incorporate a general prohibition on reprisals against all objects and
persons protected by Protocol I and the Geneva Conventions. The ICRC's
Commentary to Protocol I notes that some States expressed the fear that in
prohibiting reprisals in a piecemeal fashion, as occurs in Articles 20 & 51-56, some
persons and objects may be overlooked.897 A number of delegates to the Geneva
Diplomatic Conference of 1974-77 had supported the adoption of a general provision
on reprisals,8'8 and two competing (and mutually exclusive) proposals were
894 See above.
895 Bristol (1979), p. 427.
896 Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 3456.
891 Id., par. 3456.
898 Id. par 3423. See, also, id., pars 3440-3448. Greenwood notes that: "Although the 1CRC had at one
point contemplated including a general provision dealing with reprisals in Draft Protocol I, the
opposition which this proposal aroused at the Conference of Government Experts led it to abandon
this idea." ((1989)(b), p. 235).
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submitted during the course of the Conference to this end.899 The first of these was a
proposal by Poland to insert an amendment into the Protocol in the following terms:
"Measures of reprisals against persons and objects protected by the Conventions and
by the present Protocol are prohibited."900 The alternative proposal was that by
France whose proposed amendment expressly recognised a right to take reprisals
involving breaches of Protocol I (but not the Geneva Conventions) where certain
preconditions were met.901 Those preconditions were arguably more stringent than
the requirements of customary law. Strangely, however, the proposal only recognised
a right to take reprisals in answer to violations of Protocol I; thus leaving the right of
reprisals in answer to violations of the Geneva Conventions or other rules applicable
in armed conflict unclear. An odd result given that the purpose of the proposal must
surely have been to bring some measure of clarity to the right to reprisals. The
French proposal received the clear backing of Australia, Belgium, Canada, the
Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 3434.
900
CDDH/III/103, reprinted in Official Records, vol. Ill, p. 313.
901 The French Proposal provided that:
1. In the event that a party to a conflict commits serious, manifest and
deliberate breaches of its obligations under this Protocol, and a party
victimized by these breaches considers it imperative to take action to
compel the party violating its obligations to cease doing so, the victimised
party shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of this Article, to resort to
certain measures which are designed to repress the breaches and induce
compliance with the Protocol, but which would otherwise be prohibited
by the Protocol.
2. The measures described in paragraph 1 of the Article may be taken
only when the following conditions are met:
(a) The measure may be taken only when other efforts to induce the
adverse party to comply with the law have failed or are not feasible, and
the victimized party clearly has no other means of ending the breach;
(b) The decision to have recourse to such measures must be taken at the
highest level of the government of the victimized party; and
(c) The party committing the breach must be given specific, formal and
prior warning that such measures will be taken if the breach is continued
or renewed.
3. If it proves imperative to take these measures, their extent and their
means of application shall in no case exceed the extent of the breach
which they are designed to end. The measures may not involve any
actions prohibited by the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The measures
must cease, in all events, when they have achieved their objective,
namely, cessation of the breach which prompted the measure.
(CDDH/I/221/Rev.l, reprinted in Official Records, vol. Ill, p. 324).
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Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, the UK and the US.902 The opposition it
engendered, however, was far wider.90"1 In stressing the need for a general prohibition
on reprisals (as opposed to a collection of piecemeal prohibitions), the representative
of Poland stated, in a meeting of Working Group B, where the issue of the competing
proposals was dealt with from 19 to 21 April, 1977, that the Protocol left open
certain lacunae.904 Ultimately, however, it became clear that neither the Polish nor
the French proposal could muster sufficient votes and both were simultaneously
withdrawn.91'7 It is of course fair to say that the reason for this lay at least partly in
the fact that both proposals were put at a relatively late stage in the drafting process
when the matter of reprisals had already largely been decided and this opened up
significant difficulties from a procedural point of view.906 On the other hand it may
be argued that the Conference rejected the position that Protocol I prohibits reprisals
in a blanket manner against all persons and objects protected by the Protocol,
although at a formal level it could be argued that Poland voluntarily withdrew its
submission and the matter was never put to a vote. As Nahlik has stated:
As the matter now stands, only specific categories of persons and objects
are protected from reprisals. Even if those categories comprise most of the
persons and objects mentioned in the Protocol, some have been
excluded...The possibility of an a contrcirio reasoning (inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius). allowing persons or objects not covered specifically by
any of the prohibitory clauses to be lawfully exposed to reprisals, cannot
be excluded. Should such interpretation occur, the lack of a general
prohibitory provision would prove, too late, how misguided the
Conference had been.4"7
902 See CDDH/1/SR.46, pars 45-55, reprinted in Official Records, vol. IX, p. 55; CDDH/I/48, pars 25-
28 & 54, reprinted in Official Records, vol. Ill, p. 40. Switzerland, however, did suggest enlarging the
category of immune persons and objects (CDDH/I/SR.46, pars 50-52, reprinted in Official Records,
vol. IX, p. 55).
m
See, e.g.. CDDH/I/SR.46. pars 28-44, reprinted in id.', CDDH/I/SR.47, pars 20-32, 39-60, reprinted
in Official Records, vol. IX, p. 67; CDDH/I/SR.48, pars 1, 9-13, 18-23, 29-39, 57, reprinted in
Official Records, vol. IX. p. 83. While much of the opposition to the French proposal was
unequivocal, some of it was directed at specific aspects of the proposal, rather than the proposal in its
entirety.
904 S.E. Nahlik, "Belligerent Reprisals as Seen in the Light of the Diplomatic Conference on
Humanitarian Law, Geneva, 1974-1977", (1978) 42 Law and Contemporary Problems 36. p. 56. In
particular he noted that there was no express prohibition on reprisals against: remains of the deceased,
enemies hors de combat, occupants of aircraft, members of the armed forces and military units
assigned to civil defense organizations, women and children vulnerable to rape, forced prostitution, or
indecent assault, and undefended localities and demilitarized zones.
9lb S.E. Nahlik, "From Reprisals to Individual Penal Responsibility", in A.J.M. Delissen and G.J.
Tanja, Humanitarian Law ofArmed Conflict: Challenges Ahead, Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991,
pp. 171-2.
716 See id., p. 169; see, also, Nahlik (1978), pp. 51-66.
907 Nahlik (1978), pp. 64-5.
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The list of persons or objects receiving no express protection against reprisals
includes:
• Persons or Objects at Sea, in the Air or in Outer Space. Although the reprisal
prohibitions in Part IV of Protocol I only apply (at least as a matter of express
provision) to conflicts affecting civilians on land,90S the Protocol is, in other sections,
of wider effect. The Fundamental Guarantees, set out in Article 75, which are now
recognised as being of customary status,909 apply to persons (but not objects) in the
power of a Party to the conflict affected, inter alia. by "all cases of declared war or
of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties..."910 - nothing here limits the Fundamental Guarantees of
Protocol I to persons on land. Thus, had the Polish proposal been adopted, any
person in the power of a Party to the conflict who did not benefit from more
favourable treatment under the Conventions or Protocol I, whether on land, at sea, in
the air or outer space, would have been expressly immune from reprisals as a person
protected (under Article 75) by Protocol I. As it now stands, however, there is no
express prohibition on departing from the Fundamental Guarantees set out in Article
75 as a measure of reprisal.
• Other Persons Entitled only to Fundamental Guarantees under Article 75 upon
Capture. Other persons who fall under the protection of Article 75, but who receive
no express guarantee against reprisals (because, for instance, they do not qualify for
protection as civilians under Geneva Convention IV or under Articles 50-51 of
Protocol I; or because they do not qualify for Prisoner of War status under Geneva
Convention III or under Articles 43-47 of Protocol I) may theoretically be subjected
to reprisals. Thus, spies and mercenaries do not benefit from any express protection
against reprisals (being denied prisoner of war status by Articles 46 and 47 of
Protocol I respectively). According to Provost, "a State could lawfully respond to an
908 Art. 49(3), Protocol I.
1,119 Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 3084; M.J. Matheson, "The United States Position on the Relation of
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions"
(1987) 2 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 419.
910
Art. 2 common to Geneva Conventions I-IV. Art. 75, Protocol I, applies to individuals affected by
a situation referred to in Art. 1, Protocol I, which, in paragraph 3, specifically includes the situations
referred to in Art. 2 common to Geneva Conventions I-IV.
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enemy belligerent's killing of that State's prisoners of war by executing captured
mercenaries without conforming to the due process guarantees found in Article
75(4)."911 Significantly, spies, mercenaries and "unlawful combatants"' generally91"
would each be immune from reprisals had the Polish proposal been adopted, as each
would be protected persons on the basis of the protections afforded them under
Article 75 of Protocol I.
• Persons or Objects in Non-International Conflicts. Similarly, the Polish proposal
would have rendered any person in the context of a non-international conflict taking
no active part in the hostilities as expressly immune from reprisals, on the basis that
such persons are protected under the terms of the Geneva Conventions (in Common
Article 3). Nothing within Common Article 3, itself, states that the protections there
afforded are inviolable in the case of reprisals.
• Certain miscellaneous objects receive no protection against reprisals, including the
personal effects of POWs913 and remains of the deceased.914 In addition, no
protection is afforded undefended localities and demilitarised zones.91:1
vi. 1980 UN CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS
It was originally expected that Additional Protocol I of 1977 would contain
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific conventional weapons, but
agreement could not be reached during the course of the Geneva Diplomatic
Conference of 1974-77 to that end.916 On 9 June 1977, the Conference adopted
resolution 22(IV) which contained the recommendation that prohibitions or
911 Provost (1994), p. 422.
912 On the status of unlawful combatancy, see R. Baxter, "So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency',
Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs", (1951) 28 British Yearbook ofInternational Law 323; J. Callen,
"Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions", (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International
Law 1025; M. Mofidi and A.E. Eckert, "'Unlawful Combatants' or "Prisoners ofWar"; The Law of
Politics and Labels", (2003) 36 Cornell International Law Journal 59; M.H. Hoffman, "Terrorists are
Unlawful Belligerents, Not Unlawful Combatants: A Distinction with Implications for the Future of
International Humanitarian Law", (2002) 34 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 227.
91' Discussed above.
914 Id.
9L" Mentioned in the statement of the representative of Poland (cited in Nahlik (1978), p. 56).
916 Roberts & Guelff (2000), p. 515.
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restrictions on the use of specific conventional weapons be the subject of a separate
treaty regime.917 That regime was provided for in the Conventional Weapons
Convention. Prohibitions or restrictions on specific conventional weapons are
provided for in Protocols annexed to the Conventional Weapons Convention. Upon
its adoption in 1980 the Conventional Weapons Convention contained three annexed
Protocols. Article 8 of the Conventional Weapons Convention sets up a mechanism
for the establishment of intermittent Review Conferences in which the Conventional
Weapons Convention or its annexed Protocols may be amended.9 |s or new Protocols
created establishing prohibitions or restrictions on categories of conventional
weapons not already covered by the pre-existing Protocols.919 Protocol II of 1980,
sometimes known as the '"Mines Protocol", prohibits the use on land of mines,
booby-traps and other devices "by way of reprisals against the civilian population as
such or against individual civilians."920 The scope of this prohibition is limited by
Article 1 of the Conventional Weapons Convention which states that:
This Convention and its annexed Protocols shall apply in the situations
referred to in Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 for the Protection of War Victims, including any situation described
in paragraph 4 of Article 1 of Additional Protocol I to these
Conventions.921
The Mines Protocol of 1980 replicates the effect of Article 51(6) of
Protocol I in prohibiting specific reprisals against civilians. It suffers from the same
limitations of Protocol I in that it is restricted in its application to international
conflicts922 on land.922 During the Spring 1996 session of the first Review
Conference of the States Parties to the Conventional Weapons Convention, the
Parties adopted Amended Protocol II (also known as the '"Amended Mines
Protocol") of 1996 which extended the terms of the Mines Protocol, including the
prohibition on reprisals. Article 1(2) of the Amended Mines Protocol states that the
Protocol shall apply:
918 Arts 8(1) & 8(3), UNCCW.
919
Art. 8(2), id.
920 Art. 3(2), Mines Protocol.
921 Article 1, UNCCW.
922 Article 1, id.
92:1 Article 1, Mines Protocol.
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in addition to situations referred to in Article 1 of [the Conventional
Weapons Convention], to situations referred to in Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.v"4
Thus the Amended Mines Protocol exceeds, by agreement, the scope of application
ordinarily applicable to Protocols annexed to the Conventional Weapons Convention.
Article 3(7) of the Amended Mines Protocol prohibits the use on land of mines,
booby-traps and other devices "by way of reprisals against the civilian population as
such or against individual civilians or civilian objects." The Amended Mines
Protocol of 1996 therefore extends the reprisal prohibition contained in the Mines
Protocol of 1980 by extending that prohibition to non-international conflicts (at least
as defined in article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949) and to civilian
objects.
On 21 December 2001, a number of Parties to the Conventional
Weapons Convention adopted an amendment to Article 1 of the Convention which
states, inter alia, that:
This Convention and its annexed Protocols shall also apply, in addition to
situations referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article [identical to original
Article 1, Conventional Weapons Convention, cited above], to situations
referred to in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949.
In case of armed conflicts not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply the prohibitions and restrictions of this
Convention and its annexed Protocols.
The effect of this amendment is to expand the scope of the Mines Protocol of 1980
(and its reprisal prohibition) to non-international conflicts, at least for Parties to the
amendment. The number of Parties to the amendment however (totalling 39 after
Turkey's accession to the amendment on 2 March 2005),926 is only a fraction of the
total number of Parties to the Conventional Weapons Convention (totalling 97
following Sierra Leone's ratification on 30 September 2004).927 The vast majority of
924 Article 1(2), Amended Mines Protocol.
Art. l(2)-(3), Amendment to Article 1 of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, 21 December 2001, UN Doc. CCW/CONF.II/2 (2001).
1.26 List of States parties available at vvww.icrc.org.
1.27 List of States parties available at www.icrc.org.
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the 39 Parties are bound in any event by the Mines Protocol II of 1996 which already
prohibited the use on land of mines, booby-traps and other devices by way of
reprisals against civilians in non-international conflicts. In the case of Mexico,
however, that State is bound both by the Mines Protocol of 1980 and the amendment
of 2001 but not the Mines Protocol of 1996. Thus, for Mexico at least, the
amendment of 2001 has the effect of extending Mexico's treaty obligations under the
Mines Protocol of 1980 (including its prohibition on reprisals) to the case of non-
international conflicts.
Unusually, the 1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction
does not include any provision relating to reprisals, despite the fact that the Parties to
that Convention sought to adopt a more comprehensive set of prohibitions than those
found in the Mines Protocol of 1980 and the Amended Mines Protocol of 1996.928
92S See Roberts & Guelff (2000), pp. 645-47.
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6
customary law status of
treaty prohibitions
i. INTRODUCTION
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are widely regarded as wholly, or at least, largely,
embodying customary international law.929 Nevertheless, a number of authors still
stress the need to distend custom from those provisions binding only on a
conventional basis. Meron states that: "the determination to which category -
customary or conventional - a particular provision [of the Geneva Conventions of
1949] belongs must be made in concreto."93° Even the limited decision in the
Nicaragua Case - that Articles 1 and 3 common to the Geneva Conventions reflected
931
customary law — was not reached without dissent. ~ At the time of their
promulgation, the Geneva Conventions were partly reflective of pre-existing custom
and partly innovative.932 While the prohibition on reprisals against prisoners of war
had its antecedents in the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929, the other
reprisal prohibitions were innovative. Nevertheless, the prohibitions on reprisals in
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are now widely viewed as having entered
customary law.933 Geneva Convention III replaced the Geneva Prisoners of War
929 Prosecutor vMilorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 17
September 2003, par. 220: Roberts & Guelff (2000), p. 196.
930 T. Meron. Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1989, p. 37.
931 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US)
(Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jennings, p. 537; see, also, id., Separate
Opinion of Judge Ago, p. 184.93~ Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US)
(Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, p. 113.
933 Kalshoven (1990), p. 53; Meron (1989), pp. 46-47.
200
Convention of 1929 as between parties to both agreements,934 but as the former
simply expanded upon the latter the 1929 Convention must also be viewed as having
entered customary law.
In relation to the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, the
customary law status of the reprisal prohibition therein is somewhat more difficult to
assess. Cassese has stated that:
In view of the very broad participation in this Convention, and the fact
that contracting parties include States from practically all main areas of
the world, the contention could be made that the prohibition [on reprisals
therein] has passed into customary law. If this view is correct, it could be
argued that Article 53(c) [of Protocol I], on reprisals, is itself part of
customary law, to the extent that it restates the prohibition of reprisals
against cultural objects covered by both the 1954 Hague Convention and
by Article 53 itself.9'1'1
Nevertheless, Cassese had already stated that "one can doubt whether the ban on
reprisals [in Article 53(c), Protocol I] has become a part of general consent."936 In
addition, it appears fair to conclude that at least prior to the adoption of Protocol I,
the reprisal prohibition in the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention had not
entered customary law given that the analogous prohibition in Article 53 of Protocol
I was widely viewed as an innovation in international law.91' Whether the reprisal
prohibition in the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention has, in recent years,
entered customary law, is probably best ascertained by assessing whether the parallel
reprisal prohibition in the far-more-subscribed Protocol I has now entered customary
law. The customary law status of the reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I is a matter of
great controversy, and great consequence given the extent to which Protocol I
attempts to close many lacunae in the area of legitimate reprisals: -
ii. CODIFICATION OR CRYSTALLISATION
The prohibitions upon reprisals in Protocol I, in so far as they add to the pre-existing
prohibitions found in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, are accepted as having been
934 Roberts & Guelff (2000), p. 243.
911 A. Cassese, "The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and





innovations in international law. As such, there is little room to argue that the
Protocol I prohibitions were in any sense declaratory of pre-existing customary
law.lbl' Nor can the prohibitions be viewed as having crystallised as customary law
938 C. Greenwood, "Customary Law Status of the 1977 Additional Protocols" in A.J.M. Delissen and
G.J. Tanja, Humanitarian Law ofArmed Conflict: Essays in Honour ofFrits Kalshoven, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers. Dordrecht, 1991. pp. 110-111; see, also, Cassese (1984), pp. 88-94; Kwakwa
(1990), p. 72. Many of the delegates to the Diplomatic Conference appeared to have viewed the
breadth of the prohibitions on reprisals in Protocol I as an open matter to be negotiated. In relation to
the civilian population, see, e.g.. the comments of Mr. Nahlik (Poland), which indicate that although
Poland supported the categorical prohibition on reprisals against the civilian population or civilians,
they nevertheless viewed it as innovative, stating that the prohibition on reprisals together with other
rules "would fill some of the gaps in existing rules of a more specific character" (CDDH/SR.41. par.
130, reprinted in Official Records, vol. VI, p. 141); see, also, comments by Mr. Girard (France)
opposing the blanket prohibition of reprisals against the civilian population or civilians
(CDDH/III/SR.8, par. 56, reprinted in Official Records, vol. XIV, p. 59). In relation to civilian
objects, see, e.g., the explanatory statement made by the delegation of Australia in regard to draft
Article 47: "The Australian delegation supports proposals for rules to prohibit attacks against civilian
objects but it opposes the adoption of a provision which prohibits reprisals against civilian objects in
all circumstances." (CDDH/SR.41, Annex, reprinted in Official Records, vol. VI, p. 175); see, also,
comments by Mr. Samuels (Canada) that his delegation could accept a prohibition on reprisals
against civilians or the civilian population, but not on reprisals against civilian objects.
(CDDH/III/SR.7, par. 38, reprinted in Official Records, vol. XIV, p. 51). In relation to cultural objects
and places of worship see, e.g., comments by Mr. Mahony (Australia) who stated that his delegation
objected to the proposed new Article 47 bis (Protection of Cultural Objects and of Places ofWorship)
because of the reference in the proposed article to reprisals (CDDH/III/SR.59, par. 42, reprinted in
Official Records, vol. XV, p. 209). In relation to objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population, see, e.g., comments by Mr. Eaton (United Kingdom) discussing an amendment to draft
Article 48 (Objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population) sponsored by Belgium and
the United Kingdom (CDDH/1II/67, reprinted in Official Records, vol. Ill, p. 218), which, inter alia
and unlike the draft Article, proposed no ban on reprisals: "The amendment proposed no ban on
reprisals, the intention being to leave intact the existing bans on reprisals against civilian objects in
occupied territory which were contained in the Hague Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention
No. IV on 1907 concerning the Laws ofWar on Land, and the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. and
to retain the right of reprisal against such objects in enemy territory subject to the existing restraints in
customary law, which were considerable." (CDDH/III/SR. 16, par. 57, reprinted in Official Records,
vol. XIV. p. 127); see. also, comments by Mrs. Bindschelder-Robert (ICRC): "The reprisals to which
reference was made in the second sentence of the draft article constituted an extension of the rule
under Article 33, third paragraph, of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, applicable in occupied
and national territory, according to which "Reprisals against protected persons and their property are
prohibited.' The prohibition provided for in Article 66 would in fact cover all indispensable objects,
no matter in whose possession those objects were." (CDDH/II1/SR.37, par. 40, reprinted in Official
Records, vol. XIV, p. 387). In relation to the natural environment, see, e.g., comments by Mr. Rosas
(Finland) indicating that the protection of the natural environment was an essential but innovative idea
(CDDH/III/SR. 17, par. 5, reprinted in Official Records, vol. XV, p. 141). In relation to works and
installations containing dangerous forces, see, e.g., comments by Mr. Veuthey (ICRC), who in
introducing draft Article 49 (Works and installations containing dangerous forces), argued that works
and installations "required special measures of protection", implying that the draft article was filling a
lacuna (CDDH/III/SR. 14, par. 16, reprinted in Official Records, vol. XIV, p. 109).
939 It has been suggested that reprisals against all civilians (and not just those protected by Geneva
Convention IV) were prohibited under customary international law prior to the convening of the
Geneva Diplomatic Conference which promulgated Protocol I (Kwakwa (1990), p. 81, n. 131;
Greenwood (1989a), p. 63; see, also, Sandoz et al.( 1987), par. 3444). This view finds support in UN
General Assembly Resolution 2675 (XXV) of 1970, entitled "Basic Principles for the Protection of
Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts", which states, inter alia, that: "Civilian populations, or
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through the process of the 1974-1977 Geneva Diplomatic Conference which
promulgated Protocol I, or in the adoption of the Protocol itself.940 No consensus
emerged within that conference as to the binding character of the reprisal
prohibitions contained within, what became, Articles 51-56 of Protocol I qua norms
of general international law.941
iii. SUBSEQUENT GENERATION
1. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
The question then is whether the reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I have since come
to be accepted as generating new customary law. In order to answer this, one must
look, at least in the first instance, to the decision of the ICJ in the North Sea
individual members thereof, should not be the object of reprisals, forcible transfers or other assaults
on their integrity" (UN Doc. A/8028 (1970)). But there is very little to support the proposition that
reprisals against civilians generally (regardless of the territorial status of the land in which they were
located) were prohibited under general international law prior to the promulgation of Protocol I. There
is little in the practice of States or the content of juristic opinion to suggest a movement away from the
permissive attitude of the Second World War (discussed above) by the 1970s. Kalshoven, for instance,
stated, prior to the promulgation of Protocol I, that "it is clear that there is no express treaty
prohibition of reprisals against the enemy civil population, nor can it be maintained that a customary-
rule to that effect has emerged from the practice of belligerents" (Kalshoven (1971), p. 357). There is
also very little in the writings of publicists to support the position. Greenwood has stated that: "The
better view...is that no firm rule prohibiting reprisals against the civilian population was already part
of customary international law when the Diplomatic Conference convened" (Greenwood (1989a), p.
63).
1,4(1 In the course of the oral hearing in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Denmark and the
Netherlands argued that Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf did not embody
a pre-existing rule of customary law, but rather "the process of the definition and consolidation of the
emerging customary law took place through the work of the International Law Commission, the
reaction of governments to that work and the proceedings of the Geneva Conference" and this
emerging customary law "crystallized in the adoption of the Continental Shelf Convention by the
Conference." (North Sea Continental ShelfCases (Federal Republic ofGermany v Denmark; Federal
Republic ofGermany v Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep. 3. par. 61). Although the Court rejected this
contention of Denmark and the Netherlands with respect to Article 6, it was nevertheless clear that the
Court viewed as entirely possible the process of crystallization of emerging rules in the adoption of
multilateral conventions (see id., pars 62-69). The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea is often
cited as highlighting the potential of diplomatic conferences to crystallize novel or emergent norms as
customary law. The Conference crystallized at least two law of the sea principles as customary law;
the first being the 12 nautical mile limit to the territorial sea and the second being the concept of the
Exclusive Economic Zone. See, e.g., Cassese (1984), pp. 65-66.
941 See Sandoz et al.( 1987), pars 3450-3451, noting that it proved impossible to reconcile the different
points of view of the delegates in relation to reprisals during the Diplomatic Conference. See, also,
Cassese, who notes that the declarations made by States during the Conference and the lengthy
discussions on the general rule on reprisals made it clear that no general agreement emerged at any
point during the course of the Conference (Cassese (1984), p. 88. See, also, id., pp. 89-94).
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Continental Shelf Cases. " There the Court laid down certain preconditions which
must be met before a non-codifying or crystallizing provision in a treaty may be said
to have entered customary law: The first of these was that the provision should, '"at
all events potentially, be of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be
regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law";94 , the second pre-condition
was that "State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially
affected, should [be] both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the
provision invoked"';944 and third was the requirement that that State practice must be
shown to be based upon opinio juris.94' Underlying each of these requirements was
the caveat that the concurrence of all three was "not lightly to be regarded as having
been attained."946
a. Norm-Creating Character
The norm-creating character of the Protocol I prohibitions on reprisals is enhanced
by the fact that each prohibition in Articles 51-56 is clear and unambiguous in its
meaning (subject to minor exceptions at the periphery, addressed above) and non-
derogable (i.e. by reference to military necessity).94' On the other hand, those
prohibitions appear to be subject, potentially, to reservation. In the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases the ICJ treated the potential to make reservations to treaty
provisions as diminishing the capacity of those provisions to generate customary
law.948 This was on the basis that where treaty provisions are intended to reflect or
942 North Sea Continental ShelfCases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany v Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep. 3.
943 Id., par. 72.
944 Id., par. 74.
945 See id.
946 Id., par. 71.
947 Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 1984.
948 In addition to the faculty of reservation-making, the faculty of denunciation may also be considered
in examining the norm-creating character of a treaty. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 each provide a
faculty for denunciation of the Convention, subject to the consideration that the denunciation "shall in
no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfill by virtue
of the principles of the law of nations..." (Art. 63, Geneva Convention I; Art. 62, Geneva Convention
II; Art. 142, Geneva Convention III; Art. 158, Geneva Convention IV). While Protocol I makes no
such reference to customary law in its denunciation clause (Art. 99), that may be in large measure
because the very same consideration expressly applies to Protocol I in treaty form as a result of the
operation of Article 43 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The absence of any
reference to customary law in Article 99 of Protocol I should in no way be viewed as weakening the
claim of Protocol I, or various of its provisions, to customary status (see Meron (1989), pp. 6-7.)
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embody existing, or emerging,949 customary norms, it is to be expected that those
provisions "will figure amongst those in respect of which a right of unilateral
reservation is not conferred, or is excluded."950 In that case the ICJ was concerned, in
part, with whether Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
(embodying the equidistance principle) had come to generate customary law
subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention. The Court considered it
relevant that Article 12 of the Convention permitted reservations to all the articles of
the Convention "other than to Articles 1 to 3 inclusive".951 This made it exceedingly
difficult for the ICJ to conclude that Article 6 had come to generate customary
international law:
...the faculty of making reservations to Article 6, while it might not of
itself prevent the equidistance principle being eventually received as
general law, does add considerably to the difficulty of regarding this
result as having been brought about (or being potentially possible) on the
basis of the Convention: for so long as this faculty continues to exist, and
is not the subject of any revision brought about in consequence of a
request made under Article 13 of the Convention - of which there is at
present no official indication - it is the Convention itself which would, for
the reasons already indicated, seem to deny to the provisions of Article 6
the same norm-creating character as, for instance, Articles 1 and 2
952
possess.
The situation with respect to the Protocol I prohibitions on reprisals is
somewhat different in that Protocol I does not expressly provide any faculty for the
making of reservations; although it does not expressly exclude reservations either.
Baxter has suggested that it is only where a treaty makes an express distinction
between provisions to which reservations are permitted and provisions to which they
are excluded that any inference should be drawn as to the customary status of those
949 The principle was applied to emerging norms in [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, par. 72.
9MI North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark) (Federal Republic
ofGermany v Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, pp. 38-39.
Id.
iJ>2 Id., p. 72. See, however, the dissenting opinion of Judge Morelli who argued that the power to
make reservations under the terms of a treaty affects only the obligation flowing from the treaty qua
treaty law and therefore does not affect the status of any parallel customary rule. On this basis, it
appears that Judge Morelli did not view the power of reservation-making under the treaty as of any
evidential significance in relation to the question of whether the treaty or its individual provisions
codify or crystallize customary law. See [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Morelli, p.
198); see, also, id.. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lachs, pp. 223-225; London Statement of Principles,
Section 22, Commentary, pp. 44-45.
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provisions.953 This would certainly provide a sound basis for distinguishing the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases from the present inquiry.954 It has also been suggested
that it is only where reservations have in fact been made (and deposited) in relation
to particular provisions that any negative inference should be drawn in terms of the
customary status of those provisions.955 Meron has stated that in assessing the
adverse effect of reservations upon the status of provisions under customary law,
"the number and depth of the reservations actually made must be considered."966
At the present moment it appears that four States have entered
reservations to the reprisal prohibitions in Articles 51-56 of Protocol I (Italy,
Germany, the United Kingdom and France) although only two of these (the United
Kingdom and France) have entered what amounts unequivocally to a reservation.
Italy ratified Protocol I on 27 February 1986 and issued a number of statements of
interpretation, including one which appears to relate to reprisals: "Italy will react to
serious and systematic violations by an enemy of the obligations imposed by
Additional Protocol I and in particular its Articles 51 and 52 with all means
admissible under international law in order to prevent any further violation."967
Germany issued a virtually identical statement upon its ratification to Protocol I on
14 February 1991.958 Although the statement has been described as a
R. Baxter, "Treaties and Custom", (1970-1) 129 Recueil des Cours 25, pp. 49-50.
It may be that the ICJ had the very same distinction in mind when it stated in relation to treaty
provisions of customary status that those provisions "will figure amongst those in respect of which a
right of unilateral reservation is not conferred, or is excluded" ([1969] ICJ Rep. 3, pp. 38-9), implying
(as was the case with the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf) that some provisions will be
subject to a right of reservation and others will not.
See Baxter (1970), p. 51; Meron (1989), p. 16.
l'b6 Meron (1989), p. 16. Thus Cassese stated that the approval, by consensus, of four of the five
reprisal provisions of Protocol I (Article 51 being adopted by a vote of 77 to 1 (France) with 16
abstentions) combined with "the lack of substantial reservations" to those provisions could
demonstrate that all States, with the exception of France and Australia, agreed to ban reprisals and that
such agreement was so strong as to demonstrate the intention to create a general rule (Cassese (1984),
p. 103). Cassese notes, however, that a more cautious, and possibly, more accurate, view may be that
many States were in fact opposed to the extension of reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I, but refrained
from voicing their dissent on the understanding that they could enter reservations upon ratification
(id.). Given the significant number of ratifications now received, and the very limited number of
reservations in relation to the reprisal prohibitions, this view may have reflected the understanding of
a number of States during the process of the Diplomatic Conference, but it does not appear to have
been an understanding that continued to be held by States over the course of time. Australia for
instance, was a vocal critic of the reprisal prohibitions in Protocol 1 during the period of the
Diplomatic Conference, but ultimately it ratified Protocol I without making any reservation in relation
to the reprisal provisions.
"




"reservation",959 it is unclear whether, in affirming their right to use "all means
admissible under international law", Italy and Germany intended to include, within
that, their pre-Protocol rights including the right to take reprisals prohibited in
Articles 51-56.
Upon ratification of Protocol I on 28 January 1998, the United Kingdom
entered a clear reservation to the reprisal prohibitions in Articles 51 to 55 in the
following terms:
The obligations of Articles 51 to 55 are accepted on the basis that any
adverse party against which the UK might be engaged will itself
scrupulously observe those observations. If an adverse party makes
serious and deliberate attacks, in violation of Article 51 or 52 against the
civilian population or civilians or against civilian objects, or. in violations
of Articles 53, 54 and 55, on objects or items protected by those Articles,
the UK will regard itself as entitled to take measures otherwise prohibited
by the Articles in question to the extent that it considers such measures
necessary for the sole purpose of compelling the adverse party to cease
committing violations under those Articles, but only after formal warning
to the adverse party requiring cessation of the violations has been
disregarded and then only after a decision taken at the highest level of
government. Any measures thus taken by the UK will not be
disproportionate to the violations giving rise thereto and will not involve
any action prohibited by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 nor will such
measures be continued after the violations have ceased. The UK will
notify the Protecting Powers of any such formal warning given to an
adverse party, and if that warning has been disregarded, of any measures
taken as a result.960
The fact that the above reservation deals only with Articles 51-55, and not Article 56,
may be explained by the fact that the United Kingdom entered a separate reservation
concerning Article 56 (as well as Article 85(3)(c), which defined certain attacks
against works and installations containing dangerous forces as a "grave breach" of
Protocol I). That reservation stated that:
The UK cannot undertake to grant absolute protection to installations
which may contribute to the opposing Party's war effort, or to the
defenders of such installations, but will take all due precautions in
military operations at or near the installations referred to in paragraph 1 of
Article 56 in light of the known facts, including any special markings
which the installation may carry to avoid severe collateral losses among
the civilian population; direct attacks against such installations will be
launched only an authorisation at a high level of command.VM
959 See Meron (1989), pp. 66-67.
960 Roberts & Guelff (2000). p. 511.
961 Id., p. 511.
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In reserving the right to make direct attacks against the works and installations
protected by Article 56 (and Article 85(3)(c)), the United Kingdom has, ipso facto,
reserved a right of reprisal against such works and installations.
France, upon its accession to Protocol II, on 24 February 1984, issued a
statement in which it stated that it was not acceding to Protocol I due to the "lack of
consensus among the signatory states of Protocol I as to the exact meaning of the
obligations they have undertaken so far as deterrence is concerned."962 This appears
to be a somewhat cryptic protest against the inclusion of the reprisal prohibitions,
although each of those prohibition, subject to minor exceptions at the periphery, is
quite clear and unambiguous. It may be, however, that some uncertainty exists as to
which (if any) reprisal measures remain legal as a result of the Protocol I
prohibitions, and the statement is intended to highlight that uncertainty.96. In any
event, France acceded to Protocol I on 11 April 2001, but issued a reservation to the
prohibitions on reprisals therein.964
The question of whether Protocol I includes the potential of reservation
making is probably not exhausted by an examination of whether (1) reprisals are
expressly excluded under the terms of the Protocol; and (2) reservations have in fact
been entered. On both these tests Protocol I may be said to include the potential that
reservations be entered to the reprisal prohibitions in Articles 51-56, if not Article 20
(neither the United Kingdom nor France entered a reservation to Article 20 although
the ambiguous statement of Italy and Germany may be thought to cover it). Attention
should also be placed on the permissibility of the reservations entered under the law
of treaties. Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that
reservations be compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.966 Although the
Aldrich has stated: "France ratified [s/c] Protocol II, but not Protocol I, in large part. I believe,
because of the objections to protocol I's prohibitions of reprisals" (G.H. Aldrich, "Why the United
States of America Should Ratify Additional Protocol I" in A.J.M. Delissen and G.J. Tanja,
Humanitarian Law ofArmed Conflict: Essays in Honour ofFrits Kalslioven, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991, p. 129).
964 See reservations of France upon accession to Protocol 1(11 April 2001), available in French at
www.icrc.org. See, in particular, par. 11 ("Le Gouvernment de la Republique Frangaise declare cpt 'il
appliquera les dispositions du paragraphe 8 de I'article 51 dans la mesure on /'interpretation de
celles-ci nefait pas obstacle a I'emploi, conformement au droit international, des moyens qu 'il
estimerait indispensables pour proteger sa population civile de violations graves, manifestes et
deliberees des Conventions de Geneve et du protocole par I 'ennemiC)
965 Art. 19, Vienna Convention. For judicial consideration of the compatibility of reservations with the
object and purpose of treaties, see Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
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Vienna Convention does not strictly govern the terms of Protocol I (as Protocol I
came into force prior to the Vienna Convention),966 nevertheless those Articles of the
Vienna Convention dealing with reservations (Articles 19-23) are based in part on
the ICJ's earlier jurisprudence concerning reservations under the law of treaties,967
and are often viewed as reflective of customary law.966 During the course of the
Geneva Diplomatic Conference, the representative for the German Democratic
Republic stated (specifically in relation to the prohibition of reprisals against the
civilian population or civilians) that his delegation would regard any reservation as
incompatible with the humanitarian object and purpose of the Protocol.969
Compatibility is difficult to assess in this context given that the object and purpose of
reprisal measures, strictly speaking, is to effect compliance with the law of armed
conflict, and therefore its object and purpose could be argued to run parallel to that of
Protocol I as a whole.970 George Aldrich, who was the Chairman of the United States
delegation to the Conference, has confirmed that the United States seriously
considered ratifying Protocol I, but reserving certain rights of reprisal.971 Aldrich has
stated that: "The only provisions of the Protocol that I believe may warrant a
reservation are the various prohibitions of reprisal found in Articles 51-56."972
Ultimately, however, the United States did not reserve the right of reprisals, choosing
of the Crime ofGenocide (Advisory Opinion) [1951] ICJ Rep. 16. Aust notes that it can ve extremely
difficult to assess whether a reservation passes the test of compatibility with the object and purpose of
a treaty. He states further that there is no clear consensus as to how the test is to be applied (Aust
(2000), pp. 110-111; see, also, J. Klabbers, "Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of
Treaties" (1997) 8 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 138). Article 19 of the Vienna Convention
provides that a State "may" formulate a reservation to a treaty "unless [inter alia] the reservation is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty". Incompatible reservations are therefore not
permitted by the Vienna Convention. International law has not, however, reached consensus on the
question of what happens if a State does in fact formulate an incompatible reservation. While some
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights appear to support the view that in such a case the
State is bound by the treaty, but without the benefit of the reservation (see Belilos v Switzerland
(1988) 10 EHRR 466; Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) 20 EHRR 99), Aust
suggests that these decisions reflect the particular circumstances of their cases and the special
character of the European Convention on Human Rights (Aust (2000), pp. 118-119).
9M'
The Vienna Convention entered into force on 27 January 1980. The non-retroactivity provision
within Art. 4 of the Convention provides that the Convention applies only to treaties concluded after
the Vienna Convention has entered into force.
See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime ofGenocide
(Advisory Opinion) [1951 ] ICJ Rep. 16.
968 See, e.g., Hampson (1988), p. 832.
969 Comments by Mr Ullrich (German Democratic Republic) in Plenary Meeting, 26 May 1977,
(CDDH/SR.41. par. 137, available at Official Records, vol. VI. p. 141.
9711
See W. Hays Parks, "Air War and the Law ofWar", (1990) 32 Air Force Law Review 1, p. 94.
971 Aldrich (1991), p. 129.
972 JJ „ I A1
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instead not to ratify the Protocol at all. This could be cited as evidence of the non-
admissibility of reservations to the reprisal prohibitions, but the motivation of the
United States appears to have been more complex than a desire to retain the right of
reprisals alone. The decision in 1987 by the United States President, Ronald Reagan,
not to seek the Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the Protocol appears
to have been based primarily on the concern that by assimilating wars of national
liberation to international armed conflict,973 the Protocol would unduly privilege
974
terrorists.
Even if the potential for reservation-making were deemed to diminish the
norm-creating character of the reprisal prohibitions, the passage from the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, cited above, indicates that that potential should not be
treated as dispositive in relation to the question of whether treaty prohibitions have
subsequently come to be viewed as embodying customary law. The norm-creating
character of the treaty was important in the context of the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases where the Court was examining whether Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf had entered customary law "partly because of
its own impact, partly on the basis of subsequent State practice".976 There is no
reason in principle why a treaty provision which lacked normative character upon its
adoption could not nevertheless come to embody customary law at a later stage. The
process of the formation of customary law would proceed less because of the
provision's "own impact" and more on the basis of subsequent State practice.976 In
such a case, one would expect a greater lapse of time between the creation of the
treaty norm and the emergence of its customary counterpart, and one would probably
expect a more rigorous demonstration of both State practice and opinio juris.
b. State Practice and Opinio Juris
' Art. 1(4), Protocol I.
974 See Sofaer (1988); see, also, Aldrich (1991), pp. 129-130 & 134.
975
[1969] ICJ Rep. 3, par. 70.
976 Nowhere does the ICJ elaborate on exactly what is meant by the reference to the treaty's "own
impact" as distinct from State practice. It is significant, however, that the two factors are not treated as
mutually exclusive explanations for the development of customary law, but rather, are seen as running
together. See further, below.
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There is a requirement of both quantitative and qualitative elements of State
practice.977 In terms of quantum, the required level of State practice has been
expressed as "extensive and virtually uniform" (in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases),97lS or "constant and uniform" (in the Asylum Case),919 although differing
expressions have also been formulated, including the more flexible statement in the
Nicaragua Case that there need not be "absolute rigorous conformity", but that "the
conduct of States, should, in general, be consistent" with the putative rule and that
inconsistent conduct should have been treated as violative of it.980 The qualitative
element is expressed in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases as a requirement that
the relevant practice includes "that of States whose interests are specially
affected".981 The International Law Association's London Statement of Principles
Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law and
accompanying Commentary (2000), concluded that:
A State or group of States which is important in a particular area of
activity can. by its opposition, prevent any rule of general (as opposed to
particular) customary law from developing...If States of sufficient
importance in the area of activity in question manifest their dissent, the
requisite condition [for the emergence of the rule] is not fulfilled.98"
What is significant in the assessment of both the quantitative and
qualitative aspects of State practice, according to the North Sea Continental Shelf
977 See International Law Association (ILA), Final Report of the Committee on Formation of
Customary (General) International Law, Statement ofPrinciples Applicable to the Formation of
General Customary International Law, as amended at the London Conference (2000), London, 2000,
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/CustomarvLaw.pdf (hereinafter London Statement of
Principles), Section 14, Commentary, p. 26, par. (e).
978
[1969] ICJ Rep. 3, par. 74.
979 [1950] ICJ Rep. 266, p. 276.
980 [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, par. 186.
981 [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, par. 74.
982 London Statement of Principles, p. 27; see Resolution 16/2000 of the ILA, adopting the London
Statement of Principles and requesting that it be transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations (available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/RESC'ust.pdf). The ICRC has emphasized the need to
consider all forms of State practice, rather than simply the conduct of belligerents, in order to enable
all States to contribute to the creation of customary humanitarian law (ICRC, Report on the Follow-up
to the International Conference for the Protection ofWar Criminals, 26th International Conference of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Commission I, Item 2, Doc. 95/C.1/2/2 (1995), p. 8). But as the
London Statement of Principles explains: "The fact that the test is not purely quantitative may appear
undemocratic. But leaving aside the question what is meant by 'democratic' in this context, it should
be noted that customary systems are rarely completely democratic: the more important participants
play a particularly significant role in the process. And certainly, the international system as a whole is
far from democratic. So, in this regard, customary international law is at least in touch with political
reality." (Section 14, Commentary, p. 26, par. (e)).
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Cases, is whether there is sufficient practice which emulates the treaty-norm in
question by non-party States, and whether that practice is supported by opinio juris.
Although the extent of participation in the treaty itself was viewed as potentially
relevant to the question of whether the treaty had come to generate customary norms
(and this is dealt with below), the central consideration in terms of sufficiency of
practice and opinio juris was the conduct of non-party States. Relevant State
practice, stated the ICJ, excluded the practice of States "acting actually or potentially
in the application of the Convention."98'1 This leads to the so-called "Baxter
Paradox",984 whereby the greater the number of parties to a treaty, the more difficult
98*5
it becomes to pinpoint State practice outside the treaty; ' the more universal a treaty
becomes, the less scope there is for concluding that it has entered general
international law. It is of significance here that there are (following Japan's accession
on 31 August 2004) 162 Parties to Protocol I.986 This leaves us with only a relatively
small pool of non-party States to consider in terms of their conduct vis-a-vis the
Protocol 1 norms. There are, however, a number of significant military powers who
are not party to the provisions of Protocol I. These include the United States as well
as India, Pakistan, Turkey and Israel.
c. Active Undertakings
Although there have been undertakings by non-parties to Protocol I to apply certain
provisions of the Protocol in certain or all circumstances, these undertakings have
tended to relate to provisions of the Protocol which were viewed by the undertaking
State as declaratory of customary law. For instance, in relation to the Gulf War of
1990-1991, Protocol I was not in force for Iraq, the United States, France or the
983 See [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, par. 76. By "potentially" the reference here is to States which were shortly
to become Parties to the Convention, though the Convention was not strictly binding at the time of the
relevant conduct. Meron notes, in the context of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, that the practice of
States parties may merely indicate that those States are complying with their obligation under
common Article 1 to "ensure respect" for the Conventions (Meron (1989), p. 30). The same point
may be made in relation to Protocol I - Article 1(1) of which is materially identical to common Article
1 of the Geneva Conventions.
984
The term is employed, for instance, by Meron (1989), p. 50.
985 Baxter (1970), pp. 64 & 73.
986 List of States Parties available at www.icrc.org.
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United Kingdom during the period of hostilities,987 yet the Final Report to Congress
on the conduct of the war justified a number of targeting decisions in terms of the
provisions of Protocol I, and expressly considered portions of the Protocol to be
binding on the basis of pre-existing customary law.988 Rogers, asserting that coalition
forces undertook great efforts to ensure that collateral damage was reduced to a
minimum (for e.g. by the use of low altitude bombing and precision guided missiles)
concludes that "the allied bombing campaign can be seen as a good example of the
application in practice of the principles of Art. 57 of Protocol I", requiring
precautions in attack,989 even though that Article was not binding on coalition forces
qua treaty law. It has also been noted, in relation to Operation Allied Force, the 1999
NATO air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that certain
provisions of Protocol I which were not strictly binding on the United States were
nevertheless applied in practice.990 Despite instances of the unilateral application of
987
Rogers notes that of the main protagonists, only Syria was a party to Protocol I (Rogers (1996). p.
63).
988 See US Dept. of Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Dept. of
Defense, Washington D.C., 1992, Appendices A-S; see, also, US Field Manual No. 27-10, par. 41; US
Dept. of the Air Force, International Law — The Conduct ofArmed Conflict andAir Operations,
Pamphlet AFP 110-31, Dept. of the Air Force, Washington D.C., 1976, pars l-3a(2), 5-3c(l)(b); see,
however, Parks (1990), pp. 173-4.
989
Rogers (1996), pp. 63-65; see, also, C. Greenwood, "Customary International Law and the First
Geneva Protocol of 1977 in the Gulf Conflict", in P. Rowe (ed.), The GulfWar 1990-1991 in
International and English Law, Routledge, New York, 1993, p. 63ff. See, however, statement by Mr
Al-Anbari (Iraq) to the Security Council during deliberations over Security Council Resolution 687
(1991):
The American media portrayed the aerial bombardment as being
conducted with the use of the latest military technology, aircraft
launching laser-guided bombs or "smart" bombs to hit only strategic and
military targets, and not civilian targets. However, the reality was
different. The reality was that the offensive forces placed great reliance-
on the B-52s, which carry only "dumb" bombs launched from an altitude
of more than 30,000 feet, thus making it almost impossible to distinguish
between civilian and military targets.
(Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty-First Meeting, 3 April
1991, UN Doc. S/PV.2981, available at www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/sc910403.pdf: see, also,
Human Rights Watch, Needless Deaths in the GulfWar, Human Rights Watch, New York, 1991,
especially at pp. 5-6. Rogers states that bombing by B-52 aircraft was directed in large part against
Iraqi Republican Guard positions and was unlikely to have been carried out in populous areas (Rogers
(1996), p. 64)
990 See W. Hays Parks, "Rules ofConduct during Operations Other Than War: The Law ofWar Does
Apply", American Diplomacy, 2001, available at
http://www. unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2001_07-09/hum_intervention/hum_08_parks.html.
In fact three ofNATO's alliance members were not party to Protocol I at the time of that campaign:
The United States, France and Turkey.
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some of the terms of Protocol I, one would be hard pressed to find instances of non¬
party States undertaking to be bound by the prohibitions on reprisals in Articles 51-
56. For instance, while United States military manuals and instructions have
incorporated the principles of proportionality, precautions in attack, and the
requirement to undertake legal reviews of new weapons, in similar terms to those
found in Protocol I,991 on the basis that they are a part of general international law,
they steadfastly maintain that the prohibitions on reprisals in Articles 51-56 are
not.992 Were evidence located as to unilateral undertakings to abide by the reprisal
prohibitions in Articles 51-56 of Protocol I, the issue would still remain as to the
animus behind those undertakings. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the
Court found in relation to States which were not party to the 1958 Continental Shelf
Convention, yet which nevertheless applied the equidistance principle, that the basis
of their compliance in practice with Article 6 of the Convention "must remain
entirely speculative" and that there was '"not a shred of evidence" that they believed
themselves to be applying a mandatory rule of international law"99. The de facto
application of humanitarian law rules on policy grounds, for e.g. the desire for
uniform or near-uniform rules of engagement in multi-State operations, would not
tend towards the generation of customary norms on this approach.
d. Restraint as State Practice
Evidence of practice in relation to prohibitive rules (such as prohibitions on reprisals)
can also be located in the non-employment of the prohibited conduct. But there is an
issue of sufficiency of evidence here. If States, within their military manuals, and
through their public pronouncements, continue to maintain a right to engage certain
reprisals, but in their operational conduct do not in fact do so, the evidence of State
practice could at best be described as ambiguous. But even if there can be shown to
be, in effect, a usage in place whereby States refrain from engaging certain (or all)
reprisals, the question would still be whether that usage is backed up by opinio juris.
991 See US Field Manual No. 27-10, par. 41; US Dept. of Defence, Instruction 5500.15, Review of
Legality of Weapons under International Law, 16 October 1974.
992 See Greenwood (1991), p. 103.
North Sea Continental ShelfCases (Federal Republic ofGermany v Denmark) (Federal Republic
ofGermany vNetherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, par. 76.
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If such a usage exists merely due to the absence of conflict, or because it is felt that
the conditions that would warrant reprisals against civilians are extreme and have not
presented themselves (perhaps even over a period of decades), then there is no basis
for asserting the existence of a customary rule to the effect that reprisals against
civilians or civilian objects are impermissible. In the course of the Lotus case France
argued that an absence of State prosecutions in relation to collisions on the High Seas
- except by the flag State of the ship aboard which the wrongful act occurred -
indicated the existence of a customary rule prohibiting the initiation of prosecutions
by non-flag States. The PCIJ rejected the argument on the basis that there was no
evidence that any such restraint was grounded in States being conscious of having a
duty to abstain.994 The United States Department of Defense review and analysis of
Protocols I and II indicated that although it would be unlikely that the United States
would ever have resort to reprisals against civilian populations except in the context
of nuclear warfare, nevertheless the United States '"might want to preserve the right
of reprisals in some types of widespread conventional warfare."995 In the context of
the law of armed conflict, it would be a particularly perverse result if a State was
forced into employing each and every weapon and method of warfare in its arsenal at
regular intervals in order to maintain their continued legality.99'' Customary law does
not recognise a doctrine of desuetude, except where the absence of a particular usage
can be shown assertively to be grounded in opinio juris as to the illegality of that
997
usage.
e. Treaty Practice as State Practice?
5.5. Lotus (France v Turkey). 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 10. p. 28.
United States Department of Defense Law of War Working Group Review and Analysis of
Protocols I and II Adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on International Humanitarian Law 1-51-9
(1987), discussed in Parks (1990). p. 95, n. 297.
Waxman notes in another context: "Somewhat perversely, an argument that the consistent U.S.
practice of using only precision-guided munitions (PGMs) against urban targets generates a legal
norm despite U.S. protestations to the contrary might in theory create incentives for the
United States to deviate from its practice in order to manifest dissent." (M.C. Waxman, International
Law and the Politics ofUrban Air Operations, MR-1175-AF, 2000, Ch. 2, p. 14, n. 30, available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MRl 175/MR1175.chap2.pdf).
w
On this point, see R. Higgins, Problems & Process: International Law and How We Use It,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 19-22. Higgins states, for e.g.. that "'an existing [customary] norm
does not die without the great majority of states engaging in both a contrary practice and withdrawing
their opinio juris." (p. 22).
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It will be recalled that the ICJ, in the North Sea Continental ShelfCases, attempted to
determine whether Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf had
generated a parallel customary law "partly because of its own impact, partly on the
basis of subsequent State practice."998 Although the Court did not elaborate upon the
notion of a conventional provision generating custom as a result of "its own impact"
(as opposed to subsequent State practice) it may be that the Court had in mind some
notion of treaty-practice as State practice. The Court stated, in addition to the
requirement that the treaty rule be of a fundamentally norm-creating character, that:
it might be that even without the passage of any considerable period of
time, a very widespread and representative participation in the convention
might suffice of itself [to generate a "general rule of international law'"],
provided it included that of States whose interests were specially
affected.999
It is difficult to reconcile this passage with the rest of the Court's judgment. The
practice of States acting in accordance with their treaty obligations was viewed as
irrelevant to the formation of customary law:1000 States bound by treaties would tend
to locate the basis of their obligation in the treaty itself (and the principle pacta sunt
servanda) rather than in any belief that a parallel norm to that in the treaty was also
binding as a matter of general international law (i.e. opinio juris). The London
Statement of Principles attempts to explain the ICJ's reasoning by stating that it may
be possible, in exceptional cases, for a multilateral treaty to create customary law "of
its own impact" if it is widely adopted and if it is clear that by adopting the treaty the
States specifically intended to create customary law.1001 As the Commentary to the
Statement explains:
the consent of States to a rule of customary law, whilst not a necessary
condition of their being bound, is a sufficient condition. In other words, if
States indicate by any means that they intend to be bound as a matter of
customary law, being bound will be the consequence, so long as their
intention is clear. They can evince that intention by a public statement, for
instance. That being so, there is no a priori reason why they cannot
instead evince it through, in conjunction with, or subsequent to the
998
[19691 ICJ Rep. 3, par. 70.
999 r , -T-,Id., par. 73.
1 (KKi r i IdIdpar. 76.
"I"' See London Statement of Principles, Section 27, p. 50.
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conclusion of a treaty, provided that it is their clear intention to accept
more than a merely conventional norm}002
In that sense, the process of entering into a treaty is neither to be viewed as State
practice, nor as opinio juris-, rather, in certain exceptional cases, it may (or so it is
argued) stand as evidence of a consent to be bound by a rule of general international
law. Consent differs here from opinio juris in that consent corresponds to a will to be
bound as opposed to a belief that one is already bound.100. Yet it is difficult to see
how the consent of a certain pool of States to be bound by a rule of law is
constitutive of that rule as general law in the absence of State practice and opinio
juris. Perhaps that is why the Court stated that a treaty may give rise to customary
law "partly because of its own impact, partly on the basis of subsequent State
practice":1004 Whatever the juridical status of a treaty's "own impact" on general
international law - i.e. whether as consent, State practice, or opinio juris - State
practice by non-parties in relation to specific treaty provisions was viewed as
necessary to convert those provisions into general international law. Ultimately,
however, the potential for a treaty to create customary law "of its own impact" was
dealt with cursorily by the Court. It was dismissed in the context of the particular
case on the basis that the number of ratifications and accessions to the Convention
was "respectable" though "hardly sufficient".1002 In the context of Protocol I, it has
already been noted that there are 162 parties: considerable, though not quite the near-
universality of the 192 parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (following the
Marshall Islands" accession on 1 June 2004).1006 Nevertheless, the fact that a number
of major military powers have neither ratified nor acceded to Protocol I indicates that
the Protocol could not have resulted in the generation of customary law "of its own
impact"'.
11X12 London Statement of Principles, Section 27, Commentary, pp. 51-2, par. (b) (emphasis in
original).
101)2 London Statement of Principles, Section 18, Commentary, p. 38, par. (a).
11X14
[1969] ICJ Rep. 3, par. 70.
1005 Id., par. 73.
1"1)'' List of States Parties available at www.icrc.org.
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2. Beyond The North SeaContinental Shelf Cases
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases adopted a conservative approach to the
determination of the customary status of treaty provisions which were innovative (or
only emerging) at the time of their promulgation. The practice, particularly in more
recent times, of international courts and tribunals appears to indicate a more flexible
approach to the ascertainment of customary rules. This practice can be seen in
relation to the full spectrum of international law rules, but is most marked in relation
to those appearing in humanitarian law treaties. As Higgins asked:
Applying the same tests that it enunciated in the Continental Shelf Cases
to the question of genocide, would the Court have determined that there
were relatively few ratifying parties to the Genocide Convention, that
they did not include most of the potential butchers, and that the basis of
the practice of most states in not committing genocide has to remain
'entirely speculative'?1007
Her answer was that "[t]he character of the alleged emerging norm seems important
in the analysis."1008 It may be, particularly in light of the "purely humanitarian and
civilizing purpose"1009 of Protocol I, that a great number of its provisions, including
those prohibiting reprisals, will come to be accepted as reflecting the current state of
customary law despite an absence of clear and extensive practice in their favour.
Numerous examples can be cited of international courts and tribunals applying lesser
standards of proof in the determination of the customary status of humanitarian treaty
provisions than those set out in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. In the Trial of
the Major War Criminals, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held,
without any systematic analysis, that the Hague Regulations of 1907 had entered
customary law by 1939.1010 In United States v von Leeb (the High Command Case),
the U.S. Military Tribunal accepted that many of the provisions of the Geneva
"""
Higgins (1994), p. 31.
am
G. Abi-Saab, "The 1977 Additional Protocols and General International Law: Some Preliminary
Reflexions", in A.J.M. Delissen and G.J. Tanja, Humanitarian Law ofArmed Conflict: Essays in
Honour ofFrits Kalshoven, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991, p. 121 (borrowing from the
language used by the ICJ in Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime ofGenocide (Advisory Opinion) [1951] ICJ Rep. 16, p. 23).
""" Trial of the Major War Criminals, Cmd. 6964, Misc. No. 12, p. 65 (1946); Greenwood (1991), p.
98; T. Meron, "The Continuing Role ofCustom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law",
(1996) 90 American Journal of International Law 238, p. 239.
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Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 had entered into customary law by the same
date, once again without systematic analysis.10" In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ
accepted that common Articles 1 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 had
entered customary law, yet again without any real examination of State practice.101"
Meron states that in each of these cases (as well as in Prosecutor v Tadic, discussed
directly below) the courts looked primarily to opinio juris rather than State practice
in reaching their conclusions.10"'
The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadic decision on jurisdiction found
that the "core" of Protocol II has become part of customary international law.1014 The
Appeals Chamber stated that many provisions of Protocol II "can now be regarded as
declaratory of existing rules or as having crystallised emerging rules of customary
law or else as having been strongly instrumental in their evolution as general
principles."10" The evidentiary basis for this conclusion rested largely on (1) a
pronouncement made by the government of El Salvador to the effect that although
Protocol II did not apply as such to El Salvador's civil war, the government would
nevertheless comply with its provisions on the basis that it merely "developed and
supplemented" common Article 3 which was in turn of universal application;1016 and
(2) a statement by the Deputy Legal Adviser to the United States State Department,
made in his official capacity, to the effect that "the basic core" of Protocol II is
reflected in common article 3 and is therefore a part of generally accepted customary
law.1017 The Appeals Chamber's conclusion in this respect was obiter and that may
excuse the sparseness of the evidence cited, but the specific conclusion as to Protocol
II was merely part of a broader conclusion concerning the application of the laws of
armed conflict to "internal" conflicts as a matter of customary law, a conclusion
which was essential to the finding that the ICTY had subject-matter jurisdiction over
1011 (1948) 11 TWC 462, pp. 533-535; Greenwood (1991), p. 98; Meron (1996), p. 239.
1012 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US)
(Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14. pars 218-220; Greenwood (1991), p. 98; Meron (1996). p. 239.
1013 Meron (1996), p. 239. Whether the sparse evidence cited in the various cases indicates a
legal opinion as such is, however, open to question (see, e.g., I.G. Corey, "The Fine Line
between Policy and Custom: Prosecutor v Tadic and the Customary International Law of
Armed Conflict", (2000) 166 Military Law Review 145, pp. 154-5).
""J Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1/AR72, Appeals Chamber. Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, par. 98.




the acts alleged against Tadic under Article 3 of its Statute regardless of whether they
occurred in the context of an internal or international armed conflict.10llS
Nevertheless, even in relation to the broader proposition, the evidence cited was
limited in nature; it included statements and protests by governments,1019 and
insurgents,1020 declarations of international organisations,1021 and military manuals
• 10??
and instructions, ~ but the only examples of "physical" State practice in the
classical sense (i.e. evidence of what States actually do, as opposed to what they say)
cited by the Appeals Chamber were the conduct of hostilities in the Spanish Civil
War,102"' and the enforcement by Nigeria of its military Code against its own officers
in the context of its military operations against Biafran rebels (including the
execution by firing squad of those officers).1024
Any departure from the type of rigorous analysis of the customary
status of rules as mandated in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases must be
supported upon some doctrinal basis. Otherwise, the principle of legality is infringed,
and this has particularly serious implications in the context of international criminal
law which is grounded, inter alia, in the principle nullum crimen sine lege.102' Thus,
it is insufficient to argue that some multilateral treaties operate as "quasi-
international legislation" on the basis that this is "dictated by the necessity of solving
global problems";1026 or to put the following form of argument flagged as a possible
process of reasoning in relation to the customary status of Protocol I and II by Abi-
Saab:
Even where there is a normative increment, i.e., where the Protocols
introduce new law, we have to keep in mind that they belong to a special
category of treaties, the law-making multilateral conventions (trades-
lois), and more particularly and significantly to a sub-species of this
category which has, to use the language of the ICJ, 'a purely humanitarian
and civilizing purpose'.
1018 See id., par. 137.
1019 See id., pars 100, 105, & 121-123.
1020 See id., par. 107.
1021 See id., pars. 101, 110-115 & 119-120.
1022 See id., pars 102, 106 & 118.
1023 See id., par. 100. Even here, no concrete evidence was cited, although its existence was adverted
to.
1024 See id., par. 106.
102:1 See above.
")2h G. Tunkin, "Is General International Law Customary Law Only?", (1993) 4 European Journal of
International law 534, part III (available at http://www.eiil.org/iournaEVol4/No4/art4.html).
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This explains their special technical and substantive characteristics
(e.g., the absolute and erga omnes character of their obligations); but
above all it makes for their universal vocation and explains the general
tendency to consider them as having a particular propensity to
'generalize', i.e., to pass into general international law, and to view this
contingency as a normal stage or the normal outcome of their
development. It has sometimes been suggested - on the basis of the
findings of the post-war International Military Tribunals - that there is a
presumption to that effect, whether rebuttable (Tokyo) or irrebuttable
(Nuremberg)."127
Typically, to say that something is '"law-making" is to assert a legal fact; i.e. that the
norm was constructed in a manner recognised as formally conferring the status of
law upon that norm. But that cannot be the sense in which Abi-Saab means it here,
for treaties are not recognised, formally, as creating general law.1()2's He seems to be
asserting, therefore, something else; perhaps something about the expectations of
those who promulgated the treaty. In fact, there is something highly circular in the
argument, for he is intending to show why a treaty creates general law, and he begins
this illustration by telling us that first we have to keep in mind that the Protocols are
"law-making multilateral conventions"! Surely he's not suggesting that a treaty
creates general law whenever the parties to a treaty expect that result. This is to claim
the treaty as a legislative platform; a claim which has no basis in international law.
Perhaps in light of the radical (and groundless) nature of the assertion, he chooses to
narrow the claim, arguing that the Protocols belong not simply to the category of
"law-making multilateral conventions", but "more particularly and significantly to a
102 ' Abi-Saab (1991), p. 121. For a strong critique of the tendency to view treaty norms as having
easily ascended to the status of customary law, see P. Weil, "Towards Relative Normativity in
International Law?", (1983) 77 American Journal ofInternational Law 413, especially pp. 434-439.
102s See, however, Lauterpacht who appears to have suggested that "universal" or "general"
international law can be created through multilateral treaties even in the absence of universal
participation in those treaties (H. Lauterpacht. Oppenheim's International Law, 8th ed., David McKay
Co., New York, 1955, vol. I, p. 28). This is contrary to the orthodox position as evinced by Kelsen
when he noted that as no treaty is adhered to by every State in the world without exception, there is no
such thing as "general" conventional law, only "general" customary law (H. Kelsen, Principles of
International Law, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, NY, 1952, p. 188). See, also, the opposition of the U.S.
and the U.K. to the ILC's use of the term "general multilateral treaties" during the ILC's drafting of
articles on the law of treaties. The final draft contained no reference to the term (see G. Tunkin,
Theory of International Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1974, pp. 137-142). Whilst
the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case did make reference to "international instruments of a universal
or quasi-universal character" (1970 ICJ Rep. 3, p. 32), Weil has stated that it is by no means certain
that such dicta bear the expansive construction sometimes placed on them (Weil (1983), p. 435). The
history of international law, particularly in the nineteenth century, nevertheless indicates that
multilateral treaties between a relatively small number of "Great Powers" were often treated as
generating general international law (Cassese (1984), pp. 115-117). This approach is of course long
obsolete.
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sub-species of this category which has, to use the language ol the ICJ, "a purely
humanitarian and civilizing purpose'". So the argument becomes: Whenever you
have a treaty which the parties expect to enter into general law, and which has a
humanitarian and civilizing purpose, then that treaty enters into customary law.
There are, however, a number of possible grounds which could be
asserted for lowering the evidentiary threshold in terms of the ascertainment of
custom in relation to humanitarian law rules, without radically distorting the formal
sources of international law or contravening the requirements of legality:
a. Lack ofAlternative Evidence
The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tcidic decision on jurisdiction appears to have
suggested that the process of determining the customary status of the rules and
principles of the law of armed conflict is sui generis in that the elements of custom
may more readily be evinced by official statements and documents than is the case
for other rules of international law. According to the Appeals Chamber:
When attempting to ascertain State practice with a view to establishing
the existence of a customary rule or a general principle, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to pinpoint the actual behaviour of the troops in the field
for the purpose of establishing whether they in fact comply with, or
disregard, certain standards of behaviour. This examination is rendered
extremely difficult by the fact that not only is access to the theatre of
military operations normally refused to independent observers (often even
to the ICRC) but information on the actual conduct of hostilities is
withheld by the parties to the conflict; what is worse, often recourse is
had to misinformation with a view to misleading the enemy as well as
public opinion and foreign Governments. In appraising the formation of
customary rules or general principles one should therefore be aware that,
on account of the inherent nature of this subject-matter, reliance must
primarily be placed on such elements as official pronouncements of
States, military manuals and judicial decisions.ll)2l>
1029 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1/AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, par. 99. The position adopted here
appears somewhat similar to Kirgis' position that evidence of State practice and opinio juris are
largely interchangeable. Kirgis argued that evidence of State practice and opinio juris may be assessed
on a "sliding scale" whereby "very frequent, consistent state practice establishes a customary rule
without much (or any) affirmative showing of an opinio juris so long as it is not negated by evidence
of non-normative intent. As the frequency and consistency of the practice decline in any series of
cases, a stronger showing of an opinio juris is required. At the other end of the scale a clearly
demonstrated opinio juris establishes a customary rule without much (or any) affirmative showing that
governments are consistently behaving in accordance with the asserted rule." (F.L. Kirgis, Jr.,
"Custom on a Sliding Scale", (1987) 81 American Journal ofInternational Law 146). Meron asks,
however, whether the Appeals Chamber in Tadic decision on jurisdiction could not have made a
222
Naturally, if evidence of operational or other physical practice exists then it is
probably fair to assert that the evidentiary value of that practice should be accorded
primacy or at least sufficient weighting depending on the quality of that evidence.10'"0
The practice of the ICTY, however, appears only partly consistent with this caveat.
For example, in relation to the assessment of whether the violation of certain rules
gives rise to individual criminal responsibility under customary law, physical
practice in the form of national prosecutions and punishment has been examined,1031
but only cursorily, with far greater emphasis being placed on official statements and
•••• ...1099
documents including military manuals and domestic legislation. " Looking to
official pronouncements or documents in order to pinpoint State practice is, however,
unlikely to lead to the conclusion that any of the Protocol I prohibitions on reprisals
have entered customary law. The military manuals of non-party States do not appear
to have adopted the Protocol's aversion to reprisal measures, and the international
community speaking through fora such as the United Nations General Assembly
does not appear to have clearly spelled out the position that the full spectrum of
reprisal prohibitions in protocol I is reflective of customary law.
b. Treaty Practice as State Practice
greater effort to identity "actual state practice". He notes that without some significant discussion of
operational practice governments may not be puruaded by the Tribunal's propouncements on the
substance of customary law (Meron, 1996, p. 240).
See, however, Baxter's argument that: "The actual conduct of States in their relations with other
nations is only a subsidiary means whereby the rules which guide the conduct of States are
ascertained. The firm statement by the State of what it considers to be the rule is far better evidence of
its position than what can be pieced together from the actions of that country at different times and in
a variety of contexts." (R. Baxter, "Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International
Law", (1965-6) 41 British Yearbook ofInternational Law 275, p. 300); see, also, Cheng, who viewed
opinio juris, rather than State practice, as constitutive of customary law. State practice was significant
only as evidence of opinio juris (B. Cheng, "Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a
Divided World", in McDonald & Johnston (eds.), The Structure & Process of International Law,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1983, p. 515; Cheng (1965)).
1031
See, e.g., Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence
Motion on the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 10 August 1995, par. 68; see, also, Prosecutor v Dusko
Tadic, Case No. 1T-94-1/AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, par. 130.
"b~ See Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion
on the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 10 August 1995, par. 68.
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Greenwood has suggested that the ease with which international courts and tribunals
have moved towards the recognition of treaty rules as custom suggests a refinement
to the test set out in the North Sea Continental ShelfCases, such that the adoption of
the treaty text itself may be viewed as an important piece of State practice.10'''
Although the ICJ in that case recognised the possibility of a treaty entering
customary law partly "of its own impact", it remains uncertain precisely what the
Court had in mind by that phraseology.1034 If Greenwood is correct, then judicial
practice has moved towards a more flexible calculus of State practice whereby the
practice of non-party States and the practice of party States may be considered
cumulatively.103:1 Greenwood warns, however, that:
If abused, this approach runs the risk of obliterating the distinction
between conventional and customary law and of ignoring the often
delicate "package deal' nature of treaty negotiations. Nevertheless, it is
suggested that it is acceptable - and is, indeed, applied in practice - in
cases where the treaty provision concerned commands general acceptance
(amongst the international community as a whole) not merely as part of a
treaty package but as the statement of a rule of general application.1016
The approach is therefore no substitute for ascertaining the existence of widespread
support for the rule in question, and the fact still remains that a number of significant
military powers have not only refrained from embracing the reprisal prohibitions in
Protocol I, but have, in some cases, actively displayed their opposition to those
prohibitions.
c. Treaty Law as Clarification ofPre-Existing Custom
An alternative approach is to view, where applicable, subsequent treaty provisions as
merely applying and clarifying pre-existing customary law. Greenwood has stated
that treaty law provisions may more easily enter custom where they are merely "a
detailed application of a more general principle which is already well established in
1011 Greenwood (1991), p. 99.
11)14 See above.
This was the position taken by Judge Lachs in his Dissenting Opinion in the North Sea
Continental ShelfCases (Federal Republic ofGermany v Denmark) (Federal Republic ofGermany v
Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, p. 228.
1016 Greenwood (1991), p. 99.
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customary law".1037 Baxter noted that this trend was particularly prevalent in the
context of humanitarian law treaties where:
each new wave of such treaties builds upon the past conventions, so that
each detailed rule of the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War
Victims is nothing more than an implementation of a more general
standard already laid down in an earlier convention, such as the
Regulations annexed to Convention No. IV of The Hague.1038
These observations are confirmed by the practice of the ICTY, for e.g. in relation to
Article 75 of Protocol I or the '"core" of Protocol II, both of which were accepted as
having entered into custom on the basis that they were merely an elaboration on
Common Article 3.1039 There is nothing wrong with this approach, in principle, given
that the new provisions are merely viewed as clarifications which are accepted by a
large number of States. As the approach taken is not that a new rule is come into
being, but rather that an old rule is being interpreted, the standard of proof is
presumably lower. Could it be argued that the prohibitions on reprisals in Protocol I
are merely detailed applications of more general proscriptions in customary law?
Abi-Saab has stated that:
the greatest contribution of the Protocols is not in introducing new rules,
but in specifying the meaning and import of the general principles and
provisions of the [Geneva] Conventions - and to a lesser extent the Hague
Regulations - in the conditions of present-day warfare. Most of the
provisions of the Protocols fall into this category.104"
While this may certainly be viewed as true for certain provisions of Protocol I - such
as the requirement to assess the legality of new weapons under Article 36, which
may be argued to be implicit in general international law on the basis that it logically
flows, for e.g., as an application of the principle of good faith, from rules prohibiting
1037 Id., p. 98.
1038 Baxter (1965-6), p. 286. Meron treats Baxter's argument as supporting the proposition that the
repitition of particular terms in subsequent treaties strengthens the claim that those terms are
declaratory of customary law (Meron (1989), pp. 28-29).
1039 See above.
10411 Abi-Saab (1991), p. 119. Abi-Saab's position is that eventually the whole treaty enters customary
law, not just individual provisions: "As time passes and the circle of formal participants widens, the
new updated instrument as a normative whole - and not some of its isolated provisions here and there
- (with the possible exception of those establishing new institutional and procedural arrangements),
ends up structuring expectations and the legal environment as the only standard of reference; whence
opinio juris if you like." (id., p. 122)
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or restricting the use of weapons, - it is less likely to be true for the prohibitions
on reprisals. The reprisal prohibitions, subject to what is stated in the next chapter of
this thesis, do not add meaning or content to a pre-existing nebulous set of norms, but
rather mark a clear and unambiguous departure from prior principles. Rules on the
legal review of new weapons, or precautionary measures to be taken in attack, for
example, can easily fit into the ambit of the hazy standards that existed before. But
with reprisals, the law prior to Protocol I was clear in terms of the permissibility of
reprisals other than those expressly precluded in treaty form; and it was clear that the
reprisal prohibitions in Articles 51-56 marked a definite and purely innovative
departure from pre-existing law.104" There is therefore, subject to what is stated
below, no ambiguity upon which we can "piggyback" the new reprisal prohibitions
into customary law. It is important to contrast, in this context, rules which essentially
reaffirm, but still develop, pre-existing law, by adding precision, detail or
clarification with those rules which are largely innovative.104'1 The prospect for
"piggy-backing" new rules into general law on the basis that they merely apply and
clarify pre-existing customary law is limited to the former class of new rules and
does not extend to the latter.
3. Conclusion as to Customary Status of Reprisal Prohibitions
There would appear to be only the most limited basis upon which the reprisal
prohibitions in Protocol I, to the extent that they add to those prohibitions found in
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, could be asserted to have entered customary law.
The prohibitions were widely viewed as innovative at the time of their promulgation,
and since that time no significant body of practice has emerged (outside of
compliance with treaty requirements) that would indicate that reprisals no longer
form a part of the methods of armed conflict. The right to reprisals is maintained in
UMI See Cassese (1984), p. 77. Another example is Article 57 of Protocol i requiring precautionary
measures to be taken in the context of any attack. Cassese states that this Article is based on
obligations arising under customary law, but that Article 57 "greatly develops [customary law] by
clarifying and spelling out aspects of existing regulations that were obscure or controversial; it also
gives precision to loose legal provisions." (id, p. 95)
'i)J2 See Cassese (1984), pp. 88-94.
1114' Casses (1984), p. 113. Cassese identified a third class of rules; namely those that merely re-state
and codify customary law (id.)
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military manuals,1044 and the prohibition on reprisals in Protocol I has been the
subject of recent reservations.1045 Thus even if we have moved to a position where
the elements of customary law are more readily evinced by official statements and
documents than the conduct of hostilities in the field, it would be exceedingly
difficult to conclude that those elements are made out in relation to the reprisal
prohibitions in Protocol I. Similarly, the fact that there are an appreciable number of
significant military powers which have either refrained from ratifying or acceding to
Protocol I or reserved the right of reprisals in the context of their obligations under
the Protocol, would suggest that even if we could treat practice pursuant to a treaty as
State practice for the purpose of ascertaining customary law, that practice is
insufficient in relation to the reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I. The ICTY Trial
Chamber in Kupreskic therefore appears to concede that the reprisal prohibitions in
Protocol I are not backed up by State practice for the purpose of positing their entry
into customary law:
As for reprisals against civilians, under customary international law they
are prohibited as long as civilians find themselves in the hands of the
adversary . With regard to civilians in combat zones, reprisals against
them are prohibited by Article 51(6) of the First Additional Protocol of
1977, whereas reprisals against civilian objects are outlawed by Article
52(1) of the same instrument. The question nevertheless arises as to
whether these provisions, assuming that they were not declaratory of
customary international law, have subsequently been transformed into
general rules of international law. In other words, are those States which
have not ratified the First Protocol (which include such countries as the
U.S., France, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Pakistan and Turkey),
nevertheless bound by general rules having the same purport as those two
provisions? Admittedly, there does not seem to have emerged recently a
body of State practice consistently supporting the proposition that one of
the elements of custom, namely usus or diaturnitas has taken shape. "'J''
The Trial Chamber nevertheless suggests (in obiter) that the reprisal prohibitions in
Protocol I may have entered general international law by virtue of the Martens clause
and the principles of humanity.1047 Whether the Martens clause or principles of
in44 See above.
1045 See above.
1046 Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan
Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, par.
527. It should be noted that France and Japan are now Parties to Protocol I, although France has
submitted a reservation in relation to the reprisal prohibitions.
11)47 See id., par. 527//.
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humanity can properly be asserted as a basis of obligations in the context of
international criminal law is addressed in the next chapter.
In relation to the reprisal prohibitions introduced in accordance with the
Conventional Weapons Convention, there is clearly insufficient evidence of opinio
juris or State practice to conclude that those prohibitions have entered customary
law.
4. PersistentObjector Rule and Jus Cogens
In the event that the prohibitions on reprisals in Protocol I have entered customary
international law, it could be asserted by some States not party to Protocol 1 that
those prohibitions are non-opposable to the States in question on the basis that those
States have consistently objected to the emergence and crystallisation of the
prohibitions as customary law.1048 There is, however, some argument that the
"persistent objector rule" has never attained the status of an extant rule of
international law;1049 this proceeds partly on the basis that the ICRs jurisprudence on
the matter is in fact obiter dicta.l0>° h certainly remains to be seen whether the rule
will come to be accepted in the context of humanitarian law norms, particularly
where those norms come to attain the status of jus cogens.x0>^ There must, however,
be considerable doubt as to whether the reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I could be
viewed as attaining the status of jus cogens (even if it were accepted that they had
entered customary law). Given that a number of significant military powers openly
maintain a continued (theoretical) right to engage in reprisals,10 " it is difficult to see
how any one of the reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I could be viewd as a "norm
",4S SeeAnglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (UK v Norway) [1951] ICJ Rep 116, p. 131; Asylum Case
(Columbia v Peru) [1950] ICJ Rep 266, pp. 277-8; see also Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v France)
[1974] ICJ Rep. 253, pp. 286-93 (Separate Opinion of Judge Gross); I. Brownlie, Principles ofPublic
International Law, 5Ih ed„ Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 10; R.Y. Jennings and A.D.
Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed., Longman, London, 1992, vol. 1, p. 29; G. Tunkin,
Theory of International Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 1974, p. 130.
1049 See J.I. Charney, "The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development ofCustomary International
Law", (1985) 56 British Yearbook ofInternational Law 1; T.L. Stein, "The Approach of the Different
Drummer; The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law", (1985) 26 Harvard
International Law Journal 457.
ltb<) See especially Charney (1985). This argument has been challenged (see, e.g., M.H. Mendelson,
"The Formation ofCustomary International Law", (1998) 272 Recueil des Cours 155, pp. 227ff.)
1051 See M. Bos, A Methodology of International Law, T.M.C. Asser, Amsterdam, 1984, pp. 247-255.
llb2 See above.
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accepted and recognized by the international community as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted".10:0 The situation of reprisals is therefore entirely
different to that of genocide or torture. While torture, for e.g., may be routinely
practiced by a number of States,1054 Higgins notes that the prohibition on torture
retains its quality as customary law (and the same observation may be made in
relation to its quality as jus cogens)IOro on the basis that not a single torturing State
publicly asserts its right to engage in torture.10M> Higgins' point is that despite
violations of international law by torturing States, there is neither sufficient State
practice nor opinio juris to posit a new and contrary customary law that permits
torture.1057 The right to engage in reprisals, however, is publicly advocated, including
through military manuals and reservations to Protocol I.ICbS Therefore it would not
appear open to form the conclusion that the prohibitions on reprisals in Protocol I
have attained the status of jus cogens, even if it were conceded that they are binding
as a matter of customary law.
Art. 53, Vienna Convention (definition of "peremptory norm" (jus cogens)).
105^ See Higgins (1994), p. 22.
For the conclusion that the prohibition on torture is a norm of jus cogens, see, e.g.. Prosecutor v
Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazint Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber,
Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 454.
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additional bases of the
illegality of reprisals
i. INTRODUCTION
As suggested above, there is little basis for asserting the general applicability of the
prohibitions on reprisals in Protocol I, and even less for prohibitions beyond that
(such as those located within the framework of the Conventional Weapons
Convention). Nevertheless, the question was flagged above as to whether we can
'"piggy-back" a prohibition on reprisals (whether generally, or in relation to certain
classes of reprisals such as those prohibited in Protocol I) onto other nebulous rules
or principles of international law.
ii. THE PROHIBITION ON COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT
One potential means of positing the outlawry of reprisals against persons and
property protected under the terms of the Hague Regulations, the Geneva
Conventions or the additional Protocols is to raise the prohibition on collective
punishment. The prohibition appears in Article 50 of the Hague Regulations which
provides that "[n]o general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon
the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be
regarded as jointly and severally responsible."1059 Article 33 of Geneva Convention
IV provides that '"[cjollective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or
Art. 50, Hague Regulations of 1907.
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of terrorism are prohibited";1060 and Article 75 of Protocol I and Article 4 of Protocol
II both provide that "collective punishments" are prohibited "at any time and in any
place whatsoever".1061 The ICRC's Commentary on Protocol II asserts that the
concept of "collective punishments" should be understood in its widest sense, and
extends to any kind of "sanction".1062 The Commentary concludes that "to include
the prohibition on collective punishments amongst the acts unconditionally
prohibited by Article 4 is virtually equivalent to prohibiting 'reprisals' against
protected persons."1063 The difficulty with this conclusion, however, is that reprisals
are an exception to treaty-based and customary norms in force. Thus, assuming that
acts amounting to "reprisals" could be described as acts of "collective
punishment",1064 it would need to be shown that the prohibition on collective
punishment was not itself subject to exception in the case of reprisals. The basis of
the conclusion in the Commentary on Protocol II would appear to rest in part on the
fact that Protocol II (as with Protocol I) expressly prohibits collective punishment "at
any time and in any place whatsoever". Presumably, these words were viewed as
sufficient to oust the possibility of any exception to the prohibition (including the
case of reprisals). Each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, as well as Protocol
I, provides that the terms of the treaty are to be respected "in all circumstances" (no
such provision appears in Protocol II).1062 There must be some considerable doubt as
to whether a long-established exception such as reprisals could be ousted without a
provision expressly and directly providing for such ouster (such as those appearing in
Articles 51-56 of Protocol I).1066 Nevertheless, whether general terms providing for
treaty provisions to be respected in all circumstances, or in any time and place
whatsoever, are sufficient to oust the exception of reprisals is addressed below. The
'
Art. 33, Geneva Convention IV.
1061 Art. 75(2)(d), Protocol I; Art. 4(2)(b), Protocol II.
"",2 Sandoz et al. (1987). par. 4536.
11,63 W.
11164
Reprisals, stricto sensu, are those carried out for the specific purpose of coercing compliance with
the law and any reprisal carried out, instead, for the purpose of "punishment", loses, ipso juris, its
justification as a reprisal (see above). Thus, "collective punishments" and "reprisals" may, strictly
speaking, relate to mutually exclusive acts. Of course, if, as asserted in the ICRC's Commentary on
Protocol II (Sandoz et al. (1987)), the term "collective punishments" is to be construed expansively
and includes any form of "sanction" then collective punishments and reprisals may overlap or be
entirely co-extensive.
"",;i Art. 1, Geneva Conventions I-IV; Art. 1(1), Protocol I.
1066 Arts. 51-56, Protocol I.
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question addressed here is whether the prohibition on collective punishment, in and
of itself, operates to preclude reprisals as a defence at least in relation to persons and
property protected against collective punishment.
As indicated above, the Oxford Manual explicitly recognised reprisals as
an "exception" to the prohibition on collective punishment.1067 It appears that the
prohibition on collective punishment in the Hague Regulations was enacted without
prejudice to the question of reprisals.1068 While a number of decisions of the post-
World War II military tribunals impugned "reprisal" attacks on the basis that they
failed to comply with the prohibition on collective punishment in Article 50 of the
Hague Regulations,1069 (as well as Article 46, which provides, inter alia, that the
lives of persons and private property in occupied territory must be respected),1070
nevertheless these decisions do not confirm or establish that the prohibition on
collective punishment ousts, or in any way restricts, the right to engage reprisals. In
In re Wintgen1071 the accused was a member of the German Security Police during
the occupation of Holland who, under orders, set fire to a number of houses near
Amsterdam as a reprisal for acts of sabotage committed by unknown persons on a
near-by railway line. He was convicted by the Special Criminal Court in Amsterdam
and appealed to the Court of Cassation. The Court of Cassation upheld the lower
court's conviction on the grounds that the arson constituted, inter alia, a violation of
the prohibition on collective punishment under Article 50 of the Hague Regulations.
The Court stated that it was no defence that provisions exist in military manuals
permitting reprisals, including the burning of villages and houses (as provided, for
e.g., in the U.S. Basic Field Manual at paragraph 356E).10'2 The Court found that,
""[i]n order to be permissible under the laws of war, such a provision may not extend
beyond the limits defined in Article 50 of the Hague Regulations of 1907".1073
Similarly, in In re Fullriede,1074 the accused ordered the deportation of




See, e.g.. In re Wintgen (1949) 16 AD 484; In re Fullriede (1949) 16 AD 548.
111 " Art. 46. Hague Regulations of 1907. See, e.g., In re "Silbertanne" Murders (1946) 13 AD 397; In
re von Lewinski (1949) 16 AD 509; see, also, In re Heinemann (1946) 13 AD 395.
1071 In re Wintgen (1949) 16 AD 484.
1072 Id., p. 484.
1072 Id.
1074
In re Fullriede (1949) 16 AD 548.
232
part of the village as a reprisal for an attack by Dutch citizens on a car containing
four German officers and soldiers. The Special Criminal Court at Arnhem accepted,
in principle, the admissibility of a plea of reprisals against innocent persons for acts
committed by their fellow citizens, but rejected the plea in the circumstances of the
case on the basis, inter alia, of the lack of proportionality. On appeal, the Special
Court of Cassation found (in the words of the law reporter) that:
As to the reasoning of the Court below regarding the permissibility of
reprisals against the innocent for acts of violence committed by their
fellow citizens, the Court completely rejected it on the grounds fully set
out in the leading case of Ranter, where such reprisals were held to be
contrary to the rules of war, in particular to the principle underlying
Article 50 of the Hague Regulations as to proportionality."1 °
The case there cited (namely that of In re Ranter) clarifies, however, that neither
Article 50 of the Hague Regulations, nor Article 46, in any way limits the right to
take reprisals stricto sensu. Those authorities that impugned certain "reprisal"
measures on the basis that they did not conform with the requirements in Article 50
of the Hague Regulations107'1 may be explained on the basis that they did not involve
reprisals stricto sensu. In re Ranter concerned, in part, the so-called "Silbertanne"
murders which were carried out by members of the Netherlands S.S. against innocent
members of the population in purported reprisal for attacks by the Dutch resistance.
The Special Criminal Court at the Hague held that "the shooting of innocent persons
by way of reprisals was contrary to Articles 46 and 50" of the Hague Regulations.1077
On appeal, the Special Court of Cassation held, in relation to the defence plea of
reprisals, that:
the appellant has not sufficiently distinguished between two types of
cases which must be sharply differentiated. One can only properly speak
of reprisals when a State resorts, by means of its organs, to measures at
variance with international law, on account of the fact that its opponent -
in this case the State with which it is at war - had begun, through one or
more of its organs, to commit acts contrary to international law. The
measures which the appellant describes as "reprisals' bear an entirely
different character. They are in fact retaliatory measures taken in time of
war by the Occupant of enemy territory as retaliation not against unlawful
acts of the State with which he is at war, but against hostile acts of the
population of the territory in question or of individual members thereof,
° In re Fullriede (1949) 16 AD 548, p. 550.
1076
See, e.g.. In re Wintgen (1949) 16 AD 484; In re Fullriede (1949) 16 AD 548.
I()77 In re Ranter (1949) 16 AD 526, p. 531.
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which, in accordance with the rights of occupation, he is not bound to
tolerate.
With regard to the right of the then German Reich to take genuine
reprisals against the population of the Netherlands territory occupied by
it, if the Netherlands could be rightly charged with any previous offence
under international law against the then German State, the latter would be
justified in striking against the population by taking counter-measures.
This is recognised in the official explanation contained in the Rolin
Report of 1899 concerning Article 50 of the Rules of Land Warfare,
which remained unchanged on this point in 1907. In that report it is
expressly stated that the said Article was enacted without prejudice to the
question of reprisals, this being a subject distinct from that of the mesures
de repression covered by the said Article. The objects against which
genuine reprisals can be directed by an injured State on account of an
offence previously committed in violation of international law by another
State, need not be identical with the objects affected by the original
wrong. Accordingly, the genuine reprisals, provided that they are taken
within certain limits and provided that attention is paid to the
requirements of proportionality, can in principle be directed against all
objects which in the given circumstances can be considered for this
purpose, whether these be the land, sea or air forces of the enemy, his
organs, his territory, his merchant navy or property, his subjects wherever
they may be, or their property.
Unlike the genuine reprisals dealt with above, which the Hague Peace
Conference did not wish to prejudice and which they left unsettled, the
'so called reprisals', being retaliatory measures against inhabitants of
occupied territory on account of punishable acts by other inhabitants, are
certainly covered by a rule of law, namely the final part of Article 50 of
the Hague Regulations of 1907. This Article expressly forbids the
imposition of collective penalties, of a financial or other nature, against
the population in the matter of individual acts for which they could not be
considered jointly and severally responsible."1 "s
The jurisprudence arising out of the Second World War therefore appears to confirm
that reprisals stricto sensu (i.e. those preceded, inter alia, by a violation of
international law attributable to the target of the reprisal attack), are not limited or
affected by the prohibition on collective punishment. It would be exceedingly
difficult to assert that the prohibition on collective punishment embodied in the
treaties enacted post-World War II (i.e. in Geneva Convention IV and Protocols I and
II) is of fundamentally different effect to the prohibition on collective punishment in
the earlier instruments and now incorporates an implicit prohibition on reprisals.
There is certainly a facial similarity between the notion of "collective punishment"
and "reprisals" (although of course, they are juridically distinct)1079 - but to assert
that reprisals must be prohibited because collective punishments are is to engage in
an impermissible form of analogical reasoning contrary to the principle nullum
1078 Id.
I C * JSee, e.g., id.
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crimen sine lege 1080 The assertion that reprisals are prohibited by virtue of the
prohibition on collective punishment must be established through juridical reasoning,
yet putting aside isolated opinion (such as that expressed in the Commentary on
Protocol II that the prohibition on collective punishment in Protocol II is "virtually
equivalent'' to a prohibition on reprisals against protected persons)1081 there is no
authority, at least of the status of the decision of an international criminal tribunal,
clearly establishing that the prohibition on collective punishment excludes the
possibility of reprisals.1082
iii. THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITY
A number of authorities cite, as an additional limitation on the taking of reprisals, the
requirement, purportedly derived from customary international law, that reprisals not
violate elementary' considerations or principles of "humanity". It has been noted that
the practical impact of the principles of humanity as an overriding limitation on the
permissibility of reprisals would be substantial if it rendered illegal those reprisal
measures currently falling into lacunae or "loopholes" left by the conventional
prohibitions.1083 The arbitral tribunal in the Naulilaa Incident stated that "[t]he most
recent doctrine [provides that reprisals] are limited by considerations of humanity
and the rules of good faith, applicable in the relations between states."1084 The
Institut de Droit International in its 1934 resolution on recourse to reprisals stated
that reprisals cannot be engaged which are contrary to the laws of humanity or public
conscience (lois de I'humanite et aux exigences de la conscience publique).1085 Both
authorities were specifically concerned with the situation of peace-time reprisals, and
it may well be (in line with the view expressed by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case
that elementary considerations of humanity are more exacting in peace-time than in
war)1086 that the principle expressed by the arbitral tribunal in the Naulilaa Incident
and by the Institut de Droit International cannot be translated across to the context of
1080 See above.
11,81 See above.
1082 See, e.g. Jones & Powles (2003), par. 4.2.523.
1083 Provost (1994), p. 423.
1084 Green (2000), p. 629.
1085 Art. 6(4), (1934) AIDI 692, pp. 708-711, translated in Kalshoven (1971), p. 8..
1086 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep. 1, p. 6.
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belligerent reprisals. Nevertheless, the 1880 Oxford Manual, which was concerned
specifically with the law of armed conflict, provided that belligerent reprisals "must
conform in all cases to the laws of humanity and morality".108' A.P. Higgins, writing
in 1927 in the context of the law of naval warfare stated that "[t]he only limitation on
the right of [reprisals] is the overriding law of humanity; for instance, because state
A sinks the merchant ships of state B, state B does not become entitled to retaliate by
doing the like."1088 In the case of the Cervignano, a decision of an Italian Prize
Court, the Court held that reprisals were permissible in naval warfare provided they
did not violate the "imperious obligations of humanity".1089 According to A.P.
Higgins:
reprisals must not violate the imperious obligations of humanity; and to
this rule Anglo-French reprisals conformed. In no single case did the
application of these principles involve the loss of life to either enemy
noncombatant or neutral, this differing in a striking manner from the
proceedings of their adversary.1"9"
Thus in A.P. Higgins' view, the principle of humanity immunised non-combatants
(but not their property) from reprisal attack. He stated, in the context of the First
World War, that:
Reprisals ordered by the Anglo-French Orders and Decrees were directed
against property and involved the detention and, under the Order in
Council of February 1917, the condemnation of neutral property;
but... [i]n the course of the execution of their Decrees the Central Powers
destroyed no less than 1,716 neutral ships, involving a loss of over 2000
lives...1091
The practice of States in the Second World War, and the decisions of
national military tribunals in the post-World War II war crimes trials, creates a far
more ambiguous picture as to whether reprisals are limited by the principles of
humanity. The United Nations War Crimes Commission stated in its Notes on the
1087 Art. 86(3), Oxford Manual.
1088 A.P. Higgins, "Retaliation in Naval Warfare", (1927) 8 British Yearbook of International Law
129, p. 131.
1089 Fauchille and Basdevant, Jurisprudence Italienne, p. 178, cited in Higgins (1927), p. 140.
1090 A. Higgins (1927), p. 142.
1(191 A. Higgins (1927). p. 141 (emphasis in original). Property belonging to neutrals or other innocents
have long been held to be subject to reprisal measures under the law of naval warfare (see, e.g.. The
Lucy (1809) Edw. 122, 165 ER 1054; The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77; The Stigstad [1919] AC 279: The
Leonora [1919] AC 974).
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Trial of General von Mackensen and General Maelzer before the British Military
Court at Rome,1092 that "[i]t is the opinion of almost all writers on the subject that if
reprisals are inflicted they must be...[i]n accordance with the fundamental principles
of war, e.g., respect for lives of non-combatants or the interest of neutrals.''109"1
Neither the practice of belligerents during the Second World War, nor the war crimes
trials examined by the UNWCC, appear, however, to bear consistency with this
principle. For instance, the UNWCC, after offering the above observation, proceeded
immediately to state, in relation to the specific facts of the case, that "the crime for
which reprisals were being inflicted was committed by non-combatants, so that the
question of sparing non-combatants did not arise as a separate issue."1094 The
accused were jointly charged with committing a war crime by being concerned in the
killing of 335 Italians in the Ardeatine Cave. The facts, as agreed between the
defence and prosecution, were than on 23 March 1944 a bomb exploded amongst a
company of German police officers as they marched through the Via Rasella in
Rome killing 28 immediately, and wounding a number of others, at least four of
whom died later that day. In response. Hitler's Headquarters issued an order to shoot,
within 24 hours, ten Italians for every one German police officer killed. The German
Security Service in Rome carried out the order by herding 335 prisoners into the
Ardeatine Cave the very next day and shooting them in the back at close range. The
prisoners consisted of individuals awaiting execution for partisan activity, but also
others "worthy of death" including a significant number of Jews who were innocent
of any involvement in partisan crimes. There is no indication arising out of the
Military Court's decision that reprisal actions against non-combatants were
considered improper. In fact, the prosecution conceded that it was proper for the
German authorities to carry out reprisals in answer to the partisan attack and that the
German authorities would have been entitled to blow up the houses in the Via
Rasella1095 (although, strictly speaking, this amounts to no more than a concession as
to the propriety of reprisal measures against civilian property as opposed to civilians
themselves).
1092 Trial ofGeneral von Mackensen and General Maelzer (1945) 8 LRTWC 1.
1093 UNWCC, Notes on the Case, Trial ofGeneral von Mackensen and General Maelzer (1945) 8
LRTWC 1, p. 5.
j09* Id.11195 Trial ofGeneral von Mackensen and GeneralMaelzer (1945) 8 LRTWC 1, p. 5.
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In the Trial of Albert Kesselring before the British Military Court at
Venice (also in relation to the Ardeatine Cave massacre), the Prosecutor conceded
that the Germans were justified in imposing reprisals, but argued that whereas there
was authority for the destruction of property and incarceration of nationals of
occupied territory as reprisals, there was no authority for the taking of human life.1096
The Judge Advocate stated, however, in his summing up, that:
I have come to the conclusion that there is nothing which makes it
absolutely clear that in no circumstances and especially in the
circumstances which I think are agreed in this case that an innocent
person properly taken for the purpose of a reprisal cannot be
executed...1"97
In the case of In re Kappler (a further matter concerning the Ardeatine
Cave massacre),1098 the Military Tribunal of Rome appeared to subject reprisal
measures to the principles of humanity and the Martens Clause, when it stated that:
Reprisals are subject to a general limitation which consists in the duty not
to violate those rights which are intended to safeguard fundamental needs.
This principle was formulated by writers in the last century. It now finds
clear expression in the preamble to the Hague Convention of 18 October
1907 where the activities of States are set a limit by the principles of the
law of nations, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the
public conscience.
This formulation is a little vague, but if one turns to the most
authoritative writings prior to the Convention and to the opinions of
subsequent writers who have attempted to define its sphere of operation,
it is not difficult to determine its content. For the purpose of this inquiry
precedents are of special importance inasmuch as they have been treated
as a practice which corresponds to the requirements of the law. It is true
that not all practices are relevant in the quest for a rule of customary law,
but only those which have been accepted as lawful..."1099
There are, however, two important considerations in relation to the apparent
conclusion above that reprisals must abide by the principles of humanity. The first is
that the Military Tribunal did not hold the reprisal measure to be unlawful on the
basis of the principles of humanity (but rather, on the grounds of disproportionality).
The second point to consider is that the principles of humanity and the Martens
Clause as expounded by the Military Tribunal are in fact co-extensive with extant
1096 Trial ofAlbert Kesselring (1947) 8 LRTWC 9, p. 12.
1091 Id., pp 12-13.
1098 In re Kappler (1948) 15 AD 471.
1099 In re Kappler (1948) 15 AD 471, p. 474.
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principles of customary international law. Thus, rather than limit the right to reprisals
by reference to nebulous standards of humanity or the public conscience, the Military
Tribunal had in mind (as is apparent in the second paragraph of the above citation)
only those limitations that belong to the lex lata and have the status of customary
international law. Further examples from the post-World War II war crimes trials
may be given in which the principles of humanity or the Martens Clause (or similar
notions) were cited as a limitation on the right to reprisals; but in no such case did the
principles of humanity stand as an independent substantive basis for positing the
illegality of the acts in question. Thus in In re von Lewinski, the Judge Advocate
advised the British Military Court at Hamburg that the killing of hostages or reprisal
prisoners was a violation of the usages of war. The Judge Advocate relied in this
respect on Article 46 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 as well as the Martens
Clause.1100 There was no reliance on the Martens Clause as a stand-alone provision.
In In re "Silbertanne " Murders, the Dutch Court of Cassation held that "[t]he killing
of persons as a reprisal for attacks of which they were in no way guilty ran counter to
Christian morality and to the most elementary notions of military honour."1101
Nevertheless, the substantive basis of the Court's decision was grounded in Article
46 of the Hague Regulations.
The writings of contemporary authors tends to doubt whether reprisal
measures are in fact limited by any principles of humanity. According to Greenwood:
It has sometimes been suggested that there is a customary law
requirement that reprisals must not infringe basic principles of humanity.
This requirement appears most frequently in some of the nineteenth
century statements of the law. In that context it probably reflects the fact
that, at the time texts like the Oxford manual were drawn up, there were
no treaty provisions expressly prohibiting reprisals against the wounded
or prisoners of war.1102
Greenwood concludes that while principles of humanity are probably the inspiration
behind many of the treaty-based prohibitions on reprisals, "it must be questioned
whether they constitute a separate customary law requirement."110"1 Kalshoven
concludes that:
"""in re von Lewisnky (1949) 16 AD 509, pp. 519-520.
1101 In re "Silbertanne" Murders (1946) 13 AD 397, p. 398.
11112 Greenwood (1989a), pp. 47-8.
11112
Id., p. 48, n. 48; see, also, Greenwood (1989b). pp. 232-3.
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As far as the alleged requirement of humanity is concerned...this is not a
legal requirement of the law of reprisals, not even a flexible one, that
would of itself suffice to render particular retaliatory measures illegal.1104
The difficulty with the modern conclusion that reprisals need not conform with the
principles of humanity, however, is that given that early sources clearly and
unambiguously expressed the requirement of conformity with humanity it would
appear to be incumbent on those denying the applicability of humanity to indicate
precisely how that requirement no longer came to apply. For e.g., it would appear
necessary to establish that the requirement fell into desuetude in terms of usage and
in terms of the emergence of a new opinio juris, both negativing the requirement that
reprisals conform to the principles of humanity. Greenwood's principal explanation
for the requirement in older texts such as the Oxford Manual of a requirement of
humanity was that at the time such texts were drawn up there were no treaty
provisions expressly prohibiting reprisals against classes of persons such as the
wounded or prisoners of war. As indicated above, however, there is still some
question as to the customary status of the reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I, and in
any event the lacunae arising from that Protocol appear to leave certain classes of
non-combatant persons and property unprotected. It could hardly be said, therefore,
that a principle of humanity is no longer needed from the perspective of the
protection of the human person. There are, for e.g., no express reprisal prohibitions
in the context of naval warfare, even in favour of civilians. Does this mean then that
the post-World War I statements on the requirements of humanity in the context of
naval warfare continue to apply?Iia"' It is necessary in addressing this question to
distinguish two distinct issues: The first is whether "humanity" is recognised by
today's customary international law as applying as an independent formal source of
law; the second is whether distinct obligations which were previously justified under
the banner of "humanity" attained the status of customary international law and
apply today qua customary law.
In answering the second question first, there appears to be some basis for
asserting that the inviolability of neutral persons and enemy non-combatants during
reprisal attacks was recognised in the context of naval warfare during the First World
11<M Kalshoven (1971). p. 344.
",b See above.
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War.1106 What is uncertain is whether that principle attained the status of customary
international law. By virtue of the principle of inter-temporal law1107 and in light of
the fact that the Central Powers, at least, engaged reprisals against neutrals and
enemy non-combatants,"0tS it could be doubted as to whether the immunity of
neutrals and enemy non-combatants from reprisal attacks ever reached the
consistency of practice necessary at that time to attain the status of customary
law."09 In any event, any gains made from the perspective of civilian protections vis¬
a-vis reprisals in the First World War could be considered to have been undone
during and in the aftermath of the Second World War. The jurisprudence arising out
of the military tribunals convened after the Second World War appear to recognise
the right to carry out reprisals against enemy civilians."10 Further, military manuals
recognised that right and the extinguishment of the right to carry out reprisals against
civilians protected under Geneva Convention IV and under Protocol I were
considered novel developments at the conferences which promulgated the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I respectively."" Thus any suggestion that the
immunity of civilians from reprisals was established as a principle of customary
international law by the First World War and continued to apply as such to the
present day would be entirely difficult to make out and appears to be contradicted by
the evidence. On the other hand, there could be some highly limited basis for
asserting the inviolability of civilians against reprisal attacks in the context of naval
warfare given that the decisions of national military tribunals cited above permitting
reprisal attacks against civilians related, strictly speaking, to the law of land warfare
only."12 Nevertheless, the position at best must be considered highly uncertain or
ambiguous, and the evidential basis for the inviolability of civilians in naval warfare
against reprisal attacks must be considered tenuous. It would hardly seem open to
any international criminal tribunal to announce that it was free from doubt that
civilians were protected against reprisal attacks in the context of naval warfare, this
'106 See discussion above.
11117
See, e.g., D.W. Greig, Intertemporality and the Law of Treaties, British Institute of International
and Comparative Law, London, 2001.
1 "ls See above.
U(W See, e.g., W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law, Columbia University





being the progeny of a rule of customary international law deriving in or before the
First World War.
The other issue raised above is whether "humanity'' is recognised by
today's customary international law as applying as a formal source of law. If so, then
it would not matter that putative rules such as the inviolability of neutral or enemy
naval merchants from reprisal attacks may have entered customary law and then
fallen into desuetude, as the basis for the rule today could be posited on the
principles of "humanity" rather than customary international law. If, however,
"humanity" does not apply as a formal source of international law (perhaps having
fallen into desuetude), then it may be that early statements requiring that reprisals
abide by the principles of humanity are no longer to be considered applicable - either
because they are based on a misconception of the formal sources of international law,
or because they are based on an earlier conception of the formal sources of
international law that was once correct but no longer applies. It is probably fair to
conclude that early sources such as the Oxford Manual of 1880 and even the Martens
clause of 1899 and 1907 (with its reference to "the laws of humanity") were drafted
during a period in which there was still some lingering uncertainty concerning the
formal sources of international law. In particular, lingering uncertainty concerning
the continued applicability of the law of nature, from which the "laws of humanity"
would appear to derive.111'' Of course, by the turn of the twentieth century, legal
positivism had indisputably established its ascendency over natural law theory.1114
Nevertheless, there were still some voices that claimed a residual role for "the law of
nature" within the framework of international law.111"' Oppenheim, writing in 1908,
declared that:
there is no generally recognized method of the science of international
law. The three schools of the Grotians, the Naturalists and the Positivists
are still in the field...All these schools are to-day represented by
prominent men...To many it would therefore seem ridiculous to take part
in the fray and to join one group and fight the others.1"6
1113 See, generally, R. Coupland, "Humanity: What is it and how does it influence international law?",
(2001)83 IRRC969.
1114 E.D. Dickinson, "Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation", (1932) 26 AJIL 239, p.
253.
"" See, e.g., R. Lansing, "Notes on World Sovereignty", (1921) 15 AJIL 13, esp. pp. 22-25.
1116 L Oppenheim, "The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method", (1908) 2 AJIL 313, pp.
326-7.
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While Oppenheim stated that in his own opinion "we are now-a-days no longer
justified in teaching a law of nature and a 'natural" law of nations",1"7 he
nevertheless conceded that such a view point would be treated as controversial by a
number of his contemporaries:
I know quite well that this emphatic denial of the law of nature exposes
me to attacks. Most French and other Romanic and also some British and
American Jurists will stigmatize my standpoint as "unscientific", for they
consider it inferior work to collect the 'crude' real rules of international
law without regard to the "higher' rules of the law of nature.1118
While natural law theory continued to receive some isolated support among
international jurists,1119 it is generally regarded as long having fallen into
obsolescence.1120 It could be asserted, therefore, that if "humanity" ever held the
status of a formal source of international law it lost that status contemporaneously
with the law of nature.
1. Is "Humanity" a Formal Source of Law?
If one examines the terms of the Martens clause, there is no express provision for the
direct applicability of principles of "humanity" or the requirements (or dictates) of
the public conscience as formal sources of law. This is an interpretation which has
been implied into the terms of the Martens clause by some authorities.1121 The
1117 Id., p. 328.
1118 M., p. 330.
1119 See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, (1958), p. 174.
1120 H.H. Sprout, "'Theories as to the Applicability of International Law in the Federal Courts of the
United States", (1932) 26 AJIL 280, p. 281. See, e.g., North American Dredging Company of Texas v
UnitedMexican States (1926) 20 AJIL 800. p. 804, par. 12:
The law of nature may have been helpful, some three centuries ago, to
build up a new law of nations, and the conception of the inalienable rights
of men and nations may have exercised a salutary influence, some one
hundred and fifty years ago, on the development of modern democracy on
both sides of the ocean, but they have failed as a durable foundation of
either municipal or international law; and cannot be used in the present
day for positive municipal law, on the one hand, and for positive
international law, as recognized by nations and governments through their
acts and statements on the other hand.
1121 See, e.g.. United States v Krupp von Bohlen (1948) 10 LRTWC 69, p. 133; Legality of the Threat
or Use ofNuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen. p. 408.
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Martens clause itself states merely that, until a more complete code of the law of war
is issued, in cases not dealt with by the Hague Conventions and Regulations,
populations and belligerents "remain under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public
conscience.*'112" The clause does not state that populations and belligerents remain
under the protection of the laws of humanity or the requirements of the public
conscience; populations and belligerents remain, instead, under the protection of the
"principles of international law" as they result from certain sources. Thus nothing in
the Martens clause indicates whether those sources (including the laws of humanity
and the requirements of the public conscience) exist as sources of international law in
a formal or only material sense. In fact, if anything it should be clear that the sources
listed were intended as material sources. The third listed source, besides the laws of
humanity and the public conscience, is "the usages established between civilized
nations*'. It is uncontroversial that the mere usages of nations is only a material
source of international law and requires opinio juris to ripen into its formal
counterpart - customary international law.112'1 In Prosecutor v Kupreskic Judge
Cassese stated that the Martens clause "may not be taken to mean that the "principles
of humanity' and the 'dictates of public conscience' have been elevated to the rank
of independent sources of international law, for this conclusion is belied by
international practice." 1124 According to Meron. the Martens clause "does not allow
one to build castles of sand. Except in extreme cases, its references to principles of
humanity and dictates of public conscience cannot, alone, delegitimize weapons and
methods of war. especially in contested cases.'"1122 Elementary considerations or
principles of humanity, appear to be invoked in order to justify conclusions reached
on other legal grounds rather than as a formal source of substantive law in their own
right. They appear, in short, to add nothing to the totality of legal obligations already
existing in international law. Though the principles of humanity may be invoked
1122 Preamble. Hague Regulations of 1899.
1123
See, e.g.. Art. 38(1 )(b), ICJ Statute.
1124 Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic. Dragan
Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, par.
525.
"2" T. Meron, "The Martens Clause, Principles ofHumanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience",
(2000) 94 AJIL 78, p. 88.
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from time to time in the decisions of international courts or tribunals that does not
necessarily indicate their status as a formal source of law. Akehurst, for instance,
noted in a discussion in the parallel context of the status of equity under international
law that:
[t]he fact that tribunals often invoke equity does not necessarily mean that
equity is a formal Source of law. Counsel and judges in national courts
frequently appeal to considerations of equity and justice when the law is
uncertain, but this does not lead to equity being regarded as a Source of
national law. When deciding a doubtful case, a judge may point out that
the rule he is laying down is just; he may also point out that it is a work¬
able rule, which will be easy to apply and will yield predictable results in
future cases. In both national and international law, similar appeals are
often made to other extra-legal factors - religion, morality, good manners,
neighbourliness, logic, reason, reasonable-ness, common sense,
convenience, and political, economical, socio-logical, geographical and
scientific factors. These factors are material Sources of law: they are not
formal Sources. The same may well be true of equity...
And indeed, the same may well be true of the principles of humanity. Consider, for
instance, the role of "elementary considerations of humanity" in the reasoning of the
ICJ in the Corfu Channel case.
a. The Corfu Channel Case
That case, it will be recalled, concerned, inter alia, Albania's international law
responsibility for the explosion of moored contact mines in its territorial waters
resulting in damage to two British destroyers and the death and injury of a number of
naval officers and men."27 The United Kingdom asserted that the minefield was laid
by or with the connivance or knowledge of the Government of Albania, or else that
its presence was known to the Government. Albania contested these claims. The
Court concluded that the laying of the minefield which caused the explosions could
1126 M. Akehurst, "Equity and General Principles of Law", (1976) 25 1CLQ 801.
112 The Special Agreement entered into between Albania and the United Kingdom for the purpose of
transmitting the case to the ICJ raised two questions for the Court's determination: The first asked
whether Albania was responsible under international law for the explosions which occurred on 22
October 1946 and whether there was a duty to pay compensation; the second asked whether the
United Kingdom had violated Albania's sovereignty under international law by reason of the acts of
its navy on 22 October and 12 and 13 November 1946 and whether there was a duty to give
satisfaction (see Corfu Channel Case (UK vAlbania) [1949] ICJ Rep. 1, p. 6.)
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not have been accomplished without the knowledge of the Albanian Government.
Crucially, the Court noted that "[t]he obligations resulting for Albania from this
knowledge are not disputed between the Parties."1129 Those obligations consisted in
"notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in
Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British warships of the
imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them."1130 The Court proceeded to
elucidate the underlying basis of these obligations, which it noted did not rest upon
the Hague Convention VIII of 1907 (indeed the explosions took place on 22 October
1946, a date subsequent to the cessation of hostilities and therefore outside of the
Convention's period of operation; in any event the Convention would not have
applied during the course of hostilities qua treaty law as Albania was not a Party).
Instead, the Court stated that the obligations were based upon:
certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary
considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war; the
principle of the freedom of maritime communication; and every State's
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary
to the rights of other States.1131
The question then, is what the Court intended by its reference to "elementary
considerations of humanity" as a basis of Albania's legal obligations, and, in
particular, whether these considerations of humanity stood as an independent formal
source of international law. It might be pointed out that "humanity" is listed
conjunctively, together with the two other bases of Albania's legal obligation
(freedom of maritime communication and the obligation not to allow knowingly
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States). Thus each stands as
a separate basis of obligation; "humanity" cannot be reduced to the other two. On the
other hand, it might be pointed out that there was no dispute between Albania and the
United Kingdom as to the concrete obligations accruing to Albania once the Court
was of the opinion that the Albanian Government had knowledge of the mine-laying
operation. Thus, it cannot be asserted that elementary considerations of humanity, at
least in the context of the Corfu Channel case, created for Albania any concrete




obligation that exceeded those clearly arising under conventional or customary law.
Albania would not have conceded the presence of any obligation arising from a novel
or controversial source of international law. It may be that the reference to
"elementary considerations of humanity" was simply intended to signify the presence
of certain positive obligations inhering in a State over its sovereign territory
tantamount to the positive aspects of the delictual duties of "due diligence" or "duty
of care". While the Court cited the obligation "not to allow knowingly its territory to
be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States", this could be characterised as a
reference to the negative component of a broader catalogue of delictual duties that
includes both negative and positive obligations. The duty "not to allow
knowingly..." prohibits a State from directly harming the rights of other States (e.g.
through mine-laying) or from complicity or acquiescence in the harming of the rights
of other States by third parties (e.g. complicity in or tacit knowledge of mine-laying),
but it is difficult to subsume a positive duty to warn approaching British warships of
the imminent danger they face into this negative formulation ("not to allow
knowingly its territory to be used..."). The obligation to actively warn third parties
of the relevant danger may well have followed from "elementary considerations of
humanity", but it should not be assumed that the legal basis of that obligation was
not explicable by reference to customary international law. That positive delictual
duties inhere in a State in respect of its sovereign territory has long been recognised
in customary international law. In the 1928 Island ofPalmas case, the sole arbitrator,
Max Huber, recognised that territorial sovereignty entailed "the obligation to protect
within the territory the rights of other States, in particular their right to integrity and
inviolability in peace and in war, together with the rights which each State may claim
for its nationals in foreign territory."1132 The obligation to "protect" such rights must
extend beyond the purely negative obligation to refrain from actively harming such
rights (directly, or indirectly through third parties) and include a positive duty to
minimise, and if possible, bring to an end, the harmful consequences of the actions of
third parties operating within the territorial State. This obligation is not absolute, but
limited by the principle of "due diligence". In his dissenting opinion in the Lotus case
" ~ Island ofPalmas (Netherlands v US) 2 RIAA 829, p. 839.
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Judge Moore, citing favourably from the US Supreme Court, ~ stated that "[i]t is
well settled that a State is bound to use due diligence to prevent the commission
within its dominion of criminal acts against another nation or its people."11,4 Thus
Albania's international law obligations, as found by the ICJ, were explicable by
extant principles of customary international law.
b. The Nicaragua Case
Elementary considerations of humanity were also considered by the ICJ in the Merits
phase of the Nicaragua case. The applicable law in that case did not include
multilateral treaties as a result of a reservation entered by the United States upon its
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. In
relation to the applicability of the principles embodied in Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Court found that they constituted "general
principles of humanitarian law" and as such were subsumed within the applicable
law of the Court for the purposes of the case.11 ° The Court stated that:
the conduct of the United States may be judged according to the
fundamental general principles of humanitarian law; in [the Court's]
view, the Geneva Conventions are in some respects a development, and in
other respects no more than an expression, of such principles...Article 3
which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
defines certain rules to be applied in the armed conflicts of a non-
international character. There is no doubt that, in the event of
international armed conflicts, these rules also constitute a minimum
yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules which are also to apply
to international conflicts; and they are rules which, in the Court's opinion,
reflect what the Court in 1949 called 'elementary considerations of
humanity' (Corfu Channel, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 22...). The Court may
therefore find them applicable to the present dispute...'136
It is not immediately clear whether the Court viewed common Article 3 as codifying,
or otherwise embodying customary law, or whether common Article 3 was viewed
instead as binding ipso jure by virtue of its reflecting "elementary considerations of
humanity". It certainly does not follow inexorably from the above passage that
1133 United States v. Arjona, 120 US 479 (1887).
1134 PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, p. 88. The dissenting opinion of Judge Moore in the Lotus case and the
decision of Max Huber in the Island ofPalmas case are both discussed in the Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Winiarski in the Corfu Channel Case (UK vAlbania) [1949] ICJ Rep. 1
11" See Case Concerning Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v
US) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, par. 220; see, also, id., dispositive, par. 9.
1136 Id., par. 218.
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"elementary considerations of humanity" are automatically binding as a matter of
international law. It is significant that the Court implied that common Article 3 was
binding as a matter of general international law before it addressed on "elementary
considerations of humanity". The Court stated that "the Geneva Conventions are in
some respects a development, and in other respects no more than the expression, of
such principles" - i.e., "fundamental general principles of humanitarian law".1137 It is
only later in the passage, perhaps even in the manner of a tangential observation, that
the Court notes "and they are rules which, in the Court's opinion, reflect what the
*1118Court in 1949 called 'elementary considerations of humanity'". ~ It has thus been
observed that when the ICJ in the Nicaragua case considered general principles of
humanitarian law, it did so clearly and specifically in the context of treaties in
force,1139 rather than by reference to nebulous standards of "humanity". Subsequent
judicial consideration of the passage clearly supports the conclusion that the ICJ
viewed common Article 3 as binding by virtue of customary international law. For
e.g., the ICTY Appeals Chamber in its Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in Tadic held that:
The emergence of international rules governing general internal strife has
occurred at two different levels; at the level of customary international
law and at the level of treaty law. Two bodies of rules have thus
crystallised...Indeed the interplay between these two sets of rules is such
that some treaty rules have gradually become part of customary law. This
holds true for common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as was




1139 See Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep. 226,
Oral Submissions of the UK, UN Doc. CR 95/34 (1995), p. 46.
1140 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1/AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, par. 98. See, also. Prosecutor v
Dusko Tadic. Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, Opinion and Judgment 7 May 1997, par. 609;
Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic. Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Chamber. Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 316; Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-
95-14-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, 3 March 2000, par. 166; Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, 2 September 1998, par. 608. Judge Ago in his Separate
Opinion in the Nicaragua case also understood the ICJ to have posited the binding nature of common
Article 3 on customary international law, although he found it difficult to reach the same conclusion:
"I am more-over most reluctant to be persuaded that any broad identity of content exists between the
Geneva Conventions and certain "fundamental general principles of humanitarian law', which,
according to the Court, were pre-existent in customary law..." (Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14,
Separate Opinion of Judge Ago, Nicaragua case, p. 184). See, however, the Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Sir Robert Jennings in the Nicaragua case, where his Honour expressed his concern with "the
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In the same Decision, the Appeals Chamber noted that the ICJ "has confirmed that
[the rules in common Article 3] reflect 'elementary considerations ol humanity
applicable under customary international law."1141 This statement perhaps captures
the crux of what the ICJ intended: The ethical basis of common Article 3 lies in
"elementary considerations of humanity", but its normative or formally binding basis
lies in its having entered customary international law: i.e., while the rules "reflect"
elementary considerations of humanity, they are formally "applicable" through
customary international law.
2. Humanity and the Requirements of Specificity
Even if we assume that humanity does exert force as a formal source of international
law, the problem with applying it in the context of international criminal law (e.g. to
ouster the defence of reprisals in certain contexts) is that it is difficult to envisage
how it comports with the requirements of specificity (a corollary of the principle
nullum crimen sine lege). Provost has stated that "very little guidance is provided by
the relevant humanitarian conventions or past State practice in warfare as to which
rules might constitute the nucleus of a principle of humanity."1142 "Humanity" is of
course a highly nebulous and undefined standard. Provost does however suggest that:
Given that the law of war is already the product of a compromise between
military necessity and considerations of humanity, the breach of its
minimal rules will more often than not violate a broad principle of
humanity."41
While the above statement is somewhat equivocal (the "minimal" rules of the law of
war will not necessarily always, but only "more often than not", violate humanity)
nevertheless it suggests some means for positing the content of the principles of
humanity in a concrete manner. Of course there may still be issues of specificity in
Court's view" that the rules of common Article 3 "are applicable as 'elementary considerations of
humanity'" (Case ConcerningMilitary and ParamilitaryActivities in and againstNicaragua
(Nicaragua v US) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings, p.
537).
1141 Prosecutor v Dttsko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1/AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, par. 102.
1142 Provost (1994). p. 425.
1143 Id., p. 425.
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so far as determining which rules of the law of armed conflict are "minimal" ones,
but the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals provides at least some
guidance in that respect. According to the ICJ in the Nicaragua case:
Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 defines certain rules to be applied in the armed conflicts of a non-
international character. There is no doubt that, in the event of
international armed conflicts, these rules also constitute a minimum
yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules which are also to apply
in international conflicts; and they are rules which, in the Court's opinion,
reflect what the Court in 1949 called, "elementary considerations of
humanity"..."44
This reasoning has been endorsed, inter alia, in the decisions of the ICTY1145 and
ICTR.1146 The ICTY Appeals Chamber in its Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in Tadic identified common Article 3 as
embodying certain "minimum mandatory rules" applicable under customary
international law to any armed conflict, whether international or non-international in
character.1147 Nevertheless there may be some difficulty in attempting to posit the
content of the principles of "humanity" by examining minimal applicable rules in
armed conflict. According to Pictet, the underpinning of Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 is found in "the rudiments of humanity, a minimum
applicable at all times, in all places and circumstances.. .part of the customs of
peoples from which none may disengage himself."1148 If common Article 3 is viewed
1144 Case ConcerningMilitary and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US)
(Merits) [ 1986] ICJ Rep. 14, par. 218 (emphasis added).
1145 See, e.g.. Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, Opinion and Judgment 7
May 1997, par. 609; Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1/AR72, Appeals Chamber. Decision
on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, par. 102; Prosecutor v
Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, 3 March 2000. par. 167.
1146
See, e.g., Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I. Judgment, 2
September 1998, par. 608. Nevertheless, the assertion that common Article 3 constitutes a "minimum
yardstick", applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts, was obiter in the
context of the Nicaragua case (see, e.g., Prosecutor v Auto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1,
Decision on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts 13 and 14 of the Indictment (Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction), 29 May 1998, par. 14). Further, it has been pointed out that as a result of the
limitation on cumulative charging under the procedure applicable in the ICTY, it will never be
necessary to charge an individual with a violation of common Article 3 in the context of an
international armed conflict: Where a conviction is entered under Article 2 of the ICTY Statute
(relating to Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions applicable in international armed conflict), it
would be impermissible to convict on the basis of a violation of common Article 3 (under Article 3 of
the ICTY Statute) for the same violation (Jones & Powles (2003), par. 4.2.467).
1147 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1/AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, par. 102.
1148 J. Pictet, Principles ofInternational Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Geneva, 1966, p. 26.
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as constituting a minimal standard of rules because it reflects humanity, it would be
entirely circuitous to assert that common Article 3 constitutes humanity because it
reflects a minimal standard of rules. In addition, there must clearly be some question
as to what, exactly (beyond common Article 3) constitutes the minimal rules
applicable in armed conflict. For instance, are the "fundamental guarantees" in
Article 75 of Protocol I included? While examining minimal applicable rules may
offer some means of overcoming the requirements of specificity in relation to
applying principles of "humanity" directly as law, the conclusion would still appear
to be that "humanity" has no status as a formal source of international law.
Nevertheless, there are suggestions that it may operate indirectly as an interpretative
criterion in the interpretation of international law - and to this end, the sort of
concrete guidance as to the meaning of "humanity" offered by the minimal rules
approach indicated above could still prove useful. The possibility of "humanity"
operating as an interpretative criterion is addressed below.
iv. HUMANITY AND THE GENERATION OF CUSTOMARY
LAW
A related argument to that relying on the principles of humanity as an independent
formal source of law is to rely on the principles of humanity as a generating force
behind the emergence of customary international law. The ICTY Trial Chamber, in
its Judgment in Kupreskic, noted the apparent absence of State practice indicating the
outlawry of those reprisals prohibited in Articles 51(6) and 52(1) of Protocol I
(pertaining to civilians and civilian objects),1149 nevertheless, the Trial Chamber
proceeded to state that:
This is however an area where opinio iuris sive necessitatis may play a
much greater role than usus, as a result of the aforementioned Martens
Clause. In the light of the way States and courts have implemented it, this
Clause clearly shows that principles of international humanitarian law
may emerge through a customary process under the pressure of the
demands of humanity or the dictates of public conscience, even where
State practice is scant or inconsistent. The other element, in the form of
opinio necessitatis, crystallising as a result of the imperatives of humanity
U49 proseCUt0r v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic. Dragan
Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, par.
527.
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or public conscience, may turn out to be the decisive element heralding
the emergence of a general rule or principle of humanitarian law."10
It has been suggested above that where the "fog of war" prevents an examination of
the actual conduct of hostilities on the field, it may be sufficient to examine official
statements and documents (such as the content of military manuals) in order to
determine State practice. In this sense, elements that may be thought in some respects
as indicia of opinio juris could be viewed as elements of State practice. Nevertheless,
on the basis of the evidence we have before us - including, not only military manuals
and other documents, but reservations to reprisal prohibitions - these indicia hardly
point overwhelmingly to the emergence of a customary norm in favour of the
prohibition on certain reprisals.
If the suggestion in the above passage is that the principles of humanity
or the public conscience may, by themselves, generate or create customary
international law, the suggestion would have to viewed as groundless. Firstly, as
indicated above, humanity is not an independent formal source of law (and viewing
humanity as directly leading to the formation of customary law is to treat humanity
as a formal source). A new rule of customary law cannot be derived simply from
humanitarian principles.11"11
v. HUMANITY AS AN INTERPRETATIVE CRITERION
There is a suggestion that the Martens clause mandates a particular interpretative
criterion, namely one that requires that in the interpretation of customary or treaty-
based rules of humanitarian law doubt be resolved in favour of that position most
consistent with "humanity" or the "public conscience".In Prosecutor v Kupreskic
the ICTY Trial Chamber stated that while the Martens clause may not be taken to
mean that the "principles of humanity" and the "dictates of public conscience" have




Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, Oral
Submission of UK, CR 95/34 (1995), pp. 45-46.
1152 See Meron (2000), pp. 87-88.
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enjoins, as a minimum, reference to those principles and dictates any time
a rule of international humanitarian law is not sufficiently rigorous or
precise: in those instances the scope and purport of the rule must be
defined with reference to those principles and dictates.
Yet how can this be the case? It is a corollary of the principle nullum crimen sine
lege that ambiguous provisions be interpreted contra proferentem,1154 This is a rule
which applies both to the interpretation of treaty-based norms and customary
ones.11"0 The interpretative criterion contra proferentem would appear to be
diametrically opposed to "humanity" as an interpretative criterion, at least to the
extent that "humanity" and the "public conscience" tend towards maximum restraint
of belligerents. The Trial Chamber in Kupreskic suggested that the Martens clause
would entail that Articles 57 and 58 of Protocol I (concerning precautions in attack
and precautions against the effects of attacks) must be interpreted "so as to construe
as narrowly as possible the discretionary power to attack belligerents and, by the
same token, so as to expand the protection accorded to civilians".11'6 The Trial
Chamber went on to suggest that:
As an example of the way in which the Martens clause may be utilised,
regard might be had to considerations such as the cumulative effect of
attacks on military objectives causing incidental damage to civilians. In
other words, it may happen that single attacks on military objectives
causing incidental damage to civilians, although they may raise doubts as
to their lawfulness, nevertheless do not appear on their face to fall foul
per se of the loose prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58 (or of the
corresponding customary rules). However, in case of repeated attacks, all
or most of them falling within the grey area between indisputable legality
and unlawfulness, it might be warranted to conclude that the cumulative
effect of such acts entails that they may not be in keeping with
international law. Indeed, this pattern of military conduct may turn out to
jeopardise excessively the lives and assets of civilians, contrary to the
demands of humanity.1157
The above passage appears to imply that conduct which is ostensibly lawful, and in
any event cannot be said without doubt to entail criminality under treaty or
customary law, may be construed as criminal on the basis of the Martens clause. This




Prosecutor v Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, par.
525.
1157 Id., par. 526.
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suggestion is made in the context of provisions of Protocol I which are described by
the Trial Chamber as "loose prescriptions" and therefore presumably ambiguous. As
indicated above, the requirement of strict construction as a corollary of nullum
1 I SR
crimen sine lege does not technically apply to ambiguous provisions; " further, the
suggestion that the cumulative effect of attacks may contravene Protocol 1 even
where each attack viewed in isolation does not, cannot be viewed as a form of
analogical reasoning and thus does not raise concerns from the point of view of the
ban on analogy.11:1' Nevertheless, it appears to entail a form of reasoning which
interprets ambiguity against the interests of the accused, even in the face of real
doubt. The statement, however, is obiter and given the cursory nature of the
discussion in the passage cited above some caution is necessary in order not to read
into the passage conclusions that are not intended.1160
The suggestion that "humanity" may operate as an interpretative criterion
is directly and irreconcilably at odds with the international law requirements of
nullum crimen sine lege. There is a direct inconsistency here between two legal
philosophies - substantive justice on the one hand and strict legality on the other.
Cassese has discussed these competing philosophies as follows:
National legal systems tend to embrace, and ground their criminal law on
either the doctrine of substantive justice or that of strict legality. Under
the former doctrine the legal order must primarily aim at prohibiting and
punishing any conduct that is socially harmful or causes danger to
society, whether or not that conduct has already been legally criminalized
at the moment it is taken. The paramount interest is defending society
against any deviant behaviour likely to cause damage or jeopardize the
social and legal system. Hence this doctrine favours society over the
individual (favor societatis). Extreme and reprehensible applications of
this doctrine can be found in the Soviet legal system (1918-58) or in the
1158 See above.
11:19 See above.
1160 The Trial Chamber does not suggest that a conviction may follow even where real doubts remain
as to the illegality of the actions concerned. Instead, the Trial Chamber states that where there are
doubts as to the legality of each individual attack when taken in isolation, criminality may still attach
to the cumulative effect of such attacks. Of course there must be no real doubt as to the illegality of
the cumulative effect of the attacks before criminality may follow - that follows from the
requirements of nullum crimen sine lege, and nothing in the passage cited above adopts in any direct
manner a contrary position. It may be. for instance, that a single attack on foreign terrain, unfamiliar
to the attacking forces, produces extensive collateral loss without necessarily entailing a violation of
Protocol I on the basis that all feasible precautions were taken (see Art. 57(2)(a)(ii), Protocol I.)
Where the very same attack is repeated on numerous occasions, even as attacking forces develop a
level of familiarity with the terrain (and an ability, for instance, to engage in more precise targeting), it
may become perfectly clear that the method of attack is in fact a stratagem employed to maximise
civilian casualties, or at least that there are feasible precautions not being taken.
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Nazi criminal law (1933-45). However, one can also find some variations
of this doctrine in modern democratic Germany, where the principles of
'objective justice' (materielle Gerechtigkeit) have been upheld as a
reaction to oppressive governments trampling upon fundamental human
rights...
In contrast, the doctrine of strict legality postulates that a person may
only be held criminally liable and punished if at the moment when he
performed a certain act, the act was regarded as a criminal offence by the
relevant legal order or, in other words, under the applicable law... 1161
Plainly... the purpose of these principles is to safeguard citizens as far
as possible against both the arbitrary power of government and possible
excessive judicial discretion. In short, the basic underpinning of this
doctrine lies in the postulate of favor rei (in favour of the accused) (as
opposed to favor societatis or in favour of society)."62
Cassese notes that "for a long period, and until recently, international law has applied
the doctrine of substantive justice and it is only in recent years that it is gradually
replacing it with the doctrine of strict legality, albeit with some important
qualifications."1163 He concludes that "nowadays this principle [of strict legality]
must be complied with...at the international level, albeit subject to a number of
significant qualifications..."1164 Justice Robertson in his Dissenting Opinion in
Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, agreed with Cassese that "the nulla crimen
doctrine of strict legality, originating in Article 39 of the Magna Carta has replaced
the 'substantive justice' doctrine initially adopted by international law."1162 It is
impermissible in the context of the ICC Statute to delegate to the principles of
"humanity" any role inconsistent with the principle nullum crimen sine lege, whether
as a direct and formal source of legal obligations, as an evidentiary basis for
ascertaining custom (in lieu of the establishment of State practice or opinio juris) or
as an interpretative criterion in international law.
vi. THE OBLIGATION TO RESPECT THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOL I IN "ALL
CIRCUMSTANCES"
1161 Cassese (2003), pp. 139-141.
1162 Id., pp. 139-142.
1163 Id., pp. 142-143.
1164 Id., p. 145.
1165 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Appeals Chamber, Decision
on Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May 2004, Dissenting
Opinion of Justice Robertson, par. 15.
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Article 1 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides that. "The High
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present
Convention in all circumstances.*'1166 Article 1(1) of Protocol I provides for an
obligation in respect of the Protocol in identical terms.116 The obligation to "respect*"
the Conventions and Protocol is an obligation which inheres in each Party, in any
event, by the principle pacta sunt servanda and the obligation to abide by each
conventional undertaking in good faith.1 "KS The obligation to "ensure respect*"
appears to add an additional layer of obligation, although whether it creates anything
beyond a duty to refrain from actively encouraging external parties to engage in acts
inconsistent with the Conventions and Protocol is open to doubt.1169 Both
obligations, to respect, and to ensure respect, apply "in all circumstances".
It has been argued that the obligation to respect and ensure respect for the
Conventions and Protocol I "in all circumstances" has the effect of excluding the
right of reprisals.1170 If this were so, then it would be impermissible to carry out, in
reprisal, any violation of the terms of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I - and
not just those the subject of express reprisal prohibitions. This appears to be the
interpretation adopted by Trial Chamber 1 of the ICTY in its Rule 61 decision in
Prosecutor v. Martic.1171 There the accused was alleged to have ordered the
bombardment of civilians in Zagreb using Orkan rockets fitted with "cluster bomb"
warheads. The Prosecution alleged that this was in retaliation for a massive attack by
the Croatian army against the armed-forces of the self-proclaimed Republic of
Serbian Krajina of which the accused was the president. In its review of the
indictment against the accused pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure, the
1166 Article 1 common to the Geneva Conventions I-IV.
116 Article 1(1), Protocol 1 ("The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure for this
Protocol in all circumstances.")
1168 See J. Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law. Kluwer Law International, The
Hague, 1996. pp. 38-40.
1169 This was the limited interpretation of the phrase "ensure respect" in the Case Concerning Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14,
par. 220
1170 See, e.g.. Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep.
226. Written Statement of the Government of the Solomon Islands, 20 June 1995, p. 67.
1171 Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-R61, Trial Chamber I. Review of the Indictment
Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 8 March 1996, (1998) 108 ILR 39.
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Trial Chamber addressed the question, "does the fact that the attack was carried out
as a reprisal reverse the illegality of the attack?".117" It concluded that it does not:
The prohibition against attacking civilians must be respected in all
circumstances regardless of the behaviour of the other party. The opinion
of the great majority of legal authorities permits the Trial Chamber to
assert that no circumstances would legitimize an attack against civilians
even if it were a response proportionate to a similar violation perpetrated
by the other party. The exclusion of the application of the principle of
reprisals in the case of such fundamental norms is confirmed by Article 1
common to all Geneva Conventions. Under this provision, the High
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the
Conventions in all circumstances, even when the behaviour of the other
party might be considered wrongful. The International Court of Justice
considered that this obligation does not derive only from the Geneva
Conventions themselves but also from the general principles of
humanitarian law (Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v. United States of America,
merits, ICJ Reports, 1986, paragraph 220).11
This view is entirely inconsistent with the drafting history of Article 1 common to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the substantively identical Article 1(1) of
Protocol I.
1. The Travaux Preparatoires
A provision of this nature first appeared in the two Geneva Conventions of 27 July
1929 - the Sick and Wounded Convention and the Prisoners of War Convention -
both of which provide that, "The provisions of the present Convention shall be
respected by the High Contracting Parties in all circumstances."1174 During the
course of the 1929 Geneva Diplomatic Conference, which resulted in the adoption of
both Conventions, the ICRC sought to ensure that the new conventions did not
include any remnant of the so-called si omnes clause (which may be found in the
1906 Sick and Wounded Convention)117:1 whereby the convention is not triggered, or
ceases to be binding, where even a single belligerent is not party to the
1172 Id., par. 15.
m Id.
1174 Art. 25,1929 Wounded and Sick Convention; Art. 82, 1929 Prisoners ofWar Convention.
11 °
Art. 24, 1906 Wounded and Sick Convention.
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convention.1176 The ICRC's draft Sick and Wounded Convention was quite clumsy
in its phraseology, leading Britain to propose a much clearer amendment stating that
parties shall respect the Convention in all circumstances except in one, namely where
a non-contracting belligerent is engaged in the war; in that case, the Convention will
not govern the relations between the parties to the Convention and the non-
contracting belligerent, but it will still govern the relations between each contracting
belligerent inter se.117; The Drafting Committee was left with the task of giving the
draft article its final shape, and this consisted in a re-working of the British proposal,
including its division into two separate paragraphs.1176 Thus, both the Sick and
Wounded Convention and the Prisoners of War Convention came to contain the
following identical article:
(1) The provisions of the present Convention shall be respected by the
High Contracting Parties in all circumstances.
(2) If, in time of war, a belligerent is not a party to the Convention, its
provisions shall, nevertheless, be binding as between all the belligerents
who are parties thereto.11'9
The drafting history of the above article, therefore, indicates that the reference to "all
circumstances" was intended, originally, as part of the abolition of the si omnes
clause.11S0
During the course of the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949, draft
common Article 1 engendered some small debate centred around the addition of the
undertaking "to ensure respect",1181 but otherwise the article proved entirely
inconspicuous and uncontroversial, being accepted without challenge or substantive
discussion.1182 The drafting history of Article 1(1) of Protocol I is even sparser.
During the course of the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1974-77 only one
delegate offered any interpretation of the meaning of the obligation to "respect and
ensure respect in all circumstances". Ambassador B. Akporode Clark of Nigeria
1176 F. Kalshoven, "The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: From Tiny
Seed to Ripening Fruit", (1999) 2 Yearbook ofInternational Humanitarian Law 3, p. 7.
1177 Id., pp. 7-8.
1178 Id., p. 8.
1179 Art. 25, 1929 Wounded and Sick Convention; Art. 82, 1929 Prisoners ofWar Convention.
1180 See Kalshoven (1999), p. 10.
1181 See Id., p. 21.
1182 See Id., pp. 27-8.
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stated that common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions had broken "new ground in
1949 by introducing the idea of unilateral obligation not subject to reciprocity: from
that point of view, paragraph 1 [of the proposed amendment], which reaffirmed
11
already recognized principles, was acceptable." " Once again, the article was
entirely uncontroversial and engendered no substantive debate. It is clear from the
identical terminology employed in the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I and the
lack of debate or exposition that Article 1(1) of Protocol I was not intended, by those
involved in the drafting process, to have added anything to the development of the
principle as enunciated in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, except to incorporate
and reaffirm it.
Neither common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, nor
Article 1(1) of Protocol I, is limited in its effects to confirming the abolition of the si
omnes clause as that is explicitly confirmed elsewhere in each of the Conventions
and the Protocol."84 It now appears uncontroversial (as apparent for instance, in the
unchallenged interpretation of Clark, above) that the obligation to respect and
ensure respect "in all circumstances" goes beyond this and operates to overturn the
doctrine of reciprocity, at least in its strictest sense,118(> in relation to the Conventions
and the Protocol: If States X, Y and Z are each Parties to an armed conflict, but only
X and Y are parties to the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, the abolition of the si
omnes clause ensures that the Conventions and Protocol remain in force in the
mutual relations between X and Y, but not between X and Z or Y and Z. The
obligation to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions and Protocol "in all
circumstances" in common Article 1 and Article 1(1) respectively ensures X and Y
must abide by the obligations in the Conventions and Protocol even in relation to Z
as those obligations are assumed unilaterally and not on a reciprocal basis.
llv
CDDH/I/SR.4, par. 35, reprinted in Official Records, vol. VIII, p. 25 (discussed in id., pp. 46-7).
"M Article 2(3) common to the Geneva Conventions I-IV: "Although one of the Powers in conflict
may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound
by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the
said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof'; Article 96(2), Protocol I; "When
one of the Parties to the conflict is not bound by this Protocol, the parties to the Protocol shall remain
bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by this Protocol in relation to
each of the parties which are not bound by it, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof."
1 See. also, below.
1186 See below.
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While some very limited support may be found in the speeches of
delegates to the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949 and of 1974-77 for the view
that common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 1(1) of Protocol I
1187
operate to overturn the doctrine of reciprocity as indicated above, at no point is
there any explicit support (even veiled support) for the notion that those articles
excluded the application of the principle of reprisals. Such an interpretation would be
directly inconsistent with the negotiating record of Protocol I in particular, which
indicates that the delegates abandoned attempts to introduce a provision outlawing
reprisals against all persons and objects protected by the Protocol on the basis that it
would not succeed."88 While each of the provisions prohibiting reprisals in Protocol
I proved controversial and was the subject of considerable negotiation,1189 no such
controversy attached to Article 1(1).1190
The attempt to subsume a general prohibition on reprisals into treaty
provisions requiring respect for the treaties "in all circumstances'', appears to involve
an erroneous conflation of reciprocity and reprisals.
2. Reciprocity v Reprisals
The non-reciprocal nature of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I is affirmed by
customary international law (at least in relation to those provisions relating to the
protection of the human person). Article 60(5) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties provides that the right to suspend or terminate a treaty on the basis
of a material breach by another party:
do[es] not apply to provisions relating to the protection of the human
person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to
provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by
such treaties.1191
1187 In relation to the 1974-77 conference, see the statement of Clark above. In relation to the 1949
conference, see the statement of the delegate of Monaco, Professor de Geouffre de la Pradelle,
referring to the "super-contractual" character of the Geneva Conventions (Final Record, Vol. IIB, p.




1191 Art. 60(5), Vienna Convention.
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Although neither the Geneva Conventions nor Protocol I are governed by this
provision qua treaty law (due to the non-retroactivity provision of the Vienna
Convention),1192 the ICJ has formed the opinion that the inadmissibility of
reciprocity in the sense provided for in Article 60(5) is embodied in general
international law. The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion in the South West Africa Case
stated as a "general principle of law", the rule whereby:
a right of termination on account of breach must be presumed to exist in
respect of treaties, except as regards provisions relating to the protection
of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character (as
indicated in Art. 60, paragraph 5 of the Vienna Convention)."93
The ICRC's commentary to Protocol I takes the view that this principle is reflected
in the undertaking to respect and to ensure respect for the Protocol "in all
circumstances", as provided for in Article 1(1) of Protocol I. According to the
commentary, Article 1(1):
does not allow the suspension of the application of the law either in part
or as a whole, even if this is aimed at obtaining reparations from the
adversary or a return to a respect for the law from him. This was
confirmed quite unambiguously in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which lays down under what conditions a material
breach can permit its suspension or termination; that article specifically
exempts treaties of a humanitarian character.1194
1192 Art. 4, Vienna Convention.
1193
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence ofSouth Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep. 16, p.
47.
1194 Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 51. If this view is correct. Article 1(1) in fact exceeds the principle laid
down in Article 60(5) of the Vienna Convention, as the latter article only relates to provisions relating
to the protection of the human person, whereas Article 1(1) of Protocol I relates to all provisions of
the Protocol including those relating to the protection of objects and other interests. See also the
ICRC's Commentary on common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949:
By undertaking at the very outset to respect the clauses of the Convention, the
Contracting Parties draw attention to the special character of that instrument. It is not
an engagement concluded on a basis of reciprocity, binding each party to the contract
only in so far as the other party observes its obligations. It is rather a series of
unilateral engagements solemnly contracted before the world as represented by the
other Contracting Parties. Each State contracts obligations vis-a-vis itself and at the
same time vis-a-vis the others. The motive of the Convention is such a lofty one, so
universally recognized as an imperative call of civilization, that one feels the need for
its assertion, as much because of the respect one has for it oneself as because of the
respect for it which one expects from one's opponent, and perhaps even more for the
former reason than for the latter.
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By referring to action aimed at ensuring compliance with the law, the ICRC's
commentary evokes the notion of reprisals, but the above passage, as with the terms
of Article 60 of the Vienna Convention, relate only to the suspension or termination
of treaties in whole or in part, 1195 and reprisals involve neither. In fact reprisals are
predicated on the assumption that the underlying obligation remains in tact; the
reprisal merely precludes wrongfulness to the extent that it remains within the strict
limitations governing reprisals under international law.1196 If the operation of
reprisals in this sense is ousted by virtue of the obligation to respect and ensure
respect for the Conventions and Protocol I "in all circumstances", then taken to its
logical conclusion this would negate any circumstances precluding wrongfulness,
and thus deny any defence to a defendant.
The inadmissibility of reciprocity in war crimes proceedings has a long
history, but it has been treated as distinct from that of reprisals. In oral proceedings at
the Nuremberg Trial, United States Chief Prosecutor Justice Jackson clearly rejected
the operation of the principle of reciprocity in relation to the law of war obligations
applicable during the course of World War II, while nevertheless conceding the
theoretical admissibility of reprisals."97 The term "reciprocity" may be understood in
its broadest sense to refer to any state of interdependence between the obligations
owed by respective participants within the international legal order,1198 and hence, in
this broad sense, reprisals may be an example of "reciprocity". But reciprocity in its
strictest sense - sometimes referred to as the "condition of reciprocity", or known
more formally as inadimplenti non est adimplendum - refers to only one aspect of
this broad conception of reciprocity; namely that rule of the law of treaties which
permits one State to suspend or terminate its treaty obligations upon the material
(Pictet (1952), p. 25).
"',;i Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 51; Article 60, Vienna Convention.
1196 See discussion of "reciprocity", above.
1197 Trial of theMajor War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14
November 1945-1 October 1946, IMT, Nuremberg, 1947-49, vol. 9, p. 187:
If Your Honour please, I believe it is a well-established principle of international law
that a violation on one side does not excuse or warrant violations on the other side.
There is, of course, a doctrine of reprisal, but it is clearly not applicable here, in any
basis that has been shown.
1198 See Provost (1994), p. 383.
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breach of another State. js onjy reciprocity in this strict sense that is ousted by
Article 1(1) of Protocol I or common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Although Trial Chamber I in its Rule 61 decision in Prosecutor v Martic
limited itself to a consideration of the admissibility of reprisals against the civilian
population or individual civilians in any armed conflict,1200 its reasoning - resting at
least in part on the obligation to respect and to ensure respect for the Geneva
Conventions "in all circumstances" - implicates reprisals against any persons and
objects protected by the Geneva Conventions. It further implicates reprisals against
any persons or objects protected by Protocol I (due to the identical language in
Article 1(1)), and any persons or objects falling under the protection of provisions
similarly worded. Trial Chamber I noted, for instance, that a prohibition on reprisals
against civilians must be inferred from Article 4 of Protocol II which, while not
incorporating a provision equivalent to Article 1(1) of Protocol I or common Article
1 of the Geneva Conventions, nevertheless prohibits a catalogue of atrocities against
all persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities
"at any time and in any place whatsoever".1201
1202The Martic decision, as with all Rule 61 decisions, " should be
followed only with the utmost caution. Rule 61 of the ICTY's Rules of Procedure
and Evidence creates a procedure which may be employed in cases where attempts to
execute a warrant of arrest have been frustrated, due for e.g. to the failure of the State
in which the accused is located to cooperate with the Tribunal or the unkown
whereabouts of the accused.1203 The procedure involves a public hearing to examine
the evidence against the accused in order to reconfirm the indictment.1204 The
irregular nature of the Rule 61 apparatus (serving a largely pedagogic function,
1199 Id., p. 383, n. 1.
1200 See Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-R61. Trial Chamber I, Review of the
Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 8 March 1996. pars 15-17.
1201 Id., par. 16.
12,12 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY and ICTR both contain a Rule 61 procedure
that may be followed in the case of failure to execute a warrant (see Rule 61. International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as amended up to and
including the amendment of 11 March 2005, UN Doc, IT/32/Rev.34 (2005) (hereinafter ICTY Rules
of Procedure and Evidence); Rule 61, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, as amended up to and including the amendment of 15 May 2004, UN Doc. ITR/3/Rev.6
(2004)).
12113 Rule 61, ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
1204 Rule 61(B)-(C), id.
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intended to highlight the atrocities alleged against the accused)1205 leads to a decision
which lacks both precedential value and authoritative weight. As defence counsel are
barred from participation in the proceedings,1201' the decision is arrived at through a
non-adversarial process within a system that is otherwise, largely adversarial.1207 The
transcript of the Rule 61 proceedings in Martic indicates that minimal substantive
discussion took place on the question of the law relating to reprisals.1208 Had defence
counsel been present (and had they considered the defence of reprisals as potentially
exculpatory in relation to their client) they may have raised points going to the
legality of reprisals which were completely ignored, both at the oral stage and in the
decision itself.
The Trial Chamber's decision in Martic - both as to the narrower claim
concerning the inadmissibility of reprisals against civilians in any armed conflict, as
well as to the wider implication indicated above - is in any event, obiter. In
proceedings brought under Rule 61 of the ICTY's Rules of Procedure, the trial
chamber must test whether there are "reasonable grounds" for believing that the
accused has committed one or more of the crimes charged in the indictment.1"09 In
his Separate Opinion in the Rule 61 decision in Prosecutor v. Rajic, Judge Sidhwa
stated that Rule 61 proceedings are somewhat akin to committal proceedings in
l2lb In the Rule 61 decision in Prosecutor v. Rajic, the Trial Chamber stated that Rule 61 proceedings
"are a public reminder than an accused is wanted for serious violations of international humanitarian
law. They also offer the victims of atrocities the opportunity to be heard and create a historical record
of the manner in which they were treated." (Prosecutor v Ivica Rajic, Case No. IT-95-12-R61, Trial
Chamber. Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 13
September 1996, par. 2); see, also, id.. Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa, par. 9.
120>
See, e.g., Prosecutor v Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, Case Nos IT-95-5 and IT-95-18,
Trial Chamber I, Decision Rejecting the Request Submitted by Mr. Medvene and Mr. Hanley III
Defence Counsels for Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, 5 July 1996, in which the Trial Chamber
rejected the request of Karadzic's defence counsels to be present continuously in the courtroom during
the Rule 61 proceedings and to have free access to the documents and case-files submitted by the
Prosecutor. The Chamber stated instead that the counsels should be escorted to the public gallery
where they could sit in reserved seating as observers throughout the proceedings. The Chamber
considered that only once the accused appeared before the Tribunal would "the nature of the
proceedings change and become inter partes, accompanied with the guarantees inherent in an
equitable trial".
1217 In Rule 61 proceedings, the Prosecutor makes submissions of law and fact prejudicial to the
accused in the same manner in which this may occur at trial.
1208 See Prosecutor v Martic, Case No IT-95-11, Transcript of hearing, 27 February 1996.
121)9 Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-R61, Trial Chamber I, Review of the Indictment
Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 8 March 1996, pp. 42-3.
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certain national jurisdictions.1210 With the possible exception of certain general
threats, issued by the Republic of Serbian Krajina, to target civilians in the event of a
Croatian attack,1211 there was no evidence before the Chamber that the legal
preconditions for reprisals had been met. This in itself would have been sufficient
cause to confirm the indictment. Further, while the prosecution pointed to the initial
Croatian attack as spurning the accused's retaliatory response, they did not raise any
evidence of a single violation of the law of armed conflict by Croatia.1"1" Although
evidence indicated that the accused had characterised the attack as an act of
"aggression"',1"13 it is undisputed that jus ad bellum violations do not give rise to the
right to reprisals.1214 The discussion of reprisals was therefore not merely
hypothetical, but related to a defence which was wholly unsupported on the facts.
In the event that the reasoning in Martic comes to be accepted in the
jurisprudence of international law, it might be pointed out that the duty to respect and
ensure respect for the Conventions and Protocol I "'in all circumstances" cannot
relate to those provisions which are not binding, either as a result of non-ratification
or accession to the treaty, or by virtue of an existing reservation. The ICJ, in the
Nicaragua case held the obligation in Article 1 common to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 to derive not merely from the Conventions themselves, "but from the general
principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions merely give
expression".1215 That was stated in the context of a decision in which the Court was
prepared to accept a broad identity of content between the Geneva Conventions and
customary law.1216 It is significant that the ICJ in that case was silent about the
corresponding duty, to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances, in Protocol I.
Where the primary conventional obligation is not binding as a matter of customary
1210 Prosecutor v. Rajic, Case No. IT-95-12-R61, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 13 September 1996, Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa, par. 9; see,
also, Jones & Powles (2003), par. 8.4.132.
1211 See Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-R61, Trial Chamber I, Review of the
Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 8 March 1996, Transcript of
hearing, 27 February 1996, pp. 35-38.
1212 See id.
1213 Id., p. 51.
1214 See above.
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US)
(Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, par. 220.
1216
See, e.g.. id., pars. 218, 220.
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In order to assess the admissibility of reprisals as a defence to war crimes under
Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute, it is necessary to establish (1) that reprisals
constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under the applicable law set
forth in Article 21 of the ICC Statute; and (2) that no discretionary barrier operates to
prevent the admissibility of the defence. Whether or not both elements are satisfied
must be determined in light of the interpretative criteria that govern the interpretation
of the ICC Statute and its applicable law.
i. APPLICABLE LAW
Reprisals are an institution of customary international law which have been outlawed
in certain circumstances by treaty,1217 and limited generally, both in terms of the
conditions precedent to their lawful use and the manner of their use, by customary
law.12ltS There are also suggestions that the legality of reprisals may be governed, in
addition, by general principles of law1219 and the laws of "humanity".1220 It is
necessary to determine which sources of law governing reprisals belong to the
applicable law of the ICC Statute, and whether and how they are to be applied in
light of the hierarchy of sources set out in Article 21 of the Statute.
The defence of reprisals is not expressly provided for in the ICC Statute,
the Elements of Crimes or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (the first tier of
applicable law under Article 21 of the ICC Statute);1221 nor may the doctrine of
reprisals be located in "general principles of law derived by the Court from national
laws of legal systems of the world" (i.e. the third tier of applicable law).1222 Reprisals






Art. 21(l)(a), ICC Statute.
1222
Art. 21(1)(C), ICC Statute.
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an institution governing the relations between States inter se.1 23 Although it is true
• • 1224
that the right to reprisals is enunciated in a number of national military manuals, ~
and acts by military personnel contrary to the rules regarding reprisals may be
punished by national military authorities exercising domestic jurisdiction,122"
nevertheless, such national laws are invariably only a reflection of the State's
international law obligations.1226 The admissibility of the defence of reprisals under
Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute depends, therefore, upon the particular reprisal
measure being justified under that law deriving from the second tier of applicable
law under Article 21 of the ICC Statute, namely "applicable treaties and the
principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the
international law of armed conflict",1227 a formulation which includes customary
international law.1228 Indeed, the legality of reprisals as a ground excluding criminal
(as well as delictual) responsibility is clearly recognised under customary law.1229
The question is, however, to what extent is the defence of reprisals limited, or even
excluded altogether, by competing sources of applicable law?
1. The First Tier of Applicable Law
The formulation of the hierarchy in Article 21 of the ICC Statute ("in the first place",
"in the second place" and "failing that") may imply that the ICC is to apply the ICC
Statute as written, as well as the Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (at least to the extent that the latter two do not conflict with the Statute),123
and only in the case of ambiguity or a lacuna is the Court to proceed to the additional
sources located in the second and third tier of applicable law. If this is what is
implied by Article 21 of the ICC Statute, then it may be that there is no room for a
defence of reprisals. Reprisals, after all, do not purport to derive their legality from
any ambiguity or lacunae in the terms of customary or treaty-based provisions in




1226 See. e.g.. US Field Manual No. 27-10, where each prescription cites international law authority.
1227 Art. 21(l)(b), ICC Statute.
122s See above.
1229 See above.
1230 Art. 9(3), ICC Statute; Art. 51(5), ICC Statute.
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law is clear and unambiguous. It could be argued, therefore, that the hierarchy of
applicable law under Article 21 of the ICC Statute extinguishes the legality of
reprisals by giving primacy to the terms of the Statute (and the obligations described
therein) over any competing rights (or exceptions) located in inferior sources of
applicable law, such as customary international law. Nevertheless, as indicated
above, second and third tier sources of applicable law may operate by way of
clarification, or even exception, to the terms of the ICC Statute.1^1 A relevant
defence which is located in the second or third tier of applicable law, and admitted
under Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute, is effectively given primacy over that part of
the ICC Statute which enumerates and defines the relevant crime. Given that Article
31(3) of the ICC Statute expressly provides for non-enumerated grounds excluding
criminal responsibility, the application of any such defence (or exception) to the
terms of the Statute must be considered as consistent with the terms of the Statute
itself, and therefore consistent with the requirement, under Article 21 of the ICC
Statute, that the Statute and its related instruments be applied "[i]n the first place". In
particular, it should be noted that nowhere does the ICC Statute expressly exclude
the admissibility of reprisals (something one would expect if that was what was
intended by those involved in the negotiating and drafting process). The travaux
preparatoires in fact indicates that reprisals were considered as a potential defence:
The Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court
established a Working Group whose mandate involved the preparation of guidelines
• ... io'P
for the consideration of the question of general principles of criminal law. " The
guidelines in their final form comprised a point-form list of relevant matters to be
discussed by the Committee, and they expressly suggest the possibility of a defence
of reprisals.1233 By leaving open the possibility of raising defences not expressly
provided for, those who negotiated and drafted Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute must
have had reprisals in mind as one of the very defences which could potentially be
raised. The effect of Article 31(3) is to provide a Statutory basis for applying the
1231 See above.
1232
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN
GAOR, 50lh Sess., Supp. No. 22, UN Doc. A/50/22 (1995), par. 9.
1233 Id., Annex II, p. 60.
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lesser (customary) norms providing for reprisals, at least potentially,1234
notwithstanding its direct opposition to the Statutory provisions on crimes.
2. The Third Tier of Applicable Law
The third tier of applicable law consists of general principles of law derived from
national laws of the legal systems of the world.1235 It was concluded above that if
international law recognises a species of '"general principles" derived, not from
principles of municipal law, but rather, from legal conscience generally, then that
species of general principles must be applicable under the second tier of applicable
1236 • • •law under the ICC Statute. " If'"humanity" is a source of international law, it may
well be that it belongs to this second-tier species of general principles of law.
It is sometimes suggested that the right to resort to reprisals derives
1 977
axiomatically from the decentralised nature of the international community. The
right to reprisals is thereby conceived as a general principle of law; it continues only
so long as the international community remains devoid of an effective central
mechanism aimed at enforcing the law of armed conflict. If this is truly the
theoretical basis of reprisals in international law, then the right to reprisals would
disintegrate upon the creation of the ICC, assuming that the ICC was an effective law
enforcement mechanism. It may be difficult to assess whether what is described here
is a general principle of law derived from national laws of legal systems of the world,
or whether it is, instead, a general principle derived from legal conscience generally.




See, e.g., Kalshoven (1971), p. 10: "to deny the status of reprisals as an institution of international
law can hardly be correct, in view of the uncommonly high degree of decentralization which
characterizes international society to the present day and which must needs be reflected in
international law, if only by the recognition for the time being of a legal power of the States, as the
decentralized authoritative power units, to act unilaterally in defence of their rights and of the
international legal order."; The ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan
Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-
16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, stated that: "...while reprisals could have had a
modicum of justification in the past, when they constituted practically the only effective means of
compelling the enemy to abandon unlawful acts of warfare and to comply in future with international
law, at present they can no longer be justified in this manner. A means of inducing compliance with
international law is at present more widely available and, more importantly, is beginning to prove
efficacious: the prosecution and punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity by national or
international courts." (par. 530).
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As reprisals are an institution of the international law of armed conflict, they do not
form a part of municipal law except to the extent that national military laws and
regulations reflect or incorporate the international law of armed conflict. Thus, if it is
indeed a principle of law that the legality of reprisals ceases upon the creation of an
effective central mechanism aimed at ensuring compliance with the law of armed
conflict, this is not a principle which finds any counterpart in national laws.
Nevertheless, it may be that this principle is merely a concrete reflection of more
abstract principles, relating generally to self-help mechanisms, applicable under
national laws. It may be, for instance, a general principle of law deriving from
national laws of the legal systems of the world, that measures of self-help such as
self-defence or the right of abnegation, may be employed only to the extent that there
is no effective, available, centralised law enforcement mechanism capable of
enforcing law in the circumstances. It is more likely, however, that where there are
alternatives to self-help this is merely a factual consideration to be taken into account
in determining whether self-help was employed, in the context of the concrete case,
as a measure of last-resort.123lS The right to self-defence in interpersonal relations, for
example, continues to exist in the legal systems of the world, despite the near
universal existence of domestic police forces and municipal courts.
In any event, while it is true that the institution of public reprisals arose
amid the disappearance of centralised authority,1239 the current legal basis of reprisals
lies in customary international law.1240 As such, the institution of reprisals will
remain in place until it falls into desuetude, or is otherwise repealed by treaty or
subsequent custom. The existence of the ICC will however, impact upon the
availability of reprisals in that the existence of the ICC is another factor to be taken
into account in assessing the rule of subsidiarity. If reprisals are subsidiary to all
other effective sanctions, then was sufficient opportunity given to having the ICC
address the matter? Was it necessary in light of the existence of the ICC to resort to
reprisals? These are factual questions to be answered in the context of each particular
case. It is unlikely, however, that the existence of the ICC could lead to the
l22x
See, e.g., Ashworth (1999), p. 138.
I23'; Kalshoven (1971), p. 3.
12411
Greenspan (1959), p. 408; Kalshoven (1971). p. 3; Bristol (1979), p. 397; Greenwood (1989a). p.
39; Tucker (1972), p. 587.
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conclusion that there is an absence of subsidiarity in each and every case. First, it
may be necessary to engage in immediate corrective action, especially where the
enemy's violation results in decisive gains on their part;1241 and secondly, the
effectiveness of the ICC in terms of its deterrent capacity is not something that can
simply be assumed.1242 Despite the successes of the ICTY and ICTR. for instance, in
securing a number of high-level prosecutions,1243 there are indications that the
presence of those tribunals has had only a limited deterrent effect in securing wide¬
spread compliance with the law of armed conflict.1244
3. The Battleground for Reprisals: The Second Tier of Applicable Law
The second tier of applicable law under Article 21 of the ICC Statute includes
customary international law, '"applicable" treaties, and to the extent, if any. that they
are recognised as sources of international law, general principles of law derived from
legal conscience generally (as opposed to municipal law).1242 Within the second tier
of applicable law, one finds rules and principles justifying reprisals, regulating the
general recourse to reprisals, and prohibiting reprisals, either against specific classes
of persons and property protected under the law of armed conflict, or, according to
certain authorities, against all classes of persons and property protected under the
law of armed conflict. As concluded above, the ICC is duty-bound to arrive, where
possible, at a concrete and final determination of the law in relation to any issue that
genuinely presents itself, taking cognisance, in such determination, of those rules
and principles that belong to the applicable law. Thus, just as the ICC must admit the
defence of reprisals where the reprisal measure is justified under customary law
1241 See the statements of M. Girard for the French delegation in Main Committee I at the Geneva
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977), CDDH/I/SR.46, pars 15-27, reprinted in Official Records,
vol. IX, p. 55 (discussed in Nahlik (1978), p. 53).
1242 See Almond (1980), p. 197, noting that "the law ofwar cannot be readily enforced, particularly
during combat, nor illegal actions deterred, except by reprisals." See, also, Albrecht (1953), p. 613.
1-43
See, e.g., Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54 (before the ICTY).
1244 See P. Akhavan, "Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia?", (1999) 20 Human
Rights Quarterly 737; D. Wippmann, "'Atrocities, Deterrence and the Limits of International Justice",
(1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal 473; M.M. Penrose, "Lest We Fail: The Importance of
Enforcement in International Criminal Law", (2000) 15 American University International Law
Review 321; see, also, M.L. Sinidt, "The ICC: An Effective Means of Deterrence?", (2001) 167
Military Law Review 156.
I24> See above.
273
(notwithstanding that the ICC Statute, on its face, criminalises the conduct in
question), equally, where the right to reprisals is restricted by any one rule or
principle of applicable law, that restriction must be given effect, and the defence of
reprisals will not be admissible to the extent that it is contrary to the restriction in
question.1246 The question is, however, which restrictions on the right to reprisals fall
within the applicable law of the ICC Statute, and how are these restrictions to be
interpreted for the purpose of application?
The restrictions on reprisals discussed in Part II of this thesis (including
general limitations on the preconditions to, and exercise of, reprisals, as well as
outright prohibitions on their use) derive from customary international law, treaties
and the principles of "humanity". A fourth possible source of restrictions, namely
general principles of law derived from municipal law, has been discussed above
within this conclusion. Restrictions located in customary international law clearly
belong to the applicable law of the ICC Statute.1247 In relation to restrictions located
in treaty form only, it is only those derived from "applicable" treaties which belong
to the applicable law of the ICC.124S There has been some discussion in Part I of this
thesis as to the possible meanings of "applicable" treaties under the second tier of
applicable law. Whatever is meant by the phrase "applicable" treaties, in its widest
sense the term could include any treaty which is in force and governs the conduct of
the parties in question qua treaty law. There may be some question, in light of the
principle nullum crimen sine lege, as to whether the proper interpretation of the term
"applicable" treaties should be a wide or a narrow one. It is probably fair to conclude
that the wider the class of "applicable" treaties, the greater the extent of obligations
accruing to any one belligerent or individual. In this sense, a narrower interpretation
of the phrase "applicable" treaties would probably be in the best interest of any one
defendant. On the other hand, one cannot rule out the possibility that one or more
treaties could set out provisions which are beneficial to a defendant appearing before
the ICC, whether exculpatory in nature or beneficial in some other sense. The ICTY
has taken a wide view of the treaties (applicable qua treaty law) which may be
1246 This follows from the principle of international law, lex posterior derogat priori.
1247 See above.
,24fi Art. 21(1 )(b). ICC Statute.
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applied by the ICTY.1-49 jn fact there has been judicial consideration by the ICTY on
the question of the applicability of reprisal prohibitions (express and implied) located
in treaty law. In its Judgment in Prosecutor v Kupreskic, the ICTY Trial Chamber
held (in obiter) that whatever the customary status of the prohibition on reprisals,
reprisals against civilians in the context of the attack on Ahmici were prohibited as a
matter of treaty law on the basis that in 1993 both Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina had ratified Additional Protocol I and II, in addition to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949.1250 Thus no defence of reprisals would have been admissible.
While it may be fair to assert that the principle contra proferentem requires a narrow
view of the meaning of "applicable" treaties under Article 21 of the ICC Statute, it
would be open to the ICC to conclude, in light of the jurisprudence of the ICTY in
particular, that there was no doubt that remained to be resolved, and that "applicable"
treaties includes any treaty in force and applicable in the context qua treaty law. Thus
a particular reprisal prohibition located in treaty form and binding only qua treaty
law would, on this view, provide a basis for denying to an individual, who belonged
to the armed forces of a party to that treaty, the right to rely on any defence of
reprisals where the reprisal measure was contrary to the prohibition in question.
On the question of limitations on reprisals purportedly derived from the
principles of '"humanity", here there may be some real doubt as to whether
"humanity" is a source of applicable law under the ICC Statute. Nevertheless, the
real point of contention must be whether "humanity" is a source of international law
per se. If it is, then it would probably be included within the second tier of applicable
law under the ICC Statute (which extends to "applicable treaties and the principles
and rules of international law").1251
ii. "APPLICABLE" TREATIES / CUSTOMARY LAW
1. Express Prohibitions on Reprisals
1249 See above.
12,0 Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan
Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-I6-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, par.
536.
1251 Art. 21(l)(b), ICC Statute.
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There are, as indicated in Chapter 5 above, prohibitions on reprisals against certain
targets, set out in a number of treaties currently in force. Express prohibitions are
located in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,1252 the 1954 Hague Cultural
Property Convention,1253 Additional Protocol I of 1977,1254 and the Mines Protocol
and Amended Mines Protocol annexed to the UN Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons.12:0 While the wide interpretation of "applicable" treaties
outlined above would result in the prohibitions within any one of these treaties being
applied as against a national of a party to the treaty, the prohibition would not be
applicable as against nationals of non-parties unless the prohibition had entered
customary international law. It was argued, in Chapter 6, that the reprisal
prohibitions in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are widely viewed as having
entered customary international law, while there is little, if any, evidential basis for
the assertion that the reprisal prohibitions in the Protocols annexed to the
Conventional Weapons Convention have entered customary law. The position of the
reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I and the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention
is far more contentious.
The difficulty lies in the fact that while the prohibitions in Protocol I and
the 1954 Hague Convention were widely viewed as innovative at the time of their
promulgation (at least to the extent that they added to those prohibitions located in
the Geneva Conventions of 1949), no significant body of State practice has emerged,
outside of compliance with treaty norms, to indicate that reprisals no longer form
part of the lawful methods of warfare.1256 A number of significant military powers
are not party to Protocol I, and the right to reprisals is expressly maintained in certain
military manuals and in reservations to the Protocol.1-57 The position of reprisals is
thus wholly different to that of torture or genocide where, although such acts may
continue to be perpetrated by some States,1258 the official position of each State is a
repudiation of the legality of such acts.1259 While the requirements for the emergence









of customary law may no longer be as stringent within the practice of international
law today (as compared with the position under the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases), nevertheless, there must remain a pressing and real doubt as to whether the
reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I and the 1954 Hague Convention can be viewed as
having attained customary status. Even if we accept that the elements of customary
law may now more readily be evinced by official statements and documents, or that
the practice of States in conformity with treaty obligations may be viewed as
"practice" for the purpose of ascertaining the customary status of those same
obligations, there are still significant difficulties in reaching the conclusion that the
reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I and the 1954 Hague Convention have entered
customary law.1260 The only basis for such a conclusion would be to adopt a wholly
radical view of the requirements of customary law, for e.g., the conclusion that
humanitarian treaties act as legislative platforms, transmitting their content into
customary law by virtue of the necessity of solving global problems or their
"humanitarian and civilizing" function.1261 Any such conclusion is precluded under
the ICC Statute by virtue of the principle nullum crimen sine lege. Such reasoning
appears violative of that corollary of nullum crimen sine lege prohibiting the
retroactive application of criminal law: To dramatically alter the basis of one of the
sources of international law is to effectively create a new source of international law,
and thus a new branch of obligation. In any event, such reasoning could hardly be
supported on any juridical basis. As argued in Chapter 6 above, if it can be
established that international courts or tribunals are prepared to find for the existence
of norms of customary law without engaging in the type of rigorous analysis
mandated in the North Sea Continental ShelfCases, then the reasoning behind that is
likely to be based on a more expansive or inclusive approach to the assessment of the
elements of customary law, for e.g. through an assessment of official
pronouncements and documents, or practice pursuant to treaty obligations, in the
determination of the presence of State practice. Where there are contrary indications
of State practice (for e.g., assertions of the legality of certain conduct in military
manuals, or - where practice pursuant to treaty obligations is considered in the




be concluded that a particular treaty provision has entered customary law merely
because of the significant number of parties to the provision. While international
courts and tribunals may today adopt a less rigorous approach to the determination of
customary norms than that suggested in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
especially in the context of humanitarian law obligations, the conflation of treaty-
based obligations and customary law does not fit within any predictable trajectory of
juridical reasoning. Thus any such approach violates the requirements of specificity
(a corollary of nullum crimen sine lege).l2b2 In addition, the existence of contrary
indications of State practice must create some real doubt as to whether the treaty-
based provision can be considered binding as customary law. Thus, conflating treaty
and customary law in such circumstances would appear to be precluded by the
principle contra proferentem. Stripping away the demarcating lines between the
elements of treaty law and the elements of customary law involves a multi-faceted
violation of the principle nullum crimen sine lege, in that the corollaries of non-
retroactivity, specificity and contra proferentem are each likely to be contravened.
If the reprisal prohibitions in Protocol I and the 1954 Hague Convention
are binding only as a matter of treaty law, then a number of reprisal measures would,
at least potentially, remain lawful when conducted by agents of States not party to
those conventions. Neither Protocol I nor the 1954 Hague Convention offer any
express protection against reprisals to persons or objects in non-international armed
conflicts, or, in the case of international armed conflicts, to persons or objects at sea,
in the air or outer space, or to other persons entitled only to the Fundamental
Guarantees under Article 75 of Protocol I.
2. Implied Prohibitions on Reprisals
The view has been expressed by some authorities that reprisals are impliedly
prohibited, either generally or as against particular enumerated targets, by virtue of
certain provisions in the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, and Protocols I and II of 1977. It has been suggested that
reprisals are prohibited by virtue of the prohibition on collective punishment which
1262 See above.
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features in the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907, Geneva Convention IV and
Protocols I and II.1263 It has also been suggested that reprisals are prohibited against
all persons and objects receiving any protection under the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and Protocol I of 1977 by virtue of the requirement to respect these
conventions "in all circumstances".1264 A similar argument could be put in relation to
the "fundamental guarantees" in Article 4 of Protocol II which provides, inter alia,
that all persons hors de combat shall "in all circumstances be treated humanely",126"'
and that such persons are entitled to protections against certain enumerated acts
which "shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever".1266
a. The Prohibition on Collective Punishment
It was concluded in Chapter 7 above that prohibitions on collective punishment have
historically been enacted without prejudice to the right to reprisals, and that, in any
event, as reprisals are an exception to extant provisions of the law of armed conflict
the prohibition on collective punishment would be equally open to exception in the
case of reprisals.1267 Some confusion may have been produced by a number of
decisions of national military tribunals in the aftermath of World War II (acting
pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10) which adjudged a number of "reprisal"
measures according, inter alia, to whether they abided by Article 50 of the Hague
Regulations of 1899 and 1907 (concerning the prohibition on collective
punishment).1268 Those decisions nevertheless indicate that reprisals stricto sensu are
not restricted by the prohibition on collective punishment to any extent.1269
Collective "punishment" would appear to relate to the imposition of
certain measures against civilians for a punitive purpose. The requirement, for the
purpose of the crime, of some purpose or animus behind the imposition of any
measure adversely affecting civilians or the civilian population is supported by the
12f'3 Art. 50, Hague Regulations of 1907; Art. 33, Geneva Convention IV; Art. 75, Protocol I; Art. 4,
Protocol II. See, also, Art. 46, Hague Regulations of 1907 (discussed in Chapter 7 above).
1264 Art. 1 common to Geneva Conventions I-IV; Art. 1(1), Protocol I.
1265 Art. 4(1). Protocol II.





fact that Article 33 of Geneva Convention IV prohibits "[collective penalties and
likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism".1270 Reprisals, however, may
never be imposed for a punitive purpose and thus reprisals are, strictly speaking, not
acts of collective "punishment''. To assimilate reprisals to collective punishment is to
engage in a form of analogical reasoning prohibited by the principle nullum crimen
sine lege. At the crucial level of purpose or animus, reprisals and collective
punishments are entirely distinct. It is only facial similarity that leads to the
conclusion that reprisals are a form of collective punishment. It could be argued,
however, that "collective punishment" should not be viewed in any narrow or literal
sense, and that it should extend to the imposition of any form of sanction affecting
civilians. The ICRC's Commentary on Protocol II certainly suggests such an
P71
approach. It could therefore be argued that treating reprisals as a form of
collective punishment is not to engage in analogical reasoning at all, but rather
follows from juridical reasoning following in turn from an evolutive process in the
accepted meaning of "collective punishment". The problem with this view, however,
is that there is a paucity of judicial consideration of "collective punishment" in the
jurisprudence of the contemporary international criminal tribunals.1272 One would be
hard-pressed, therefore, to identify the trajectory of juridical reasoning according to
which collective punishment has moved from a category that was considered to be
unrelated, and without prejudice, to the right to reprisals, to the position where the
prohibition on collective punishment in fact prohibits reprisals. To treat the
prohibition on collective punishment as a prohibition on reprisals therefore entails a
violation of the requirement of specificity: There is no predictable trajectory of
juridical reasoning involved. For the same reason, it could not be asserted in good
faith that there was no doubt that the prohibition on collective punishment entails a
prohibition on reprisals. The requirement of contra proferentem would preclude such
a conclusion.
b. "In All Circumstances " andAnalogous Provisions
12711 Art. 33, Geneva Convention IV.
1271 Sandoz et al. (1987), par. 4536.
1272 See, e.g., Jones & Powles (2003), par. 4.2.523.
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As indicated in Chapter 7 above, the ICTY Trial Chamber I in its Rule 61 decision in
Prosecutor v Martic adopted the view that the requirement to abide by the terms of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 '"in all circumstances" entails a refutation of the
127^
right to engage any reprisal measure contrary to the terms of those Conventions. " *
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Protocol I includes an identical provision, and an analogous provision may be
found within the "fundamental guarantees" of Protocol II.127:1 This is certainly an
innovative approach to the question of the legality of reprisals. It is, however, an
entirely unhistorical approach. The argument not only finds no support within the
travaux preparatoires of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, but it is directly at
odds with the drafting history of those Conventions and with the understanding of
States as to the obligations they were adopting under those Conventions.1270 The
obligation to respect the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I "in all circumstances"
operates to overturn the doctrine of reciprocity stricto sensu, but to go further and
assert that it overturns the right to engage reprisals is to conflate the doctrines of
reciprocity and reprisals, which, in their strict senses, are entirely distinct.1277 The
question for our purposes is whether the reasoning adopted in the Rule 61 decision in
Prosecutor v Martic may permissibly be adopted by the ICC: Does it, in any sense,
violate the principle nullum crimen sine legel
One must start, here, with the requirement of strict construction. It has
been concluded above that the principles relating to strict construction apply only
177c .
where there is no ambiguity in the terms of a provision. The requirement to
respect and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I "in all
circumstances" appears to entail some level of ambiguity. It is ambiguous, for
instance, as to whether the requirement ousts all, or certain, defences (whether
criminal or delictual) to violations of the terms of the Conventions, and, if so, which
defences.
1273 See above.
1274 Art. 1(1), Protocol I.





In the case of ambiguity, the relevant interpretative criterion is contra
proferentem}219 As indicated in Chapter 2 above, there may be some confusion as to
how the rule contra proferentem is to be applied. The ICTY Trial Chamber in
Prosecutor v Delalic suggested that it is only where '"an equivocal word or
ambiguous sentence leaves a reasonable doubt of its meaning which the canons of
construction fail to solve" that the benefit of the doubt should be given to the
accused.1280 One could assert that the effect of this is to relegate contra proferentem
to an interpretative criterion of last resort, and that one must apply all other
interpretative criteria first (such as those in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties); only if the law is still unclear or uncertain is the court to interpret the law
contra proferentem. It is fair to conclude, however, that this is not what was intended
by the ICTY Trial Chamber. Given the prohibition on non liquet in international
law,128' it would appear that the "canons of construction" will always lead to a result
one way or another. The above passage of the ICTY Trial Chamber appears,
therefore, to suggest that one must attempt to interpret international penal provisions
according to the ordinary canons of construction (presumably those located in the
Vienna Convention), but that each canon applied must point, without any reasonable
doubt, to a particular meaning - and that if the canons of construction do not point to
a concrete result at that high threshold of "[no] reasonable doubt", then any
remaining reasonable doubt must be interpreted contra proferentem. Contra
proferentem is therefore to be applied simultaneously with other canons of
construction applicable under international law, with the effect that each canon is to
be applied only to the extent that it produces a clear, certain result, free of reasonable
doubt. Thus, one would only adopt, for e.g., the "'ordinary meaning [of] the terms of
the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose",1282 if such an
enquiry produced a single clear result, free of reasonable doubt. Nevertheless,
whether there is "doubt" remaining after the attempted application of any canon of
construction is not, in itself, a question that necessarily produces an unequivocal
answer. In fact it may leave some scope for the application of discretion in the
127y See above.
1280 Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T.
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 413.
1281 See above.
1282
Art. 31(1), Vienna Convention.
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interpretation of penal provisions. For instance, in DPP v Ottewell, Lord Reid stated,
in relation to the meaning of s. 37(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, that:
The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) refer to the well-established
principle that in doubtful cases a penal provision ought to be given that
interpretation which is least unfavourable to the accused. I would never
seek to diminish in any way the importance of that principle within its
proper sphere. But it only applies where after a full enquiry and
consideration one is left in real doubt. It is not enough that the provision
is ambiguous in the sense that it is capable of having two meanings. The
imprecision of the English language (and, so far as I am aware, of any
other language) is such that it is extremely difficult to draft any provision
which is not ambiguous in that sense. This section is clearly ambiguous in
that sense: the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) attach one meaning to
it, and your Lordships are attaching a different meaning to it. But if, after
full consideration, your Lordships are satisfied, as I am, that the latter is
the meaning which Parliament must have intended the words to convey,
then this principle does not prevent us from giving effect to our
conclusions.128'1
Similarly, in an earlier House of Lords decision, Kirkness v John Hudson & Co. Ltd,
Viscount Simonds stated that:
It would have been easy then to say that, since judicial opinion differed as
to the meaning of these words, there was such an ambiguity as to justify
recourse to a later Act to resolve it. But the decision of this House was
unanimously to the contrary. That means that each one of us has the task
of deciding what the relevant words mean. In coming to that decision he
will necessarily give great weight to the opinion of others, but if at the
end of the day he forms his own clear judgment and does not think that
the words are "fairly and equally open to divers meanings" he is not
entitled to say that there is an ambiguity. For him at least there is no
ambiguity and on that basis he must decide the case.1284
The question of the existence of '"doubt" therefore appears to be treated as a
subjective question, rather than an objective one. The question is not (at least in the
two decisions cited immediately above) one of ambiguity in the objective sense that
two or more authorities differ as to the meaning, but rather a question of personal
conviction or judgement on the part of the decision maker. Nevertheless, that
personal conviction or judgement must be grounded in legal reasoning, and where
there is a paucity of evidence as to the content (or existence) of a customary norm, or
differing opinion as to the meaning of a treaty provision, it may be that no court
could, in good faith, form the conclusion that it was left in no doubt as to the content
1288 DPP v Ottewell [1970] AC 642, p. 649.
1284 Kirkness v John Hudson & Co. Ltd [1955] AC 696, p. 712.
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of the customary norm or the meaning of the treaty provision. It may therefore be
that it is not, in the circumstances, open to a court to decline to apply the rule contra
proferentem. That is certainly the conclusion reached above on the question of
whether the prohibition on collective punishment entails a prohibition on reprisals.
In relation to the reasoning in the Rule 61 decision in Prosecutor v Martic that the
obligation to abide by the Geneva Convention 'in all circumstances" outlaws
reprisals against persons and objects protected by the Geneva Conventions (and. by
implication, Protocol I); the question is whether that is a form of reasoning that
would be precluded by the rule contra proferentem. It has already been objected that
such reasoning is unhistorical and contrary to the travaux preparatoires of the
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I. The two Geneva Conventions of 1929 each
included a provision that the Convention be '"respected by the High Contracting
Parties in all circumstances".128? It was indicated above that this provision was
intended as part of the abolition of the si omnes clause (whereby the convention is
not triggered, or ceases to be binding, where even a single belligerent is not party to
the convention).1286 Nevertheless, the requirement in common Article 1 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and in Article 1(1) of Protocol I to respect the
Conventions and Protocol "in all circumstances" cannot be limited in its effects to
the abolition of the si omnes clause as that is achieved elsewhere in the four Geneva
Conventions and in Protocol I.1287 It is argued above that the requirement now goes
beyond the abolition of the si omnes clause and entails an abolition of reciprocity,
stricto sensu.]288 Yet one may well ask why the requirement only entails an abolition
of reciprocity stricto sensu and not an abolition of other forms of reciprocity such as
reprisals. By what juridical principle is the requirement limited in its effects to one
form of reciprocity only? The answer may well be, by virtue of the intention of the
parties: The suggestion that the parties to Protocol I intended a prohibition, within
Article 1(1) of Protocol I, on reprisals against all persons and property protected by
the Protocol would appear to be directly contradicted by the Protocol's drafting
1239
history. Nevertheless, the intention of the parties at the time of the promulgation






of Protocol I would not necessarily prevent a development, over time, of the
meaning of the obligation to respect the Protocol "in all circumstances", beyond that
originally envisaged by the signatories. Can such a development as that suggested in
the Rule 61 decision in Prosecutor v Martic be said to have occurred without any
doubt? It is probably the case that a fair and objective decision-maker would be left
in some doubt as to whether the words "in all circumstances*' effects an outlawry of
reprisals against all persons and objects protected by the convention. Nevertheless,
as tenuous as the line of reasoning that resulted in that conclusion, it is a conclusion
that is now grounded in the case law of the ICTY.1290 On that basis, it could
theoretically be open to the ICC to conclude that it is left in no doubt that the
obligation to respect the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I "in all circumstances*'
has the effect of outlawing reprisals against all persons and objects protected by the
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I. The existence of such case law would also
appear to satisfy the requirements of specificity, in that any conclusion in line with
that in the Rule 61 decision in Prosecutor v Martic is both accessible and
predictable,1291 notwithstanding the limited precedential value of Rule 61
decisions.1292
iii. THE PRINCIPLES OF "HUMANITY"
There is nothing in terms of modern case-law that provides a clear and unequivocal
statement as to the validity of the principles of "humanity" as a formal source of
international law. It would not, therefore, appear to be open to the ICC to form the
conclusion that it was left in no doubt that "humanity" was such a source and to
criminalise conduct on that basis (for e.g. by denying reprisals as a defence where
those reprisals violated the principles of "humanity"). In fact, to the extent that the
international criminal tribunals have examined the status of "humanity" under
international law, they have formed the conclusion that humanity is not a formal
1292
source of international law. "






The conclusion of this thesis is that it is theoretically open to the ICC to form the
view that reprisals are impliedly prohibited by "applicable" treaties against (1) all
persons and objects protected under the Geneva Conventions including common
Article 3; (2) in relation to agents of States party to Protocol I, all persons and objects
protected by Protocol I; and (3) in relation to agents of States party to Protocol II, all
persons and objects protected under the "fundamental guarantees" in Protocol II.
Nevertheless, it could equally be open to the ICC to form the view that there is some
plausible doubt in relation to these reprisal prohibitions, and thus interpret those
alleged prohibitions contra proferentem. The question of whether the ICC
experiences doubt in its interpretation of the law is to some extent discretionary in
that it is grounded in questions of personal conviction or judgement as to the state of
the law. Nevertheless, that conviction or judgement must be firmly grounded in
juridical reasoning. If the ICC forms the view that there is doubt as to the illegality of
certain reprisal measures (and must therefore interpret the legality of those measures
contra proferentem), is it open to the ICC to deny the defence of reprisals on
discretionary grounds?
There are two potential points at which the ICC could be said to have
discretion in the admissibility of grounds excluding criminal responsibility. Firstly,
Article 31(3) of the ICC Statute states that "the court may consider a ground for
excluding criminal responsibility"1294, indicating, by use of the word "may" an
ostensible grant of discretion. Second, Article 21(l)(b) of the ICC Statute states, in
the context of the applicable law, that the ICC "shall apply...[i]n the second place.
where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international
law...".1295 It could be argued that the appropriateness of the defence of reprisals is
something that could factor into this determination. One of the chief arguments
commonly raised against reprisals is that they are ineffective as sanctions, and that
they provoke counterreprisals, leading to an escalation not only in the level of
1294 Art. 31(3), ICC Statute (emphasis added).
1295 Art. 21(l)(b), ICC Statute (emphasis added).
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violence, but in the extent of violations of the law of armed conflict.1296 The ICTY
Trial Chamber in its Judgment in Kupreskic stated that:
It cannot be denied that reprisals against civilians are inherently a
barbarous means of seeking compliance with international law. The most
blatant reason for the universal revulsion that usually accompanies
reprisals is that they may not only be arbitrary but are also not directed
specifically at the individual authors of the initial violation.12''
Nevertheless, it was concluded in Chapters 1 and 3 above that neither the term
"where appropriate" in Article 21(1 )(b) nor the term "may" in Article 31(3) of the
ICC Statute respectively, is discretionary in nature, and that they are provisions
which must be applied de jure. The inappropriateness, even abhorrence, of certain
defences is not something that can be tabulated in the determination of the
admissibility of that defence, except to the extent that it factors into a factual
determination of whether the defence is made out. The non-discretionary nature of
the admissibility of non-enumerated defences under the ICC Statute is an element of
the principle nullum crimen sine lege. As Justice Robertson stated in his Dissenting
Opinion in the Decision on Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child
Recruitment) in Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman:
There are some European Court of Human Rights decisions which
suggest that [milium crimen sine lege] is primarily a safe-guard against
arbitrary conduct by government. But it is much more than that. It is the
very basis of the rule of law. because it impels governments (in the case
of national law) to take positive action against abhorrent behaviour, or
else that behaviour will go unpunished. It thus provides the rationale for
legislation and for treaties and Conventions - i.e. for a system of justice
rather than an administrative elimination of wrongdoers by command of
those in power. It is the reason why we are ruled by law and not by
police. I2'J'
See Bristol (1979), pp. 427-8; Kalshoven (1990), p. 79.
1297 Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan
Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, par.
528.
12'"' Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Appeals Chamber, Decision
on Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May 2004, Dissenting
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